Justia Juvenile Law Opinion Summaries
Michigan v. Parks
Kemo Parks was convicted by jury for first-degree premeditated-murder. Parks was 18 years old when he aided and abetted in the murder. Parks argued that his sentence was cruel and/or unusual punishment under both the United States and Michigan Constitutions. Under current United States Supreme Court precedent, the Michigan Supreme Court concluded Parks’s Eighth Amendment argument failed. However, the Court held his sentence of mandatory life without parole violated the Michigan Constitution’s ban on “cruel or unusual” punishment. Specifically, his sentence lacked proportionality because it failed to take into account the mitigating characteristics of youth, specifically late-adolescent brain development. Therefore, the Supreme Court reversed the portion of the judgment of the Court of Appeals affirming Parks’s sentence, vacated Parks’s life-without-parole sentence, and remanded this case to the Circuit Court for resentencing proceedings. View "Michigan v. Parks" on Justia Law
In re Jason V.
After June 30, 2021, juvenile courts were no longer able to commit juveniles to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Division of Juvenile Justice (DJJ). Jason V. was committed to DJJ prior to June 30, 2021, but the trial court erroneously ordered an impermissible maximum term of confinement. In July 2021, the court entered a nunc pro tunc order stating the correct maximum period. Jason contended the commitment order had to be vacated because judicial error could not be corrected by a nunc pro tunc order and, on the date the order was entered, he could not be committed to DJJ. He also contended he was entitled to additional days of credit for time spent in local confinement that the juvenile court failed to award. The Court of Appeal remanded the case for recalculation of the credits Jason was entitled to, but otherwise affirmed the dispositional order. View "In re Jason V." on Justia Law
In re Pers. Restraint of Kennedy
When Petitioner Andrew Kennedy was 19 years old, he killed his cousin’s 11-month-old daughter while she was in his care. Following a bench trial in 2007, the court convicted Kennedy of homicide by abuse and sentenced him to 380 months in confinement. Kennedy’s judgment and sentence became final after direct appeal in 2009. In 2019, he filed this personal restraint petition (PRP) seeking to be resentenced based on “[n]ewly discovered evidence.” Kennedy argued that advancements in the scientific understanding of adolescent brain development for young adults since his 2007 sentencing would have probably changed the trial court’s discretionary sentencing decision by allowing him to argue for a mitigated sentence based on youthfulness. The Court of Appeals dismissed Kennedy’s PRP as time barred, concluding that scientific evidence supporting such an argument for young adults Kennedy’s age was available at the time of sentencing. After the Washington Supreme Court granted Kennedy’s motion for discretionary review, he raised a second argument for relief based on the “significant change in the law” exemption to the time bar. The Supreme Court found Kennedy's PRP meet neither exemption to the time bar. View "In re Pers. Restraint of Kennedy" on Justia Law
In re N.L.
Minor N.L. appealed an order adjudging her a ward of the court. She argued: (1) there was insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court’s finding that she willfully and maliciously committed felony arson of property; and (2) the case should have been remanded for the juvenile court to consider informal supervision under Welfare and Institutions Code section 654.2, applying changes to the law that became effective on January 1, 2022 as a result of Senate Bill No. 383 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.). After review, the Court of Appeal found sufficient evidence to support the true finding, but the Court agreed that N.L. was entitled to a conditional reversal and remand for the trial court to consider informal supervision under the law as amended by Senate Bill No. 383. View "In re N.L." on Justia Law
In re Ernesto L.
The occupants of a car shot at officers; neither was hit. Ernesto, age 16, and others were apprehended after attempting to escape. The Alameda County District Attorney’s Office filed a wardship petition with respect to Ernesto. A juvenile court committed him to the Division of Juvenile Justice (DJJ). Generally, if a minor is removed from a parent’s physical custody after being adjudged a ward of the court, the dispositional order must “specify that the minor may not be held in physical confinement for a period in excess of the middle term of imprisonment” that could be imposed on an adult convicted of the same offense. If a minor is committed to DJJ, the juvenile court may set an even lower maximum term of physical confinement. The juvenile court applied Ernesto’s precommitment credits (over two years), against the maximum exposure term of 176 months, not the maximum custodial term of three years.The court of appeal modified the judgment. When a minor is committed to DJJ, a juvenile court must apply precommitment credits against the maximum custodial term. Because the juvenile court would have set a higher maximum custodial term had it realized Ernesto’s credits would apply against that term, the court remanded. The juvenile court did not err by committing him to DJJ under section 602.3 and by relying on prior misdemeanors when calculating the maximum exposure term. View "In re Ernesto L." on Justia Law
In re M.G.
Now four-year-old M.G. is fed through a G-tube due to his diagnoses of esophageal reflux, generalized intestinal dysmotility, and laryngomalacia. He is also eligible for Regional Center Services due to a developmental disability. Both parents are Regional Center consumers due to their developmental disabilities and are former foster children. During a medical appointment, the parents did not know M.G.’s feeding schedule and told the treating physician they were aggressive and hit each other. M.G. was temporarily placed in a medical foster home. DCFS filed a petition. The court found that the parents have violent altercations and mental and emotional problems and developmental delays rendering them incapable of caring for M.G., ordered M.G. removed from the custody of his parents, and ordered reunification services and monitored visitation for both parents. Ultimately, the court terminated their parental rights.The court of appeal reversed. The juvenile court did not conduct a correct beneficial parent-child relationship analysis as set out by the California Supreme Court in “Caden C.” (2021) and instead considered factors Caden C. deems improper. Substantial evidence does not support the finding of “no bond.” The focus is not on whether M.G.’s parents can assume their parental roles but on whether M.G. will be harmed by the termination of the relationship. View "In re M.G." on Justia Law
In re M.B.
Appellant the mother of six-year-old M.B., appealed the August 31, 2021 order terminating her parental rights, contending the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services failed to adequately investigate her claim of Indian ancestry through interviews with maternal relatives and the notices sent to the Blackfeet Tribe failed to include the birthdates of M.B.’s maternal grandfather and great-grandfather as required by federal regulations implementing the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA) (25 U.S.C. Section 1901 et seq.) and related California law. The Department argued that Appellant’s appeal of the adequacy of its investigation has been mooted by further interviews with maternal relatives and that any omission of required information from the ICWA-030 notices sent to the Blackfeet Tribe was harmless because its post-appeal investigation established ICWA notices were not required. The Second Appellate District affirmed the May 13, 2021 order denying Appellant’s section 388 petition. However, the court conditionally affirmed the August 31, 2021 section 366.26 order terminating Appellant’s parental rights. The court explained that rather than attempt to moot Appellant’s appeal by belatedly conducting the investigation required by section 224.2, the Department’s proper course of action was to stipulate to a conditional reversal with directions for full compliance with the inquiry and notice provisions of ICWA and related California law. Further, the court wrote for its part, the juvenile court failed to ensure the Department adequately investigated M.B.’s Indian ancestry, far more is required than passively accepting the Department’s reports as fulfilling its statutory obligations. View "In re M.B." on Justia Law
State v. X.S.
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals to reverse the judgment of the circuit court denying the State's request to have X.S. waived into adult court and to remand the case, holding that remand was not required for a new waiver hearing because a new waiver hearing was unnecessary.X.S. was charged with eight counts of first-degree reckless injury with use of a dangerous weapon for opening fire in Mayfair Mall located outside Milwaukee. The Sate sought to have X.S. waived into adult court instead of remaining in juvenile court. The circuit court denied the request, but the court of appeals reversed and remanded the case for a new waiver hearing. The Supreme Court affirmed but remanded the case to the circuit court with instructions to grant the State's waiver petition, holding that the circuit court abused its discretion by denying the waiver petition. View "State v. X.S." on Justia Law
Keefe v. State
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment and sentence of the district court in this criminal case, holding that the district court adequately considered evidence of Defendant's post-offense rehabilitation under Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), and imposed a constitutional sentence by striking a parole restriction.When he was seventeen years old, Defendant was charged with burglary and three counts of deliberate homicide. Defendant was convicted of all counts and sentenced to three consecutive life sentences without parole. Defendant later filed a successful postconviction petition seeking resentencing under Miller. After a resentencing hearing, the district court sentenced Defendant to three consecutive life terms at MSP without the possibility of parole. The Supreme Court remanded the case. On remand, the district court resentenced him to three life sentences and did not restrict Defendant's eligibility for parole. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court complied with the Court's instructions on remand in Keefe II and imposed a legal sentence. View "Keefe v. State" on Justia Law
Therolf v. Superior Court
Petitioner, a journalist, petitioned to obtain the juvenile case file of a deceased child, whose adoptive mother was convicted of her torture and murder. Although the Madera County Department of Social Services/Child Welfare Services (“department”) filed an objection to the disclosure of the juvenile case file, the juvenile court denied Petitioner’s petition finding release of the file would be detrimental to another child directly or indirectly connected to the deceased child. The Fifth Appellate District granted the petition for writ of mandate and directed the juvenile court to vacate its orders, hold a hearing on Petitioner’s petition after ordering the department to produce the deceased child’s juvenile case file in accordance with In re Elijah S. (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 1532, 1538–1539, 1556 (“Elijah S.”), review the responsive documents in camera, and reconsider the petition applying the appropriate standards. The court wrote that it agreed the juvenile court erred when it did not allow Petitioner time to file a reply to the department’s objection and failed to hold a hearing on his petition. However, the court rejected the department’s contention that the deceased child was not within the juvenile court’s jurisdiction when she died and concur with the decision Elijah S. The court also rejected Petitioner’s contention that, contrary to its’ decision in Pack v. Kings County Human Services Agency (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 821, 831–834 (“Pack”), the juvenile court was required to make specific factual findings when making a detriment finding. But the court found the juvenile court’s failure to comply with the other procedures set forth in Pack also was prejudicial. View "Therolf v. Superior Court" on Justia Law