Justia Juvenile Law Opinion Summaries

Two children, R.D. and S.D., were the subject of a dependency and neglect case initiated in Tennessee in 2019 due to their mother’s substance abuse and their father’s incarceration for assaulting the mother. The Tennessee court placed the children with their maternal grandmother, then later with their aunt and uncle, T.V. and R.V., in West Virginia after the grandmother’s death. In February 2022, the Tennessee court granted T.V. and R.V. full legal and physical custody but did not terminate the parents’ rights. T.V. and R.V. subsequently petitioned for adoption in West Virginia, mistakenly asserting that parental rights had been terminated.The Circuit Court of McDowell County, West Virginia, granted the adoption petitions in June 2022, believing the Tennessee court had terminated parental rights. The Tennessee court later clarified that it had not done so and transferred jurisdiction to the West Virginia court in April 2023. The circuit court consolidated all related proceedings, and various motions followed, including amended adoption petitions and requests to terminate parental rights. In June 2024, the circuit court upheld the prior adoption orders and, alternatively, modified the Tennessee disposition to terminate the father’s parental rights.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the case. It held that the circuit court lacked subject matter jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA) to make custody determinations or terminate parental rights in June 2022, rendering those adoption orders void. However, the court affirmed the circuit court’s later modification of disposition and termination of parental rights after jurisdiction was properly transferred from Tennessee. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with these holdings. View "In re R.D. and S.D." on Justia Law

A.H., a minor, was adjudged a ward of the juvenile court after admitting to grand theft and violating probation conditions, including disobeying his mother, leaving home without approval, and violating curfew. After further violations—failing to attend mentorship meetings and testing positive for THC—the probation department recommended out-of-home placement in a short-term residential therapeutic program (STRTP), citing A.H.’s mental health conditions and his mother’s unwillingness to house him due to safety concerns. The probation department did not submit a statutorily required case plan before the disposition hearing, although it later provided one after the court’s order.The Superior Court of Contra Costa County held several hearings, ultimately ordering A.H.’s placement in an STRTP without first reviewing a case plan as required by Welfare and Institutions Code sections 706.5 and 706.6, and relevant California Rules of Court. A.H.’s counsel objected to the lack of a case plan, but the court proceeded with the placement order and deferred consideration of certain recommendations pending receipt of the case plan. The case plan was provided at a subsequent hearing, but the court did not indicate it had reviewed it before proceeding.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case. While the appeal became moot when the juvenile court vacated the placement order, the appellate court exercised its discretion to address the issue due to its public importance and likelihood of recurrence. The court held that the statutory scheme requires probation to submit, and the juvenile court to consider, a case plan before ordering foster care placement. The failure to do so constituted an abuse of discretion. After deciding the merits, the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal as moot. View "In re A.H." on Justia Law

A petition alleging abuse and neglect was filed regarding a child, P.K., who was living with her paternal grandmother (the petitioner) in Lincoln County, West Virginia. The initial allegations against the petitioner concerned unsafe and unsanitary living conditions, including lack of running water, inadequate food, and exposure to hazards. P.K. was removed from the petitioner’s home and placed in the custody of the Department of Human Services (DHS). The petitioner admitted to the allegations and was adjudicated as having abused and/or neglected P.K. After a period of improvement and compliance with a family case plan, P.K. was returned to the petitioner’s care, and both were dismissed from the proceedings.After reunification, DHS filed a motion to modify the prior order, alleging new instances of abuse and neglect, such as medical neglect, exposure to registered sex offenders, and educational neglect. DHS subsequently filed a third amended petition with additional allegations. The Circuit Court of Lincoln County held a dispositional hearing, found the petitioner to be an abusive and neglectful custodian based on the new allegations, and terminated her custodial rights without first conducting a separate adjudicatory hearing on those new allegations. The petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, arguing that she was entitled to an adjudicatory hearing on the new allegations, was denied.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the case and held that termination of custodial rights requires a prerequisite adjudication of abuse or neglect on the specific allegations at issue. The court found that the petitioner was not afforded an adjudicatory hearing on the new allegations in the third amended petition, and that such allegations do not constitute a material change of circumstances for modification under Rule 46 or West Virginia Code § 49-4-606(a). The court vacated the circuit court’s order terminating custodial rights and remanded for further proceedings consistent with proper abuse and neglect procedures. View "In re P.K." on Justia Law

A child, Trinity, was removed from her mother’s custody shortly after birth and placed with the Iowa Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) for foster care. Trinity was placed in a different foster home from her siblings, who were also in state custody. As the case progressed, HHS sought to move Trinity to a new foster home with her siblings, but the guardian ad litem (GAL) objected, citing concerns about Trinity’s well-being and requested an evidentiary hearing before any move. The juvenile court ordered HHS not to move Trinity until such a hearing could be held, prioritizing the child’s best interests.HHS challenged the juvenile court’s order, arguing that it exceeded its statutory authority by interfering with HHS’s placement decisions. The Iowa District Court for Polk County maintained its position, requiring an evidentiary hearing before any change in placement. HHS then filed a petition for writ of certiorari, which was granted and transferred to the Iowa Court of Appeals. The court of appeals, in a split decision, sustained the writ, concluding that the juvenile court had acted beyond its authority by suspending HHS’s placement decision without making the findings required by statute.On further review, the Iowa Supreme Court vacated the decision of the court of appeals and annulled the writ. The Supreme Court held that the juvenile court did not exceed its authority by temporarily staying HHS’s planned move of the child pending an evidentiary hearing. The Court clarified that Iowa Code chapter 232 allows for judicial review of HHS’s placement decisions before a move occurs, especially when necessary to protect the child’s best interests. The Supreme Court’s disposition vacated the appellate decision and annulled the writ. View "Iowa Department of Health and Human Services v. Iowa District Court for Polk County" on Justia Law

A young adult, H.T., was adjudicated a ward of the court after admitting to a crime and was committed to a secure youth treatment facility. Upon completion of his baseline term, the juvenile court prepared to discharge him to probation supervision in the community. However, finding suitable housing proved difficult due to probation conditions: H.T. could not live with his mother, was ineligible for community organization housing due to a registration requirement, and could not be placed in the probation department’s usual facility because of its proximity to a high school. H.T. requested that the court order the County of Sacramento to pay for his stay at a transitional housing facility.The Superior Court of Sacramento County initially granted H.T.’s request for 30 days of housing but later declined to order further payments, concluding it lacked statutory authority to require the County to pay for H.T.’s housing. The court instead directed the probation department to provide hotel vouchers and other support. H.T. appealed the orders denying his requests for continued payment of rent at the transitional housing facility.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case. It held that the juvenile court had discretion under Welfare and Institutions Code section 900, subdivision (b), to order the County to pay for the support and maintenance of a ward, including necessary housing expenses. The appellate court found that the lower court misinterpreted its authority and abused its discretion by failing to recognize the full scope of its statutory power. The Court of Appeal vacated the juvenile court’s order and remanded the matter for the juvenile court to exercise its discretion under the correct legal standard, specifically to determine whether payment for H.T.’s housing was necessary at the relevant time. View "In re H.T." on Justia Law

A 16-year-old girl, Luna, was involved in a fatal altercation with another teenager, S.P.T., whom she knew only through social media. The conflict began when S.P.T. arrived at Luna’s home and initiated a physical fight by punching Luna. Luna responded by using a pocketknife, resulting in S.P.T.’s death. Prior to the incident, Luna had received social media messages that she interpreted as threats, including an image suggesting gang violence. The State charged Luna with murder, and she was tried as an adult.In the Kitsap County Superior Court, the State was permitted to introduce various pieces of social media evidence and a video of Luna’s police interrogation to suggest preexisting violent intent and lack of remorse. Luna argued self-defense and sought to introduce additional social media evidence to support her fear of S.P.T., but some of this evidence was excluded. The jury found Luna guilty of intentional, but not premeditated, second-degree murder. On appeal, the Washington Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, finding that some social media evidence was improperly admitted but deemed the error harmless. The appellate court also held that a new statute requiring juveniles to be provided counsel before interrogation did not apply retroactively to Luna’s case.The Supreme Court of the State of Washington reviewed the case. It held that the new statute, RCW 13.40.740, did not apply retroactively to Luna’s interrogation. However, the court found that Luna did not validly waive her right to silence, and her interrogation statements should have been excluded. The court also determined that several evidentiary rulings regarding social media evidence were erroneous and undermined the fairness of the trial. The Supreme Court vacated the jury verdict and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "State v. Luna" on Justia Law

A county attorney in Nebraska sought to challenge the appointment of a special prosecutor in a juvenile court case. The issue arose because the county attorney’s adult daughter, who works as a caseworker for the Department of Health and Human Services, was assigned to the same juvenile case and could potentially be called as a witness. The daughter testified that she did not discuss her work with her father and that her father’s position would not affect her testimony. The deputy county attorney assigned to the case also testified to his independence in handling the matter.The Separate Juvenile Court of Lancaster County, on its own initiative, raised concerns about a possible conflict of interest due to the familial relationship. The court found that the lack of disclosure of the relationship, combined with the organizational structure of the county attorney’s office, created a conflict of interest. Relying on Nebraska ethics advisory opinions and a prior appellate decision, the court concluded that the entire county attorney’s office should be disqualified and appointed a special prosecutor under Nebraska Revised Statute § 23-1205.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the matter as an original action in quo warranto. The court held that the existence of a conflict of interest must be determined on a case-by-case basis and is personal to the attorney involved. It found no evidence that the county attorney’s professional judgment or the deputy county attorney’s independence was compromised by the daughter’s involvement. The court concluded that the appointment of a special prosecutor was unwarranted under the facts presented and ordered the ouster of the special prosecutor, reinstating the county attorney’s office to the case. View "State ex rel. Condon v. Braaten" on Justia Law

A defendant, who was sixteen and seventeen years old at the time of two separate armed robberies in Washington, D.C., pleaded guilty to charges arising from those incidents. In the first case, he used a BB gun resembling a real firearm and was sentenced under the Youth Rehabilitation Act (YRA) to probation. While on probation, he committed a second robbery with an actual firearm and was sentenced to imprisonment and supervised release, not under the YRA. After completing all sentences and supervision, he moved to have both convictions set aside under a provision of the YRA that allows for such relief after completion of sentence, based on a set of statutory factors.The Superior Court of the District of Columbia denied both motions. The court found that several statutory factors weighed against the defendant, including the violent nature of the offenses, the fact that the second offense was committed while on supervision for the first, and a later temporary protective order issued against him. The court treated the defendant’s age at the time of the offenses as merely establishing eligibility for YRA relief, did not weigh in his favor the lack of prior YRA sentencing for the first conviction, and interpreted the factor regarding the ability to appreciate risks and consequences as relating to acceptance of responsibility after the fact.On appeal, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals held that the trial court erred in its application of the statutory factors. Specifically, the appellate court found that the trial court misapplied the factors concerning the defendant’s age, prior YRA sentencing, and ability to appreciate risks and consequences. The appellate court vacated the trial court’s order and remanded the case for reconsideration of the motions to set aside the convictions, instructing the lower court to apply the statutory factors correctly. View "Williams v. United States" on Justia Law

A defendant committed several serious offenses, including first-degree murder and attempted murder, when he was 17 years old. In 2002, a jury convicted him of these crimes, and he was sentenced to a total term of 79 years to life with the possibility of parole. The sentence included both determinate and indeterminate terms, with firearm enhancements. The crimes occurred in 2000, and the defendant was not sentenced to life without the possibility of parole (LWOP), but rather to a lengthy term that could be considered the functional equivalent of LWOP.Years later, the defendant filed a petition in the Superior Court of Ventura County seeking recall of his sentence under Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (d)(1)(A), which allows for resentencing of juvenile offenders sentenced to LWOP. The trial court granted the petition, reasoning that the defendant’s 79-year-to-life sentence was functionally equivalent to LWOP, relying on the reasoning in People v. Heard (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 608 and People v. Sorto (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 435. The court recalled the sentence, conditionally reversed the conviction and sentence, and certified the matter to juvenile court for further proceedings under Proposition 57. Meanwhile, the defendant received a youth offender parole hearing under Penal Code section 3051, but was found unsuitable for parole.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Six, reviewed the case. It held that the defendant was not eligible for relief under section 1170(d)(1)(A) because he was not sentenced to LWOP, and that subsequent legislative changes, specifically section 3051, rendered the Heard rule moot. The court concluded that since the defendant had already received a parole hearing, he was not serving the functional equivalent of LWOP. The appellate court reversed the trial court’s orders. View "P. v. Lara" on Justia Law

A child was removed from his parents’ care shortly after birth due to concerns about the mother’s mental health, and placed in foster care under the supervision of Good Shepherd Services. The father, a Chinese immigrant whose primary language is Fuzhou, faced significant linguistic and economic barriers throughout the agency’s involvement. The agency did not provide interpretation services during family visits or at medical appointments, failed to expose the child to the parents’ language or culture, and did not assist the father in overcoming obstacles such as his work schedule, housing needs, or understanding of the mother’s mental illness. Despite the father’s efforts to maintain contact and participate in services when available, the agency’s actions and omissions hindered reunification.The New York County Family Court found that both parents had permanently neglected the child, concluding that the agency’s “minimal” efforts were nonetheless reasonable and sufficient under the law. The court determined that the child’s best interests were served by freeing him for adoption. The Appellate Division, First Department, affirmed, holding that the agency had made diligent efforts, particularly in addressing the language barrier and providing services in Mandarin, and that the father had failed to maintain consistent contact or plan for the child’s future.The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order. The Court held that the agency failed, as a matter of law, to establish by clear and convincing evidence that it undertook diligent efforts to encourage and strengthen the parental relationship. The agency’s minimal and inadequate actions did not satisfy its statutory burden, particularly given the father’s linguistic and economic challenges. The Court ordered dismissal of the petition to terminate the father’s parental rights. View "In re K.Y.Z. (W.Z.)" on Justia Law