After determining that Kevin, a minor, committed robbery, the juvenile court declared him a ward of the court and placed him on probation with conditions. The court of appeal affirmed as modified: there was insufficient evidence he committed robbery, but a probation condition prohibiting him from possessing weapons is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. The condition is modified to read: “The minor shall: . . . Not knowingly possess weapons of any kind, which means no guns, knives, clubs, brass knuckles, attack dogs, ammunition, or something that looks like a weapon. In addition, you are not to knowingly possess anything that you intend to use as a weapon or that you know someone else might consider to be a weapon.” View "In re Kevin F." on Justia Law

The Alameda County Juvenile Court sustained the allegation that Alberto C., the presumed father, had sexually molested I.C., his four-year-old daughter. Several weeks later, the court declared I.C. a dependent child, and placed her in the custody of her mother. The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting arguments that the findings were not supported by substantial evidence and that the lengthy period between the jurisdictional and the dispositional hearings was excessive, unjustified, and contrary to section 352 of the Welfare and Institutions Code. The court acknowledged the problem of a minor child’s accusation of parental molestation, especially when there is no direct or tangible proof that any molestation occurred, but noted that the hearsay statement was found in the caseworker’s report and was also contained in the video recording of the minor being interviewed. Iin viewing it the juvenile court was exercising its power to judge credibility. The juvenile court’s decision to receive evidence of the minor’s statement—both in the form of words in the caseworker’s report and the recording—was supported by substantial evidence and properly served as the basis for asserting the jurisdiction of the juvenile court over the minor as a dependent child. View "In re I.C." on Justia Law

The Alameda County Juvenile Court sustained the allegation that Alberto C., the presumed father, had sexually molested I.C., his four-year-old daughter. Several weeks later, the court declared I.C. a dependent child, and placed her in the custody of her mother. The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting arguments that the findings were not supported by substantial evidence and that the lengthy period between the jurisdictional and the dispositional hearings was excessive, unjustified, and contrary to section 352 of the Welfare and Institutions Code. The court acknowledged the problem of a minor child’s accusation of parental molestation, especially when there is no direct or tangible proof that any molestation occurred, but noted that the hearsay statement was found in the caseworker’s report and was also contained in the video recording of the minor being interviewed. Iin viewing it the juvenile court was exercising its power to judge credibility. The juvenile court’s decision to receive evidence of the minor’s statement—both in the form of words in the caseworker’s report and the recording—was supported by substantial evidence and properly served as the basis for asserting the jurisdiction of the juvenile court over the minor as a dependent child. View "In re I.C." on Justia Law

In 1997, Frank Vigil, Jr. was convicted of first degree murder for his participation in the kidnapping, rape, torture, and murder of a 14-year-old girl. Vigil was sixteen at the time of the crime. The trial court sentenced him to life without the possibility of parole (LWOP), because it was the statutorily-mandated sentence for crimes committed between 1990 and 2006. In 2013, Vigil filed a Crim. P. 35(c) motion for post-conviction relief, arguing that his sentence was unconstitutional under "Miller v. Alabama," (132 S.Ct. 2455 (2012)). Finding that Miller applied retroactively to Vigil’s sentence, the trial court granted the motion. The State petitioned pursuant to C.A.R. 50, arguing that "Miller" did not apply retroactively. After review, the Colorado Supreme Court concluded that this case was governed by "Jensen v. Colorado," (2015 CO 42), which held that "Miller" did not apply retroactively to cases on collateral review of a final judgment. Accordingly, the Court reversed the trial court's grant of post-conviction relief. View "Colorado v. Vigil" on Justia Law

In 1997, Frank Vigil, Jr. was convicted of first degree murder for his participation in the kidnapping, rape, torture, and murder of a 14-year-old girl. Vigil was sixteen at the time of the crime. The trial court sentenced him to life without the possibility of parole (LWOP), because it was the statutorily-mandated sentence for crimes committed between 1990 and 2006. In 2013, Vigil filed a Crim. P. 35(c) motion for post-conviction relief, arguing that his sentence was unconstitutional under "Miller v. Alabama," (132 S.Ct. 2455 (2012)). Finding that Miller applied retroactively to Vigil’s sentence, the trial court granted the motion. The State petitioned pursuant to C.A.R. 50, arguing that "Miller" did not apply retroactively. After review, the Colorado Supreme Court concluded that this case was governed by "Jensen v. Colorado," (2015 CO 42), which held that "Miller" did not apply retroactively to cases on collateral review of a final judgment. Accordingly, the Court reversed the trial court's grant of post-conviction relief. View "Colorado v. Vigil" on Justia Law

Three cases concerning juvenile sentencing were consolidated by the Supreme Court for the purpose of this opinion. In each, the Court examined the appropriate remedies for the defendants whose sentences would otherwise be unconstitutional under "Miller v. Alabama," (132 S. CT 2455 (2012)). Under the statutory schemen in place between 1990 and 2006, all three defendants in these cases were given mandatory life without the possibility of parole (LWOP) for the crimes they committed as juveniles. Two of the cases, "Colorado v. Tate" and "Banks v. Colorado," came to the Supreme Court on direct review. "Miller" applied to these cases and rendered their sentences unconstitutional. "In order to preserve as much of the legislature’s work as possible, Tate and Banks should be given individualized resentencing hearings that take into account their 'youth and attendant characteristics.'" The third case, "Jensen," was a C.A.R. 50 petition that came on collateral review of a final judgment. Because this case was on collateral review, the issue was whether "Miller" applied retroactively. The Colorado Court found that because the rule announced in "Miller" was procedural rather than substantive, and was not a "watershed" rule of procedure, it did not apply retroactively to cases on collateral review of final judgment. Therefore, "Miller" did not apply to Jensen. View "Colorado v. Tate" on Justia Law

Three cases concerning juvenile sentencing were consolidated by the Supreme Court for the purpose of this opinion. In each, the Court examined the appropriate remedies for the defendants whose sentences would otherwise be unconstitutional under "Miller v. Alabama," (132 S. CT 2455 (2012)). Under the statutory schemen in place between 1990 and 2006, all three defendants in these cases were given mandatory life without the possibility of parole (LWOP) for the crimes they committed as juveniles. Two of the cases, "Colorado v. Tate" and "Banks v. Colorado," came to the Supreme Court on direct review. "Miller" applied to these cases and rendered their sentences unconstitutional. "In order to preserve as much of the legislature’s work as possible, Tate and Banks should be given individualized resentencing hearings that take into account their 'youth and attendant characteristics.'" The third case, "Jensen," was a C.A.R. 50 petition that came on collateral review of a final judgment. Because this case was on collateral review, the issue was whether "Miller" applied retroactively. The Colorado Court found that because the rule announced in "Miller" was procedural rather than substantive, and was not a "watershed" rule of procedure, it did not apply retroactively to cases on collateral review of final judgment. Therefore, "Miller" did not apply to Jensen. View "Colorado v. Tate" on Justia Law

In 2014 California voters passed Proposition 47, which reclassified certain offenses from felonies to misdemeanors. Proposition 47 also enacted Penal Code section 1170.18, which created a procedure whereby a defendant who suffered a felony conviction of one of the reclassified crimes could petition to have his or her conviction redesignated a misdemeanor. After the passage of Proposition 47, Alejandro N. filed a section 1170.18 petition to change his juvenile felony adjudication to a misdemeanor. The superior court agreed that Alejandro's offense qualified as a misdemeanor for purposes of section 1170.18's sentence reduction provisions. Based on Welfare and Institutions Code section 726 (which provided that a juvenile offender could not be physically confined longer than an adult offender for the same offense) the court reduced Alejandro's maximum period of confinement to the misdemeanor level. However, the court declined to reclassify Alejandro's offense from a felony to a misdemeanor under section 1170.18's offense reclassification provisions, ruling that because section 1170.18 used the adult offender terminology of "conviction," the statute did not apply to juvenile offenders. Alejandro filed a petition for writ of mandate challenging the superior court's ruling. Upon review, the Court of Appeal held that the offense reclassification provisions set forth in section 1170.18 applied to juveniles. Based on the reclassification of his offense from a felony to a misdemeanor, Alejandro also requested that the superior court: (1) order his DNA sample and information removed from the state's data base; and (2) reduce his fine to a misdemeanor level. The Court of Appeal agreed that a reclassified misdemeanor offense under Proposition 47 could not alone support retention of DNA materials in the state's DNA data bank, and the Court directed the superior court to expunge Alejandro's DNA unless there was another basis to retain it apart from his mere commission of the reclassified misdemeanor offense. As to Alejandro's request for a fine reduction, he did not refute the trial court's finding that his $50 fine was already at the misdemeanor level. Accordingly, the Court of Appeal granted the petition in part and directed the superior court to (1) reclassify Alejandro's felony offense as a misdemeanor, and (2) reconsider his request for DNA expungement. The Court denied the petition as to his request for fine reduction. View "Alejandro N. v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

G.F., a juvenile, was adjudicated to have committed an assault. The district court committed G.F., who was thirteen years old at the time, to the Department of Corrections Mountain View Youth Development Center for an indeterminate period up to age seventeen. The superior court affirmed the district court’s judgment. G.F. appealed, arguing that the disposition was disproportionate to the assault adjudication and not rationally related to the purposes of the Maine Juvenile Code. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the Court lacked jurisdiction over the appeal because the statutes do not authorize the Court to review a disposition. View "State v. G.F." on Justia Law

Christian, age 16, was arrested for selling cocaine base. A wardship petition was filed. Immigration officials were notified. An Immigration Detainer was faxed to the juvenile hall from the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) stating that Christian had a prior felony conviction or had been charged with a felony offense, that he had illegally re-entered after a previous removal, and there was an order of deportation. The detainer requested that juvenile hall maintain custody of the minor to allow DHS to take custody of him, with an attached “Warrant of Removal/Deportation.” Christian admitted that he had possessed a controlled substance as alleged. Christian’s counsel indicated that she was satisfied he understood the immigration consequences of his admission. Christian stated he had traveled from Honduras to the U.S. 10 months earlier without his mother’s permission. The dispositional order required him to reside with his mother in Honduras. The court of appeal reversed. The court may have proceeded under the erroneous premise that it was compelled to transfer custody to federal authorities. The court expressly determined that it was not in Christian’s best interests to return to Honduras because he had been abandoned by his biological father who has never provided assistance or support and that his mother is unable to provide support. The conflicting findings cannot be reconciled View "In re Christian H." on Justia Law