Justia Juvenile Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court of Nevada addressed whether the provision under NRS 62C.200(1)(b) violates the separation of powers doctrine. This provision requires the district attorney's written approval before a juvenile court may dismiss a delinquency petition and refer a juvenile to informal supervision. The appellant, a juvenile referred to as I.S., was adjudicated a delinquent and placed on formal probation. I.S. appealed, arguing that the provision infringed upon the court's sentencing discretion, essentially granting an unconstitutional prosecutorial veto.The court concluded that I.S.'s appeal was not moot, despite the completion of his juvenile supervision, due to the presumption of collateral consequences of such an adjudication until the juvenile reaches age 18 and/or their juvenile record is sealed.On the main issue, the court held that the requirement under NRS 62C.200(1)(b) does not contravene the separation of powers doctrine. The court reasoned that this provision does not involve a sentencing decision. Rather, the court perceived it as akin to a charging decision, which is within the executive realm. The court further noted that, unlike adult courts, the juvenile court's authority is not derived from the constitution but is limited to the authority expressly prescribed to it by statute. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's order, holding that the requirement for the district attorney's written approval before a juvenile court can dismiss a petition does not violate the separation of powers doctrine. View "In re I.S." on Justia Law

In the Supreme Court of the State of Oregon, the case involved a mother contesting the juvenile court's decision concerning the permanency plan for her child, A. In July 2019, A was made a ward of the court and placed in substitute care under the Department of Human Services (DHS). Despite DHS's efforts, the juvenile court determined that the mother had not made sufficient progress to allow A's safe return home.The mother argued that the juvenile court applied an incorrect legal standard, asserting that she had made significant progress. The court, however, determined that the evidence was legally sufficient to support the juvenile court's conclusion that the mother's progress was inadequate for A’s safe return home.The court held that the juvenile court's "sufficient progress" determination is a legal conclusion rather than a factual finding. It concluded that the record developed in this case was legally sufficient to support the juvenile court's legal conclusion that the mother's progress was insufficient to make possible A's safe return home. As a result, the court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals and the judgment of the juvenile court. View "Dept. of Human Services v. Y. B." on Justia Law

This case arises from a parental rights termination appeal in Texas. The father had been the primary caregiver for his three children, including one-year-old twins and a three-year-old daughter. However, the father tested positive for methamphetamine and the children were removed by the Department of Family and Protective Services due to the father's drug use and homelessness. Although the father initially complied with a service plan, which included drug testing and treatment, he eventually refused further treatment and missed subsequent drug tests. The trial court terminated the father's parental rights, but the court of appeals reversed the decision, arguing that the Department had failed to prove harm to the children as a direct result of their father's drug use.The Supreme Court of Texas disagreed with the court of appeals' interpretation of "endanger" in the context of illegal drug use. It held that a parent's endangering conduct does not need to be directed at the child or result in actual injury to the child. Instead, endangerment encompasses a larger array of conduct that exposes a child to loss or injury, or jeopardizes the child's physical or emotional well-being. The court argued that the father's pattern of drug use, coupled with his homelessness, employment instability, and almost complete abandonment of his children for the six months preceding the trial, posed a substantial risk to the children's emotional well-being. Therefore, legally sufficient evidence supported the trial court's determination that the father's conduct endangered the children. The case was remanded to the court of appeals for a best-interest determination. View "In re R.R.A." on Justia Law

In this case, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania was tasked with interpreting the definition of “nudity” as used in 18 Pa.C.S. § 6321. The case involved a minor, T.Q.B., who encouraged another minor, A.D., to lift her shirt during an Instagram live video. A.D., who has an intellectual disability, exposed the bottom portion of her breasts below the nipple area. The rest of A.D.’s breasts, including the nipple, were covered by a bra. T.Q.B. was charged with transmission of sexually explicit images by a minor, a second-degree misdemeanor under 18 Pa.C.S. § 6321(c). T.Q.B. argued that the nudity element of the statute had not been established because the nipple was not exposed.The trial court adjudicated T.Q.B. delinquent, interpreting the statute to cover the exposure of any part of the breast below the nipple. On appeal, the Superior Court affirmed, determining that the term "nudity" in the statute does not require that the nipple must be exposed for the offense to be committed.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the lower courts' decisions. The court found that the language of Section 6321(g) does not require exposure of the nipple to establish the element of nudity. The court held that nudity is sufficiently established where any area below the top of the nipple is visible. The court concluded that the clear language of the statute and the evidence presented at the adjudication hearing established the nudity requirement, and affirmed the Superior Court’s dispositional order finding the evidence sufficient to support T.Q.B.’s adjudication of delinquency. View "In the Int of: T.Q.B., a Minor; Apl of: T.Q.B." on Justia Law

In this case, F.K. (the Mother) filed a petition challenging the juvenile court's decision to terminate her reunification services and set a selection and implementation hearing regarding her daughter, A.R. The Mother contended that the Santa Barbara County Department of Child Welfare Services (the department) did not adequately consider her grief over the death of A.R.'s twin sister and did not provide reasonable reunification services. She also claimed that six months of services were insufficient.The Mother had a history of untreated alcohol abuse, domestic violence, and criminal convictions related to these issues. The juvenile court ordered her to receive reunification services after finding the dependency petition true and removing A.R. from her custody. The services aimed at addressing her substance abuse and its impact on her ability to safely parent A.R.The juvenile court decided to terminate the reunification services at the six-month review hearing after concluding that the Mother failed to make substantial progress in the court-ordered treatment plan. The court reasoned that it did not have discretion to extend services unless the Mother showed substantial compliance with the case plan. The court also found that the department had made reasonable efforts to return A.R. to the Mother's custody by providing reasonable services.The Court of Appeal agreed with the Mother's contention that the juvenile court erred in terminating the reunification services. The court noted that, at the six-month review, the juvenile court had the discretion to continue the case and forego setting a hearing to terminate parental rights even if it did not find a substantial probability of the child returning to the parent. The court concluded that the juvenile court did not exercise its discretion because it incorrectly believed it was bound to terminate services due to the Mother's lack of substantial progress. The Court of Appeal ordered the juvenile court to conduct a new section 366.21 hearing. View "F.K. v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

In this case conducted by the Supreme Court of Mississippi, the defendant, Keith Montrago Jackson, was charged and convicted of sexual battery and sentenced to life imprisonment. The case stemmed from an incident involving Jackson and his girlfriend's twelve-year-old daughter, Anna. Jackson and Anna went to a store late at night, and upon their return, Jackson sexually assaulted Anna in his truck. Anna reported the incident to her school, and law enforcement was contacted.At trial, Anna testified about the incident and identified Jackson as the perpetrator. Forensic evidence, including sperm cells found in Anna that matched Jackson's DNA, was presented. Jackson testified in his own defense, denying the allegations. However, he was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment.Jackson appealed the conviction, but his appellate counsel found no arguable issues for appellate review. The Court, having independently reviewed the record, also found no arguable issues. The Supreme Court of Mississippi affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "Keith Montrago Jackson a/k/a Keith Jackson v. State of Mississippi" on Justia Law

The case involves a mother appealing against a juvenile court's ruling that she neglected her infant son, AE. The infant was born prematurely and consistently underweight. Despite numerous hospitalizations and health professional instructions, the child's weight did not significantly increase while under the parents' care. However, the child showed substantial weight gain while hospitalized. The State filed a petition alleging that the parents neglected AE by failing to provide adequate care necessary for the child's well-being. The juvenile court ruled in favor of the State concerning the mother, but not the father, due to insufficient evidence against him.The Supreme Court of Wyoming affirmed the lower court's decision. The court found that the evidence of the child's ability to gain weight in a hospital setting versus his home was enough to support the neglect adjudication against the mother. The court stressed that although the mother followed medical instructions and took AE to medical appointments, the child's failure to thrive at home pointed to neglect. This case demonstrates that the courts assess neglect based on the child's well-being and not necessarily on the intent or efforts of the parents. View "In the Interest of A. E. v. The State of Wyoming" on Justia Law

This case before the Indiana Supreme Court concerns a juvenile, A.W., who was adjudicated for possession of a machine gun and dangerous possession of a firearm. The court was asked to determine if these adjudications violated the principle of double jeopardy under Indiana law. A.W. asserted that he did not know the firearm he possessed had been modified to function as a machine gun.The court found that A.W.'s exclusive possession of the modified gun, along with his abrupt flight from police, supported the conclusion that he knowingly or intentionally possessed a machine gun. This satisfied the first part of the court's inquiry.On the issue of double jeopardy, the court noted that while the Indiana Constitution could apply in juvenile proceedings, it avoided deciding that issue. Instead, it focused on whether possession of a dangerous firearm is a lesser-included offense of possession of a machine gun under the test set out in the case Wadle v. State. The court found that it was, meaning A.W.'s adjudications for both offenses violated his rights under the principle of double jeopardy. Therefore, the court affirmed the finding that A.W. knowingly possessed a machine gun but reversed the adjudication that he committed dangerous possession of a firearm. View "A. W. v. State of Indiana" on Justia Law

The case involves a father, J.L., who appealed against orders that declared his children, P.L and L.L, to be dependents of the juvenile court and placed them with their mother, H.T. J.L. also contested the condition of his visitation rights, arguing that the court improperly delegated its visitation authority to the children. The San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency maintained that J.L. forfeited the issue by not raising it at the lower court level.The parents had a child welfare history dating back to 2019, with multiple referrals regarding J.L. physically or emotionally abusing the children. The parents divorced in 2023, and shared custody until an incident occurred where J.L. allegedly punched P.L. The Agency then obtained protective custody warrants for the children. The court placed the children with their mother and ordered liberal supervised visitation for J.L., considering the children's wishes on whether visits would go forward. This order was not objected to by J.L's counsel.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District Division One State of California concurred with the Agency and affirmed the lower court's orders. It held that J.L. forfeited his right to contest the visitation orders by failing to raise the issue at the lower court level. Furthermore, even if the issue was not forfeited, the appellate court found no abuse of discretion by the lower court in allowing the children to decline visiting J.L. The court explained that it was J.L.’s responsibility to request a specific change to the visitation order if he was unhappy with the children's refusal to visit him. View "In re P.L." on Justia Law

This case involves the multiple appeals of a juvenile, Miguel R., who was transferred to criminal court for alleged felonies including murder and second-degree robbery. A juvenile wardship petition alleged that Miguel committed these crimes when he was 17 years old. The juvenile court initially granted the People’s motion to transfer Miguel to criminal court. Miguel appealed this order, but the decision was affirmed. Following the remittitur issue, the juvenile court transferred the matter to criminal court.However, subsequent amendments to section 707 of the Welfare and Institutions Code necessitated a second transfer hearing. The amendments raised the standard of proof to clear and convincing evidence on the issue of whether a juvenile should be transferred. The juvenile court, after considering the statutory changes, again ordered Miguel to be transferred to criminal court based on the conclusion that he was “not amenable to the care, treatment and training programs available through the juvenile court system”. Miguel appealed this order as well, arguing that the juvenile court misapplied the statutory changes and that the prosecution did not carry its burden under the clear and convincing evidence standard.The court of appeal rejected Miguel’s arguments and affirmed the juvenile court's decision. The court held that the juvenile court was not required to give greater weight to any particular statutory criterion in its determination of whether a minor is amenable to rehabilitation. The court also found that substantial evidence supported the juvenile court's findings. Thus, the order transferring Miguel to criminal court was affirmed. View "In re Miguel R." on Justia Law