Justia Juvenile Law Opinion Summaries

Santiago Gonzalo Canales was convicted of lewd acts and continuous sexual abuse of children, specifically his stepdaughter and niece, both under the age of 14 during the abuse. Canales's niece testified that he molested her from ages seven to 13, while his stepdaughter testified that he began molesting her when she was about 11, including vaginal penetration. Canales denied all allegations.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County convicted Canales on all counts and found true the multiple victims allegations. He was sentenced to 60 years to life in prison, consisting of four consecutive sentences of 15 years to life.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. Canales challenged two jury instructions: CALCRIM No. 1120 and CALCRIM No. 252. The court upheld the use of CALCRIM No. 1120, stating it correctly reflected the statutory requirements for continuous sexual abuse, which did not necessitate a heightened mental state for "substantial sexual conduct." The court acknowledged an error in CALCRIM No. 252 but deemed it harmless beyond a reasonable doubt due to the overwhelming evidence of Canales's guilt. Canales's argument regarding the unanimity instruction was forfeited as he did not raise it during the trial.The court agreed with Canales and the prosecution that his sentence violated ex post facto principles because the One Strike law, which enhanced his sentence, did not apply to his offenses against his stepdaughter, which occurred before the law was amended to include continuous sexual abuse. Consequently, the court vacated Canales's sentence and remanded the case for resentencing without applying the One Strike law. View "People v. Canales" on Justia Law

A juvenile was seen masturbating in a parked car and was charged with open and gross lewdness and lascivious behavior, a felony. At trial, the jury was also instructed on the lesser included offense of indecent exposure, a misdemeanor punishable by no more than six months in jail. The jury found the juvenile delinquent only of the lesser included offense. The juvenile, who had no prior offenses, argued that the delinquency adjudication must be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.The Juvenile Court judge denied the motion to dismiss and sentenced the juvenile to a continuance without a finding until his nineteenth birthday, after which the charge was dismissed. The juvenile appealed, and the Supreme Judicial Court transferred the case from the Appeals Court to address whether the Juvenile Court retained jurisdiction over a first offense of a minor misdemeanor after a jury trial.The Supreme Judicial Court concluded that once the jury found the juvenile delinquent only of a minor misdemeanor and it was undisputed that it was his first offense, the Juvenile Court no longer had subject matter jurisdiction. The court held that the delinquency adjudication should have been dismissed and recorded only as a Wallace W. determination. The court vacated the adjudication of delinquency and remanded the matter to the Juvenile Court with instructions to make the appropriate entry. View "Commonwealth v. Vince V." on Justia Law

Juan A., a teenager and dependent of the juvenile court, was removed from parental custody and placed in long-term foster care after the court found he was not adoptable and no one was willing to be his legal guardian. The court terminated family reunification services but did not terminate parental rights. Juan attended many hearings during his dependency case but was not present at the status review hearing that is the subject of this appeal. At that hearing, the court denied Juan’s trial counsel’s request for a brief continuance to allow Juan to be present, which was found to be an error as Juan had a right to be present under Welfare and Institutions Code section 349.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County declared Juan a dependent of the court in January 2020, removed him from parental custody, and ordered family reunification services for his mother. In August 2021, the court terminated these services. At a section 366.26 review hearing in June 2023, the court decided not to terminate parental rights, finding Juan not adoptable and no potential legal guardians available. The court ordered Juan to remain in foster care with permanent placement services. In March 2024, the court denied a continuance request for Juan to attend the permanency planning review hearing, found his placement appropriate, and scheduled the next review hearing for September 2024.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case and found that the juvenile court erred in denying the continuance request, as Juan had a statutory right to be present at the hearing. The court held that this error prejudiced Juan, as his presence could have allowed him to request additional services to improve his academic performance and employment prospects. The appellate court reversed the orders issued at the March 28, 2024 hearing and remanded the case for a new status review hearing in accordance with section 349. View "In re Juan A." on Justia Law

James Lamont Bagsby was convicted and sentenced to 107 years to life for violent crimes committed at age 15. After serving over 15 years, he petitioned for recall and resentencing under Penal Code section 1170(d), which applies to juveniles sentenced to life without parole. Bagsby argued his sentence was the functional equivalent of life without parole, citing People v. Heard, which held that denying such juveniles the opportunity to petition for resentencing violates equal protection. The trial court agreed, granted his petition, and ordered his release, but stayed the release pending appeal.The People appealed, asking the Court of Appeal to strike down the section 1170(d) resentencing provision or reconsider Heard. They also contended the trial court had jurisdiction to resentence Bagsby and erred by ordering his release. Bagsby cross-appealed the stay order.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, affirmed the trial court's orders. The court upheld Heard, finding no compelling reason to overturn it. The court rejected the People's arguments, noting that the Legislature had not repealed section 1170(d) despite amendments and that the trial court correctly applied Proposition 57 and Senate Bill 1391 retroactively, making Bagsby's judgment nonfinal and outside juvenile court jurisdiction. The court also found the stay order would expire upon remittitur, making Bagsby's release effective as of the original release date for custody credit purposes. View "P. v. Bagsby" on Justia Law

The case involves a grandmother (Grandmother) who was adjudicated as an abusing and neglectful parent to her grandchildren, B.L.-1, B.L.-2, K.L., M.L., and M.S. The West Virginia Department of Human Services (DHS) filed an abuse and neglect petition against the children's parents in 2018, and the children were placed with Grandmother. In 2021, several referrals were made to Child Protective Services (CPS) regarding Grandmother's care, leading to the children's removal from her home in December 2021 due to safety concerns and Grandmother's failure to inform DHS of her marriage. The DHS filed a Sixth Amended Petition in April 2022, alleging various forms of abuse and neglect by Grandmother.The Circuit Court of Barbour County held several hearings, concluding with a final adjudicatory hearing in March 2023. The court found that Grandmother had abused and neglected the children, citing evidence of her excessive drinking, drug use, lack of supervision, inappropriate discipline, and instability. The court also noted Grandmother's failure to take responsibility for her actions. The court directed the Multidisciplinary Treatment Team (MDT) to discuss an improvement period for visitation purposes only, as it could not envision a scenario where the children would be returned to Grandmother's custody.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the case and affirmed the circuit court's rulings. The court found that Grandmother was not entitled to relief based on procedural delays, as she did not seek extraordinary relief through a petition for writ of mandamus. The court also upheld the circuit court's adjudication of Grandmother as abusing and neglectful, finding no clear error in the circuit court's findings. Additionally, the court found that consideration of Grandmother's status as a psychological parent was premature at the adjudicatory phase and that the current visitation arrangement served the best interests of the children. Finally, the court determined that any discussion of dispositional decisions was premature, given the procedural posture of the case. View "In re B.L.-1, B.L.-2, K.L., M.L., and M.S." on Justia Law

Baby Girl R. was born to S.R., who abandoned her shortly after birth. S.R. and Baby Girl R. were taken to a hospital where S.R. admitted to daily methamphetamine use, and Baby Girl R. tested positive for the drug. S.R. was placed on an involuntary psychiatric hold due to her mental state and left the hospital without Baby Girl R. The Santa Clara County Department of Family and Children’s Services (Department) initiated dependency proceedings, and Baby Girl R. was placed in protective custody. Despite diligent efforts, the Department could not locate S.R.The juvenile court placed Baby Girl R. in foster care and ordered reunification services for S.R., despite her unknown whereabouts. The Department recommended reunification services, noting it was S.R.’s first dependency case and her relatives wanted her to receive help. Counsel for Baby Girl R. objected, arguing that reunification services should be bypassed under Welfare and Institutions Code section 361.5, subdivision (b)(1), due to S.R.’s unknown whereabouts. The court, however, ordered reunification services and set a six-month review hearing.The California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, reviewed the case. The Department argued the appeal was moot because the juvenile court had since terminated reunification services and placed Baby Girl R. with her maternal grandparents. The appellate court agreed the appeal was moot but exercised discretion to address the merits. The court concluded that section 361.5, subdivision (b)(1), does not mandate bypassing reunification services when a parent’s whereabouts are unknown. The juvenile court has discretion to order reunification services in such cases. The appellate court found no error in the juvenile court’s decision to order reunification services for S.R. and affirmed the disposition order. View "In re Baby Girl R." on Justia Law

The petitioner, K.S., sought certiorari review of orders issued by the Circuit Court in proceedings under RSA chapter 169-C. K.S. argued that the trial court erred in several ways, including denying her access to information she claimed she had a right to, relying on a "reasonable efforts" standard instead of the child's best interest, not holding an evidentiary hearing before approving her placement in a residential treatment program, denying her request to be placed with her father, and denying her request to involve her grandmother in family therapy and other meetings.The New Hampshire Division for Children, Youth and Families (DCYF) had filed petitions alleging neglect by K.S.'s parents, leading to K.S. being placed in various out-of-home settings. Eventually, the court granted DCYF legal custody of K.S. and issued a dispositional order finding that returning K.S. to her parents was not in her best interest. K.S. was hospitalized and later placed in a residential treatment program. The court approved these placements and denied K.S.'s requests for reunification with her father and for additional discovery.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case and found that many of K.S.'s arguments were moot due to changes in her circumstances, such as her father's surrender of parental rights and her subsequent placements. The court also held that the trial court did not violate K.S.'s due process rights by not holding an evidentiary hearing before approving her placement in an institutional setting, as the established procedures provided sufficient safeguards. The court affirmed the lower court's decisions, concluding that it did not act illegally or unsustainably exercise its discretion. View "Petition of K.S." on Justia Law

The case involves the Department of Human Services (DHS) assuming dependency jurisdiction over a child, A, born prematurely with special medical needs. Both parents have cognitive disabilities, and due to concerns about their ability to care for A, she was placed in substitute care. DHS provided services to the parents for approximately two years before requesting a change in the permanency plan from reunification to adoption, which the juvenile court approved in August 2022.The juvenile court found that DHS made reasonable efforts to reunify the family, but the parents did not make sufficient progress to safely care for A. The court noted that the parents' most significant barrier was their lack of follow-through and unwillingness to attend services. The court also determined that there was no compelling reason why adoption would not be in A's best interest.The parents appealed, arguing that DHS failed to make reasonable efforts tailored to their cognitive disabilities and that the agency displayed cultural and racial insensitivity. The Court of Appeals affirmed the juvenile court's judgment, acknowledging DHS's shortcomings but concluding that the totality of DHS's efforts was reasonable.The Oregon Supreme Court reviewed the case and upheld the lower courts' decisions. The court concluded that DHS's efforts, including multiple referrals to services tailored to the parents' needs, were reasonable. The court also found that the parents' failure to engage in services was a significant barrier to reunification. Additionally, the court determined that there was no compelling reason to conclude that adoption would not be in A's best interest, given the lack of an alternative permanent plan and the child's need for stability. View "Dept. of Human Services v. C. H." on Justia Law

The case involves a father, H.B., who appealed a juvenile court's disposition order declaring his two sons dependents of the court, placing them in the custody of their mother, and granting family maintenance services to the mother and supportive services to the father. The San Francisco Human Services Agency filed a petition alleging that the minors were at substantial risk of harm due to the father's substance abuse and provision of drugs to one of the children. The juvenile court sustained the petition and ordered the children to remain with their mother while the father received supportive services.The juvenile court found that the father had a long history of substance abuse and had provided drugs to his son, which posed a substantial danger to the children. The court also noted the father's poor judgment and parenting skills. The court ordered the children to remain with their mother and granted the father supervised visitation and supportive services. The father argued that the court applied the wrong legal standard and that there was insufficient evidence to support the findings.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court found that the juvenile court erred in applying section 362(c) instead of section 361(c) of the Welfare and Institutions Code, which requires findings by clear and convincing evidence that there would be a substantial danger to the children if returned to the father's custody and that reasonable efforts were made to prevent removal. The appellate court concluded that substantial evidence supported the finding of substantial danger but not the finding that reasonable efforts were made to prevent removal. The court reversed the disposition order and remanded the case for a new disposition hearing. View "In re H.B." on Justia Law

In May 2019, a fire in Davisville resulted in the deaths of Robert and Charlotte Taylor and injuries to a child. Sixteen-year-old M.W., the Taylors' daughter, was interviewed by Deputy Fire Marshal Jason Baltic at the scene. During the interview, M.W. confessed to starting the fire using gasoline. M.W. was subsequently indicted for first-degree murder, attempted murder, and arson. She moved to suppress her confession, arguing that she had not voluntarily waived her Miranda rights and that her confession was coerced. The circuit court denied the motion, and the case proceeded to trial, where the jury found M.W. guilty on all counts.The Circuit Court of Wood County denied M.W.'s motion to suppress her confession, finding that she had knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived her Miranda rights. The court also found that her confession was not coerced. M.W. later filed an emergency motion to reconsider the suppression ruling, citing a Brady violation due to the late disclosure of Deputy Sheriff Tasha Hewitt's past untruthfulness. The circuit court denied this motion, stating that Baltic's testimony was credible and sufficient to establish that M.W. had been read her Miranda rights.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the case and affirmed the circuit court's decisions. The court held that M.W. had knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived her Miranda rights, considering her age, intelligence, and the circumstances of the interview. The court also found that her confession was not coerced, as Baltic's interview techniques did not overbear her will. Additionally, the court ruled that the late disclosure of Hewitt's past untruthfulness did not constitute a Brady violation that would have changed the outcome of the suppression hearing. Finally, the court upheld the jury's verdict, finding sufficient evidence to support M.W.'s convictions. View "State v. M.W." on Justia Law