Kentucky’s Health and Family Services commenced a Dependency, Neglect, and Abuse proceeding. The mother stipulated to neglecting her children. Kentucky placed both boys in foster care. R.O., the mother’s aunt, sought custody of the children. The state conducted a standard home evaluation and criminal background check on R.O. and eventually both children were placed in her home by court order. The family court closed the action and granted joint custody to the mother and R.O., though the boys remained living with R.O., who sought foster care maintenance payments. The family court declined to rule on the issue, “indicating that permanency had been achieved.” R.O. then sued the state, arguing that the federal Child Welfare Act, 42 U.S.C. 672(a), required the state to provide maintenance payments, and that the failure to make payments violated the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses. The state removed the case to federal court. The district court dismissed, reasoning that the Child Welfare Act provides no privately enforceable rights, that the family lacked a property interest in the payments, and that Kentucky’s scheme rationally distinguished between relative and non-relative foster care providers. The Sixth Circuit reversed, finding that the Act creates a private right of action. View "D.O. v. Glisson" on Justia Law

In lieu of adjudging minor J.G. a ward of the court based on his commission of trespass and felony vandalism, the juvenile court granted minor deferred entry of judgment and placed him on probation with terms and conditions including payment of restitution to the victim. Because minor eventually satisfied the terms and conditions of his probation with the exception of ordered restitution, the juvenile court terminated probation, dismissed the wardship petition and converted the restitution order to a civil judgment. Minor appealed that order, arguing: (1) the Court of Appeal had jurisdiction to review the juvenile court’s order because the order was a judgment within the meaning of Welfare and Institutions Code section 800(a); (2) a juvenile court can only convert a restitution order to a civil judgment if it has adjudged a minor a ward of the court; and (3) the juvenile court misapplied the law in assessing minor’s ability to pay restitution. In the published portion of its opinion, the Court of Appeal concluded: (1) the challenged order was a judgment within the meaning of section 800(a) because the juvenile court rendered a final determination of the rights of the parties in the wardship proceeding; and (2) even if a juvenile court has not adjudged a minor a ward of the court, it can convert an unfulfilled restitution order to a civil judgment when it terminates a minor’s deferred entry of judgment probation and dismisses the wardship petition. In the unpublished portion of this opinion, the Court concluded: (3) minor has not established a misapplication of the law. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the juvenile court. View "In re J.G." on Justia Law

Mother‘s childhood was marked by abuse and neglect. When she was 13 years old she began an abusive relationship with Carl, a 20-year-old dropout. Their child, Carl Jr., was born when Mother was 14. While still a minor, Mother left Carl, started a relationship with Kevin, and gave birth to Harmony in 2012 and Melody in 2013. The family, including both fathers, had at least 13 referrals for physical and emotional abuse and neglect before Melody died in 2015, as a result of acute methadone toxicity. The Agency filed petitions on behalf of the surviving children, alleging failure to protect because: parents allowed them to live in a home where dangerous medications were within easy access despite Carl Jr.‘s earlier methadone poisoning; Mother failed to adequately supervise the children by frequently leaving them with Grandmother or Carl Sr. despite earlier incidents and warnings from the Agency; and Kevin was living in a residential facility. The court found that Mother‘s neglect contributed to Melody's death and that there was no clear and convincing evidence that reunification services were in the children’s best interest. The court of appeal upheld the court‘s jurisdictional findings and the bypass of services to Mother, but reversed the dismissal of Carl Jr.‘s dependency case. View "In re Carl H." on Justia Law

This appeal arose out of Victor Garrett and Erion Varnado’s participation in armed robberies and an attempted armed robbery in November 2008. Both Garrett and Varnado were 17 years old when the offenses were committed, but were tried as adults. A jury convicted Garrett of six counts of second degree robbery, two counts of kidnapping for robbery, one count of attempted robbery, and one count of assault with a firearm. For each of the offenses, the jury found true the allegation Garrett personally used a firearm, and as to the assault with a firearm, that Garrett personally discharged a firearm. Garrett was sentenced to serve a total of 74 years and 4 months to life in prison. Varnado was also convicted by a jury of two counts of second degree robbery, one count of attempted robbery, and one count of assault with a firearm. The jury also found true the allegation Varnado personally used a firearm during the assault and attempted robbery. However, the jury found Varnado not guilty of four counts of robbery. The jury was unable to reach a verdict as to: the two counts of kidnapping to commit robbery, whether Varnado personally used a firearm during the second degree robberies, or he discharged a firearm during the attempted robbery. The trial court declared a mistrial as to the counts and enhancements for which the jury could not reach a verdict. On retrial, Varnado was convicted of the remaining two counts of second degree robbery, and the jury found true the allegation he used a firearm during these robberies. The second jury was not asked to decide whether Varnado discharged a firearm during the attempted robbery. Varnado was sentenced to serve a total of 31 years to life in prison. Both appealed. The Court of Appeal found no reversible error and affirmed each defendant's convictions and sentence. View "California v. Garrett" on Justia Law

In early 2016, petitioner (the State) initiated a prosecution against real party in interest, a minor who was detained at juvenile hall, by directly filing a criminal complaint against him in adult court. Preliminary hearings occurred on May 26, 2016, and on June 10, 2016, and the State filed an information charging real party in interest with felony violations. On November 8, 2016, the voters passed Proposition 57. As relevant here, Proposition 57 eliminated the State's ability to directly file charges against a juvenile offender in adult court and instead authorized the State to file “a motion to transfer the minor from juvenile court to a court of criminal jurisdiction.” On November 16, 2016, real party in interest filed a motion requesting “a fitness hearing in juvenile court pursuant to recently enacted legislation via Proposition 57.” After considering written opposition from the State, who argued Proposition 57 could not be applied to real party in interest’s case retroactively, the trial court granted the motion on November 29, 2016. The State then appealed. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded lacked merit. "Our order requesting an informal response notified real party in interest that a peremptory writ might issue unless it showed good cause to the contrary. All parties received 'due notice,' and 'it appears that the petition and opposing papers on file adequately address the issues raised by the petition, that no factual dispute exists, and that the additional briefing that would follow issuance of an alternative writ is unnecessary to disposition of the petition.'" In reliance on these rules, and because the Court agreed that the issue posed by the petition was an important one warranting speedy resolution, the Court of Appeal resolved the petition by way of a formal written opinion denying relief. View "California v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

The juvenile court dismissed Joshua R.’s juvenile adjudication after he successfully completed probation. The court declined to seal his record, however, because of an ongoing probation condition stating he was not permitted to own a firearm before he turned 30 years old. Joshua argued this was error. The Court of Appeal agreed: "[t]he pertinent issue is whether the substantive Penal Code section addressing future firearm ownership for minors in his situation conflicts with the Welfare and Institutions Code section requiring the juvenile court to seal records upon the successful completion of probation. We conclude these statutes can be harmonized to effect the purposes of each." View "In re Joshua R." on Justia Law

Defendant, sixteen-years-old at the time of the crimes, was convicted of one count of second degree murder and two counts of attempted willful, premeditated, and deliberate murder. The court concluded that defendant's Batson/Wheeler motions were properly denied where the totality of the relevant facts dispel any inference of a discriminatory intent on the part of the prosecutor in exercising her peremptory challenges to excuse three African-American prospective jurors; defendant's April 13, 2013 statement to the police was properly admitted where he validly waived his Miranda rights and his post-Miranda statement was voluntary; and defendant's Eighth Amendment challenge to his 80 year to life prison sentence has been rendered moot where the legislature has enacted Penal Code section 3051, and in light of the holding in People v. Franklin, where defendant will be entitled to a youth offender parole hearing with a meaningful opportunity for release after 25 years of incarceration. The court remanded the matter for the trial court to follow the procedures outlined in Franklin to see if defendant is entitled to a hearing to present evidence relevant to his future youthful offender parole hearing. View "People v. Jones" on Justia Law

As a juvenile homicide offender facing a de facto life-without-parole sentence, petitioner Joel Rodriguez Ramos was entitled to a "Miller" hearing, just as a juvenile homicide offender facing a literal life-without-parole sentence would be. Based on the record presented, the Supreme Court found that that Ramos received a constitutionally adequate Miller hearing and he did not show that his aggregated 85-year sentence violated the Eighth Amendment. View "Washington v. Rodriguez Ramos" on Justia Law

In May 2015, police detained defendant M.F. at his high school after he gave one of his teachers a letter stating that she "should be worried about getting shot." When detained, he was wearing an empty holster. The police searched M.F.'s backpack and found journals that described a plan to kill individuals associated with schools that he had attended. The journals also contained a list of supplies that he would need to carry out his plan and "hit lists" of potential victims, with various types of "punishments" (such as wound, torture, death, rape, or a combination thereof) next to each name. In addition, one journal entry indicated that M.F. had been "faking it" while participating in anger management and counseling following his 2013 expulsion. At home, police searched M.F.'s bedroom and found 20 rounds of live ammunition, several replica firearms, gun magazines, gun cleaning equipment and gun holsters, including one for a Glock firearm, a handgun case, a folding knife, black ski masks and a balaclava. Police also found tactical gear, including a ballistic helmet, vest and armor plates. Several items found in M.F.'s bedroom had been checked off on his supply list. M.F. told police that he had been involved in a militia for several years, admitted having borrowed a Glock and a rifle from militia members, and that the militia had given him body armor, which he said he used "mostly" for his job as a paintball referee. He claimed that his journal entries were intended to be cathartic and he had no intention of physically harming anyone. Regarding his participation in anger management and decision-making counseling in 2014, he admitted that the programs had been ineffective in helping him appropriately channel his anger. M.F. appealed a juvenile court's disposition order declaring him a ward of the court, committing him to a residential program, and setting probation conditions. He contended the court erred by: (1) admitting cumulative and prejudicial testimony and exhibits at the disposition hearing; (2) committing him to a 480-day residential program; (3) imposing an unconstitutionally overbroad probation condition restricting his possession of electronic devices; (4) designating one of his offenses as a felony without a proper section 702 finding; and (5) failing to deduct his predisposition custody credits when calculating his maximum term of confinement. The Court of Appeal concluded the juvenile court erred in imposing an overly broad probation condition regarding electronic devices and in failing to deduct predisposition custody credits when determining M.F.'s maximum time of confinement. The Court reversed the disposition order in part, and remanded for the juvenile court to modify its order to include: (1) a more narrowly tailored probation condition, and (2) a deduction of M.F.'s predisposition custody credits in its determination of his maximum period of confinement. In all other respects, the Court affirmed the order. View "In re M.F." on Justia Law

The defendants in these appeals committed very serious, violent crimes when they were juveniles. One was serving a sentence of 110 years imprisonment and would not be eligible for parole until he spent 55 years in jail. At that time, he would be about 72 years old. The second was serving a 75-year term and was ineligible for parole until he served 68 years and 3 months in jail. He would then be 85 years old. The United States Supreme Court recognized the mitigating qualities of youth and directed that judges in those cases consider a number of factors at sentencing, including immaturity and failure to appreciate risks and consequences; family and home environment; family and peer pressures; an inability to deal with police officers or prosecutors or the juvenile s own attorney; and the possibility of rehabilitation. The New Jersey Court found the same concerns applied to sentences that were the practical equivalent of life without parole, like the ones in these appeals. "The proper focus belongs on the amount of real time a juvenile will spend in jail and not on the formal label attached to his sentence. To satisfy the Eighth Amendment and Article I, Paragraph 12 of the State Constitution, which both prohibit cruel and unusual punishment, we direct that defendants be resentenced and that the 'Miller' factors be addressed at that time. [. . .] In short, judges should exercise a heightened level of care before they impose multiple consecutive sentences on juveniles which would result in lengthy jail terms." Both cases were remanded for resentencing. View "New Jersey v. Zuber" on Justia Law