Defendant was charged with first degree assault and an associated armed criminal action count under Mo. Rev. Stat. 571.015.1. Defendant, who was a juvenile at the time of the offenses, moved to dismiss the armed criminal action charge on the ground that the application of the sentencing provisions of section 571.015.1 to juvenile offenders is unconstitutional. The trial court agreed with Defendant, concluding that section 571.015.1 is unconstitutional as applied to all juvenile offenders and declared unconstitutional the three-year mandatory minimum incarceration requirement for juveniles who are certified to stand trial as adults. The State subsequently filed this interlocutory appeal challenging the trial court’s determination regarding the constitutional validity of section 571.015.1. The Supreme Court dismissed the State’s appeal, holding that the State has no right to appeal this interlocutory decision under section 547.200.1, nor does the trial court’s decision constitute a final judgment from which the State is entitled to appeal under section 547.200.2. View "State v. Smiley" on Justia Law

Montgomery was 17 years old in 1963, when he killed a deputy in Louisiana. The jury returned a verdict of “guilty without capital punishment,” which carried an automatic sentence of life without parole. Nearly 50 years later, the Supreme Court decided, in Miller v. Alabama, that mandatory life without parole for juvenile offenders violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments. The trial court denied his motion for relief. His application for a supervisory writ was denied by the Louisiana Supreme Court, which had previously held that Miller does not have retroactive effect in state collateral review. The Supreme Court reversed. Courts must give retroactive effect to new watershed procedural rules and to substantive rules of constitutional law. Substantive constitutional rules include “rules forbidding criminal punishment of certain primary conduct” and “rules prohibiting a certain category of punishment for a class of defendants because of their status or offense.” Miller announced a substantive rule of constitutional law, which is retroactive because it necessarily carries a significant risk that a defendant faces a punishment that the law cannot impose. A state may remedy a Miller violation by extending parole eligibility to juvenile offenders. This would neither impose an onerous burden nor disturb the finality of state convictions and would afford someone like Montgomery, who may have evolved from a troubled, misguided youth to a model member of the prison community, the opportunity to demonstrate the truth of Miller’s central intuition—that children who commit even heinous crimes are capable of change. View "Montgomery v. Louisiana" on Justia Law

In 2002, Thurston was convicted of felony driving in disregard for safety of persons or property while fleeing from a police officer, with three prior strike convictions for robberies in 1990 and 1984, and two prison priors for the 1990 robbery and a 1999 violation of Vehicle Code section 2800. He was sentenced to 25 years to life in prison for the 2002 conviction plus two consecutive one-year terms for the prison priors. He appealed denial of his request for resentencing under the Three Strikes Reform Act. The appeal court affirmed the denial, rejecting his arguments that the trial court erred in finding he was not eligible for resentencing due to a 1975 juvenile adjudication of rape because that adjudication was not pleaded and proved in the third strike case; a prior juvenile conviction is not a “prior conviction” for purposes of determining eligibility for resentencing; the record of the juvenile adjudication was not properly before the court; the court’s statement that it would not resentence Thurston even if he was eligible for resentencing should be disregarded; and the evidence did not support the court’s statement that, if he was eligible, it would find that resentencing would pose an unreasonable risk to public safety. View "People v. Thurston" on Justia Law

Defendant was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole (LWOP) because she participated in the murder of a 13-year-old when she was 16-years-old. Based on the intervening decision in Miller v. Alabama, and with the agreement of the prosecution, the trial court vacated the LWOP sentence and conducted a new sentencing hearing in 2015. The trial court ruled inadmissible defendant's proffered evidence of her rehabilitative conduct in prison and again sentenced defendant to LWOP. The court concluded that the trial court erred in excluding defendant's evidence of rehabilitation in prison where the state Supreme Court in People v. Gutierrez held that, under Miller, “a sentencing court must consider any evidence or other information in the record bearing on ‘the possibility of rehabilitation’” before imposing an LWOP sentence on a juvenile who kills. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for resentencing. View "People v. Lozano" on Justia Law

A grand jury returned an indictment against Defendant on charges of conspiracy to commit murder and active participation in a criminal street gang. The grand jury found reasonable cause to believe that Defendant came within the provisions of Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code 707(d)(4). Defendant initially pleaded not guilty but later demurred to the indictment, arguing that section 707(d)(4) requires a determination that a juvenile qualifies for prosecution in adult court, and because he was a juvenile at the time of the alleged offenses, the grand jury had no legal authority to inquire into the charged offenses. The trial court agreed with Defendant, allowed him to withdraw his plea, and sustained his demurrer. The court of appeal reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that section 707(d) allows prosecutors the option of filing charges against certain juveniles accused of specified offenses in criminal court by grand jury indictment. View "People v. Arroyo" on Justia Law

A Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 petition alleging violations of Penal Code section 288, subdivision (a) (lewd or lascivious acts with a child under the age of 14) was sustained against A.A., a juvenile court dependent from 2007-2015. A.A. was committed to a period of confinement with the DJJ. A.A. subsequently turned 18 years old and the juvenile court terminated its dependency jurisdiction over him. In this appeal, the court rejected A.A.'s contention that the juvenile court should have maintained dependency jurisdiction over him and provided him with services under the California Fostering Connections to Success Act, Assembly Bill No. 12. In this case, A.A. is not eligible for A.B. 12 benefits where A.A. is not a nonminor dependent; the juvenile court reasonably concluded that A.A. did not wish to remain subject to dependency jurisdiction; and the juvenile court did not err in concluding that A.A. was not participating in a transition to living independently case plan where he was committed to a juvenile detention facility. Further, DCFS has complied with the requirements of section 391, subdivision (b), and the juvenile court's order did not violate section 303, subdivision (b). Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "LA Cnty. DCFS v. A.A." on Justia Law

On May 12, 2009, the State filed a juvenile delinquency petition charging Appellant with burglary and grand larceny. On August 16, 2010, the State filed a petition to certify Appellant for criminal proceedings as an adult. The juvenile court granted the State’s petition and certified Appellant for criminal proceedings as an adult. After a trial, Appellant was found guilty. The Supreme Court reversed the district court’s judgment of conviction, holding (1) the juvenile court maintains jurisdiction over a juvenile even if it does not make its final disposition of the case within the one-year period provided by statute; but (2) there was insufficient evidence to convict Appellant of burglary and grand larceny. View "Barber v. State" on Justia Law

Alejandro, a minor, admitted to being an accessory to illegal drug sales and was found to be a ward of the court. In addition to typical conditions of probation, the juvenile court imposed a condition requiring him to submit to warrantless searches of his electronic devices and his use of social media. The court of appeal modified that condition. The condition, while valid, is overbroad as imposed. Any probation condition that imposes limitations on a person’s constitutional rights must closely tailor those limitations to the purpose of the condition.The juvenile court should limit searches to sources of electronic information reasonably likely to reveal whether the minor is boasting about his drug use or otherwise involved with drugs, such as text and voicemail messages, photographs, e-mails, and social media accounts, so that data related to matters such as medical care and personal finances are not subject to search. View "In re Alejandro R." on Justia Law

In March 2013, when the minor (K.R.) was 13 years old, a delinquency petition was filed alleging he had committed the crimes of robbery, criminal threats, and brandishing a knife. In August 2013, Judge James Arguelles presided over a jurisdictional hearing on the petition in Department 97 and found the allegations true. At a disposition hearing in Department 97 in September, Judge Arguelles granted the minor probation with a number of conditions, including 150 days of confinement. In April 2015, the minor’s probation officer filed a petition alleging the minor had violated his probation by remaining away from his home overnight without parental permission; failing to keep his probation officer informed of his address and telephone number; using marijuana; and committing the crimes of having marijuana on a school campus, falsely identifying himself to a law enforcement officer, and being a disruptive presence on a school campus. A week later, the People filed a petition alleging the minor had violated his probation by committing the crimes of brandishing a firearm and brandishing a replica firearm. The parties appeared before Judge Jack Sapunor in Department 97 for a settlement conference. The minor’s attorney told the court the minor was prepared to admit the allegation in the first petition that he remained away from his home overnight without parental permission and the allegation in the second petition that he brandished a replica firearm. Judge Sapunor was a “regular visiting judge” in juvenile court. The settlement conference was continued, and when it resumed, Judge James Arguelles presided. He noted that there was “a minute order saying that May 28th the minor admitted a violation of probation” and “[a]pparently, probation is recommending that [the minor] just be shipped off to Vegas to live with his mother.” Judge Arguelles disagreed with that proposal and stated that his intention was “probably to send him to DJJ [Department of Juvenile Justice]." The matter was continued again, and upon the resumption of the conference, the minor’s attorney objected to Judge Arguelles presiding over the disposition because “we have not affirmatively asserted an Arbuckle waiver in this case.” She requested that the matter be set for hearing in front of Judge Sapunor. Judge Arguelles reiterated his disagreement with the proposed disposition, set a schedule for the parties to brief the application of Arbuckle, and continued the matter to July 2. On June 25, the minor commenced the proceeding underlying this appeal, essentially requesting that the Court of Appeal order Judge Arguelles to either: (1) impose the disposition the parties had agreed upon in front of Judge Sapunor or (2) set the case for a disposition hearing in front of Judge Sapunor. The Court of Appeal denied the minor's petition for a writ of mandate: "[w]hile the minor certainly had a reasonable expectation that he would receive the agreed-upon disposition that was part of the plea agreement approved by Judge Sapunor, and the refusal by Judge James P. Arguelles to impose that disposition certainly entitles the minor to withdraw his negotiated plea, the minor has failed to show that he entered into the plea agreement in expectation of and reliance upon Judge Sapunor conducting the disposition hearing. Thus, the minor is not entitled to have the disposition hearing set in front of Judge Sapunor, nor is he entitled to an order requiring Judge Arguelles to impose the agreed-upon disposition." View "K.R. v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

The district court denied Appellant’s request for a hearing de novo after reviewing the recommendations of a master of the juvenile court after Appellant timely requested such a hearing. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Nev. Rev. Stat. 62B.030(4) does not require the juvenile court to direct a hearing de novo if, after a master of the juvenile court provides notice of the master’s recommendations, a person who is entitled to such notice files a timely request for a hearing de novo; and (2) therefore, the district court did not violate section 62B.030(4) by denying Appellant’s request for a hearing de novo because section 62B.030(4) grants the district court discretion to decide whether to grant such a hearing. View "In re P.S." on Justia Law