In 1995, Cheryl Armstrong was convicted by jury on two counts of second-degree murder under a complicity theory. She was sixteen at the time of the charged offenses, and was tried as an adult. Armstrong was sentenced to forty-eight years in prison on each count, to be served consecutively, resulting in an aggregate sentence of ninety-six years. Following the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010), which categorically banned sentences of life without parole for juveniles who were not convicted of homicide, Armstrong moved the district court to vacate the sentence, arguing that her aggregate term-of-years sentence was the functional equivalent of life without parole and therefore unconstitutional under "Graham." The district court denied Armstrong’s motion. On appeal, the court of appeals affirmed, concluding that, because Armstrong will be eligible for parole at about age sixty, she has a meaningful opportunity to obtain release, and her sentence thereby complied with "Graham" and the subsequent case of Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012). The Colorado Supreme Court determined "Graham" and "Miller" did not apply here, and therefore, did not invalidate Armstrong's aggregate term-of-years sentence. View "Armstrong v. Colorado" on Justia Law

In 2006, a jury convicted Alejandro Estrada-Huerta of second-degree kidnapping and sexual assault. Estrada-Huerta was seventeen at the time he was charged, and he was tried as an adult. The trial court sentenced Estrada-Huerta to twenty-four years for the kidnapping conviction and sixteen years to life for each count of sexual assault. The sexual assault sentences were ordered to run concurrently with each other but consecutive to the kidnapping sentence, resulting in an aggregate sentence of forty years to life in the custody of the Department of Corrections. Estrada-Huerta moved to vacate his sentences, arguing his aggregate term-of-years sentence was the functional equivalent of life without parole and was therefore unconstitutional under Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010). The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that, because Estrada-Huerta would be eligible for parole at age fifty-eight, he had a meaningful opportunity to obtain release, therefore his sentence complied with “Graham” and the subsequent case of Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012). The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court’s result, though on different grounds. The Court found that “Graham” and “Miller” did not apply in this matter; Estrada-Huerta was not sentenced to life without the possibility of parole: he received consecutive terms for three separate convictions. View "Estrada-Huerta v. Colorado" on Justia Law

Defendant was sentenced to life without parole (LWOP) for special circumstance murder. While defendant's original appeal was pending, the United States Supreme Court decided Miller v. Alabama, (2012) 567 U.S. 460, which held that mandatory LWOP sentences for juvenile homicide offenders violated the Eighth Amendment. In defendant's first appeal, the Court of Appeal reversed the judgment and remanded to the trial court to reconsider defendant's LWOP sentence after applying the individualized sentencing criteria set forth in Miller. After the trial court again imposed an LWOP sentence, defendant appealed once more. In supplemental briefing, defendant argued that Proposition 57, the Public Safety and Rehabilitation Act of 2016 applied retroactively to his case. In the published portion of this opinion, the Court of Appeal held that the suitability hearing provisions of Proposition 57 are not retroactive. View "People v. Marquez" on Justia Law

Although the Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act (Proposition 47) applies generally to juveniles as held in Alejandro N. v. Superior Court, (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 1209, the search for statutory intent calls for a more narrow and limited approach, which focuses on the statutory language and settled case law interpreting this language. Applying this approach, the Court of Appeal held that defendant's juvenile adjudication for a violation of Penal Code section 243.4 was not a prior conviction as used in Health and Safety Code section 11377 and did not disqualify him from misdemeanor sentencing. Accordingly, the court reversed the trial court's finding that defendant's offense constituted a felony instead of a misdemeanor. View "People v. Zamora" on Justia Law

Where a ward’s compliance with probation conditions (Welfare and Institutions Code section 786) has been satisfactory for dismissal purposes, the court must seal the ward’s records in accordance with the statute.A 2014 section 602 wardship petition charged A.V., age 15, with felony possession of marijuana for sale and misdemeanor possession of concentrated cannabis. A.V. admitted the truth of the allegations. The court placed A.V. on probation on the conditions, among others, that he complete 150 hours of community service work, write a 1,000-word essay about the effects of marijuana on the adolescent brain, refrain from using or possessing alcohol or drugs, and complete outpatient substance abuse counseling. While on probation, A.V. twice tested positive for marijuana use and spent time in juvenile hall. Ultimately, citing A.V.’s “record of successfully completing probation programs, excellent reports from his school, and his family support network,” the probation department recommended “that all proceedings be dismissed.” The court agreed to dismiss the proceedings but refused to seal the records. The court of appeal remanded to have the records sealed. View "In re A.V." on Justia Law

Justin B. was found delinquent for committing criminal sexual conduct with a minor in the first degree. The family court imposed the mandatory, statutory requirement that he register as a sex offender and wear an electronic monitor, both for life. Justin B. claimed the mandatory imposition of lifetime registration and electronic monitoring on juveniles was unconstitutional. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the family court. View "In the Interest of Justin B." on Justia Law

Order that juveniles submit to psychological evaluation before court ruling on motion to transfer for adult prosecution is not subject to immediate appellate review. Juveniles allegedly robbed a pharmacy. They were charged with Hobbs Act Robbery, 18 U.S.C. 1951(a), and possession of a firearm during that robbery, 18 U.S.C. 924(c). The government sought transfer for adult prosecution, 18 U.S.C. 5032 and moved to have the juveniles examined by government psychologists. The juveniles argued that the examinations—without counsel present—would violate their Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights. The magistrate granted the motion, ordering that the psychologists “not talk … about the specific allegations.” The district court affirmed. The Seventh Circuit dismissed an interlocutory appeal for lack of jurisdiction, without addressing the merits. The order did not fit within the “small class” of nonfinal orders that “finally determine claims of right separable from, and collateral to, rights asserted in the action, too important to be denied review and too independent of the cause itself to require that appellate consideration be deferred until the whole case is adjudicated.” The juvenile will not be irreparably harmed by failure to review his constitutional claims now; he can raise these same claims on an immediate appeal if the district court grants the motion to transfer. If the court denies that motion, the government will be prohibited from using at any subsequent prosecution any information obtained during the examination. View "United States v. Sealed Defendant Juvenile Male (4)" on Justia Law

Oswaldo, age 14, was declared a ward of the court and placed on probation after he admitted the allegation of a Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 petition that he committed misdemeanor battery on the property of a school, park, or hospital. The court dismissed an allegation of felony resisting an officer. Another section 602 petition, filed a month later, alleged two counts of felony vandalism causing damage of over $400. Days later, the probation officer filed a notice, alleging that Oswaldo had violated probation by failing to obey all laws, comply with his court-ordered curfew, attend school and behave appropriately in school. He admitted the first count, reduced to a misdemeanor; the second count and probation violation allegations were dismissed. The court removed Oswaldo from parental custody and ordered conditions of probation, to which Oswaldo objected, including that Oswaldo “not be in any specific locations where gang members are known by him to meet or gather or specific locations known by him for gang-related activity or specified by his probation officer or a parent, in writing, as involving gang-related activity, nor shall he participate in any gang-related activity.” The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting an argument that the condition was unconstitutionally vague for lacking an express knowledge requirement. View "In re Oswaldo R." on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit reversed and remanded the district court's grant of summary judgment in a suit against employees of a juvenile home, concluding that the district court erred by holding as a matter of law that defendants were entitled to qualified immunity. Plaintiff alleged that defendants violated his constitutional rights by housing him in prolonged solitary confinement, failing to educate him, and allowing him to be sexually abused. In this case, the district court addressed only the fact of juvenile court supervision in determining that defendants were entitled to qualified immunity, and its opinion did not contain sufficient detail to allow the court to review whether defendants were entitled to qualified immunity. View "Bradford v. Avery" on Justia Law

R.S. acknowledged that he did not object to two issues he raised on appeal to the Court of Appeal; the Court determined R.S. forfeited those issues. R.S. was found trespassing on school grounds as a nonstudent. Officers detained him after he became belligerent. One of the officers suffered a hairline fracture to his thumb during the struggle. R.S. was arrested in connection with a robbery outside of a Starbucks approximately two months later. At the police station, R.S. at first denied punching the victim in the head, later admitting to striking the victim. R.S. conceded that he attacked the victim to steal his iPhone. At the disposition hearing, the juvenile court imposed, among others, the following probation conditions: "Minor shall submit [his] person, property, or vehicle, and any property under [his] immediate custody or control to search at any time, with or without probable cause, with or without a search warrant, by any law enforcement officer or peace officers, probation officers, school officials or officers, and any other state security officers or agents engaged in the lawful performance of their duties [search condition]." "The minor shall not knowingly be in any privately owned vehicle with more than one person the minor knows or reasonably should know is under the age of 18 unless accompanied by a parent or legal guardian, a responsible adult, or with permission of the probation officer [supervision condition]." R.S. challenged these two conditions, arguing the search condition was unconstitutionally overbroad and vague while the supervision condition was unconstitutionally vague. Because he was making facial challenges to the conditions, R.S. argues his claims of error raised pure questions of law that the Court of Appeal should review. The Court disagreed, concluding R.S. forfeited these challenges by not raising them sooner. View "In re R.S." on Justia Law