Justia Juvenile Law Opinion Summaries

A father was accused of sexually abusing and assaulting his 11-year-old daughter over the course of a single day. The daughter testified to three separate incidents: in the family’s toy room, the father touched her chest through her clothes and showed her a pornographic video; in the school room, he told her they would have vaginal sex that night, described the pain she would experience, touched her vagina through her clothes, and made her touch his exposed penis; later, while driving her to a store, he touched her again, showed more pornographic videos, and, after stopping on a dirt road, moved her onto his lap, sucked on her chest, touched her vagina, kissed her, and asked if she was sure about having sex.A jury in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma found the father guilty of abusive sexual contact with a minor under 12 and assault with intent to commit aggravated sexual abuse. After the verdict, the district court entered a judgment of acquittal on the assault charge, reasoning that the evidence was insufficient because the father had said the sex would occur later that night, not immediately. The government moved for reconsideration, and the district court reinstated the conviction, concluding that a reasonable jury could have found both assault and the required intent.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed three issues: whether the district court plainly erred by not instructing the jury to agree on a specific incident of sexual contact, whether the district court could reinstate the assault conviction after acquittal, and whether sufficient evidence supported the assault conviction. The court held that the omission of a specific unanimity instruction did not affect the defendant’s substantial rights, that the district court could correct its mistaken acquittal without violating the Double Jeopardy Clause, and that sufficient evidence supported the assault conviction. The convictions were affirmed. View "United States v. Roark" on Justia Law

G.W. was taken into custody in the District of Columbia on a delinquency matter. Although released in that matter, the trial court ordered his detention under the Interstate Compact for Juveniles (ICJ) to be picked up by Virginia authorities on a different juvenile matter. When Virginia authorities did not take custody, the trial court dismissed the ICJ matter, but the District of Columbia Department of Youth Rehabilitation Services (DYRS) continued to detain G.W., interpreting the ICJ to require detention until all of G.W.'s juvenile matters in the District were resolved or until Virginia took custody or consented to his release.G.W. filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, arguing that DYRS had no authority under the ICJ to detain him once Virginia failed to take custody. DYRS opposed the petition, citing ICJ rules and an advisory opinion by the Interstate Commission for Juveniles. The Superior Court of the District of Columbia denied the petition, relying on the advisory opinion that interpreted the ICJ rules to require detention until charges in the holding state were resolved or there was consent from the demanding state.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case. Since the trial court's ruling, the Commission withdrew the advisory opinion, and both the Commission and the District of Columbia conceded that the ICJ rules did not require G.W.'s detention. The Court of Appeals agreed, holding that ICJ Rule 7-103 did not address detention and that ICJ Rule 6-102.2 required detention only until the demanding state returned the juvenile or the time period for doing so expired. Consequently, the Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the Superior Court. View "In re G.W." on Justia Law

Curtis Walker, who was 17 years old when he committed murder, was sentenced to life in prison with a parole eligibility date set for 2071, effectively making it a life-without-parole sentence. After serving nearly 30 years, Walker sought postconviction relief, arguing that his sentence violated the Eighth Amendment based on a series of Supreme Court decisions regarding juvenile offenders sentenced to life without parole. Walker's request for a "meaningful opportunity" to demonstrate his rehabilitation was denied by the Wisconsin state courts, prompting him to file a federal habeas corpus petition.The Wisconsin Court of Appeals denied Walker's postconviction motion, holding that his sentence did not violate the Eighth Amendment because the sentencing judge had considered his youth and its attendant circumstances. The Wisconsin Supreme Court denied review. Walker then filed a federal habeas petition, which the district court dismissed as untimely and without merit, concluding that the Wisconsin Court of Appeals did not unreasonably apply federal law.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's denial of habeas relief. The court held that the Wisconsin Court of Appeals did not unreasonably apply Supreme Court precedent, particularly in light of the decisions in Miller v. Alabama, Montgomery v. Louisiana, and Jones v. Mississippi. The Seventh Circuit concluded that the state court's decision was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, as the Supreme Court's precedents did not clearly establish a categorical prohibition against sentencing corrigible juvenile offenders to life without parole. View "Walker v Cromwell" on Justia Law

A child protection agency filed a petition alleging that a child, A.T., was in need of protection after A.T.'s sibling, K.T., died from head trauma and a leg fracture. The mother, Tautiana Bellamy, witnessed the abuse by her boyfriend but did not protect K.T. Consequently, the Clark County Department of Family Services took protective custody of A.T. and filed a petition alleging abuse or neglect. Bellamy entered a no-contest plea to the petition, which the district court accepted over the objection of the deputy district attorney.The district court treated the no-contest plea as an admission, allowing the case to proceed without an evidentiary hearing. The Clark County Department of Family Services and the District Attorney's Office filed a petition for a writ of certiorari or mandamus, arguing that a no-contest plea is not permissible without the prosecutor's agreement. They contended that the statute only allows for admission or denial of allegations.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the case and held that a district court may accept a no-contest plea in NRS Chapter 432B dependency proceedings. The court found that the statute's language does not explicitly prohibit no-contest pleas and that such pleas align with the legislative intent of providing swift resolution in child protection cases. The court emphasized that accepting a no-contest plea does not infringe on the prosecutor's functions and helps avoid delays that could harm the child's welfare. The petition for a writ of certiorari or mandamus was denied. View "In re A.T." on Justia Law

In December 2020, Gavin Smith's grandfather discovered Smith's mother, stepfather, and two younger brothers shot to death in their home. Smith, who was sixteen at the time, was later found at his girlfriend's grandmother's house and arrested. Smith's girlfriend, Rebecca Walker, was also charged but entered a plea agreement to testify against Smith in exchange for a reduced sentence.The Circuit Court of Kanawha County transferred Smith from juvenile to adult criminal jurisdiction. A grand jury indicted him on four counts of first-degree murder and four counts of using a firearm during a felony. During the trial, Walker testified about her plea deal and the events of the murders. Smith's counsel cross-examined her about the life sentence she avoided, leading to a court instruction clarifying that Smith would be eligible for parole after fifteen years due to his age at the time of the crime.The jury convicted Smith of three counts of first-degree murder, one count of second-degree murder, and one count of using a firearm during a felony. The court sentenced him to three life terms with mercy plus fifty years, all to run consecutively.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the case. Smith argued that the circuit court erred by informing the jury about his parole eligibility, which prejudiced the jury. The Supreme Court agreed, finding that the circuit court's instruction on parole eligibility was improper and prejudicial. The court held that outside the context of cases involving a recommendation of mercy, it is improper to inform the jury about sentencing possibilities. Consequently, the Supreme Court vacated Smith's convictions and the circuit court's sentencing order, remanding the case for a new trial. View "State v. Smith" on Justia Law

A 15-year-old male was charged with a Class II felony for allegedly sexually assaulting a 14-year-old female at a high school in Omaha, Nebraska. The incident was reported by the victim, L.S., who stated that the assault occurred within the school premises. Video footage and interviews with the involved parties, including the accused, Jeremiah T., and a witness, G.G., were part of the evidence. L.S. claimed that Jeremiah forcibly assaulted her despite her resistance, while Jeremiah contended that the encounter was consensual. G.G.'s involvement as a lookout was also scrutinized.The district court overruled Jeremiah's motion to transfer the case to juvenile court, citing concerns about public safety and the severity of the offense. The court found that the nature of the crime and the degree of violence involved suggested that Jeremiah might need supervision beyond the age of 19, which the juvenile court could not provide. The court also noted that while Jeremiah was amenable to treatment, the timeline for effective rehabilitation within the juvenile system was uncertain.The Nebraska Court of Appeals reversed the district court's decision, arguing that the lower court abused its discretion. The appellate court emphasized that the evidence favored Jeremiah's rehabilitation within the juvenile system and that the State did not sufficiently prove a sound basis for retaining the case in adult court. The Court of Appeals highlighted the availability of appropriate services in the juvenile system and questioned the district court's interpretation of the evidence.Upon further review, the Nebraska Supreme Court found that the Court of Appeals had improperly reweighed the evidence and failed to apply the correct standard of review. The Supreme Court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in retaining the case in adult court, as its decision was supported by appropriate evidence and considerations of public safety. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision and remanded the case with directions to affirm the district court's order. View "State v. Jeremiah T." on Justia Law

A twelve-year-old child disclosed to a school counselor that she had been communicating with a twenty-six-year-old man, later identified as Eric Overton, via Snapchat. The child’s mother confirmed the communication, obtained evidence from the phone, and contacted law enforcement. The investigation revealed that Overton and the child had exchanged nude photographs and sexually explicit messages, and that Overton had picked up the child from her home on three occasions, during which they engaged in sexual intercourse. The child provided detailed testimony at trial regarding these encounters.The Hot Spring County Circuit Court presided over the trial, during which Overton objected to the prosecutor’s voir dire questioning about whether a conviction could be based on the testimony of a single credible witness. The court overruled the objection and denied a subsequent motion for mistrial, emphasizing that the jury would be instructed on the law at the end of the case. The jury was later instructed on the presumption of innocence and the State’s burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The jury found Overton guilty of rape and internet stalking of a child, and he was sentenced to life imprisonment on each count.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Arkansas reviewed whether there was substantial evidence to support the rape conviction and whether the circuit court erred in its handling of voir dire and jury instructions. The court held that the evidence, including the victim’s testimony, was sufficient to support the conviction, and that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying the mistrial. The court affirmed the convictions, finding no prejudicial error in the proceedings. View "Overton v. State" on Justia Law

Terry Break was convicted in 2021 of multiple child sexual abuse offenses, including rape, second-degree sexual assault, and sexual indecency with a child, involving three minor victims. He received six life sentences plus 488 years in prison and $425,000 in fines. His convictions were affirmed on direct appeal. Break then filed a Rule 37 petition for postconviction relief, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel on several grounds.The Boone County Circuit Court denied Break's petition. The court found that the State had provided sufficient evidence of "sexual gratification or desire" for the offenses, and thus, trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to challenge this element. The court also found that the prosecutor's comment during closing arguments, referring to Break as a "proven liar," was based on Break's own admissions and was not improper. Additionally, the court determined that the prosecutor's opening statement did not shift the burden of proof, as it referred to Break's demeanor during a recorded interview rather than his silence at trial. Lastly, the court acknowledged that the prosecutor's biblical reference during closing arguments was improper but concluded that Break failed to show that trial counsel's failure to object constituted ineffective assistance.The Arkansas Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the circuit court's decision. The court held that Break failed to demonstrate that his trial counsel's performance was deficient or that any alleged deficiencies prejudiced the outcome of his trial. The court emphasized that Break did not provide sufficient evidence to support his claims of ineffective assistance and that the decisions made by his trial counsel fell within the range of reasonable professional judgment. View "BREAK v. STATE OF ARKANSAS" on Justia Law

A juvenile court in a dependency proceeding granted a restraining order requested by a mother, K.B., against her 17-year-old dependent child, D.B. The Santa Clara County Department of Family and Children’s Services had received multiple referrals over the years concerning D.B.'s well-being due to alleged abuse and neglect by the mother. D.B. had a history of physical altercations with her mother and was placed in protective custody after her mother refused to allow her back home following an arrest for assault.The Santa Clara County Superior Court assumed jurisdiction over D.B. and declared her a dependent child. The court adopted a case plan that included supervised visitation with the mother. However, D.B. struggled in her placement and exhibited behavioral issues. The mother later requested termination of reunification services, which the court granted with D.B.'s agreement.Subsequently, the mother filed for a restraining order against D.B., citing threats and harassment. The court issued a temporary restraining order and later a one-year restraining order after a hearing. The court found that section 213.5 of the Welfare and Institutions Code authorized it to issue restraining orders against a dependent child and determined that it was in D.B.'s best interest to do so.The California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, reviewed the case and affirmed the juvenile court's decision. The appellate court held that section 213.5, subdivision (a), grants the juvenile dependency court authority to issue restraining orders against a dependent child, provided the child's best interest is considered. The court found substantial evidence supporting the restraining order and concluded that it did not violate D.B.'s constitutional rights, as reunification services had already been terminated with D.B.'s consent. View "In re D.B." on Justia Law

A child, B.C.B., was born in a car where his parents were living. After being transported to a hospital, both B.C.B. and his mother tested positive for methamphetamine. The El Paso County Department of Human Services conducted a safety assessment and took temporary custody of B.C.B. due to the positive drug test. The Department filed a petition alleging that B.C.B. was dependent or neglected under Colorado law.The El Paso County District Court held an adjudicatory trial, where evidence was presented that B.C.B. had difficulty latching to breastfeed and exhibited symptoms potentially related to methamphetamine exposure. Three pediatricians testified about the potential long-term risks of methamphetamine exposure, although they could not definitively link the symptoms to the drug exposure. The jury found that B.C.B. was born affected by substance exposure and that his health or welfare was threatened by substance use. The trial court adjudicated B.C.B. as dependent or neglected and ordered continued custody with the Department.The Colorado Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's adjudication, concluding that the Department had not provided sufficient evidence to show that B.C.B. was adversely affected by substance exposure at birth. The majority held that a positive drug test alone was insufficient to establish dependency or neglect under the amended statute.The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed the case and concluded that a positive drug test at birth satisfies the first prong of the statute, indicating that the child was affected by substance exposure. The Court also found that the Department provided sufficient evidence to show that B.C.B.'s health or welfare was threatened by substance use, either directly or due to the mother's inability to care for the child properly. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision and upheld the jury's finding that B.C.B. was dependent or neglected. View "People ex rel. B.C.B. v. A.B." on Justia Law