Justia Juvenile Law Opinion Summaries

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A juvenile was involved in an altercation at the Barnstable District and Juvenile Court, where he was charged with disorderly conduct and assault and battery. The incident was captured on video, showing the juvenile and the victim engaging in a physical fight. The juvenile had a prior continuance without a finding (CWOF) after admitting to sufficient facts for an assault and battery charge.The Juvenile Court adjudicated the juvenile delinquent on both charges and sentenced him to one year of probation for each. The juvenile appealed, arguing that the court lacked jurisdiction over the disorderly conduct charge because a CWOF after an admission to sufficient facts should not count as a prior offense under G. L. c. 119, § 52. The Appeals Court did not review the case as it was transferred to the Supreme Judicial Court.The Supreme Judicial Court held that a CWOF entered after an admission to sufficient facts is sufficient to establish a first offense under § 52. Therefore, the Juvenile Court had jurisdiction over the disorderly conduct charge. The court also found that the evidence was sufficient to support the juvenile's adjudications of delinquency for both disorderly conduct and assault and battery. The court affirmed the adjudications, concluding that the juvenile did not act in self-defense and that his actions met the criteria for disorderly conduct. View "Commonwealth v. Fayad F." on Justia Law

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J.M.H. pleaded guilty to disorderly conduct in juvenile court in 2022. The trial court judge issued a disposition order with certain conditions, which J.M.H. violated multiple times. In October 2022, the judge issued a warrant for her arrest. J.M.H.'s lawyer challenged the warrant, arguing it did not comply with JuCR 7.16, the rule for issuing juvenile warrants. The trial court denied the motion, and J.M.H. appealed.The appeal was reviewed by the Court of Appeals. By that time, the trial court judge who issued the warrant had been appointed to the Court of Appeals and sat on the panel reviewing his own decision. The panel dismissed the appeal, stating the order was not appealable under RAP 2.2(a). J.M.H. sought discretionary review, arguing it was reversible error for the judge to sit on the appellate panel.The Supreme Court of the State of Washington reviewed the case. The court held that a judge cannot review an appeal of a decision they made as a trial court judge in the same case, citing In re Murchison and In re Dependency of A.N.G. The court found that this violated due process and required automatic reversal. The Supreme Court reversed the decision and remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings. View "State v. J.M.H." on Justia Law

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Jennifer Harmon’s son, N.J., died by suicide while residing at the Bruce Normile Juvenile Justice Center (BNJJC) under the care of the Second Judicial Circuit of Missouri. Harmon filed a lawsuit seeking damages for her son’s death, including various 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state wrongful death claims against the Second Circuit, several named defendants from both the Second Circuit and BNJJC, Preferred Family Healthcare (PFH), and several named defendants from PFH. All defendants filed motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri granted the Second Circuit and Government Defendants’ motion to dismiss. The court found that the claims against the Second Circuit were barred by the Eleventh Amendment, the § 1983 claims against the Government Defendants were barred by qualified immunity, and the state tort claims against the Government Defendants were barred by official immunity. Harmon appealed these immunity judgments.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Harmon’s claims against the Second Circuit, holding that the Second Circuit is not a “person” amenable to suit under § 1983 and is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity, which Missouri has not waived. The court also affirmed the dismissal of Harmon’s § 1983 claims against the Government Defendants, concluding that the Government Defendants were entitled to qualified immunity because Harmon failed to show that any constitutional violation was clearly established. Lastly, the court affirmed the dismissal of Harmon’s state tort claims against the Government Defendants, holding that the Government Defendants were entitled to official immunity under Missouri law because Harmon failed to plead both the existence of a department-mandated policy and a breach of that policy. View "Harmon v. Second Judicial Circuit of the State of Missouri" on Justia Law

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G.R. lived with her mother and had no contact with her alleged father, R.R. In 2017, G.R. was hospitalized and diagnosed with disruptive mood dysregulation disorder. The Los Angeles Department of Child and Family Services became involved when the mother failed to secure necessary mental health services for G.R. The mother did not have contact information for R.R. The juvenile court initially found R.R. to be G.R.'s alleged father, later amending the order to reflect this accurately. R.R. was incarcerated for domestic violence and had an extensive criminal history. The court denied services to R.R. and ordered no visits until he contacted the Department.In May 2018, the juvenile court removed G.R. from her mother's custody and placed her with a maternal aunt. In November 2020, R.R. expressed a desire to have a relationship with G.R., but did not follow through with setting up visits. In January 2023, R.R. filed a deficient section 388 petition, which the juvenile court denied. By June 2023, G.R. had spoken with R.R. by phone but was not ready for in-person visits. In September 2023, the juvenile court appointed G.R.'s caregiver as her legal guardian, ordered monitored visits for R.R., and terminated its jurisdiction.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court dismissed R.R.'s appeal of the juvenile court's order requiring monitored visits, stating that as an alleged father, R.R. could not show he was aggrieved by the order. The court emphasized that an alleged father has no rights to custody, reunification services, or visits unless he establishes paternity and achieves presumed father status. R.R. did not establish paternity, and thus had no standing to appeal the visitation order. View "In re G.R." on Justia Law

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The case involves a father (H.B.) appealing a juvenile court's disposition order that declared his two sons dependents of the court, placed them in the custody of their mother, and provided family maintenance services to the mother and supportive services to the father. The San Francisco Human Services Agency filed a petition alleging that the minors were at substantial risk of harm due to the father's substance abuse and provision of drugs to one of the children. The father contested the findings, arguing that the juvenile court applied an incorrect legal standard and that there was insufficient evidence to support its findings.The juvenile court sustained the petition's allegations, assumed jurisdiction over the children, and ordered their placement with the mother. The court found that the father posed a substantial danger to the children due to his substance abuse and poor parenting decisions, including providing drugs to his son. The court applied section 362, subdivision (c), rather than section 361, subdivision (c), concluding that the children were not removed from a custodial parent since they remained with their mother.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court determined that the juvenile court erred in applying section 362(c) instead of section 361(c), as the children were effectively removed from the father's custody. The appellate court found substantial evidence supporting the juvenile court's finding of substantial danger to the children if returned to the father's care. However, it concluded that there was insufficient evidence to support the finding that reasonable efforts were made to prevent or eliminate the need for removal. The appellate court reversed the disposition order and remanded the case for a new disposition hearing, instructing the juvenile court to make its decision based on the facts existing at the time of the new hearing. View "In re H.B." on Justia Law

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A minor child, Baby Girl R., was abandoned by her mother, S.R., shortly after birth. S.R. gave birth in a homeless encampment and was using methamphetamines daily. Baby Girl R. tested positive for the drug and exhibited withdrawal symptoms. S.R. was placed on an involuntary psychiatric hold due to paranoia, delusions, and aggression. After being discharged, S.R. left Baby Girl R. at the hospital and returned to the encampment. The Department of Family and Children’s Services initiated dependency proceedings, and Baby Girl R. was placed in protective custody. Despite diligent efforts, the Department could not locate S.R.The juvenile court placed Baby Girl R. in foster care and ordered reunification services for S.R., despite her unknown whereabouts. The court found that S.R.’s location was unknown despite reasonable efforts to locate her. Baby Girl R. appealed, arguing that the court should have bypassed reunification services under Welfare and Institutions Code section 361.5, subdivision (b)(1). While the appeal was pending, the juvenile court terminated reunification services for S.R. at the six-month review hearing and placed Baby Girl R. with her maternal grandparents.The California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court determined that the appeal was moot due to the termination of reunification services but exercised discretion to address the merits. The court concluded that section 361.5, subdivision (b)(1) does not mandate bypassing reunification services when a parent’s whereabouts are unknown despite a diligent search. The juvenile court has discretion to grant or deny reunification services in such cases. The appellate court found no error in the juvenile court’s decision to order reunification services for S.R. and affirmed the disposition order. View "In re Baby Girl R." on Justia Law

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Juan A., a teenager and dependent of the juvenile court, was removed from parental custody and placed in long-term foster care after the court found he was not adoptable and no legal guardian was available. The court terminated family reunification services but did not terminate parental rights. Juan attended many hearings during his dependency case but was absent from the status review hearing that is the subject of this appeal. At that hearing, the court denied Juan’s trial counsel’s request for a brief continuance to allow Juan to be present, which was argued to be his right under Welfare and Institutions Code section 349.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County had previously declared Juan a dependent, removed him from parental custody, and ordered family reunification services for his mother. These services were terminated in August 2021. At a section 366.26 review hearing in June 2023, the court decided not to terminate parental rights and ordered Juan to remain in foster care. In subsequent hearings, the court found Juan’s placement appropriate and continued to order permanent placement services.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case and found that the juvenile court erred in denying the continuance request, as Juan had a right to be present at the hearing under section 349. The appellate court determined that this error prejudiced Juan, as his presence could have led to additional support services to help him achieve his educational and employment goals. The appellate court reversed the orders issued at the March 28, 2024, permanency planning review hearing and remanded the case for a new hearing, ensuring Juan’s right to be present is upheld. View "In re Juan A." on Justia Law

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The defendant, a 16-year-old student, was charged with assault with intent to commit great bodily harm less than murder (AWIGBH) under an aiding and abetting theory. The incident involved two other students, TI and CB, who attacked the victim by hitting and kicking him. The defendant did not participate in the physical attack but recorded the incident on his cell phone and shared the video with other students. The prosecution argued that the defendant's recording of the attack encouraged the assailants. Instead of filing a juvenile petition, the prosecution sought to try the defendant as an adult under the automatic waiver statute, arguing that the shoes worn by the assailants were used as dangerous weapons.The 53rd District Court found probable cause to believe that the defendant had aided and abetted the assault and bound him over to the criminal division of the circuit court. The circuit court denied the defendant's motion to quash the bindover and dismiss the charges, concluding that a shoe could be used as a dangerous weapon. The Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court's decision, with a dissenting opinion arguing that the shoes did not constitute dangerous weapons and that the defendant was not armed with a dangerous weapon.The Michigan Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that for the criminal division of the circuit court to have jurisdiction under the automatic waiver statute, the juvenile defendant must be armed with a dangerous weapon. The Court found no evidence that the defendant was armed with a dangerous weapon during the assault. Consequently, the statutory requirements for automatic waiver were not met, and the criminal division of the circuit court did not have jurisdiction over the defendant. The Court reversed the Court of Appeals' judgment in part, vacated it in part, and remanded the case to the circuit court to grant the defendant's motion to quash the bindover and transfer the case to the family division of the circuit court. View "People Of Michigan v. Oslund" on Justia Law

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In 2013, an eleven-year-old juvenile was charged with rape of a child by force and assault and battery on a child with substantial injury after allegedly biting his four-year-old cousin's penis. The rape charge was dismissed, and the juvenile was placed on one year of pretrial probation for the reduced charge of simple assault and battery. The juvenile completed probation without incident, and the charge was dismissed. In 2023, the now twenty-two-year-old juvenile, with no other record, petitioned to expunge his record under a statute allowing expungement if the offense is no longer a crime.The Juvenile Court denied the expungement petition. The court found that the offenses of rape of a child by force and assault and battery remain criminal acts, regardless of the age of the perpetrator, and thus do not qualify for expungement under the statute. The court also noted that the juvenile's records were ineligible for time-based expungement due to the serious nature of the offenses.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the case and affirmed the Juvenile Court's decision. The court held that the 2018 legislative change, which excluded children under twelve from the Juvenile Court's jurisdiction, did not alter the definition of what constitutes a "crime" for the purposes of expungement under the statute. The court concluded that the relevant inquiry is whether the conduct itself has been decriminalized, not whether the individual can be prosecuted due to age. Since the conduct in question remains criminal, the juvenile's records do not qualify for expungement. View "Commonwealth v. Ambrose A." on Justia Law

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In April 2022, H.H., the mother of A.E.E., was arrested for the murder of A.E.E.'s father. H.H. provided written consent for A.E.E. to be placed with the maternal aunt and uncle, A.V. and E.V., as emergency co-guardians. The maternal aunt and uncle filed a petition to be appointed as emergency and permanent co-guardians, which the paternal grandparents, K.B. and T.B., opposed, seeking guardianship themselves. The juvenile court appointed the maternal aunt and uncle as emergency co-guardians pending a full hearing. After a full hearing, the court appointed the maternal aunt and uncle as co-guardians, and the paternal grandparents did not appeal.Following H.H.'s conviction for murder and her life sentence without parole, the maternal aunt and uncle sought to relocate out of state with A.E.E. The paternal grandparents opposed this motion and sought to remove the maternal aunt and uncle as co-guardians. The juvenile court granted the relocation and denied the motion to remove the co-guardians, finding that the reasons for the original appointment had not changed and that it was in A.E.E.'s best interests to remain under their guardianship.The paternal grandparents appealed to the Supreme Court of North Dakota, arguing that the juvenile court erred in its decision, citing H.H.'s conviction and alleging false testimony by the maternal aunt and uncle. They also requested a presumption against appointing family members of a parent convicted of murdering the other parent as guardians. The Supreme Court of North Dakota held that the juvenile court's findings were not clearly erroneous and affirmed the denial of the motion to modify the guardianship, concluding that the paternal grandparents failed to prove that removal or modification of the guardianship was in A.E.E.'s best interests. View "Interest of A.E.E." on Justia Law