In 2015, the legislature amended the juvenile transfer statute to increase the age of a child whose case was subject to an automatic transfer to the regular criminal docket by one year, to fifteen years old. Automatic transfer is required in cases involving children who have been charged with the commission of a class A or class B felony. At issue in this case was whether that amendment applied retroactively so that the case of a child, such as Defendant, who had been charged with committing a class A or class B felony prior to the amendment for crimes he committed when he was fourteen years old, and whose case had already been transferred to the regular criminal docket, should have his case transferred back to the juvenile docket. The trial court reserved this question of law for the advice of the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court granted the request and answered the question in the affirmative, concluding that the legislature intended that the amendment apply retroactively. View "State v. Nathaniel S." on Justia Law

Reyes, then 16, was convicted of the first-degree murder of Ventura and the attempted murders of two others, having discharged a firearm in the direction of a vehicle occupied by the three. Prosecuted as an adult, he received the mandatory minimum sentence of 45 years’ imprisonment for the murder conviction plus 26 years’ imprisonment for each of the two attempted murder convictions. The sentences were required to run consecutively, resulting in aggregate sentence of 97 years’ imprisonment. Under the truth in sentencing statute he was required to serve a minimum of 89 years before he would be eligible for release. In the appellate court, defendant cited Miller v. Alabama (2012), in which the Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amendment “forbids a sentencing scheme that mandates life in prison without possibility of parole for juvenile offenders.” The Court clarified that life-without-parole sentences must be based on judicial discretion rather than statutory mandates. The appellate court held that Miller applied only to actual sentences of life without the possibility of parole and not to aggregate consecutive sentences. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed. A mandatory term-of-years sentence that cannot be served in one lifetime has the same practical effect on a juvenile defendant’s life as would an actual mandatory sentence of life without parole—in either situation, the juvenile will die in prison. Miller makes clear that a juvenile may not be sentenced to a mandatory, unsurvivable prison term without first considering in mitigation his youth, immaturity, and potential for rehabilitation. View "People v. Reyes" on Justia Law

A 14-year-old ran away from her mother’s home. Mother asked that she be taken into the custody of Child Protective Services, stating a need for therapy for herself, minor, and her younger daughter. The court ordered reunification services for “the child and to the mother.” At the six-month review the agency recommended that minor remain in out-of-home placement. Minor wanted to return home and participate in therapy. The agency and mother were concerned about minor’s previous molestation of her younger sister. The court ordered reunification services continued. At the 12-month review, the agency recommended and the court ordered that minor remain in out-of-home placement and reunification services be continued. Sister’s treating psychiatrist had recommended that visits between minor and her sister be suspended. At the 18-month review, the agency recommended that minor remain in out-of- home placement and that reunification services be terminated because her sister continued to be “triggered” by minor. The court expressed concern about failure to provide services specifically targeted at resolving the impediment to reunification, minor’s sexual abuse of her sister, and ordered services continued up to 24 months. The court of appeal affirmed. Although significant services were provided, they were not tailored to the family’s particular needs arising out of the unique circumstances. Amendments to Welfare and Institutions Code sections 361.5 and 366.221 did not restrict the court’s section 352 authority to extend reunification services to 24 months upon a showing of good cause. View "In re J.E." on Justia Law

Defendant, 17 years old, committed a residential burglary. Defendant entered the youth rehabilitation center in April 2011 and was granted early release in September 2011, with good reports. A December 2011 review hearing concluded that defendant “has fully complied with the conditions of his probation” and was participating in the GED program, while working part time in a restaurant. As recommended by the probation department, the court ordered defendant’s parole “terminated successfully” and maintained his wardship. No further proceedings were held until January 2016, when defendant was 22. It was reported that defendant “perform[ed] well in the community.” Defendant had not paid restitution ($2,100 plus a $100 fine). Defense counsel cited Welfare & Institutions Code 786(c)(2): “An unfulfilled order or condition of restitution, including a restitution fine that can be converted to a civil judgment under Section 730.6 or an unpaid restitution fee shall not be deemed to constitute unsatisfactory completion of supervision or probation.” The prosecutor argued that the restitution order remained an “unfulfilled” probation condition, preventing a finding that probation was successfully completed. The court, believing it lacked authority to issue a civil judgment because defendant was over 21, terminated probation unsuccessfully. The court of appeal reversed. The court had the authority to enter a civil judgment; defendant agreed that a judgment should have been entered. View "In re J.G." on Justia Law

Father appealed the juvenile court's order on his petition under Welf. & Inst. Code 388 giving his minor son sole discretion whether Father will have visits with him. The court concluded that where, as here, the juvenile court has not ordered reunification services because, under section 361.5, subdivisions (b)(1) and (d), the parent’s whereabouts were unknown for more than six months after the child’s out-of home placement, the parent has no right to visitation. Nonetheless, the court concluded that the juvenile court may order visitation in the exercise of its discretion under section 362, subdivision (a), on a finding that such visitation will serve and protect the child’s best interests. But, as is the rule when visitation is ordered as part of a reunification plan, the court concluded that the juvenile court cannot give the child sole discretion to determine whether such visitation will occur. Rather, once the juvenile court determines that visitation is in the child’s best interests, the juvenile court must, as part of its duty to protect and serve those interests, ensure that such visitation occurs under terms set by the juvenile court. Otherwise, the court concluded that, by placing sole discretion whether visitation will occur in the hands of the child, the juvenile court will have ceded to the child the determination whether visitation is in the child’s best interests. Accordingly, the court reversed the order and remanded for reconsideration. View "In re Korbin Z." on Justia Law

In 2007, Blackwell, then 17 years old, committed a burglary and attempted robbery with an accomplice and shot and killed Carreno in the course of those offenses. The district attorney elected to directly file the case in adult court under the provisions of Welfare and Institutions Code section 707(d). Blackwell was convicted in 2009 of first-degree murder with a robbery-murder special circumstance (Pen. Code 187(a), 189, 190.2(a)(17)(A)) and sentenced to life without the possibility of parole (LWOP). In 2013 the court of appeal remanded for resentencing pursuant to the constitutional standards announced by the Supreme Court in Miller v. Alabama, which held mandatory LWOP sentences for homicide amount to cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment when imposed on a defendant who was a juvenile at the time of the offense. On remand, the trial court considered the factors outlined in Miller, and again imposed an LWOP sentence. The court of appeal affirmed, stating that it was unpersuaded that Blackwell’s LWOP sentence is disproportionate to his individual culpability and amounts to cruel and unusual punishment in his particular case. View "People v. Blackwell" on Justia Law

C.H. shoplifted a pair of jeans and was arrested after a physical altercation with a loss prevention officer at Kohl’s Department Store. He was charged with second-degree robbery and assault with force likely to cause great bodily injury. The robbery and assault charges were dismissed after C.H. admitted to felony grand theft from a person. Later, voters passed Proposition 47, the Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act; section 1170.18 permits offenders adjudicated of felony grand theft to petition for redesignation of their crimes as misdemeanors. The court redesignated C.H.’s felony as a misdemeanor but denied his request to expunge his DNA sample. The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting C.H.'s argument that misdemeanants are not required to provide a DNA sample for the state database and that he is no longer a felon. Proposition 47’s directive to treat a redesignated offense as a misdemeanor “for all purposes” employs words that have a well-defined meaning and have never applied to alter a crime’s original status. The provisions of Proposition 47 can be harmonized with the DNA collection law, Proposition 69. In any event, Proposition 69 controls as the more specific law. The underlying purpose of both measures to protect public safety. View "In re C.H." on Justia Law

The minor broke into a Concord apartment and stole a cell phone, wallet, and Nintendo game. Leaving, the minor was confronted by the resident, who assaulted him. The minor brandished a knife. Charged with second degree robbery, first degree residential burglary, felony grand theft from the person, and misdemeanor burglary, the minor admitted counts three and four. Counts one and two were dismissed. The juvenile court adjudged the minor a ward of the court and ordered him to submit DNA samples for the state DNA database. The minor later sought relief under Penal Code section 1170.18, requesting that his felony grand theft adjudication be redesignated as a misdemeanor, that the order requiring submission of DNA samples be vacated, and that his DNA samples be expunged from the state database. The court granted the request to redesignate his felony offense, but denied requests to vacate the orders. The court of appeal affirmed, construing Proposition 47 (authorizing the redesignation), with the DNA and Forensic Identification Data Base and Data Bank Act, Penal Code section 295. The court noted that recently-enacted Assembly Bill 1492 clarifies that, under section 299, a court may not order expungement of a DNA sample when acting under section 1170.18 to redesignate a felony offense as a misdemeanor. View "In re C.B." on Justia Law

In 2014, loss prevention agent Marcus Nealy and manager Stephanie Garza, were working at a Sears department store in Yuba City, when they observed "H.W." enter the store via the store’s closed circuit surveillance system. Nealy saw the minor enter with “a backpack that looked empty” and noticed he was “looking around very suspiciously.” Nealy and Garza took up separate positions on the sales floor and communicated by cell phone as they continued to observe the minor. Garza told Nealy the minor removed the antitheft tag from a pair of jeans using a pair of pliers, carried the jeans into the restroom, and, when the minor came out of the restroom, Garza no longer saw the jeans. Nealy checked the restroom but found no jeans. Meanwhile, Garza alerted Nealy the minor was leaving the store without stopping at a cash register or attempting to pay for the jeans. Nealy headed outside to apprehend the minor, stopped him, and called police. When Yuba City Police Officer Joshua Jackson arrived at the store, Nealy and Garza informed him the minor used “a pair of diagonal cutters or wire cutters” to remove the security tag on the jeans and placed the jeans in the backpack before leaving the store without paying for them. A search of the minor’s backpack revealed the jeans and a pair of pliers. The minor had no wallet, no money, no credit cards, and no identification. A delinquency petition was filed, alleging the minor committed theft, possessed of burglary tools, and trespassed. Following a contested jurisdiction hearing, the juvenile court sustained the theft and burglary tool possession allegations, but found the trespass allegation had not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. The minor was adjudged a ward of the juvenile court and placed on juvenile probation. The juvenile court committed the minor to two days in juvenile hall with credit for time served, and set a maximum term of confinement of eight months. The minor appealed, challenging the evidence presented against him. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "In re H.W." on Justia Law

Hand entered no-contest pleas in Montgomery County to first-degree felonies (aggravated burglary, aggravated robbery, and kidnapping) and two second-degree counts of felonious assault. Each count had a three-year firearm specification attached, to which Hand also entered no-contest pleas. During the plea hearing, the parties agreed to a total six-year prison term with three of the years being mandatory because they are related to the merged firearm specifications, R.C. 2929.14 and 2941.145. The parties disputed whether the three years for the other offenses was also a mandatory term, based on whether Hand’s prior juvenile adjudication for aggravated robbery under R.C. 2911.01(A)(3) should operate as a first-degree felony conviction to enhance his sentence. The court ruled that Hand’s prior juvenile adjudication required imposition of mandatory prison terms under R.C. 2929.13(F). The appeals court affirmed. The Supreme Court of Ohio reversed. Treating a juvenile adjudication as an adult conviction to enhance a sentence for a later crime is inconsistent with Ohio’s system for juveniles, which is predicated on the fact that children are not as culpable for their acts as adults and should be rehabilitated rather than punished. In addition, juveniles are not afforded the right to a jury trial. View "State v. Hand" on Justia Law