Justia Juvenile Law Opinion Summaries

Children in the custody of the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS), held at the Juvenile Temporary Detention Center in Chicago, often remained detained even after judges ordered their release due to a lack of available placements. This issue was widespread, with instances of children being unjustifiably confined for extended periods, sometimes exceeding 300 days. The plaintiffs, including the Cook County Public Guardian representing nine minors and a putative class, alleged that individual DCFS officials were aware of this problem and failed to act to secure timely placements, violating the children’s due process rights. The suit sought compensatory and punitive damages for Fourteenth Amendment violations and also asserted claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Rehabilitation Act.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois allowed the ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims against DCFS to proceed but dismissed the Fourteenth Amendment claims against the individual DCFS defendants. The district court concluded that the claims were, in substance, official-capacity claims against the state agency and barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity. The dismissal was entered as a final order, permitting appeal, as the court determined that the § 1983 claims were distinct and could not be cured by amendment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo. It held that the plaintiffs’ complaint asserted personal-capacity claims against the individual DCFS defendants, seeking money damages rather than injunctive relief, and included both current and former officials. The court found that Eleventh Amendment immunity does not bar personal-capacity suits for damages under § 1983. Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Golbert v Smith" on Justia Law

A minor, N.S., attending a public middle school, made a comment to a school liaison officer that he had a weapon, specifically stating, "I have a Glock, too." The liaison officer, who was a Fullerton Police Officer assigned to the school, interpreted this statement as an indication that N.S. might possess a firearm on campus, which posed a potential threat to students. The officer directed N.S. to the principal's office to be searched. N.S. verbally refused to comply, left the office, and walked toward the parking lot. The officer followed and repeatedly ordered N.S. to return for the search. N.S. continued to refuse for approximately ten minutes, only agreeing after another officer arrived. He was subsequently searched, arrested, and booked into juvenile hall.A petition was filed by the Orange County District Attorney in the Superior Court of Orange County, alleging N.S. violated Penal Code section 148, subdivision (a)(1), by willfully resisting, delaying, or obstructing a peace officer. After a jurisdiction hearing, the juvenile court found this allegation true beyond a reasonable doubt. N.S. was declared a nonward for up to six months and ordered to complete probation. N.S. appealed, arguing insufficient evidence supported the finding and that the officer’s search was unlawful.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. It applied the substantial evidence standard and concluded that N.S.’s conduct—repeated refusals and physically leaving the scene—constituted willful resistance and delay under section 148, subdivision (a)(1). The court also held that school liaison officers are considered “school officials” for Fourth Amendment purposes, requiring only reasonable suspicion (not probable cause) to conduct a search. The officer had reasonable suspicion based on N.S.’s own statement. The order of the juvenile court was affirmed. View "In re N.S." on Justia Law

A woman brought her nearly two-year-old son to a hospital in Lincoln, Nebraska, where he was found with multiple injuries, including bruises, swelling, and a fractured leg. Subsequent medical examinations revealed further injuries, such as broken ribs, a lung contusion, brain swelling, and ultimately, the child died from his injuries. The mother, who had left the child in the care of her boyfriend and others, admitted to noticing symptoms and injuries over a period of weeks but did not seek medical care, citing reasons such as believing the injury was minor and fear of involvement with Child Protective Services. Evidence at trial included interviews, witness testimony, text messages, and internet searches indicating the mother was aware of the child’s worsening condition.The District Court for Lancaster County reviewed the case and presided over a jury trial. The jury found the mother guilty of intentional child abuse resulting in death, intentional child abuse resulting in serious bodily injury, and possession with intent to deliver or delivery of a controlled substance near a school. The court denied pretrial motions to exclude certain photographic evidence and sentenced her to consecutive prison terms totaling 70 years to life for the most serious charges, and additional years for the drug offense.The Nebraska Supreme Court examined claims of insufficient evidence, improper admission of photographs, ineffective assistance of counsel, and excessive sentencing. Applying the appropriate standards of review, the court held that there was sufficient evidence for the convictions, the photographs were relevant and not unduly prejudicial, and the sentences were within statutory limits and not an abuse of discretion. Claims of ineffective assistance were rejected as either unsupported or not prejudicial. The court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "State v. Cook" on Justia Law

A juvenile was charged with two counts of possession or transfer of machinegun conversion devices, known as Glock switches, which enable semiautomatic pistols to fire automatically. The charges were brought under federal statutes, 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(o) and 924(a)(2), after the government certified that the State of Mississippi lacked jurisdiction over the alleged conduct because, at the time, Mississippi did not have a law regulating possession or transfer of machineguns. The juvenile moved to dismiss the charges, arguing that the certification was inadequate and that the statute violated the Second Amendment, but both motions were denied.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi reviewed the case. After the motions were denied, the juvenile admitted to the charges, waiving appeal rights for all non-jurisdictional issues except his Second Amendment challenge. The district court adjudicated him delinquent and imposed a 19-month term of detention followed by supervised release until age 21.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit considered whether the district court had jurisdiction, whether the statute violated the Second Amendment, and whether the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms exceeded its authority in classifying Glock switches as machineguns. The Fifth Circuit held that the district court had jurisdiction because Mississippi lacked applicable law at the relevant time, the Second Amendment challenge was foreclosed by United States v. Wilson, 164 F.4th 380 (5th Cir. 2026), which upheld § 922(o) as constitutional, and the statutory challenge regarding ATF’s authority was waived under the terms of the appeal waiver. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Sealed Appellee v. Sealed Juvenile" on Justia Law

The case involves a defendant who, at age 15, allegedly committed two murders and an attempted shooting as part of gang activity in 2009. After an investigation, he was indicted at age 19, which meant he was still eligible for juvenile court jurisdiction. Over the following years, legislative changes—including Proposition 57, Senate Bill No. 1391, and Assembly Bill No. 2361—affected how minors accused of serious crimes could be prosecuted. The defendant’s case shifted repeatedly between juvenile and criminal courts while legal standards for transfer were clarified.The Ventura County Superior Court (criminal division) first remanded the case to juvenile court in 2017, following Proposition 57, which required juvenile court authorization for transfer to criminal court. The juvenile court transferred the defendant back to criminal court, but he continued to argue that, under Welfare and Institutions Code § 707(a)(2), as he was apprehended before the end of juvenile jurisdiction, his case should remain in juvenile court. In December 2022, the criminal court found jurisdiction ended at age 18, denying his request for remand. A later remand in April 2023 occurred after Assembly Bill No. 2361, requiring transfer decisions to be supported by clear and convincing evidence. An informal settlement allowed the juvenile court to base its transfer on probation reports, after which he pled guilty in criminal court.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Six reviewed the transfer order. It held that under Senate Bill No. 1391, the juvenile court erred in transferring the defendant to criminal court because he was apprehended before the end of juvenile court jurisdiction. The order granting transfer was reversed, and the matter was remanded to the juvenile court for further proceedings. View "In re J.C." on Justia Law

A mother gave birth to a child, M.P., in February 2023. In September of that year, the mother sought emergency care for M.P., who was found to be severely malnourished and developmentally delayed. Medical professionals determined the child’s condition was the result of neglect, not an underlying medical disorder. The Department of Child Safety (DCS) took custody of M.P., ultimately placing her in a medically fragile foster home. The mother was arrested, pleaded guilty to attempted child abuse, and received probation. DCS filed a dependency petition alleging that M.P. was neglected due to the mother’s failure to provide adequate nourishment and to protect the child from domestic violence. The mother participated in reunification services, but DCS remained concerned about her ability to safely care for M.P.The Superior Court in Pima County adjudicated M.P. dependent and later held a hearing on DCS’s petition to terminate the mother’s parental rights under A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(2), which authorizes termination for neglect. The juvenile court found by clear and convincing evidence that the mother’s neglect placed M.P. at substantial risk of harm and concluded that termination was in M.P.’s best interests, noting the mother’s lack of behavioral change despite engaging in services. The Arizona Court of Appeals vacated the termination, holding that the juvenile court was required to consider the mother’s participation in, and benefit from, services at the unfitness stage, and that consideration of rehabilitative efforts was not required in the best-interests analysis.The Supreme Court of the State of Arizona vacated the court of appeals’ decision and affirmed the termination. The Court held that, under § 8-533(B)(2), the juvenile court is not required to consider subsequent participation in services when determining parental unfitness, but must consider rehabilitation efforts in the best-interests analysis. The Court found that the juvenile court properly applied the law and that due process was satisfied. View "IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO M.P." on Justia Law

A mother surrendered her four-day-old twin sons at a hospital under Maryland’s Safe Haven Act, which allows parents to leave unharmed newborns at designated facilities within sixty days of birth, granting immunity from criminal prosecution and civil liability for the act of surrender. The mother left the twins with identifying information but did not disclose her identity, provide information about alternative caregivers, or express intent to return. Hospital staff found the twins healthy and notified the local department of social services, which took custody and placed them in foster care. The department later identified both parents through family contact and DNA testing. Mother participated in proceedings and argued that her actions did not constitute neglect under the Child in Need of Assistance (CINA) statute, and that Safe Haven Act immunity precluded such a finding.The Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County, sitting as the juvenile court, held a de novo hearing and found that the mother’s actions amounted to neglect, as the twins were left without a legal custodian or provision for long-term care, placing them at substantial risk of harm. The court denied mother’s request to award custody to the father and committed the twins to the department’s care. Both parents appealed. The Appellate Court of Maryland affirmed the neglect finding, concluding that abandonment under the Safe Haven Act can constitute neglect if court intervention is required to prevent harm, and that Safe Haven immunity from “civil liability” does not shield against a CINA neglect determination.The Supreme Court of Maryland reviewed the case and affirmed the Appellate Court’s judgment. The court held that a parent who surrenders a newborn under the Safe Haven Act may be found to have neglected the child within the meaning of the CINA statute if the child is left without a legal custodian or provision for care, placing the child at substantial risk of harm. The court further held that Safe Haven Act immunity from “civil liability” does not preclude a CINA neglect finding. View "In re: B.Cd. & B.Cb." on Justia Law

A child who is an enrolled member of a federally recognized tribe was placed in the guardianship of his paternal grandmother after his biological parents were found unable to care for him. Over the years, concerns arose regarding the guardian’s ability to meet the child’s medical and educational needs, leading to multiple child welfare referrals. Ultimately, the county child welfare agency filed a juvenile dependency petition, asserting the guardian’s failure to protect and provide for the child due to alleged mental illness and neglect. The child’s tribe, which had been involved in the child’s probate and dependency matters for several years, requested a court-ordered psychological evaluation of the guardian to assess her capacity to care for the child.The Superior Court of Riverside County ordered the psychological evaluation but specified it was for “case planning purposes only.” When the tribe later sought access to the evaluation to assist in case monitoring and planning, the guardian objected, arguing privacy and privilege concerns. The juvenile court denied the tribe’s request, finding the evaluation was not ordered for the tribe’s benefit and that there were no compelling reasons to release it. The tribe appealed, contending that it had a presumptive right to the evaluation under state and federal law due to its role in protecting the welfare of its citizen child.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, held that the tribe is presumptively entitled to access the guardian’s psychological evaluation under Welfare and Institutions Code section 827 and related statutes. The court concluded that the tribe, as a party to the proceedings and as a multidisciplinary team member, did not need to file a separate petition for access, and that neither privacy nor privilege barred disclosure of the court-ordered report. The appellate court reversed the juvenile court’s order and directed the release of the evaluation to the tribe. View "In re A.H." on Justia Law

A ten-year-old child, considered an Indian child under the Indian Child Welfare Act, was taken into emergency state custody due to neglect and self-harm concerns. The Office of Children’s Services (OCS) placed the child in foster care and later admitted him to a residential psychiatric facility for mental health treatment. The Native Village of Hooper Bay, the child’s tribe, intervened in the child in need of aid (CINA) proceeding and sought access to the child’s unredacted psychotherapy records, arguing they were necessary to secure appropriate services for the child. The child’s attorney objected to the release of these records, citing confidentiality concerns, while the court-appointed guardian ad litem (GAL) waived the psychotherapist-patient privilege.The Superior Court for the State of Alaska, Fourth Judicial District, Hooper Bay, ruled that the GAL held the authority to waive the child’s psychotherapist-patient privilege under CINA Rule 9(b)(3)(F)(ii) because the child was under twelve. The court ordered the release of the records to all parties, finding that the child’s attorney’s objection did not nullify the GAL’s waiver. The child’s motions for reconsideration and for an in camera review were denied, and the records were disclosed.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reviewed whether a child between ten and twelve can, through an attorney’s objection, override a GAL’s waiver of the psychotherapist-patient privilege in CINA proceedings. The court held that a child’s objection does not nullify the GAL’s waiver of the privilege. However, following an objection, the child bears the burden of showing that confidentiality should be maintained under the multi-factor framework of CINA Rule 9(b)(3)(D). The Supreme Court found that the superior court adequately applied the relevant factors and affirmed the decision to disclose the child’s records. View "Tanuk S. v. State of Alaska" on Justia Law

A 15-year-old juvenile, after a confrontation at a store in Sacramento, retrieved a stolen handgun and shot three people, resulting in one death and serious injuries to two others. He admitted to committing murder and personally and intentionally discharging a firearm causing great bodily injury or death. Initially, he was adjudged a ward of the court and committed to the Division of Juvenile Justice (DJJ) for a term not to exceed his 25th birthday. After a subsequent adult conviction for battery, he served time in state prison. Due to the closure of DJJ, his commitment was recalled and he was assigned to a secure youth treatment facility (SYTF) in San Mateo County.Following the transfer, the San Mateo County juvenile court accepted jurisdiction and placed him in the SYTF’s SOARR program. After several behavioral incidents and a probation violation for assaulting another ward, the probation department eventually petitioned to set aside his SYTF placement, citing his persistent violence and defiance. The parties agreed that the SYTF commitment should be set aside, and the probation department, supported by the prosecution, requested his continued confinement in county jail, given his age and the risks he posed.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Five, reviewed the case. The court found that Welfare and Institutions Code section 875, subdivision (k), authorized the juvenile court to order continued confinement in county jail for a person who was committed to DJJ and subsequently sentenced to state prison prior to July 1, 2023, upon return to local custody. The court affirmed the juvenile court’s dispositional order, holding that the commitment to county jail was authorized under the specific statutory language, given the appellant’s age, history, and procedural circumstances. View "In re Jose S." on Justia Law