Appellant, 16 years old when the petition underlying this appeal was filed, had a troubled history. Since 1999, her family has had 36 child welfare referrals from Lake, Shasta, Siskiyou and Solano Counties; it had five voluntary family maintenance cases between 2002 and 2014 but did not fulfill any of the suggested or requested services. Appellant appealed juvenile court orders continuing her as a ward of the court under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 and committing her to the custody of the probation officer for placement in "New Foundations." She argued: (1) there was insufficient evidence to support the court's finding that she resisted or obstructed a peace officer; (2) the court erred in failing to dismiss the section 602 petition (which she claimed impermissibly increased her maximum confinement time); and (3) the court abused its discretion in terminating her status as a section 300 dependent child and adjudging her a delinquent minor. After review, the Court of Appeal agreed with her first contention and therefore reversed the orders. View "In re Amanda A." on Justia Law

Two weeks before Defendant’s eighteenth birthday, delinquency complaints were filed alleging two counts of rape of a child under sixteen. Defendant appeared in the juvenile court and was duly arraigned. After Defendant turned eighteen, the Commonwealth sought youthful offender indictments against Defendant on the basis of a subset of the acts that were the subject of the complaints. After the indictments were returned, the Commonwealth entered nolle prosequi on all of the delinquency complaints. Defendant unsuccessfully moved to dismiss the indictments. In Mogelinski I, the Supreme Court reversed, concluding that the juvenile court did not have jurisdiction over the youthful offender indictments under the facts of this case. Thereafter, the Commonwealth brought a new complaint in the juvenile court against Defendant essentially identical to those where nolle prosequi was previously entered in order to seek a transfer hearing. The juvenile court granted Defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed, holding that the juvenile court, in fact, had jurisdiction to proceed on the basis of the newly filed complaint. View "Commonwealth v. Mogelinkski" on Justia Law

The government filed a juvenile information against Y.C.T. alleging two acts of delinquency. The government filed a motion for a discretionary transfer of Y.C.T. to the district court’s criminal jurisdiction. A magistrate judge issued a written report recommending that Y.C.T. be transferred to adult status for criminal prosecution. The district court adopted the recommendation after conducting a de novo review, concluding that the transfer best served the interest of justice. The First Circuit affirmed the transfer order, holding that the district court’s reliance on the record, as developed by the magistrate judge, to conduct its de novo review was not an abuse of discretion and did not violate Y.C.T.’s right to due process. View "United States v. Y.C.T." on Justia Law

Patrick, age 17, burglarized a neighbor’s home with an adult cousin who was on parole. Patrick admitted to a juvenile wardship petition allegation of second degree burglary. Patrick told the probation officer who prepared a report for the hearing that he stole because he wanted marijuana and did not want to ask his parents for money and that he smoked marijuana up to three times a day and had not attended school regularly for a long time because of his marijuana use. The court adjudged Patrick a ward and placed him on probation, with conditions requiring him to “[s]ubmit person and any vehicle, room or property [and] any electronics and passwords under your control to search by Probation Officer or peace office[r] with or without a search warrant at any time.” Defense counsel objected, arguing there was no nexus between electronics and the burglary. The court of appeal declined to strike the condition entirely, but modified the reference to electronics to read: Submit all electronic devices under your control to a search of any text messages, voicemail messages, call logs, photographs, e-mail accounts and social media accounts, with or without a search warrant, at any time of the day or night, and provide the probation or peace officer with any passwords necessary to access the information specified. View "In re Patrick F." on Justia Law

Appellant, a juvenile, was convicted of first-degree attempted rape. The juvenile court ordered that Appellant register on the juvenile sex offender registry. Appellant appealed, arguing that ordering him to register as a sexual offender for his lifetime, pursuant to Mo. Rev. Stat. 211.425 and 589.400.1(6), violated his constitutional rights. The Supreme Court dismissed Appellant’s claims without prejudice, holding that Appellant’s challenge to the enforcement of section 589.400.1(6), which was not made part of the judgment against Appellant, was not ripe for review, and the lack of justiciability precluded relief in this action. View "S.C. v. Juvenile Officer" on Justia Law

Defendant, a minor named in two Welfare and Institution Code 602 petitions, was detained in juvenile hall for 294 days while receiving services to assist him in gaining competence after being declared incompetent to stand trial. At the end of that 294 day period, the delinquency court reinstated proceedings based on findings that minor was competent and he had “exaggerated” his inability to understand the nature of the proceedings. The court rejected defendant's argument that the delinquency court erred in finding competency despite the report of an evaluator that defendant did not understand the nature of the proceedings; the delinquency court did not comply with the standard required by Dusky v. United States; and the delinquency court held him to the standard of competence applicable to adults, rather than the broader standard applied to juveniles. Assuming there was undue delay without evidence of progress toward attaining competency, or a violation of the Protocol or section 709, no structural error is involved. The court concluded that any error was harmless and reversal is inappropriate. Further, the court rejected defendant's equal protection claim where defendant is not similarly situated to persons who fall under the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act, Welf. & Inst. Code 5000 et seq. The court concluded, however, that Probation condition No. 9 is modified to provide as follows: “You must go to school each day. You must be on time to each class. You must follow the rules of behavioral conduct set forth by school personnel. You must receive passing grades in each graded subject.” The court affirmed in all other respects. View "People v. Albert C." on Justia Law

M.A., then 13 years old, fought with her 14-year-old brother and cut him with a kitchen knife. M.A. was adjudicated delinquent of several offenses and ordered to register under the Murderer and Violent Offender Against Youth Registration Act, 730 ILCS 154/1. M.A. argued that the registration provisions violated her rights to substantive and procedural due process and equal protection. The Appellate Court rejected the substantive due process claim, but found the registration provisions unconstitutional for violating procedural due process and equal protection. The Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the registration requirement. Current dangerousness is not relevant to the duty to register, so M.A. did not have a due process right to a hearing to address that issue. The Act requires registration solely based upon the fact of conviction or adjudication, which M.A. had a procedurally safeguarded opportunity to contest during her juvenile adjudication proceedings. M.A. did not challenge her adjudication as a juvenile delinquent on appeal. Given that the charges for which M.A. is required to register would be felonies if M.A. committed those acts as an adult, and that those charges require a finding that the offender caused “great bodily harm, permanent disability, or disfigurement,” there is a rational relationship between M.A.’s registration and protection of the public. View "In re M.A." on Justia Law

Petitioners were 13-year-old girls who were dependents of the juvenile court. While they were residing at the Polinsky Children's Center, they knocked over a vending machine and took items from inside it. When staff confronted them, petitioners fled but later returned to the Center. Staff then reported the incident to police, who arrested petitioners and booked them into Juvenile Hall. The district attorney filed petitions in the juvenile court alleging petitioners committed two misdemeanors, petty theft and vandalism. The district attorney asked the court to declare them wards. The probation officer prepared detention reports recommending petitioners be detained in Juvenile Hall, on the unexplained grounds they were likely to flee the court's jurisdiction and such detention was necessary for the protection of person or property and of petitioners. The reports included detention screening forms that showed no grounds for mandatory secure detention and that petitioners' risk assessment scores did not warrant discretionary secure detention. Petitioners promptly challenged the detention orders by filing petitions for peremptory writs of mandate in the first instance directing the juvenile court to vacate the orders. The Court of Appeal treated the petitions as petitions for writs of habeas corpus. The Court of Appeal agreed with the parties that the juvenile court erred by ordering petitioners' detention in Juvenile Hall pending further hearing. The juvenile court made no findings regarding its decision to order petitioners' continued detention in Juvenile Hall. Accordingly, the Court of Appeal granted petitioners' petitions. View "In re Bianca S." on Justia Law

Petitioner Steven R., a minor, admitted a concealed weapon allegation in a section 602 petition filed in San Francisco County Juvenile Court. The court then transferred the case to Sacramento County Juvenile Court for disposition. (section 750). The Sacramento County District Attorney filed a section 777 notice of probation violation based on the same conduct alleged in the San Francisco petition and moved to dismiss the petition (section 782) in order to make Steven eligible for commitment to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Division of Juvenile Facilities (DJF) under the terms of section 733, subdivision (c). This case was about the application of an unambiguous provision of the Welfare & Institutions Code to the dismissal of the section 602 petition following the transfer of the petition from the juvenile court in one county to the juvenile court in another county for disposition. Steven petitioned the Court of Appeal asking for a writ of mandate directing the trial court to: (1) vacate its order granting the motion to dismiss the petition; and (2) dismiss the notice of probation violation. The Court denied the petition summarily. Thereafter, the California Supreme Court granted review and transferred the matter back to the Court of Appeal with directions to vacate its order and to issue an order to show cause why relief should not be granted to Steven. Having complied with the Supreme Court’s order and having considered the parties’ arguments, the Court of Appeal concluded that the juvenile court exceeded its jurisdiction in dismissing the petition because section 782, which authorized dismissal of a section 602 petition, specifically stated that “[a] judge of the juvenile court in which a petition was filed may dismiss the petition.” Because the petition in question was not filed in Sacramento, the juvenile court was without jurisdiction to dismiss it. Therefore, the Court granted Steven’s petition and directed issuance of a writ of mandate. View "Steven R. v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Ricardo P. appealed a juvenile court order finding that he committed first degree burglary, declaring him to be a ward of the court, and placing him on probation. One of his probation conditions required him to submit to warrantless searches of his “electronics including passwords.” He challenged the condition on grounds that it allowed illegal eavesdropping under Penal Code section 632; was not reasonable; and was unconstitutionally overbroad. The court of appeal modified the order, so that the phrase “electronics including passwords” was stricken from the condition permitting warrantless searches. The court noted several pending appeals involving similar conditions. The juvenile court may choose to impose a probation condition permitting searches of a narrower range of electronic information related to the court’s supervisory concerns. Such a condition could, for example, limit searches of Ricardo’s cell phone and other devices to electronic information that is reasonably likely to reveal whether Ricardo is boasting about his drug use or activity, such as text and voicemail messages, photographs, e-mails, and social-media accounts. The court also noted that state and federal statutes, including the recently enacted California Electronic Communications Privacy Act (Stats. 2015, ch. 651), impose limits on the government’s ability to obtain private electronic information. View "In re Ricardo P." on Justia Law