Justia Juvenile Law Opinion Summaries

A mother with primary custody of her three children contacted law enforcement, expressing concern that the children’s father was using methamphetamine while caring for two of the children at a motel. During the police investigation, both parents admitted to recent methamphetamine use, and the investigating officer suspected both were under the influence. Hair follicle tests showed that the two minor children were exposed to methamphetamine, amphetamine, and marijuana. The children were placed in protective custody, and the State filed a petition alleging the parents neglected the children by failing to provide adequate care and supervision.Following the State’s petition, the District Court of Platte County held a shelter care and initial hearing, informing the parents of their rights, including the right to appointed counsel. At the subsequent adjudicatory hearing, the mother appeared without counsel, having not completed paperwork for a court-appointed attorney. The juvenile court proceeded, finding that the mother had sufficient opportunity to seek counsel. During the hearing, the court did not initially invite the mother to give opening or closing statements or to cross-examine witnesses, but later explicitly gave her the opportunity to call or question any witness and to testify. The mother declined to question previous witnesses and gave a brief statement on her own behalf.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Wyoming reviewed whether the juvenile court committed plain error by not inviting the mother to present opening or closing statements or to cross-examine witnesses during their initial testimony. The court held that, although the opportunity to participate was offered later than for other parties, the mother was ultimately afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard, as required by law. The Supreme Court concluded there was no plain error and affirmed the juvenile court’s adjudication of neglect. View "In the Interest Of: AC v. The State of Wyoming" on Justia Law

An infant, K.B., was removed from her mother’s care after a police officer witnessed the mother acting abusively toward K.B. and expressing suicidal thoughts. The Baltimore County Department of Social Services filed a petition alleging K.B. was a child in need of assistance (CINA) due to abuse, neglect, and the mother’s history of mental health issues and prior terminations of parental rights. At the adjudication and disposition hearing, the Circuit Court for Baltimore County declared K.B. a CINA, committed her to the Department’s custody, and established supervised visitation. The court’s order included a standard notice that the permanency plan of reunification could later be changed.At a subsequent initial review hearing, the Department recommended changing K.B.’s presumptive plan of reunification to a concurrent plan of reunification and adoption. A magistrate adopted this recommendation, and the juvenile court overruled the mother’s exceptions, ordering the concurrent plan. The mother appealed. The Appellate Court of Maryland reversed, holding that the juvenile court had improperly established a permanency plan before the required permanency plan hearing and without considering the statutory factors or providing proper notice.The Supreme Court of Maryland reviewed whether the juvenile court could change the permanency plan at the initial review hearing. It held that the presumptive plan of reunification established at disposition is not a permanency plan as defined by Maryland law. The court ruled that a permanency plan must be determined at a hearing that complies with statutory requirements, including consideration of specific factors and provision of reasonable notice to all parties about the date, time, and purpose of the hearing. The court affirmed the Appellate Court’s judgment and remanded the case for proper proceedings. View "In re: K.B." on Justia Law

A child, A.R.H., was born in November 2022 to Latisha H. and Redonn Malone. At birth, both the child and the mother tested positive for illegal drugs, and Malone was incarcerated on felony charges. As a result, the Jackson County Youth Court placed A.R.H. in the custody of Child Protection Services (CPS), appointed a guardian ad litem, and adjudicated the child as neglected. During subsequent hearings, the youth court found that Latisha was absent and that Malone’s paternity was confirmed. The court was presented with evidence of Malone’s extensive criminal history, including violent offenses, and his ongoing incarceration.The Jackson County Youth Court determined that Malone's criminal history constituted “aggravated circumstances” sufficient to bypass efforts to reunify the child with his father under Mississippi Code Section 43-21-603(7)(c). CPS recommended a service plan aiming for reunification, but the intake officer and guardian ad litem recommended bypassing reunification. The youth court ultimately ordered that reasonable efforts for reunification with Malone would not be required and moved toward termination of Malone’s parental rights. Malone appealed, arguing that the statute was misapplied because his criminal acts had not involved A.R.H. or any child. The Mississippi Court of Appeals affirmed the youth court’s decision, applying a deferential standard of review and concluding the court did not err in its findings or reliance on evidence.The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the statutory interpretation de novo and concluded that Section 43-21-603(7)(c)(i) requires the parent to have subjected the child to aggravated circumstances. The Court held that because Malone had not subjected A.R.H. to his past criminal conduct, bypassing reunification on this basis was not supported by the statute. The Supreme Court reversed the decisions of both the youth court and the Court of Appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "In the Interest of A.R.H. v. Jackson County Department of Child Protection Services" on Justia Law

A lawyer and parents’ rights activist assisted her client in evading a Tennessee juvenile court’s order that awarded temporary custody of the client’s child to the Department of Children’s Services. The client, a single mother, fled with her daughter after being investigated for suspected child neglect. The lawyer joined the client and child at a hotel, and when they received a missing child alert, they disabled their phones and went to the lawyer’s home to avoid authorities. The police located them the following day, and the state took custody of the children. After an extended custody dispute, the state returned the children and dismissed its petition.While the custody case was ongoing, the Department of Children’s Services and local police investigated and eventually indicted both the lawyer and her client on charges related to custodial interference. Both were convicted by juries, but on appeal, the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals vacated the convictions. The appellate court concluded that the statute at issue required proof that the alleged interference occurred after a period of lawful visitation, an element not present in this case.The lawyer and her client then filed a federal suit in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee, alleging malicious prosecution, conspiracy, and other claims against various officials and the City of Brentwood. The district court dismissed all claims, holding that the defendants were entitled to qualified or absolute immunity and that the Monell claim against the city failed because the officers lacked final policymaking authority.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed. The Sixth Circuit held that the individual defendants were entitled to immunity and that the Monell claim failed as a matter of law. The court confirmed that the law provides no recourse against prosecutors and officers acting within their respective protected functions under these circumstances. View "Reguli v. Hetzel" on Justia Law

Two children, A.T. and R.T., were placed under the legal guardianship of R.G. In August 2024, authorities became involved after A.T., then four years old, was observed with visible injuries and signs of malnourishment while accompanied by R.G. at a mall. Medical examination revealed severe physical abuse and malnutrition. Both children were subsequently removed from R.G.’s care: A.T. was hospitalized for nearly two weeks, and R.T. was placed in foster care. The San Bernardino County Children and Family Services filed dependency petitions on behalf of both minors, alleging multiple grounds for juvenile court intervention, including serious physical harm and failure to protect.The Superior Court of San Bernardino County held a combined jurisdiction/disposition hearing in April 2025. By that time, A.T. had turned five and R.T. was six years old. The juvenile court sustained allegations under section 300(e) of the Welfare and Institutions Code—severe physical abuse of a child under five—against both minors, as well as other allegations. R.G. appealed, arguing the (e) finding as to A.T. was improper because he was five at the jurisdiction hearing, and that R.T. had not suffered severe physical abuse.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, exercised discretionary review despite acknowledging the appeal was technically moot due to unchallenged findings. The court held that section 300(e) jurisdiction requires the child to be under five years old at the time of the jurisdictional hearing, not merely when the alleged abuse occurred. Because A.T. was over five by the hearing date, and because R.T. had not suffered severe physical abuse, the appellate court reversed the juvenile court’s section 300(e) findings as to both children. All other unchallenged findings remained undisturbed. View "In re A.T." on Justia Law

A 16-year-old was involved in a fatal shooting and was charged in juvenile court with multiple offenses, including aggravated murder and having a weapon while under a disability. After a probable cause hearing, the Juvenile Division of the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas found probable cause for several offenses but not for the weapon under disability charge. As required by law, the court transferred the case to adult court for prosecution of the offenses for which probable cause was found.Once in adult court, a grand jury indicted the defendant on all the original charges from the juvenile complaint plus additional charges, including attempted murder and new counts related to other alleged victims and conduct. The defendant pleaded guilty to murder (an offense for which probable cause had been found), having a weapon while under a disability (for which the juvenile court found no probable cause), and attempted murder (which had not been charged in the juvenile complaint). The trial court sentenced him accordingly.The defendant appealed to the Eighth District Court of Appeals, arguing that the adult court lacked jurisdiction over the attempted murder and weapon under disability charges because the juvenile court had not found probable cause for those. The appellate court, relying on the Supreme Court of Ohio’s prior decisions in State v. Smith and State v. Burns, vacated those convictions.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the matter and overruled its prior decisions in Smith and Burns, holding that when a juvenile court transfers a case to adult court—whether by mandatory or discretionary bindover—it transfers the entire case, including all acts charged in the juvenile complaint. The adult court’s jurisdiction then extends to any offense indicted by the grand jury, not just those for which the juvenile court found probable cause. Accordingly, the Supreme Court of Ohio reversed the Eighth District’s judgment, reinstated the convictions, and remanded for further proceedings on remaining assignments of error. View "State v. Turner" on Justia Law

The case concerns a defendant who, as a youth, was convicted of several offenses in two related criminal matters. He was charged under statutes allowing prosecution in district court rather than youth court, resulting in convictions for felony assault on a peace officer and other offenses. He received concurrent 10-year sentences to the Department of Corrections, with 5 years suspended. The judgments failed to identify him as a criminally convicted youth subject to the Criminally Convicted Youth Act (CCYA) and did not incorporate the procedural and rehabilitative provisions required under that statute, including ongoing status reports and sentence review before he turned 21.After sentencing, the defendant did not receive the mandatory status reports or sentence review contemplated by the CCYA. Nearly three years later, after turning 21, he requested a sentence review hearing, arguing that the lack of compliance with the CCYA deprived him of rehabilitative opportunities and the ability to demonstrate substantial rehabilitation. The Sixteenth Judicial District Court held a sentence review hearing, found it retained jurisdiction past age 21, but determined that the evidence did not support sentence modification.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Montana held that the district court abused its discretion by failing to include the statutory CCYA provisions in the judgments and failing to review the defendant’s sentence before he turned 21. The Supreme Court concluded that the defendant was denied the rehabilitative benefits and procedural safeguards of the CCYA for nearly three years, resulting in substantial injustice. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s denial of immediate sentence modification, but reversed in part and remanded, directing the Department of Corrections and the district court to apply the CCYA rehabilitative provisions for two years, after which a meaningful sentence review hearing must be held. View "State v. I. Pehringer" on Justia Law

A youth was charged with aggravated burglary and obstructing a peace officer after committing the offenses at age 17. He was prosecuted as an adult after the District Court denied transfer to Youth Court. He pled guilty to both counts and received a 15-year sentence to the Department of Corrections with 11 years suspended for the felony, and a concurrent suspended sentence for the misdemeanor. At sentencing, the court failed to include the mandatory provisions of the Montana Criminally Convicted Youth Act (CCYA), which require ongoing rehabilitative oversight and status reports for youthful offenders.After the youth turned 21, he moved for a sentence review hearing under the CCYA, highlighting that for nearly three years, the Department of Corrections had not provided the required status reports, and the court had not conducted the mandated sentence review before his 21st birthday. The District Court subsequently issued a nunc pro tunc order to correct the judgment and held a belated sentence review hearing, but ultimately denied any sentence modification, finding the youth had not demonstrated substantial rehabilitation.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Montana held that the District Court abused its discretion by not including the mandatory CCYA provisions in the original judgment and by failing to ensure the youth received the statutory rehabilitative process, including regular status reports and timely sentence review. The Supreme Court determined that these omissions constituted a substantial injustice, as the youth was denied opportunities for rehabilitation and meaningful sentence review as intended by statute. The court affirmed the denial of discharge but reversed in part, remanding for application of the CCYA provisions and requiring a two-year period of compliance before a new sentence review hearing. View "State v. I. Pehringer" on Justia Law

The defendant, who was a minor at the time he was arrested, was charged in district court by direct filing with several serious offenses, including first degree murder and attempted first degree murder. He was initially detained at a Division of Youth Services (DYS) facility. After turning eighteen, he was transferred to the county jail by law enforcement. The day after his transfer, the defendant objected, asserting that the transfer was unlawful and unconstitutional, and argued that the district court had discretion to keep him in DYS custody. He also claimed that his transfer to county jail violated his right to equal protection because another defendant in a different case had been allowed to remain in DYS custody after turning eighteen.The La Plata County District Court reviewed the People’s motion to transfer the defendant to county jail. After a hearing, the district court concluded that section 19-2.5-305(4)(g) of the Children’s Code required the defendant’s transfer to county jail upon turning eighteen and provided no discretion to rule otherwise. The court expressed discomfort with the result but determined it was bound by the statute. The defendant then sought relief in the Supreme Court of Colorado through an original proceeding.The Supreme Court of Colorado held that section 19-2.5-305(4)(g) plainly and unambiguously requires a person who turns eighteen while detained on charges filed directly in district court to be transferred to county jail, leaving no discretion for the district court to order continued DYS custody. The court further held that the defendant’s equal protection rights were not violated because he was not similarly situated to the other defendant who remained in DYS custody. Consequently, the Supreme Court discharged its order to show cause and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "People v. Lawrence" on Justia Law

A juvenile was charged in Newport County Family Court with two counts of first-degree child molestation, based on sexual acts he engaged in with a minor who was twelve years old at the time. Prior to trial, a competency hearing was held. Two experts in forensic psychology evaluated the respondent and testified that he had limited understanding of the legal process, particularly about sex offender registration, plea bargains, and the role of the prosecutor. Their report concluded that he did not sufficiently demonstrate factual or rational understanding or adequate decision-making abilities. However, the respondent had no prior mental health diagnoses, cognitive impairments, or psychiatric history.The Family Court judge considered the expert testimony and report but concluded that the respondent’s answers, while imperfect, demonstrated a sufficient understanding of the proceedings and the ability to assist in his defense. The judge found the respondent competent to stand trial. Following a bench trial, the respondent was found delinquent on both counts beyond a reasonable doubt. At sentencing, an expert social worker recommended against sex offender registration, describing the respondent as non-predatory and not a danger to the community. The judge rejected this recommendation, citing deficiencies in the expert’s knowledge of the case facts and the circumstances of the offenses.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island reviewed the Family Court’s findings. The Court held that the trial justice did not abuse her discretion in finding the respondent competent, as the trial judge is the ultimate factfinder on competency and need not accept uncontradicted expert testimony. The Court also held that the trial justice did not err or abuse her discretion in imposing the full fifteen-year sex offender registration period, finding the respondent’s conduct was criminal not solely because of the victim’s age but also because of his actions. The orders of the Family Court were affirmed. View "In re E.G.S" on Justia Law