Justia Juvenile Law Opinion Summaries

A 16-year-old was involved in a fatal shooting and was charged in juvenile court with multiple offenses, including aggravated murder and having a weapon while under a disability. After a probable cause hearing, the Juvenile Division of the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas found probable cause for several offenses but not for the weapon under disability charge. As required by law, the court transferred the case to adult court for prosecution of the offenses for which probable cause was found.Once in adult court, a grand jury indicted the defendant on all the original charges from the juvenile complaint plus additional charges, including attempted murder and new counts related to other alleged victims and conduct. The defendant pleaded guilty to murder (an offense for which probable cause had been found), having a weapon while under a disability (for which the juvenile court found no probable cause), and attempted murder (which had not been charged in the juvenile complaint). The trial court sentenced him accordingly.The defendant appealed to the Eighth District Court of Appeals, arguing that the adult court lacked jurisdiction over the attempted murder and weapon under disability charges because the juvenile court had not found probable cause for those. The appellate court, relying on the Supreme Court of Ohio’s prior decisions in State v. Smith and State v. Burns, vacated those convictions.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the matter and overruled its prior decisions in Smith and Burns, holding that when a juvenile court transfers a case to adult court—whether by mandatory or discretionary bindover—it transfers the entire case, including all acts charged in the juvenile complaint. The adult court’s jurisdiction then extends to any offense indicted by the grand jury, not just those for which the juvenile court found probable cause. Accordingly, the Supreme Court of Ohio reversed the Eighth District’s judgment, reinstated the convictions, and remanded for further proceedings on remaining assignments of error. View "State v. Turner" on Justia Law

The case concerns a defendant who, as a youth, was convicted of several offenses in two related criminal matters. He was charged under statutes allowing prosecution in district court rather than youth court, resulting in convictions for felony assault on a peace officer and other offenses. He received concurrent 10-year sentences to the Department of Corrections, with 5 years suspended. The judgments failed to identify him as a criminally convicted youth subject to the Criminally Convicted Youth Act (CCYA) and did not incorporate the procedural and rehabilitative provisions required under that statute, including ongoing status reports and sentence review before he turned 21.After sentencing, the defendant did not receive the mandatory status reports or sentence review contemplated by the CCYA. Nearly three years later, after turning 21, he requested a sentence review hearing, arguing that the lack of compliance with the CCYA deprived him of rehabilitative opportunities and the ability to demonstrate substantial rehabilitation. The Sixteenth Judicial District Court held a sentence review hearing, found it retained jurisdiction past age 21, but determined that the evidence did not support sentence modification.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Montana held that the district court abused its discretion by failing to include the statutory CCYA provisions in the judgments and failing to review the defendant’s sentence before he turned 21. The Supreme Court concluded that the defendant was denied the rehabilitative benefits and procedural safeguards of the CCYA for nearly three years, resulting in substantial injustice. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s denial of immediate sentence modification, but reversed in part and remanded, directing the Department of Corrections and the district court to apply the CCYA rehabilitative provisions for two years, after which a meaningful sentence review hearing must be held. View "State v. I. Pehringer" on Justia Law

A youth was charged with aggravated burglary and obstructing a peace officer after committing the offenses at age 17. He was prosecuted as an adult after the District Court denied transfer to Youth Court. He pled guilty to both counts and received a 15-year sentence to the Department of Corrections with 11 years suspended for the felony, and a concurrent suspended sentence for the misdemeanor. At sentencing, the court failed to include the mandatory provisions of the Montana Criminally Convicted Youth Act (CCYA), which require ongoing rehabilitative oversight and status reports for youthful offenders.After the youth turned 21, he moved for a sentence review hearing under the CCYA, highlighting that for nearly three years, the Department of Corrections had not provided the required status reports, and the court had not conducted the mandated sentence review before his 21st birthday. The District Court subsequently issued a nunc pro tunc order to correct the judgment and held a belated sentence review hearing, but ultimately denied any sentence modification, finding the youth had not demonstrated substantial rehabilitation.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Montana held that the District Court abused its discretion by not including the mandatory CCYA provisions in the original judgment and by failing to ensure the youth received the statutory rehabilitative process, including regular status reports and timely sentence review. The Supreme Court determined that these omissions constituted a substantial injustice, as the youth was denied opportunities for rehabilitation and meaningful sentence review as intended by statute. The court affirmed the denial of discharge but reversed in part, remanding for application of the CCYA provisions and requiring a two-year period of compliance before a new sentence review hearing. View "State v. I. Pehringer" on Justia Law

The defendant, who was a minor at the time he was arrested, was charged in district court by direct filing with several serious offenses, including first degree murder and attempted first degree murder. He was initially detained at a Division of Youth Services (DYS) facility. After turning eighteen, he was transferred to the county jail by law enforcement. The day after his transfer, the defendant objected, asserting that the transfer was unlawful and unconstitutional, and argued that the district court had discretion to keep him in DYS custody. He also claimed that his transfer to county jail violated his right to equal protection because another defendant in a different case had been allowed to remain in DYS custody after turning eighteen.The La Plata County District Court reviewed the People’s motion to transfer the defendant to county jail. After a hearing, the district court concluded that section 19-2.5-305(4)(g) of the Children’s Code required the defendant’s transfer to county jail upon turning eighteen and provided no discretion to rule otherwise. The court expressed discomfort with the result but determined it was bound by the statute. The defendant then sought relief in the Supreme Court of Colorado through an original proceeding.The Supreme Court of Colorado held that section 19-2.5-305(4)(g) plainly and unambiguously requires a person who turns eighteen while detained on charges filed directly in district court to be transferred to county jail, leaving no discretion for the district court to order continued DYS custody. The court further held that the defendant’s equal protection rights were not violated because he was not similarly situated to the other defendant who remained in DYS custody. Consequently, the Supreme Court discharged its order to show cause and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "People v. Lawrence" on Justia Law

A juvenile was charged in Newport County Family Court with two counts of first-degree child molestation, based on sexual acts he engaged in with a minor who was twelve years old at the time. Prior to trial, a competency hearing was held. Two experts in forensic psychology evaluated the respondent and testified that he had limited understanding of the legal process, particularly about sex offender registration, plea bargains, and the role of the prosecutor. Their report concluded that he did not sufficiently demonstrate factual or rational understanding or adequate decision-making abilities. However, the respondent had no prior mental health diagnoses, cognitive impairments, or psychiatric history.The Family Court judge considered the expert testimony and report but concluded that the respondent’s answers, while imperfect, demonstrated a sufficient understanding of the proceedings and the ability to assist in his defense. The judge found the respondent competent to stand trial. Following a bench trial, the respondent was found delinquent on both counts beyond a reasonable doubt. At sentencing, an expert social worker recommended against sex offender registration, describing the respondent as non-predatory and not a danger to the community. The judge rejected this recommendation, citing deficiencies in the expert’s knowledge of the case facts and the circumstances of the offenses.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island reviewed the Family Court’s findings. The Court held that the trial justice did not abuse her discretion in finding the respondent competent, as the trial judge is the ultimate factfinder on competency and need not accept uncontradicted expert testimony. The Court also held that the trial justice did not err or abuse her discretion in imposing the full fifteen-year sex offender registration period, finding the respondent’s conduct was criminal not solely because of the victim’s age but also because of his actions. The orders of the Family Court were affirmed. View "In re E.G.S" on Justia Law

A seventeen-year-old defendant was implicated in the fatal shootings of two individuals at an apartment complex in Milan, Tennessee. Law enforcement identified the defendant and a co-defendant as suspects based on anonymous tips and information from onlookers. The defendant was interrogated at the police station without the presence of his mother, despite her being at the station and his repeated requests for her. Over the course of nearly seven hours, he ultimately confessed to participating in the shootings after being told, among other things, that he could face the death penalty and subjected to other coercive tactics. No weapons were recovered, but ballistics indicated two firearms were used. Cell phone records and eyewitness testimony linked the defendant to the scene.The Gibson County Juvenile Court held a transfer hearing and, after considering statutory factors and the evidence presented, found probable cause and transferred the defendant to Circuit Court to be tried as an adult. The court suppressed the defendant’s confession for purposes of the transfer decision. Subsequently, the Circuit Court denied a motion to suppress the confession, finding it voluntary and admissible. At trial, the defendant was convicted by a jury of two counts of second-degree murder. The Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed, holding that the transfer was appropriate and the confession voluntary.The Supreme Court of Tennessee reviewed the case. It held that the juvenile court properly transferred the defendant after finding probable cause and satisfying all statutory requirements. The Supreme Court further held that the defendant validly waived his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent. However, the court found that the confession was involuntary, having been obtained through coercion in violation of the Due Process Clause. As a result, the Supreme Court vacated the convictions and remanded the case for further proceedings, excluding the coerced confession from any retrial. View "State v. Adkisson" on Justia Law

This case involves allegations that two children, S.H. and F.B., were abused and neglected by their mother and stepfather. The West Virginia Department of Human Services filed a Sixth Amended Petition after an altercation between Mother and S.H. that was recorded on video. The petition included claims of physical abuse, substance abuse, and failure by the stepfather to protect the children. After the incident, both children were removed from the home. The record shows that the parents had previously completed improvement periods related to earlier petitions involving allegations of abuse and neglect.The Circuit Court of Wood County conducted two adjudicatory hearings where it heard testimony from the parents, a Child Protective Services worker, a police officer, and others. The court admitted videos of the altercation and forensic interviews of the children. Despite conflicting evidence, the circuit court found that clear and convincing evidence did not establish that S.H. or F.B. were abused or neglected and dismissed the petition. In a supplemental order, the circuit court acknowledged significant evidence on both sides but maintained that the Department of Human Services had not met its burden of proof. The guardian ad litem for F.B. appealed, arguing that the court failed to make sufficient factual findings and failed to adjudicate the parents as abusive or neglectful.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the case and determined that the circuit court did not comply with statutory requirements or procedural rules, which mandate explicit findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding whether a child is abused or neglected. The appellate court vacated the circuit court’s orders as to F.B. and remanded the case with instructions for the circuit court to enter a new adjudicatory order containing adequate findings and conclusions. View "In re F.B." on Justia Law

A child, K.L., was removed from his mother’s custody after allegations of substance abuse and child endangerment. The Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) filed a petition on K.L.’s behalf, and he was placed with his half-siblings at their maternal aunt’s home. The mother’s whereabouts were frequently unknown, and she made only limited appearances during the proceedings. The father, J.A., was not initially involved but later established his biological relationship to K.L. and participated in reunification efforts, which ultimately were terminated after the court found his progress insufficient. The juvenile court then terminated both parents’ rights after determining K.L. was likely to be adopted, and no exception to adoption applied.After the termination of his parental rights, the father appealed, arguing that DCFS failed to conduct an adequate initial inquiry under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) and corresponding California law. Specifically, he asserted that DCFS should have made greater efforts to contact the maternal grandmother to determine whether K.L. might have Indian ancestry. The father contended that the failure to interview the maternal grandmother rendered the inquiry insufficient and warranted conditional reversal of the termination order.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, reviewed the record and determined that DCFS fulfilled its initial inquiry obligations by contacting all reasonably available relatives, including the parents, paternal grandmother, maternal aunt, and others. The court found that maternal grandmother was not reasonably available, as her contact information could not be obtained and the maternal aunt declined to provide it without her consent. The court held that DCFS was not required to take additional investigative steps. The order terminating parental rights was affirmed. View "In re K.L." on Justia Law

The case involved Christopher J., the natural father of three children, whose parental rights were challenged following their removal from his care in January 2021. This removal came after allegations by the children of physical abuse, exposure to domestic violence, and substance abuse. Prior to this, in 2016, a juvenile court case involving the family had resulted in the children being returned to Christopher’s care for five months before the subsequent removal. The children's mother had previously had her parental rights terminated and was not involved in this appeal.After the 2021 removal, the Separate Juvenile Court of Douglas County adjudicated the children under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-247(3)(a). Christopher appealed the adjudication, but the Nebraska Court of Appeals affirmed the juvenile court’s decision in March 2022. Following adjudication, Christopher’s visitation with the children was initially permitted but later suspended pending a psychological evaluation. Despite attempts, visitation never resumed, due in part to Christopher’s lack of engagement with services and the therapists’ recommendations. In September 2023, the State filed to terminate Christopher’s parental rights, presenting evidence of neglect, failure of reunification efforts, prolonged out-of-home placement, aggravated circumstances, and the children’s best interests.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case de novo. It found clear and convincing evidence that the statutory basis for termination was satisfied, specifically that the children had been in out-of-home placement for 15 or more months of the most recent 22 months. The Court held that termination of Christopher’s parental rights was in the best interests of the children, citing his refusal to acknowledge past abuse and inability to rehabilitate. The Court rejected Christopher’s argument of improper delegation regarding visitation decisions, concluding no such delegation occurred. The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals’ decision. View "In re Interest of Bosileo D." on Justia Law

A 15-year-old minor was the subject of three separate juvenile wardship petitions in Santa Barbara County. The petitions involved several charges: forcible rape and sexual battery by restraint with an offense date of December 17, 2023; forcible rape, false imprisonment by violence, and a lewd act upon a child on March 3, 2023; and attempted forcible rape along with assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury on June 9, 2023. At the same hearing, the minor admitted sexual battery by restraint (from the most recent incident), a lewd act upon a child, and assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury. All other charges were dismissed.The Santa Barbara County Superior Court conducted a dispositional hearing. For the first two petitions, the court ordered probation and time served. For the third petition, relating to the June 9, 2023 assault, the court committed the minor to a Secure Youth Treatment Facility (SYTF), relying on the fact that this offense was listed in Welfare and Institutions Code section 707, subdivision (b).The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Six, reviewed the case. The court held that under section 875, a juvenile may only be committed to a SYTF if the “most recent offense for which the juvenile has been adjudicated” is listed in section 707, subdivision (b). Since the most recent offense—the sexual battery by restraint on December 17, 2023—was not a qualifying offense, the juvenile court lacked authority to order the SYTF commitment. The Court of Appeal reversed the commitment order and remanded for a new dispositional hearing. View "In re N.S." on Justia Law