On or about March 25, 1995, applicant shot and killed Alexander Lopez. Applicant was sixteen years of age at the time. As a result of that incident, the State filed a juvenile-delinquency petition. On April 26, the State filed a motion to waive jurisdiction in the juvenile court and a petition to certify applicant to be tried as an adult. The next day, the case was reset for magistrate warnings to be given to applicant on May 4 and for a transfer hearing to be held on June 7. Applicant received magistrate warnings on May 4, but the transfer hearing was subsequently reset to July 27. On July 27, both parties announced “ready,” and the parties and witnesses were sworn to return at 10:00 a.m. on August 1 for “trial.” On appeal, applicant argued he was not properly served with a summons to the transfer hearing in the juvenile court. He further claimed that, as a consequence of that failure, the juvenile court did not have jurisdiction to transfer him and the district court did not have jurisdiction to try him. The Court of Criminal Appeals filed and set this application “to determine whether the district court lacked jurisdiction and whether this claim should be barred under the doctrine of laches.” After review, the Court concluded that the record did not affirmatively establish the trial court lacked jurisdiction, and consequently, it denied relief. View "Ex parte Rodriguez" on Justia Law

After the circuit court denied his motion to suppress certain statements he made during police questioning, Defendant pled guilty to second-degree reckless homicide as party to a crime. Defendant was fifteen years old at the time of the crime. Defendant requested that he be allowed to withdraw his plea, arguing that his confession to police was involuntary and, alternatively, that the incriminating statements he made that were not recorded during his custodial interrogation as a juvenile were inadmissible. The court of appeals affirmed the circuit court’s rulings. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant’s statements were voluntary; and (2) the police violated Wis. Stat. 938.195 by turning off the device recording Defendant’s interrogation during questioning, but the error in not suppressing some of Defendant’s statements was harmless. View "State v. Moore" on Justia Law

In 2007, Camden police officers arrived at the scene of a shooting where they found the body of Edwin Torres on the sidewalk. Torres had suffered multiple gunshot wounds to the head and neck. An eyewitness identified defendant, who was a juvenile, as the shooter. Three days later, defendant Edwin Urbina surrendered, and, subsequently, he voluntarily elected to have his case transferred from the Family Part to the Law Division. In order to avoid an indictment for first-degree murder, defendant entered into a negotiated plea agreement, agreeing to proceed as an adult and plead guilty to one count of aggravated manslaughter in exchange for the State's recommendation of a sentence not to exceed seventeen and a half years' incarceration, subject to an eighty-five percent parole disqualifier and five years of post-release parole supervision. Nearly three years after his sentencing, defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in accepting his guilty plea because the factual basis elicited for the plea indicated that he was asserting a complete defense to the charge. In a split decision, the Appellate Division affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence. The majority held that, although defendant testified to facts that raised the possibility of self-defense, when considered in light of the surrounding circumstances, his testimony did not constitute a contemporaneous claim of innocence requiring vacation of the plea. The Supreme Court reversed, however, finding that after defendant stated during the plea colloquy that he pulled his handgun after the victim and his cousin pulled their guns, and said "I ain't mean to kill him, your Honor. I just wanted to have him back up[,]" the trial court should have explored whether defendant was claiming he acted in self-defense. The Court found that the plea judge did not ensure that defendant truly understood the law of self-defense, including the requirement of a reasonable and honest belief in the necessity of using force, or that he understood that the State had the burden to disprove self-defense once asserted. "Absent such an inquiry on the record, it is unclear whether defendant's plea was truly knowing, intelligent, and voluntary." View "New Jersey v. Urbina" on Justia Law

Appellant Donta Vickers appealed his sentence stemming from his conviction as a habitual offender. A jury found Vickers guilty of assault second degree as a lesser-included offense of assault first degree; attempted robbery first degree; home invasion; conspiracy second degree; and three counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. Vickers did not dispute that he has been convicted of three violent felonies on three separate occasions, nor did he dispute that, at least as to all of the convictions, the requirements of the habitual offender statute, 11 Del. C. 4214(b), have been met by these offenses. Instead, Vickers argued on appeal that his conviction for the first of the three violent felony offenses, arson first degree, should not have been counted under the habitual offender statute because he was a juvenile at the time of the offense and conviction. The Supreme Court found no merit in the appeal and therefore affirmed. View "Vickers v. Delaware" on Justia Law

The two defendants in this case were eighteen years old when they pleaded guilty to armed felonies. Both defendants were “youths” within the meaning of N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law 720.10(1), had never been convicted of a crime, and would be eligible to be granted youthful offender status but for the fact that their convictions to be replaced by youthful offender adjudications were armed felonies. At issue on appeal was whether the court in the case of each defendant was required to determine on the record if he was an eligible youth due to the existence of one or more factors set forth in section 720.10(3). The Court of Appeals reversed in each case, holding that, when a defendant who would otherwise be an eligible youth has been convicted of an armed felony, the court is required to make a determination on the record as to whether one or more of the section 720.10(3) factors exists and the defendant is therefore an eligible youth, even if the defendant does not request it or has agreed to forgo youthful offender treatment as part of a plea bargain. View "People v. Middlebrooks" on Justia Law

In January 2008, S.J.C. pleaded guilty to two counts of fourth degree assault with sexual motivation for offenses he committed at age 13. At S.J.C.'s disposition hearing, the juvenile court ordered two years of community supervision and imposed other conditions such as regular school attendance, sexual deviancy treatment, and payment of a victim penalty assessment. After completing all of his conditions, in December 2011, S.J.C. moved to vacate his adjudication and seal his juvenile record under former RCW 13.50.050. The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on whether article I, section 10 of the Washington Constitution required the court to apply the "Ishikawa" factors when a former juvenile offender has satisfied the statutory requirements of former RCW 13.50.050 (2011) to seal his or her juvenile court record. "Based on experience and logic," the Court affirmed the juvenile court's holding that it did not. Because it was undisputed that S.J.C. met all the statutory requirements, the Court affirmed the juvenile court's order sealing his juvenile court record. View "Washington v. S.J.C." on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant D.T. (minor) and the victim had been friends before the incident at issue in this appeal. D.T. was 13 years old, and the victim was 14 years old. D.T. and the victim used to play and joke with each other; they did not "rough play." On the day of the incident, the victim was trying to avoid minor and did not want to talk to him. He approached her anyway. When minor pulled at the hood on the victim’s sweater, she tried to pull away and told him to leave her alone. Instead of complying, minor retrieved a pocketknife from his pocket and, while still holding onto the victim’s clothing, opened it so she could see the blade. D.T. poked her multiple times in the upper back with the exposed blade of the knife. The knife felt "sharp" and "pointy," and the victim felt some pain. She did not think D.T. would hurt her, or that he was trying to cut or kill her. However, the victim was scared that an injury might occur because D.T. had a knife pressed to her back. A teacher approached, and D.T. stopped hitting her with the knife and went into class. The victim told both a teacher and a police officer about the incident. When speaking to the police officer, the victim was "visibly upset." On more than one occasion, she told the officer she was scared that minor might hurt her. The police officer noticed a red mark but no broken skin where the victim said she felt the most pain. The police officer escorted D.T. to the assistant principal’s office, where he produced the knife. The two-inch blade was sharp, and the tip of the knife was pointed. D.T acknowledged that the victim told him to stop and was "continually try[ing] to get away from him." According to D.T.'s statements to the police officer, the incident ended when the victim "pulled away and was able to run from him." He expressed remorse and said "he could have hurt" the victim. He also said that he and the victim had been "just playing," and that he did not intend to harm her. After the close of evidence at the jurisdictional hearing, the court found that "the knife in question [was] being used as a deadly weapon." It stated: "The knife blade was open. It was poked numerous times to the back of the victim in this case to the extent that it could have resulted in great bodily injury if more force were to be applied with the use of that knife." On appeal, D.T. argued insufficient evidence supported the allegation that he used a deadly weapon. He asked the Court of Appeal to reduce the allegation the court found true to simple assault. Because the Court of Appeal disagreed about the sufficiency of the evidence, it affirmed the adjudication order. View "In re D.T." on Justia Law

In an original wardship petition (Welf. & Inst. Code, 602), Elias., then 13 years old, was alleged to have committed a lewd and lascivious act upon a child under the age of 14 years, Pen. Code 288(a). Before and at the jurisdictional hearing, defense counsel moved to exclude inculpatory statements Elias made to the police on the ground they were involuntary and inadmissible under Miranda v. Arizona. The motion was denied and the petition sustained. Elias was declared a ward of the court and placed on probation in the home of his parents. Elias claims his confession was involuntary under the due process clause, as it resulted from the type of coercive interrogation techniques condemned in Miranda, The court of appeal reversed. The voluntariness of inculpatory statements made during an interrogation conducted on the basis of no more than the interrogator’s “speculative, intuitive, and risky guess” that the subject is guilty warrants particularly careful judicial scrutiny. The prosecution failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Elias’s inculpatory statements were voluntary. View "In re Elias V." on Justia Law

At ten years of age, Joseph H. woke up early one morning and shot his father in the head as the father lay asleep on a sofa. Joseph had been physically abused and severely neglected by his mother, and was sexually abused by his mother’s boyfriend. Joseph lived with his father Jeff prior to Jeff's death, and Jeff's girlfriend Krista. Jeff was addicted to Percocet and methamphetamine, and was frequently violent towards both Krista and Joseph. A few days before the shooting, Jeff became violent with Krista. Jeff owned guns, which he frequently showed off, including a handgun that was kept in the closet of the bedroom. There were no child protection locks for the gun, which was kept loaded. Krista called 911 when she discovered Jeff on the sofa. When police arrived, Joseph volunteered that he had grabbed the gun and shot his dad in the ear. Joseph explained he did so because his father had beaten him and his mother, and his father had kicked Joseph “in the ass” the day before. Joseph also said he used his father’s gun and that he had put it under his bed after the shooting. When the residence was searched, the gun used in the shooting was found under Joseph’s bed. A wardship petition was filed alleging Joseph had committed acts which would have been crimes if committed by an adult, specifically, murder, with a special allegation of discharging a firearm causing death. After a contested hearing, the juvenile court found that Joseph understood the wrongfulness of his acts despite the statutory presumption of incapacity, had committed an act which would have been second degree murder if committed by an adult, and had discharged a firearm. Joseph appealed his commitment to the Department of Juvenile Justice, arguing: (1) the court erroneously considered statements obtained in violation of his Miranda rights; (2) his evaluation by a prosecution expert during trial, without counsel present, violated his due process rights; (3) the court improperly weighed the evidence in finding that he knew the wrongfulness of his conduct; (4) the true findings must be reversed due to cumulative errors during the adjudicatory hearing; and (5) the court abused its discretion in committing him to the Department of Juvenile J View "In re Joseph H." on Justia Law

This appeal concerned two unrelated cases. In the first case, Defendant pleaded guilty to burglary and misdemeanor theft. Defendant was eighteen years old when the crimes were committed. In the second case, Defendant pleaded guilty to aggravated indecent liberties with a child. Defendant was seventeen years old when the crime was committed. The district court authorized Defendant to be prosecuted as an adult. The cases were consolidated for pleas and sentencings. The district court sentenced Defendant to terms of imprisonment and to a lifetime of supervision once he was released from prison. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that mandatory lifetime postrelease supervision for juveniles convicted of aggravated indecent liberties does not categorically constitute cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that mandatory lifetime postrelease supervision for juveniles who have committed and are later convicted of aggravated indecent liberties with a child is categorically unconstitutional. View "State v. Dull" on Justia Law