At issue in these cases was what happens when the State fails to file a petition alleging delinquency against a juvenile who was not detained within 30 days of the filing of the complaint or seek an extension of that deadline from the juvenile court. In In the "Interest of M.D.H.," (779 SE2d 433 (2015)), a panel of the Court of Appeals held that the failure to comply with section 15-11-521(b) required dismissal of the juvenile case, but the dismissal was without prejudice. Three days later, in "Interest of D.V.H.," (779 SE2d 122 (2015)), a different panel answered the same question the opposite way, concluding that a violation of section 15-11-121(b) required dismissal with prejudice. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in both cases, asking whether the Court of Appeals correctly applied OCGA section 15-11-521 (b). The Supreme Court held that if the State fails to file a delinquency petition within the required 30 days or to seek and receive an extension of that deadline, the case must be dismissed without prejudice. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the Court of Appeals’ judgment in M.D.H., and reversed the judgment in D.V.H. View "In the Interest of M.D.H." on Justia Law

The State filed an amended petition seeking to adjudicate five children under Neb. Rev. Stat. 43-247(3)(a). At the beginning of the adjudication hearing, the State moved to dismiss without prejudice two factual allegations of the petition. The court dismissed the two allegations with prejudice. The State appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed the order as modified, holding that because the State sought dismissal of the factual allegations before any evidence was presented and before the children’s parents entered their admissions to certain counts, the juvenile court erred in ordering the dismissal to be with prejudice. View "In re Interest of Antonio J." on Justia Law

Juvenile defendant Trey M. challenged his three convictions for felony harassment under RCW 9A.46.020. The Court of Appeals certified the issue to the Washington Supreme Court of whether the United States Supreme Court's decision in "Elonis v. United States," (135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015)) had any impact on the Washington Court's "reasonable person standard" for what constituted a "true threat" under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. The Washington Supreme Court held that because "Elonis" expressly avoided any First Amendment analysis, it provided no basis for the Court to abandon its established First Amendment precedent. Accordingly, the Court affirmed. View "Washington v. Trey M." on Justia Law

The victim and her boyfriend’s eight-year-old son exited a bus in San Leandro. The boy then informed the victim that he had seen “a male,” later identified as 16-year-old D.H., “standing behind her on the bus and exposing his penis and masturbat[ing]” and that “the male eventually ejaculated and the semen landed on the back of [the victim’s] clothing.” The victim had not noticed anything at the time but discovered “a white substance” on the back of her jacket. She eventually reported the incident. A juvenile court declared D.H. a ward of the court and placed him on probation after he admitted to a misdemeanor count of indecent exposure. Raising mostly constitutional claims of vagueness and overbreadth, he challenged four probation conditions that required him: not to access pornography; to submit to warrantless searches of his electronic devices and provide passwords; to attend school regularly; and not to leave home without a parent or the probation officer’s permission. The court of appeal held that the no-pornography and electronics search conditions were vague, and remanded. The court affirmed the attendance condition and, in light of ambiguity in the record, requested clarification of whether the court intended to impose the stay-home condition. View "In re D.H." on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of murdering his mother and conspiracy to murder his stepfather. Defendant was sixteen years old at the time he committed the crimes and was sentenced to a term of life without the possibility of parole (LWOP). Defendant seeks resentencing in light of Miller v. Alabama. Miller held that the Eighth Amendment forbids a sentencing scheme that mandates life in prison without possibility of parole for juvenile offenders. After the trial court reimposed the LWOP term, the Supreme Court issued Montgomery v. Louisiana, which held that Miller announced a substantive rule of law that had retroactive application in state collateral review proceedings. The court reversed and remanded for resentencing because the trial court exercised its discretion in resentencing defendant without the guidance provided by Montgomery. View "People v. Padilla" on Justia Law

Police responded to a domestic disturbance involving then 16-year-old A.L.-C., who was feuding with he mother and stepfather on the first floor of the family home. B.O., his sister, told an aunt who was in the house, that A.L.-C. had sexually assaulted her. B.O. repeated her allegations to the police. A.L.-C. was briefly detained, but then returned to his parents. The following day, A.L.-C. and his parents went to the police station for questioning about the alleged sexual assaults. A detective and Spanish interpreter advised the three of A.L.-C.'s "Miranda" rights, then the detective and interpreter stepped out of the room to allow the family to discuss whether A.L.-C. would waive his rights. A videorecorder captured their exchange. Initially, the tape showed the parents individually asking A.L.-C. whether he understood his rights. A.L.-C. replied that he was "always the liar, or the one lying" and told his mother he would rather keep quiet. Whether A.L.-C. meant this as a refusal to speak with his mother or with the police was unclear. Minutes later, the detective and interpreter re-enetered the room and A.L.-C. and his mother both signed the Miranda waiver form. A.L.-C. indicated he understood his rights and agreed to discuss his sister's allegations. A.L.-C.'s stepfather left the room before more questioning began, but his mother remained for its entirety. At issue was A.L.-C.'s statement to his mother outside of police presence. The trial court suppressed A.L.-C.'s incriminating statements, concluding that although his mother was present, she could not protect his right to remain silent because she did not share his interests. The State sought the Colorado Supreme Court's review. Finding that the plain language of section 19-2-511(1) C.R.S. (2016) required only that a parent be present during the advisement and interrogation, the Supreme Court reversed the suppression order. View "People in the Interest of A.L.-C." on Justia Law

The minor, then three years old, became the subject of a dependency petition after his stepfather, Donald, assaulted his mother, in the minor’s presence. The minor’s paternity was the subject of separate family court proceedings filed by Michael and Joel, the minor’s biological father. Michael is the man with whom mother was living at the time of the minor’s birth. The family court ruled that both Michael and Joel qualify as presumed parents under Family Code section 7612(c), which authorizes multiple presumed parents. When the juvenile court inquired into the minor’s paternity, all three men sought to be declared presumed parents. Michael and Joel based their claims on the family court’s order, while Donald argued that he had served as the minor’s father for 20 months before his assault on mother. Considering itself bound by the family court’s order, the juvenile court found all three to be presumed parents. The court of appeal concluded that the juvenile court erred in finding Michael to be a presumed parent; section 316.2 grants exclusive jurisdiction over paternity issues to the juvenile court upon the filing of a dependency petition. The court upheld the designation of Donald as a presumed parent, as supported by substantial evidence. View "In re Alexander P." on Justia Law

The Iowa District Court for Story County issued an order appointing the local public defender of Nevada, Iowa to represent a juvenile, who had been detained. The public defender filed a motion to withdraw, citing conflicts of interest between the juvenile and other clients. After a detention hearing, the court ordered the juvenile’s transfer from detention to shelter care and then withdrew the local defender’s appointment and appointed new conflict-free counsel for the juvenile. The court subsequently taxed to the state public defender the court and travel costs related to the hearing for withdrawing from the representation of the juvenile prior to the hearing without first taking steps to secure alternative representation for the juvenile. The state public defender filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the Supreme Court, claiming that the district court acted illegally when it taxed the court and travel costs against the state public defender. The Supreme Court sustained the writ, holding that the district court exceeded its authority and made an error of law in determining that the state public defender or the local public defender violated either statutory or ethical duties under the circumstances of this case. View "State Public Defender v. Iowa District Court" on Justia Law

Defendant was required to register as a sex offender in Michigan because he was adjudicated a juvenile delinquent for a sex offense. Defendant later moved to Kentucky, where he was charged with failing to register under the Kentucky Sex Offender Registration Act. Defendant entered a conditional guilty plea to the charge. The court of appeals affirmed on appeal, concluding that Defendant was required to register under the plain language of the Act. Defendant appealed, claiming that he was not required to register under the Act because he was a juvenile and was not “convicted” of any crime. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the statute requires registration in the state of Kentucky of any person who was required to register in another state upon that person’s relocation; and (2) because Defendant was required to register in Michigan, he was also required to register in Kentucky. View "Murphy v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

In 2010, the circuit court adjudicated Minnis a delinquent minor for committing the offense of criminal sexual abuse (720 ILCS 5/12-15(b) and sentenced him to 12 months’ probation. The adjudication for criminal sexual abuse rendered him a “sex offender” pursuant to the Registration Act (730 ILCS 150/2(A)(5), (B)(1); the court ordered Minnis to register as a sex offender. On December 17, 2010, defendant reported to the Normal police department to register. He disclosed his two e-mail addresses and his Facebook account. Defendant’s May 2011 registration form listed the same Internet information. Defendant registered again in August 2014, including his two e-mail addresses, but omitting his Facebook account. On September 9, Normal police officers viewed defendant’s publicly accessible Facebook profile online; Minnis had changed his Facebook cover photo only one month before his August 2014 registration. The circuit court of McLean County dismissed a charge of failure to register, finding that the Internet disclosure provision was overbroad in violation of the First Amendment. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed and remanded for trial, treating the challenge as one to facial validity. The Internet disclosure provision survives intermediate scrutiny. It advances a substantial governmental interest without chilling more speech than necessary. View "People v. Minnis" on Justia Law