In 2010, the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services petitioned for wardship of M.I., a minor, 705 ILCS 405/2-3, alleging that M.I.’s mother had neglected her and that M.I.’s father had an extensive criminal history. The juvenile court granted the petition, finding M.I. to be neglected. The court ordered father to obtain a drug and alcohol assessment, submit to random drug testing twice monthly, undergo a psychological examination, and complete a parenting class. Until he dropped out of high school, father was enrolled in special education courses for learning disabilities. He had been unemployed since 2007. Father had been incarcerated on eight different occasions for approximately 18-19 years in total but had not been incarcerated since 2005. He suffers from bipolar disorder and admitted to regular marijuana use, indicating that he had been clean for two months. Father is functionally illiterate, and possesses an IQ of 58. The state asserted that he did not attend drug testing or participate in a drug and alcohol evaluation and refused to provide an address to his caseworker. The court found both parents unfit. Thereafter, at five different permanency hearings, the juvenile court found that father had failed to make reasonable efforts to achieve the service plan and permanency goal. The court appointed DCFS as guardian. The Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the termination of father’s rights. The statute, 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(b), does not contain a willfulness requirement. The juvenile court considered father’s intellectual disability and other circumstances, such as his sporadic attendance at visitation, when it found him unfit under subsection (b). View "In re M.I." on Justia Law

A petition filed under Welfare and Institutions Code 602 alleged that E.G. committed four offenses. He pled no contest to battery causing serious bodily injury and grand theft; the remaining charges were dismissed. The offenses E.G. pled no contest to were “wobblers,” offenses (Penal Code 17(b)(3)) that “are chargeable or, in the discretion of the court, punishable as either a felony or a misdemeanor.” The petition alleged them as felonies. The juvenile court placed E.G. on probation and committed him to a youth facility for nine months. The court of appeal remanded, finding the juvenile court had not exercised its discretion to declare the offenses misdemeanors or felonies as required by statute. Months later, E.G. moved to have his offenses reduced to misdemeanors under section 17(b), stating that the juvenile court had declared the offenses to be felonies. The state did not dispute this statement, although no such declaration was made on remand. The juvenile court denied the motion, finding that section 17(b)(3) did not apply in juvenile proceedings. A bench officer subsequently stated he had declared the offenses to be felonies at disposition and did so again. The court then terminated E.G.’s wardship and probation. Holding that the “wobbler” provision applies in juvenile proceedings, the court of appeal remanded to allow the juvenile court to exercise its discretion. View "In re E.G." on Justia Law

D.R., born in November 2004, lived with her maternal grandmother since she was an infant and was “thriving” in her grandmother’s care. D.R.’s two half siblings lived separately with mother and their father in the same apartment building. Dependency proceedings were initiated in 2013, following a violent incident involving the father of D.R.’s two half-siblings. Mother failed to comply with reunification plans. D.R.’s father, who initially was described as “whereabouts unknown,” eventually was located living at the home of his mother and stepfather. Father had been convicted of statutory rape of D.R.’s mother and did not see D.R. after he was released from incarceration. His name was not on D.R.’s birth certificate. Father visited D.R. for a four-month period during the dependency proceedings, after which he stopped visiting. Father did not attend conjoint therapy with D.R. As D.R.’s permanent plan, the juvenile court selected legal guardianship over adoption by her grandmother. The court of appeal reversed, holding that the trial court was required to select the more permanent plan of adoption. No substantial evidence supported the court’s rationale for selecting legal guardianship instead of adoption. View "In re D.R." on Justia Law

In 1987, Defendant murdered his twelve-year-old sister. Defendant was fourteen years old at the time of the murder. Defendant was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. In 2013, Defendant filed a motion for postconviction relief, arguing that his sentence was cruel and unusual punishment in light of the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Miller v. Alabama. The district court vacated Defendant’s life sentence, finding that the sentence was within the parameters of the holding in Miller, that the rule in Miller applies retroactively, and that Defendant was therefore entitled to postconviction relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because the relevant sentencing scheme mandated life imprisonment without the possibility for parole, the district court was bound by Miller. Remanded for resentencing. View "State v. Thieszen" on Justia Law

Sandrino T. and Remus M. were each charged in the juvenile court with six counts of ATM “skimming.” In each case, the State moved to transfer to county court. The juvenile court granted the motions. Both Sandrino and Remus appealed. The Supreme Court consolidated the cases on appeal for disposition. The Court then dismissed each appeal for lack of jurisdiction, holding that the orders transferring the cases from juvenile court to county court were not final and appealable because the transfer of the cases from juvenile court to criminal court did not affect the substantial rights of Sandrino and Remus. View "In re Sandrino T." on Justia Law

In 2013, in Contra Costa County Juvenile Court, defendant pleaded no contest to felony theft. The court declared him a ward of the state. A year later, a new petition alleged defendant unlawfully possessed a firearm. He pleaded no contest to a misdemeanor variant of the charge. The following year, prior to a disposition hearing on the new charge, defendant’s case was transferred to the San Francisco Juvenile Court (Welfare and Institutions Code section 750) because his family had moved. The San Francisco Juvenile Court re-declared defendant a ward, placed him with his mother, and kept intact orders of the transferor court. Days later, defendant filed a Proposition 47 petition in the San Francisco Juvenile Court to reduce his felony theft offense to misdemeanor larceny. The San Francisco court denied his petition, ruling only the Contra Costa Juvenile Court had jurisdiction to act on defendant’s petition, citing Penal Code 1170.18(a), which states that a defendant “may petition for a recall of sentence before the trial court that entered the judgment of conviction.” The court of appeal reversed. Proposition 47 is not intended to undercut an important goal of the juvenile justice system, to preserve and support the family unit. View "In re I.S." on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to two counts of armed sexual battery, armed burglary, and armed robbery. Defendant was fifteen years old at the time he committed the offenses. The trial court sentenced Defendant to two life sentences and two concurrent twenty-five-year terms. After Graham v. Florida was decided, the trial court resentenced Defendant to concurrent sentences of forty-five years. On appeal, the First District Court of Appeal concluded that Defendant was not entitled to resentencing under Henry v. State, which applied the new sentence review statute to a Graham-eligible defendant, because Defendant’s forty-five-year term of imprisonment did not constitute a de facto life sentence in violation of Graham. However, the district court certified a question to the Supreme Court regarding the need for clarity on a category of Graham cases. The Supreme Court disapproved the court of appeal’s decision affirming Defendant’s resentencing, holding that a defendant whose initial sentence for a nonhomicide crime violated Graham and who was resentenced to concurrent forty-five year terms was entitled to new resentencing under the framework established in chapter 2014-220, Laws of Florida. View "Kelsey v. State" on Justia Law

While J.S. was a dependent of the juvenile court, a delinquency petition was filed alleging that she committed vandalism and used force and violence against another minor. The juvenile court declared her a "dual status" child, making her both a dependent and a ward of the court. On appeal, J.S. argued that: (1) the juvenile court erred by failing to dismiss the delinquency petition and declaring her a dual status youth; (2) the court erred by detaining her in juvenile hall pending placement in a residential treatment facility; and (3) she was prejudiced by being declared a ward. The Court of Appeal rejected J.S.'s arguments and affirmed the judgment. View "In re J.S." on Justia Law

The State filed a petition in juvenile court alleging that sixteen-year-old Tyrone K. committed four counts of theft by receiving stolen property and one count of operating a motor vehicle to avoid arrest. The prosecutor moved to transfer the proceedings to criminal court. The juvenile court granted the motion to transfer after conducting an evidentiary hearing. Tyrone appealed, arguing that there was insufficient evidence for the juvenile court to transfer his case to criminal court. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the transfer order from which Tyrone appealed was not a final order. View "In re Interest of Tyrone K." on Justia Law

The juvenile court adjudicated twin brothers LeVanta S. and LeRonn S. under Neb. Rev. Stat. 43-247(3)(c) as mentally ill and dangerous. The brother were placed in out-of-home care. The juvenile court later changed the brothers’ permanency objective from family reunification to guardianship. Mother and Father appealed from this order in both cases. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the juvenile court’s order affected a substantial right of the parents, and therefore, the order was a final, appealable order; and (2) the juvenile court exceeded its authority by adopting the permanency plan of guardianship in these cases where there had been no adjudication under Neb. Rev. Stat. 43-247(3)(a). Remanded. View "In re Interest of LeVanta S." on Justia Law