Defendant was charged with aggravated robbery, a Class 1 felony (720 ILCS 5/18-5). Before trial, the prosecution and defense agreed that the sentencing range would be 4-30 years. Defendant’s counsel stated that the state had tendered a “certified court docket from the ’04 JD case” indicating that defendant, as a juvenile, had been adjudicated delinquent on multiple counts of residential burglary, which would make defendant eligible for an extended-term sentence. Counsel also indicated that defendant denied having an adjudication for residential burglary. The court admonished defendant that he faced a sentencing range of 4-30 years. At trial, the evidence was limited to the aggravated robbery charge. No evidence regarding defendant’s prior juvenile adjudication was introduced. The jury found defendant guilty. A presentencing investigative report indicated that defendant, as a juvenile, had been adjudicated delinquent in 2005 of multiple offenses, including three counts of residential burglary. The appellate court and Illinois Supreme Court affirmed defendant’s extended-term sentence of 24 years’ imprisonment, rejecting arguments that the sentence violated Supreme Court rulings in Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) and Shepard v. United States (2005). Defendant’s prior juvenile adjudication is the equivalent of a prior conviction under Apprendi and falls within Apprendi’s prior-conviction exception and an exception in section 111-3(c-5) of the Illinois Criminal Code. The state was not required to allege the fact of his juvenile adjudication in the indictment or prove its existence beyond a reasonable doubt. View "People v. Jones" on Justia Law

The State filed a complaint against D.S. in the juvenile court, alleging that D.S., who was seventeen years old, was delinquent for approaching a couple about to enter their home, brandishing a firearm, and robbing them of their possessions. At the time of the juvenile court’s disposition, D.S. had been held for more than nine months in detention. Defendant requested confinement credit, but the juvenile court denied the request. D.S. appealed. The State conceded that the juvenile court erred in not granting D.S. credit for the time he was confined prior to disposition. On appeal, the court of appeals affirmed the juvenile court’s order. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Ohio Rev. Code 2152.18(B) requires that predisposition confinement be credited to a juvenile. Remanded for further proceedings, including the proper calculation and award of preconfinement credit. View "In re D.S." on Justia Law

A jury found defendant Alden Morgan, committed armed robbery at age 17. Following return of the guilty verdict, the district court sentenced him to 99 years imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. After being denied relief on direct review, defendant filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence in light of recent developments in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence pertaining to the sentencing of juveniles. The Louisiana Supreme Court granted the defendant’s writ application to determine whether the defendant’s 99-year sentence was an effective life sentence and was, therefore, illegal under the Supreme Court’s decision in "Graham v. Florida," (560 U.S. 48 (2010)). The Louisiana Court held that a 99-year sentence without parole was illegal because it did not provide the defendant “with a meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.” Accordingly, the Court amended defendant’s sentence to delete the restriction on parole eligibility. View "State ex rel Moran v. Louisiana" on Justia Law

W.C. was born in Guatemala in 1997. He lived with his grandparents because his mother was dead and his father missing. W.C. left Guatemala because of threats to his safety and came to the U.S. alone, in 2014. At the border, W.C. was taken into protective custody and placed with a distant relative in Oakland. The relative agreed to sponsor W.C. for asylum, but their relationship deteriorated. W.C. became homeless in October 2014. He started using drugs. Taken to a hospital for assessment after cutting himself at school, he was denied treatment because he lacked insurance. W.C. lived at a youth shelter for a while, then told social services he was living with a friend. Eventually, W.C. was suspended from school because he was under the influence of drugs, possessed a knife, and engaged in theft. W.C. requested protective custody. The court ordered him detained, with temporary placement and care provided by the agency. On May 1, 2015, W.C. turned 18. At a May 26 hearing, the agency recommended the dependency be dismissed because the juvenile court had made no legal determination on dependency. On July 7, the juvenile court dismissed the Welfare and Institutions Code section 300 petition. In February 2016, W.C. filed a Request to Return to Juvenile Court Jurisdiction and Foster Care, hoping to participate in job training. The court denied the request. The court of appeal affirmed, holding that a nonminor who was never found a dependent of the court could not reenter and be subject to juvenile court jurisdiction. View "In re W.C." on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Javante Scott appealed after the trial court, at a resentencing hearing, imposed the same 120-years-to-life term as at his original sentencing. Defendant was a minor at the time he committed his crimes, but was tried as an adult and convicted of three counts of attempted murder with firearm enhancements. Defendant argued the sentence was cruel and unusual because it imposed a de facto life sentence on him as a juvenile offender. The State argued that a new statute, Penal Code section 3051,1 which guaranteed defendant a future parole eligibility hearing, rendered the sentence constitutional. After review, the Court of Appeals held that section 3051 complied with the central constitutional requirement that the State provide a juvenile offender with a meaningful opportunity to obtain release within his or her expected lifetime. For this reason, the Court affirmed but with directions that the trial court determined whether defendant was afforded an adequate opportunity to make a record that complied with the requirements set forth in "California v. Franklin" (63 Cal.4th 261 (2016)). View "California v. Scott" on Justia Law

Similar to "Colorado v. Johnson," (2016 CO 69 (2016)), at issue in this case were questions involving what a trial court could order when a juvenile seeks a reverse-transfer of her criminal case from trial court to juvenile court. Defendant Brooke Higgins was a juvenile respondent before a magistrate judge. The district attorney requested, and Higgins' then-defense-counsel agreed to, a state administered mental health assessment of Higgins. Because the parties agreed, the magistrate judge ordered the assessment. Later, in front of a trial court, the DA dismissed the juvenile charges against Higgins and charged her as an adult with two counts of conspiracy to commit murder. Higgins sought, and the trial court granted, a reverse-transfer hearing to determine whether she should remain in adult court. Before that hearing, Higgins, now represented by different counsel, filed a motion to suppress the mental health assessment and disqualify the trial court judge. The trial court denied both requests, holding that the parties stipulated to the assessment, and there was independent statutory authority for the magistrate judge to order the assessment. Higgins appealed, arguing the trial court lacked authority to order a juvenile-charged-as-an-adult to undergo a mental health assessment for a reverse-transfer hearing. The Supreme Court found that based on the facts of this case, Higgins' arguments, while loosely related to those in "Johnson," were hypothetical and premature. The Court therefore vacated the trial court's order and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Higgins v. Colorado" on Justia Law

At issue in this case were questions involving what a trial court could order when a juvenile seeks a reverse-transfer of her criminal case from trial court to juvenile court. The district attorney directly filed a criminal complaint against defendant Sienna Johnson in trial court, treating her as an adult and charging her with two counts of conspiracy to commit first-degree murder. Defendant requested a reverse-transfer hearing, and the trial court granted her request. The State appealed, arguing that C.R.S. 19-2-517(3)(b)(VI) (the reverse-transfer statute) required a trial court to evaluate the petitioner's mental health. The DA requested access to defendant's mental health and psychological records and requested a court-ordered mental health assessment. Defendant responded that she should not have to produce the records because she had not waived her psychotherapist-patient privilege in her request for a reverse-transfer, and the statute did not give the trial court authority to order an assessment. The trial court ruled in favor of the DA on both counts. The Supreme Court concluded after review: (1) nothing in the reverse-transfer statute stated that a juvenile waived her psychotherapist-patient privilege by requesting a reverse-transfer hearing, so the trial court could not order her to produce her mental records; and (2) nothing in the statute gave the trial court explicit authority to order the mental health assessment. The case was therefore remanded for further proceedings. View "Johnson v. Colorado" on Justia Law

Minor admitted a violation of grand theft from the person of another, with a stipulated restitution of $20. Minor was ordered to the Correctional Academy for 12 months, consisting of six months of confinement and six months of aftercare under the supervision of probation. It was ordered that Minor could be returned to the Correctional Academy for a one-time remediation of 30 days at any time during the aftercare component due to a violation of probation or program rules. In the published portion of the opinion, the court held that the 30-day remediation violated the statutory protections afforded in the Welfare and Institutions Code as it permitted the probation officer to determine a violation of probation without notice to Minor and an opportunity to be heard. The court further held that it was impermissible for the juvenile court to impose a $50 “Facilities Assessment” pursuant to Government Code section 70372, subdivision (a). The court vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing. View "In re Gabriel T." on Justia Law

The minor stabbed another young man in the abdomen during a brawl, using a folding pocket knife. The resulting injury required a five-day hospital stay. The minor was charged under Penal Code section 245(a)(1), assault with a deadly weapon other than a firearm, and subdivision (a)(4), assault by force likely to produce great bodily injury. The juvenile court found true both violations, and enhancement allegations for personal use of a deadly weapon and infliction of great bodily injury. The minor was committed to the Youthful Offender Treatment Program for a maximum of nine years or until age 21. The court of appeal held that the minor cannot be found to have violated both section because the offense specified in subdivision (a)(4), assault by force likely to produce great bodily injury, is necessarily included within the offense specified in subdivision (a)(1), assault with a deadly weapon or instrument other than a firearm. The court struck the deadly weapon use enhancement as an element of subdivision (a)(1) and directed the entry of a narrower electronic search condition and remanded for recalculation of the minor’s maximum term of confinement and restitution fine. View "In re Jonathan R." on Justia Law

The Del Norte County Department of Health and Human Services received a referral after police searched Mother’s residence and found mushrooms, meth pipes, marijuana paraphernalia, concentrated cannabis, brass knuckles and butterfly knives. It appeared the occupants were hoarders. Mother tested positive for methamphetamine, benzodiazepines, and marijuana. Her children (ages five and 11) were removed from her custody. The court ordered parenting education, random drug screening, substance abuse assessment and any recommended treatment, with supervised visitation. In subsequent reports, the Department noted that, despite her admitted daily marijuana and occasional methamphetamine use, Mother denied she had a substance abuse problem and had not “involved herself in any of the services” offered. After mother accepted a plea bargain, the Department recommended that services be terminated. None of the hearing participants knew how long mother would be incarcerated, or what prison programs would be available. The court concluded that there was an “extremely low” likelihood of reunification, and ordered services terminated. The court of appeal reversed. Mother was statutorily entitled to 12 months of services, which could be shortened only under circumstances described in Welfare and Institutions Code section 61.5,(a)(2). The juvenile court did not terminate services in accordance with those provisions. View "M.C. v. Superior Court" on Justia Law