Defendant was sixteen years old at the time he admitted to committing murder. Defendant made his confession after prolonged questioning by the police and by his mother. Defendant filed a motion to suppress his statements to the police, but the motion was denied. After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree on the theory of deliberate premeditation and unlicensed possession of a firearm. Defendant filed a motion for a new trial, alleging that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. Defendant’s claims were denied, and the denial of his motion was consolidated with his direct appeal. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant’s convictions and declined to grant relief under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, 33E, holding (1) the Court declines to expand the rule requiring the corroboration of extrajudicial statements as it applies to juvenile confessions; (2) the trial court did not err by denying Defendant’s motion for a new trial; (3) the trial court did not err by denying Defendant’s motion to suppress on the grounds asserted by Defendant; and (4) the trial court did not err by denying Defendant’s motion for a directed verdict on the firearms charge. View "Commonwealth v. Weaver" on Justia Law

Sixteen-year-old M.H. used his smartphone to surreptitiously record a fellow high school student, Matthew B., in a school bathroom stall while Matthew was either masturbating or jokingly pretending to do so. The video, taken inside the bathroom, but about 20 feet away from the bathroom stall, did not show Matthew's face, but did reveal his distinctive socks and shoes, which were visible in the gap between the stall wall and the floor. M.H. uploaded the 10-second video to Snapchat with the caption, "I think this dude is jacking off [sic]." M.H. intended the video to be funny and to get a laugh. But about two weeks later, Matthew took his own life, stating in a suicide note, "I can't handle school anymore and I have no friends." The San Diego County District Attorney's Office filed a juvenile delinquency petition alleging M.H. engaged in an unauthorized invasion of privacy by means of a cell phone camera. The trial court found true the allegation that M.H. violated Penal Code section 647(j)(1). The trial court sentenced M.H. to probation on numerous conditions, including several restricting his use of social media. On appeal, M.H. argued: (1) no substantial evidence supported the juvenile court's finding that he had the requisite specific intent "to invade Matthew's privacy" as required by section 647(j)(1); (2) (raised for the first time on appeal) section 647(j)(1) incorporated by reference the elements of the tort of invasion of privacy, and assuming that to be true, he asserts there is a "newsworthy" defense that immunizes him from criminal liability in this case; and (3) (also for the first time on appeal) section 647(j)(1) violated his First Amendment rights. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "In re M.H." on Justia Law

Woods and other gang members robbed two convenience stores. People were shot during the robberies, but did not die. At the time the government charged Woods he was 20, but at the time of the crime he was 15; under the Juvenile Delinquency and Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. 5031, Woods was considered a juvenile. The government successfully moved to transfer Woods’s case for adult prosecution. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. To charge Woods under the Juvenile Act, the Attorney General was required to certify that the case should be transferred for adult prosecution because it met certain factors, which were not at issue here, and that “there is a substantial Federal interest in the case or the offense to warrant the exercise of Federal jurisdiction.” The government must also submit the juvenile’s court records as a jurisdictional prerequisite to a transfer proceeding. The district court must then consider: the juvenile’s age and social background; the nature of the offense; any prior delinquency record; the present intellectual development and psychological maturity; past treatment efforts and the juvenile’s response; the availability of programs to treat the juvenile’s behavioral problems. In this case, the court thoroughly considered those factors. View "United States v. Woods" on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted as a youthful offender on a charge of involuntary manslaughter. Defendant moved in the juvenile court to dismiss the youthful offender indictment, asserting that the evidence was insufficient to warrant the return of an indictment for involuntary manslaughter where her conduct did not extend beyond words. The juvenile court denied the motion. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the grand jury were justified in returning an indictment of involuntary manslaughter against Defendant because such a conviction is punishable by imprisonment in state prison and involves the infliction of serious bodily harm. View "Commonwealth v. Carter" on Justia Law

Elijah C. signed a document waiving the one-year statute of limitations for petty theft as a condition of entering a diversion program for first-time offenders. The court held that a minor’s purported waiver of the statute of limitations for an offense is not valid, when that waiver was made without consultation with counsel and before a petition against the minor was filed. Although Elijah did not yet have the right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment because no petition had yet been filed, he faced what was in effect a critical stage of the prosecution. Accordingly, the court reversed the juvenile court's order overruling the demurrer. View "In re Elijah C." on Justia Law

A petition was filed with the juvenile court alleging that George F. committed a lewd and lascivious act upon a child under the age of 14, and that George willfully annoyed and molested a child under the age of 18. The State offered to dismiss count 1 if George admitted to count 2. George admitted to count 2 and the juvenile court found a factual basis for that admission. The court then granted the State's motion to dismiss count 1, declared George a ward of the court, and ordered him to juvenile probation on various terms and conditions. George appealed, contending that the conditions of his probation restricting his use of electronics or requiring the submission of those electronics to search were invalid under "California v. Lent (15 Cal.3d 481 (1971)) and (2) unconstitutionally overbroad. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "In re George F." on Justia Law

Petitioner D.C. appealed the denial of post-conviction relief (PCR), alleging that the change-of-plea hearing that preceded his adjudication of juvenile delinquency was constitutionally inadequate. The superior court held that the PCR statute did not apply to juvenile delinquency proceedings and that the only remedy available to petitioner was through 33 V.S.A. 5113 and Vermont Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), but that route was foreclosed because petitioner’s claim was untimely raised. On appeal, petitioner argued that the case was not moot, despite the fact he was over the age of majority at the time of his appeal (and no longer committed to state custody), and that the PCR statutes permitted juveniles to collaterally attack their adjudications. After review, the Vermont Supreme Court agreed, reversed the superior court’s order dismissing petitioner’s PCR complaint, and remanded for further proceedings. View "In re D.C." on Justia Law

K.H.-H., a 17-year-old male, was charged with assault with sexual motivation after he forced himself on C.R., a female acquaintance who attended the same high school. The issue this case presented on appeal involved whether a juvenile disposition condition requiring K.H.-H. to write an apology letter to the victim violated his constitutional free speech rights. After review, the Supreme Court held that it did not. View "Washington v K. H.-H." on Justia Law

In 1997, defendant, age 17, left a residential treatment center without authorization and bought a pistol, intending to rob and kill people and to settle gang scores. Defendant arrived in Monterey, obtained ammunition, and connected with three acquaintances. They drove around, stopping at the Monterey Wharf, where two women, drinking coffee, did not hear defendant demand money. Defendant fired nine shots at them. One woman died immediately; the other survived, but had brain operations and suffered permanent injuries. The four changed cars to escape detection. They drove to Seaside, where defendant's friend shot a pedestrian six times. She died immediately. Days later, defendant gave his gun and bullets to a friend, stating that the gun was “heated.” Defendant was arrested that day. He was convicted of two first degree murders, attempted premeditated murder, and aggravated mayhem. The court rejected defendant’s claim that he was suffering from a mental illness that reduced his culpability; noted that “all of the doctors” characterized defendant as argumentative, explosive, controlling, defiant, resistant to feedback, and a danger to society, with poor impulse control; stated that defendant “must never be allowed the possibility of drawing another breath in freedom,” and sentenced defendant to two consecutive life without parole terms, a consecutive term of 15-years-to-life, and two consecutive terms of 25-years-to-life. His appeals and habeas petition were unsuccessful. The court of appeal affirmed denial of defendant’s 2014 petition for recall and resentencing (Penal Code section 1170(d)(2)). View "People v. Willover" on Justia Law

A complaint was filed in juvenile court alleging that A.G. was delinquent for engaging in conduct that, if committed by an adult, would have constituted aggravated robbery and kidnapping, with firearms specifications as to each. A.G. admitted to the allegations in the complaint. The juvenile court found the allegations proved beyond a reasonable doubt and ordered that A.G. be committed to the Department of Youth Services for minimum terms of one year for each of the aggravated robbery and kidnapping adjudications. A.G. appealed, arguing that the juvenile court erred in failing to merge his adjudications for aggravated robbery and kidnapping as “allied offenses of similar import” and that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the allied-offenses issue. The Court of Appeals denied relief, concluding that the aggravated robbery and kidnapping would constituted allied offenses of similar import under Ohio Rev. Code 2941.25 if committed by an adult but that criminal statutes do not apply in juvenile delinquency proceedings. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that juvenile courts must conduct the same double-jeopardy analysis in delinquency proceedings that other courts apply in adult criminal proceedings to protect a child’s right against double jeopardy. View "In re A.G." on Justia Law