Justia Juvenile Law Opinion Summaries

A teenager, S.G.H., was accused of using generative artificial intelligence to create explicit composite images of three underage female classmates by digitally blending their actual faces and clothed bodies with computer-generated images of naked intimate body parts. These manipulated images were discovered on S.G.H.’s school email account during a police investigation prompted by an automated alert regarding inappropriate content. The images made it appear as though the classmates were nude, but the explicit portions were entirely computer-generated and not derived from actual photographs of the victims.In the Morgan County District Court, the People of the State of Colorado filed a delinquency petition charging S.G.H. with six counts of sexual exploitation of a child under section 18-6-403(3)(b) and (3)(b.5), C.R.S. (2024). S.G.H. moved to dismiss, arguing that the images did not constitute “sexually exploitative material” under the law then in effect, since they did not depict actual naked children and the explicit body parts were computer-generated. The District Court denied the motion, interpreting the statute as encompassing digitally manipulated images bearing a child’s actual features combined with simulated intimate parts, and found probable cause for all charges.The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed the case under its original jurisdiction. The Court held that, as of December 2023, the statutory definition of “sexually exploitative material” did not cover images created or altered using generative AI to fabricate explicit content. The Court found that recent legislative amendments expanding the definition to include such computer-generated images represented a change, not a clarification, of the law. Concluding that the District Court erred in finding probable cause, the Supreme Court made absolute its order to show cause and remanded with instructions to dismiss all charges against S.G.H. View "People ex rel. S.G.H." on Justia Law

Three advocacy organizations filed suit against the South Carolina Department of Juvenile Justice and its executive director, seeking institutional reforms to address alleged unconstitutional and unlawful conditions in the state’s juvenile detention facilities. The plaintiffs alleged that the facilities were overcrowded, understaffed, and dangerous, resulting in violence, isolation, and inadequate services for juveniles. They based their standing on their advocacy and direct representation work with affected youth, and described both the harm to juveniles and the impact on their own organizational missions.The United States District Court for the District of South Carolina dismissed the complaint without prejudice. The district court found that Disability Rights South Carolina (DRSC) had standing to sue on behalf of certain juveniles, but those claims were rendered moot when those juveniles left custody. The court also determined that Justice 360 had standing in its own right but concluded that its claims failed on the merits. The South Carolina State Conference of the NAACP was found to lack standing. The plaintiffs appealed the dismissal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The Fourth Circuit held that the advocacy organizations lacked Article III standing to pursue the claims because they failed to demonstrate a sufficient personal stake in the outcome. The court found that DRSC did not meet the requirements for associational standing as its constituents lacked indicia of membership. The court also concluded that none of the organizations suffered a cognizable injury directly caused by the defendants’ actions, but rather incurred self-imposed costs through voluntary advocacy. The court further held that the plaintiffs could not bring claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the violation of rights belonging to others, as they had not alleged violations of their own federal rights. The dismissal was affirmed. View "South Carolina State Conference of the NAACP v. South Carolina Department of Juvenile Justice" on Justia Law

A juvenile, S.M., was alleged to have committed theft and shoplifting. Initially released pending resolution, S.M. repeatedly absconded, leading to her detention to secure her attendance and protect others’ property. After being detained at the Youth Services Center, S.M. was moved to the Youth Shelter House, but following further incidents of insubordination and unauthorized departures, the trial court ordered her returned to the Youth Services Center.The Superior Court of the District of Columbia issued the order changing S.M.’s place of detention from the Youth Shelter House back to the Youth Services Center. S.M. appealed, arguing that such a move to a more restrictive facility required a specific finding that it was necessary for safety or to secure her appearance, as per D.C. Code § 16-2310(a). The District countered that the order was not subject to the emergency interlocutory review provision of D.C. Code § 16-2328 and that the trial court did not need to make such a finding for placement decisions.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case and concluded that (1) it had jurisdiction under Section 16-2328 to review the order, as it was a detention order; (2) a child can challenge both the fact of detention and the specific place of detention on an emergency interlocutory appeal; and (3) the trial court, when deciding the specific place of detention, is not required to find that placement in a particular facility is necessary to protect safety or ensure appearance. Instead, the selection of the place of detention is a discretionary decision guided by statutory goals, including placing children in the least restrictive setting necessary. The court clarified that the statutory detention criteria apply to the decision to detain, not to the specific location of detention. The disposition affirmed the trial court’s order. View "In re S.M." on Justia Law

A seventeen-year-old was charged in the St. Francis County Circuit Court with three counts of capital murder and one count of felony theft after his mother, her boyfriend, and his twelve-year-old sister were found shot to death in their home. The evidence included the recovery of the victims’ vehicle, a firearm, gunshot residue on the accused’s clothing, and DNA evidence. The accused denied involvement but was contradicted by testimony from his four-year-old sister and other evidence. The defense presented testimony about his background, mental health, and the potential for rehabilitation.After the accused moved to transfer the case to the juvenile division, the St. Francis County Circuit Court held a hearing and denied the motion. On interlocutory appeal, the Arkansas Court of Appeals found that the circuit court had failed to address a required statutory factor and remanded for additional findings. The circuit court entered an amended order again denying transfer. The accused then appealed to the Arkansas Supreme Court.The Arkansas Supreme Court first ruled that the accused's constitutional challenge to Arkansas Code Annotated section 9-27-318 was not preserved for appellate review because it was not raised in the circuit court. The court also held that the circuit court properly exercised subject-matter jurisdiction. Reviewing the denial of transfer for clear error, the Arkansas Supreme Court concluded that the amended order adequately addressed all statutorily required factors, gave appropriate weight to the seriousness and violent nature of the offenses, and was not clearly erroneous. The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court’s denial of the motion to transfer the case to the juvenile division. View "ROLFE v. STATE OF ARKANSAS" on Justia Law

The case concerns two children whose parents were subject to dependency proceedings after allegations of domestic violence and failure to protect were brought by a county child welfare agency. The children were ultimately removed from their parents' custody and placed with extended family members. Over the course of the proceedings, the social services department conducted multiple inquiries with both parents and a number of extended family members about possible Native American heritage, as required under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) and related California law. Each person asked denied any such heritage.After the initial dependency petition, the Superior Court of Los Angeles County sustained the allegations, ordered reunification services, and later returned the children to their parents. Following further incidents of domestic violence, the children were again removed, and supplemental petitions were sustained. The agency continued its ICWA inquiry, interviewing additional family members but did not specifically question the paternal grandfather, though he was interviewed on other subjects. The Superior Court terminated parental rights after finding the children adoptable and determined there was no reason to know the children were Indian children under ICWA.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Five, reviewed whether the agency’s failure to inquire specifically of the paternal grandfather required reversal of the order terminating parental rights. The court held that, under the standard articulated in In re Dezi C. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1112, a finding that the initial ICWA inquiry was adequate is supported by substantial evidence where the agency interviewed the parents and several extended family members, even if not every possible relative was asked. The court found the agency’s efforts sufficient and affirmed the order terminating parental rights. View "In re Bella L." on Justia Law

A mother left her ten-month-old son, K.R., with his paternal grandmother without specifying when she would return, leading to concerns about the child’s safety and the mother's alleged drug use. Law enforcement and child welfare agencies became involved, and K.R. was placed in temporary custody with his grandmother. The initial case plan aimed for the child’s reintegration with the mother, contingent on her maintaining sobriety, stable housing, and mental health services. Due to the mother's lack of progress, the permanency goal was later changed to adoption. After a missed drug test and absence from a court hearing, the district court terminated the mother's parental rights by default, without receiving evidence.The Kansas Court of Appeals reversed the initial termination because the district court failed to hold an evidentiary hearing, as required by statute, and remanded for proper proceedings. On remand, after an evidentiary hearing where the mother demonstrated significant improvement—maintaining sobriety, stable housing, and employment—the district court again terminated her parental rights. However, while the court found the mother unfit, it did not make a finding that her unfitness was unlikely to change in the foreseeable future. A different Court of Appeals panel affirmed the termination, concluding that sufficient evidence supported both the finding of unfitness and the likelihood it would not change.The Supreme Court of the State of Kansas reviewed whether termination was proper without an explicit district court finding that the mother’s unfitness was unlikely to change in the foreseeable future, as required by K.S.A. 38-2269(a). The court held that absent this specific finding, the district court lacked authority to terminate parental rights. The Supreme Court reversed the judgments of both the Court of Appeals and the district court and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with statutory requirements. View "In re K.R. " on Justia Law

A juvenile born in 2007 was adjudicated at age 14 for habitual truancy and placed on indefinite probation. Over the next several years, he was adjudicated in four separate delinquency cases—primarily theft and assault-related—and placed on indefinite probation in each case. While still on probation in all five cases, the State filed a felony criminal complaint against him for attempted robbery. In response, the State moved in all juvenile cases for a finding that he was not amenable to rehabilitative services under the Nebraska Juvenile Code, requesting that the court terminate jurisdiction “unsuccessfully.”The Separate Juvenile Court of Sarpy County held a consolidated hearing, receiving evidence regarding the juvenile’s history, participation in probation and services, and recent criminal charges. The court found him nonamenable to rehabilitative services and ordered termination of both probation and the court’s jurisdiction, specifying that the record would not be sealed. The juvenile appealed these orders. The Nebraska Court of Appeals consolidated the appeals, and the Nebraska Supreme Court moved them to its docket to address statutory interpretation and procedural issues regarding Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-2,106.03.The Nebraska Supreme Court held that a finding of nonamenability under § 43-2,106.03 must be established by a preponderance of the evidence, with the State bearing the burden when it moves for such a finding. The Court affirmed the juvenile court’s determination of nonamenability, finding no abuse of discretion. However, it held there is no statutory authority for a juvenile court to terminate probation or jurisdiction based solely on a finding of nonamenability under § 43-2,106.03. The Supreme Court affirmed the nonamenability finding, but vacated the orders terminating probation and jurisdiction, remanding the cases for further proceedings. View "In re Interest of Johnny H." on Justia Law

During a daytime traffic stop in Lawrence, Massachusetts, a police officer encountered a sixteen-year-old juvenile who had been reported missing by the Department of Children and Families. The juvenile was seated in a vehicle with an infant and three adults, one of whom was known by the officer to be affiliated with a street gang. The officer ordered the juvenile out of the car without asking any questions and immediately conducted a patfrisk, discovering a handgun on the juvenile’s person. The juvenile was subsequently charged with multiple firearms offenses and indicted as a youthful offender on one count.The Essex County Juvenile Court reviewed the juvenile’s motion to suppress evidence obtained from the exit order and patfrisk, arguing violation of constitutional rights. After an evidentiary hearing, the judge granted the motion to suppress, finding the officer's actions unjustified under the circumstances. The Commonwealth sought interlocutory review, and a single justice of the Supreme Judicial Court for the county of Suffolk allowed the appeal. The Appeals Court reversed the suppression order, concluding the officer’s actions were reasonable under the community caretaking doctrine. The Supreme Judicial Court then granted further appellate review.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that the officer’s exit order was justified under the community caretaking doctrine, as the officer was acting to ensure the safety and well-being of a missing juvenile. However, due to inconsistencies in the Juvenile Court judge’s findings regarding the credibility of the officer’s testimony about key facts supporting the patfrisk, the Supreme Judicial Court vacated the suppression order. The case was remanded to the Juvenile Court for clarification of factual findings and reconsideration of the legal conclusions in light of those findings and the Supreme Judicial Court's opinion. View "Commonwealth v. Demos D." on Justia Law

The Clark County Department of Family Services filed a petition under Nevada law seeking protection for three minor children, alleging they were in need of protection from their father and stepmother. The allegations against the stepmother were withdrawn prior to trial. The juvenile court in Clark County conducted a full evidentiary hearing regarding the father and ultimately found that the allegations were not proven by a preponderance of the evidence, resulting in dismissal of the petition against him.Following this dismissal, both the Department and the minor children appealed the juvenile court’s order to the Supreme Court of Nevada. However, concerns arose regarding the appealability of such an order, as prior precedent—specifically In re A.B., 128 Nev. 764—held that orders from juvenile proceedings concerning child custody were not substantively appealable under Nevada Rule of Appellate Procedure (NRAP) 3A. The Supreme Court temporarily halted the appeal and directed appellants to show cause why jurisdiction existed.Upon review, the Supreme Court of Nevada found that the jurisdictional analysis in In re A.B. was flawed. The court determined that an order completely dismissing and thus finally resolving a petition for child protection under NRS Chapter 432B meets the definition of a final judgment under NRAP 3A(b)(1), because it disposes of all issues in the case. The court overruled In re A.B. to the extent that it held such orders were unappealable, clarifying that NRAP 3A(b)(1) allows an appeal from a final judgment entered by a district court—even when it arises from juvenile proceedings involving child custody. Therefore, the Supreme Court of Nevada held that the order dismissing the petition is appealable and allowed the appeal to proceed. View "IN RE: N.D." on Justia Law

The case concerns a child, DC, who was removed from his parents’ care shortly after birth due to substantiated concerns about neglect, failure to thrive, domestic violence, mental health issues, substance abuse, and instability within the family. The child was placed with maternal grandparents, and a permanency plan for family reunification was established. The father, AC, was given a case plan with specific requirements addressing sobriety, mental health, parenting skills, stable housing, and employment. Over the next eighteen months, the father was incarcerated for nearly a year of that period, including a new sentence of five to seven years for felony offenses. He failed to make consistent progress on his case plan goals, particularly concerning mental health and substance abuse treatment, employment, and securing stable housing.The District Court of Platte County—sitting as a juvenile court—initially ordered reunification, then shifted to a concurrent goal of reunification and adoption as the father’s progress stalled and his incarceration continued. The Department of Family Services documented extensive, tailored efforts to facilitate reunification, including arranging for services while the father was both in and out of custody. Despite these efforts, the father did not meaningfully participate in or complete the required treatment, counseling, or parenting programs. At an evidentiary review hearing, the court found the Department’s efforts reasonable and accessible, and that it was in the child’s best interests to change the permanency plan to adoption. The father appealed the change, arguing insufficient efforts were made to accommodate his incarceration.The Supreme Court of Wyoming reviewed the juvenile court’s decision for abuse of discretion. It held that the Department made reasonable efforts to reunify father and child, even considering the constraints of incarceration, and that the child’s need for stability outweighed the father’s incomplete progress. The court affirmed the juvenile court’s order changing the permanency plan to adoption. View "In the Interest Of: DC" on Justia Law