Justia Juvenile Law Opinion Summaries

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The case involves a father, H.B., who appealed a juvenile court's disposition order declaring his two sons dependents of the court, placing them in the custody of their mother, and granting family maintenance services to the mother and supportive services to the father. The San Francisco Human Services Agency filed a petition alleging that the minors were at substantial risk of harm due to the father's substance abuse and provision of drugs to one of the children. The juvenile court sustained the petition and ordered the children to remain with their mother while the father received supportive services.The juvenile court found that the father had a long history of substance abuse and had provided drugs to his son, which posed a substantial danger to the children. The court also noted the father's poor judgment and parenting skills. The court ordered the children to remain with their mother and granted the father supervised visitation and supportive services. The father argued that the court applied the wrong legal standard and that there was insufficient evidence to support the findings.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court found that the juvenile court erred in applying section 362(c) instead of section 361(c) of the Welfare and Institutions Code, which requires findings by clear and convincing evidence that there would be a substantial danger to the children if returned to the father's custody and that reasonable efforts were made to prevent removal. The appellate court concluded that substantial evidence supported the finding of substantial danger but not the finding that reasonable efforts were made to prevent removal. The court reversed the disposition order and remanded the case for a new disposition hearing. View "In re H.B." on Justia Law

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In May 2019, a fire in Davisville resulted in the deaths of Robert and Charlotte Taylor and injuries to a child. Sixteen-year-old M.W., the Taylors' daughter, was interviewed by Deputy Fire Marshal Jason Baltic at the scene. During the interview, M.W. confessed to starting the fire using gasoline. M.W. was subsequently indicted for first-degree murder, attempted murder, and arson. She moved to suppress her confession, arguing that she had not voluntarily waived her Miranda rights and that her confession was coerced. The circuit court denied the motion, and the case proceeded to trial, where the jury found M.W. guilty on all counts.The Circuit Court of Wood County denied M.W.'s motion to suppress her confession, finding that she had knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived her Miranda rights. The court also found that her confession was not coerced. M.W. later filed an emergency motion to reconsider the suppression ruling, citing a Brady violation due to the late disclosure of Deputy Sheriff Tasha Hewitt's past untruthfulness. The circuit court denied this motion, stating that Baltic's testimony was credible and sufficient to establish that M.W. had been read her Miranda rights.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the case and affirmed the circuit court's decisions. The court held that M.W. had knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived her Miranda rights, considering her age, intelligence, and the circumstances of the interview. The court also found that her confession was not coerced, as Baltic's interview techniques did not overbear her will. Additionally, the court ruled that the late disclosure of Hewitt's past untruthfulness did not constitute a Brady violation that would have changed the outcome of the suppression hearing. Finally, the court upheld the jury's verdict, finding sufficient evidence to support M.W.'s convictions. View "State v. M.W." on Justia Law

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In this case, the defendant was accused of sexually assaulting three minors between 2007 and 2009. The police obtained a search warrant and found child pornography on the defendant's computers, including an encrypted file they could not access. The defendant was indicted on multiple counts, including sexual conduct against a child and possession of child pornography. He posted bail and was released but was later remanded to jail for allegedly posting a blog that intimidated a witness.The trial court assigned counsel and experts to assist the defendant, who later chose to represent himself. During the trial, the defendant's daughter testified about a recorded conversation in which one of the victims allegedly recanted her accusations. The prosecution used recorded jail phone calls to challenge the daughter's testimony, revealing that the defendant had discussed trial strategies with her. The jury found the defendant guilty of one count of sexual conduct against a child and all child pornography counts but deadlocked on other charges. The defendant entered an Alford plea to the deadlocked counts.The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment, and the New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case. The primary issue was whether the defendant's right to present a defense was violated by the prosecution's monitoring of his jail phone calls. The Court of Appeals held that the defendant's right to present a defense was not violated. The court noted that the defendant had ample time to prepare his defense while out on bail and had other means to communicate with witnesses. The court also found that the defendant's request to proceed pro se was unequivocal and that the trial court had conducted a proper inquiry into the risks of self-representation. The order of the Appellate Division was affirmed. View "People v Dixon" on Justia Law

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A juvenile court judge in Hamilton County, Ohio, presided over the trial of a thirteen-year-old accused of felonious assault. The judge found the juvenile not delinquent and sealed the case record under Ohio Revised Code (R.C.) 2151.356(B)(1)(d). After the juvenile was later killed, the Cincinnati Enquirer requested the trial transcript, which the judge denied, citing the statute.The Cincinnati Enquirer challenged the constitutionality of R.C. 2151.356, arguing that the Ohio Constitution's open courts provision prohibits sealing court records without an individualized determination balancing the interests of the juvenile and the public. The juvenile court judge argued that the open courts provision does not apply to juvenile delinquency proceedings, relying on precedent from the Ohio Supreme Court.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and held that the open courts provision of the Ohio Constitution applies to juvenile delinquency proceedings. The court determined that R.C. 2151.356 is unconstitutional because it mandates the sealing of records without an individualized balancing of interests. The court granted a writ of mandamus ordering the juvenile court judge to provide access to the trial transcript and a writ of prohibition preventing the enforcement of the sealing order. View "State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Bloom" on Justia Law

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A police officer responded to a hotel where a mother, RN, was intoxicated and with her six-year-old son, JN. Due to her intoxication and the presence of a violent boyfriend at home, JN was taken into protective custody. RN tested positive for amphetamines and had a high blood alcohol content. The State filed a neglect petition, and JN was placed in foster care. The initial permanency plan was family reunification, and RN was required to follow a case plan that included maintaining sobriety and addressing her relationship with her boyfriend.The juvenile court held a shelter care hearing and placed JN in the State's temporary custody. RN made some progress but failed to maintain sobriety and continued her relationship with her boyfriend. The court extended the consent decree to allow more time for RN to comply with the case plan. However, RN missed drug tests, tested positive for methamphetamine, and failed to appear at a hearing, leading to the revocation of the consent decree and the adjudication of neglect. The permanency plan was updated to require inpatient drug treatment, but RN did not check into treatment until the day before the permanency hearing.The Wyoming Supreme Court previously reversed the juvenile court's order changing the permanency plan to adoption due to the lack of a reasonable efforts determination by the Department of Family Services (DFS). On remand, the juvenile court determined that DFS had made reasonable efforts based on the evidence from the original hearing and reaffirmed the change in the permanency plan. The court found that despite RN's bond with JN, her inability to maintain sobriety and provide a stable environment justified the change to adoption. The Wyoming Supreme Court affirmed the juvenile court's decision, finding sufficient evidence that the change was in JN's best interests. View "RN v. The State of Wyoming" on Justia Law

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G.W. was convicted of simple assault in 2019 after allegedly grabbing the jacket of a Metropolitan Transit Police Department officer outside the Anacostia Metro Station. G.W. filed a notice of appeal, and the case was remanded to allow the trial court to set aside his conviction under the Youth Rehabilitation Act (YRA). Following the trial court's set-aside order and issuance of a new judgment and commitment order, G.W. filed a new notice of appeal, challenging his conviction.The Superior Court of the District of Columbia initially convicted G.W. of simple assault. G.W. timely filed a notice of appeal, and the case was stayed pending the outcome of the en banc decision in Perez Hernandez v. United States, which addressed the elements of an offensive touching assault. After the decision in Perez Hernandez, the stay was lifted, and G.W. sought an indicative ruling for a YRA set-aside. The trial court issued an indicative set-aside order, and the case was remanded. The trial court then issued a set-aside order and an amended judgment and commitment order, which G.W. appealed.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case and concluded that G.W.'s appeal was properly before the court. The court determined that the trial court had not applied the correct elements of an offensive touching assault as defined in Perez Hernandez. Specifically, the trial court did not consider whether G.W.'s actions would offend a person's reasonable sense of personal dignity and whether G.W. acted with the purpose of causing offense or knowing that his actions would cause offense. The court vacated the judgment and remanded the case for the trial court to make the necessary findings regarding G.W.'s mens rea and the nature of the touch. The court did not reach G.W.'s Rule 16 claim due to the decision to remand. View "G.W. v. United States" on Justia Law

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Christopher Segerstrom was convicted of capital murder for the 1986 killing of a four-year-old and was initially sentenced to life imprisonment without parole. He was 15 years old at the time of the crime. Following the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Miller v. Alabama, which prohibits mandatory life without parole for juvenile offenders, Segerstrom's sentence was vacated and remanded for resentencing. The Washington County Circuit Court resentenced him to life with the possibility of parole after thirty years without a hearing, which was reversed by the Arkansas Supreme Court, mandating a hearing to consider mitigating factors.Upon remand, Segerstrom's fitness to proceed was contested. The circuit court initially found him unfit due to schizophrenia but later deemed him fit after a year of treatment, based on a forensic evaluation by Dr. Melissa Wright. Segerstrom's defense presented conflicting expert testimony, but the court credited Dr. Wright's findings. On the day of the resentencing hearing, Segerstrom's counsel requested a continuance, claiming he was unresponsive due to medication, which the court denied.During the resentencing, the court admitted prior testimony from Dr. Joseph Halka, who performed the autopsy, over Segerstrom's objection. The court also rejected a nonmodel jury instruction proposed by Segerstrom, which emphasized the differences between juvenile and adult offenders as per Miller. The jury ultimately sentenced Segerstrom to life imprisonment.The Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's decisions, holding that substantial evidence supported the finding of Segerstrom's fitness to proceed, the denial of the continuance was not an abuse of discretion, the admission of Dr. Halka's testimony was proper, and the rejection of the proposed jury instruction was appropriate given the sentencing options. View "SEGERSTROM V. STATE OF ARKANSAS" on Justia Law

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In 2018 and 2019, a minor, J.S., committed a series of serious crimes, including seven street robberies, two burglaries, an attempted robbery resulting in murder, and the drugging and sexual assault of a 14-year-old girl. J.S. was 16 and 17 years old at the time of these offenses. The People filed an 18-count petition against J.S., including charges of murder, robbery, burglary, and sexual assault, and sought to transfer him to adult criminal court.The juvenile court in Ventura County conducted a transfer hearing and found that J.S. was not amenable to rehabilitation within the juvenile system's jurisdiction, which would expire when he turned 25. The court considered J.S.'s criminal sophistication, previous delinquent history, and the gravity of the offenses. Despite evidence of J.S.'s participation in rehabilitation programs and expert testimony suggesting potential for rehabilitation, the court concluded that the severity and premeditated nature of his crimes, along with his behavior in custody, indicated a need for prolonged treatment and supervision beyond the juvenile system's capacity.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Six, reviewed the juvenile court's decision for abuse of discretion. The appellate court affirmed the transfer order, agreeing that substantial evidence supported the juvenile court's findings. The appellate court emphasized that it does not reweigh evidence or substitute its discretion for that of the trial court. The court found that the juvenile court had appropriately considered the statutory criteria and expert testimony, and its conclusion that J.S. was not amenable to rehabilitation within the juvenile system was supported by clear and convincing evidence. View "People v. J.S." on Justia Law

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In two separate cases, mothers petitioned the Juvenile Court to involuntarily commit their children for inpatient care due to substance use disorders under Massachusetts General Laws c. 123, § 35. E.S. was committed for ninety days, and J.P. for thirty days, following hearings where family members and court clinicians testified about the juveniles' substance use and behaviors.In the case of E.S., the Bristol County Juvenile Court judge found clear and convincing evidence of a substance use disorder, citing E.S.'s history of alcohol and marijuana use, recent positive tests for fentanyl, and concerning behaviors such as stumbling and passing out. The judge also found a likelihood of serious harm due to the imminent risk posed by E.S.'s substance use and the lack of immediate outpatient care options. E.S.'s commitment was affirmed on appeal.For J.P., the Essex County Juvenile Court judge ordered commitment based on testimony about J.P.'s daily marijuana use, behavioral changes, and a single incident of driving under the influence. However, the court clinician did not find J.P. to be a danger to himself or others. On appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court found the evidence insufficient to support a likelihood of serious harm, noting the lack of clear evidence of imminent risk. J.P.'s commitment order was reversed.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that a finding of a substance use disorder under § 35 must be supported by clinical evidence to comply with substantive due process. The court affirmed E.S.'s commitment but reversed and vacated J.P.'s commitment, remanding the case for entry of an order consistent with its opinion. View "In the Matter of J.P." on Justia Law

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Elizabeth T. was taking her three children to see their father when she fell on a bus after consuming alcohol. An anonymous caller reported her to the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS), alleging she was intoxicated and her children were neglected. Elizabeth denied being heavily intoxicated and claimed her children were well cared for. DCFS filed a petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b), alleging Elizabeth's substance abuse posed a risk to her children.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County sustained the petition, citing a prior sustained allegation of substance abuse from 2018. The court ordered informal supervision under section 360, subdivision (b). Elizabeth appealed, arguing that one incident of alcohol abuse did not support the finding that she posed a risk to her children at the time of the jurisdiction hearing.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court found that the evidence of the bus incident, along with the four-year-old allegation, did not support the finding that Elizabeth's conduct created a substantial risk of serious physical harm or illness to her children. The court noted that Elizabeth had cooperated with DCFS, submitted to drug and alcohol testing, and her children were healthy and well cared for. The court concluded that there was no substantial evidence of a current risk to the children and reversed the juvenile court's jurisdiction findings and disposition orders. View "In re Gilberto G." on Justia Law