J. was born in 1992 in prison and was subsequently abandoned to a stranger in a restaurant. J.’s father was convicted of murder before J.’s birth. The stranger became his guardian, but social services received complaints about living condition and abuse in her home. By 2009, he had lived in 14 placements. He was diagnosed with several psychiatric disorders and lost 19 friends to gang violence. In 2007-2010, multiple criminal petitions were filed against J. He was committed to the Department of Juvenile Justice (DJJ). Before his release, the Juvenile Parole Realignment bill was enacted, eliminating DJJ administered parole, and releasing minors to community based supervision. In 2013, the court ordered that J. be discharged on local probation. The Parole Board did not, as required n the past, make a finding of whether his discharge was honorable. Honorable discharge entitles youths to automatic release from all penalties and disabilities. A condition of probation was that he register as a sex offender. J. became homeless. He moved to Monterey County, but failed to timely notify probation or update his registration. He was arrested while trying to update his registration. Before his probation violation hearing, J’s attorney moved for honorable discharge and relief in juvenile court, arguing that because DJJ no longer makes discharge status recommendations after Realignment, the court should make a finding and relieve J. from the registration requirement. The court of appeal affirmed denial, stating that the Legislature should amend the statutory scheme to be consistent with Realignment View "In re J.S." on Justia Law

The State argued on appeal to the Supreme Court that the trial court erred in ruling that "Miller v. Alabama," (132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012)) applied retroactively to cases on collateral review of a final judgment. Defendant Frank Vigil, Jr. Filed a Crim. P. 35(c) motion for post-conviction relief of his final judgment, arguing that his sentence was unconstitutional under "miller." The trial court applied "Miller" retroactively and granted his motion. The Supreme Court held that "Miller" did not apply retroactively, and reversed. View "Colorado v. Vigil" on Justia Law

Defendants Tenarro Banks and Michael Tate were convicted in 2004 of class 1 felonies for acts committed when they were juveniles. The Supreme Court granted review in defendants' respective cases to determine what remedy was appropriate in light of the federal Supreme Court's decision in "Miller v. Alabama," (132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012)). Under the sentencing scheme in place at the time (which governed offenses committed between 1990 and 2006), both Banks and Tate were given mandatory sentences to life in prison without the possibility of parole (LWOP). While both cases were pending on appeal to the court of appeals, the Supreme Court released its opinion in "Miller." The "Miller" decision rendered the Colorado statutory scheme for mandatory LWOP in place from 1990-2006 as unconstitutional as applied to juveniles. Because the Colorado legislature has not acted to adopt a new sentencing scheme in light of "Miller," so the Colorado Supreme Court was tasked with "filling the gap." For Tate and Banks, the Supreme Court remanded the cases for the trial court to determine wither LWOP was an appropriate sentence under "Miller;" if the trial court determined LWOP was not warranted, life with the possibility of parole (LWPP) was the proper sentence. A third case before the Court on collateral review centered on whether "Miller" applied retroactively: Brendan Jensen was convicted in 1998 of first degree murder while he was seventeen. Under the sentencing scheme in place at the time, his sentence was LWOP. The Court held that the rule announced in "Miller" was procedural rather than substantive in nature, and therefore did not apply retroactively. For Jensen, the Court affirmed the trial court's order denying his motion for post-conviction relief. View "Colorado v. Tate" on Justia Law

The State charged Christopher Maynard in juvenile court with six counts of malicious mischief. Less than one month later, he turned 18 years old. Maynard's counsel did not move for an order to extend the court's statutory jurisdiction before Maynard turned 18. As a result, the juvenile court ruled that it had lost jurisdiction and dismissed the case without prejudice. The State then filed the case in superior court. Maynard moved to dismiss, arguing that preaccusatorial delay and ineffective assistance of counsel deprived him of the benefits of juvenile court jurisdiction, including the opportunity to accept a plea offer from the State. The trial court agreed and dismissed the case with prejudice. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that ineffective assistance of counsel, not preaccusatorial delay, caused the loss of jurisdiction. The court, however, determined that remand to adult trial court for a new trial was the proper remedy. The Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeals that Maynard received ineffective assistance of counsel which then deprived him the benefit of the opportunity to accept a plea deal. The Court vacated the Court of Appeals' order with regard to remanding of the case to the adult trial court and instead, directed the State to reoffer the plea proposal of deferred disposition consistent with the Juvenile Justice Act of 1977 (JJA), chapter 13.40 RCW. View "Washington v. Maynard" on Justia Law

Mother appeals from the juvenile court's permanent restraining order against her requiring her to stay away from the father of their six-year-old daughter. Mother contends that there was insufficient evidence to support the inclusion of the daughter in the restraining order as a protected person. The court agreed and concluded that the juvenile court erred by including the daughter as a protected person in the restraining order where there is no evidence that Mother failed to obey the visitation order or in any way abused her visitation rights. Because the restraining order requires Mother here to stay away from Father, Mother necessarily is required to stay away from the daughter when the child physically is in father’s presence. Accordingly, the court remanded for modification of the restraining order. View "In re N.L." on Justia Law

The state filed a petition for adjudication of wardship, alleging that D. had committed first degree murder. D. was nine years old; the victim was 14 months old. The circuit court found D. unfit to stand trial and subsequently found him “not not guilty” of murder. Thecourt remanded D. to the Department of Human Services for fitness restoration education, so that D. may become fit and be tried for murder. The appellate court reversed, finding that the trial court erred in denying a suppression motion. The Illinois Supreme Court remanded for “harmless error analysis,” noting that in interviewing D., a detective seized on D’s fear that his father or others in the household would go to jail, or that he, himself, would be taken away. The detective promised D that no matter what he said, no one was going to jail, no one would be in trouble, he would not be taken from his father and, at the end of the day, he could go to his grandmother’s house and “hang out” with his dad. The detective reinforced that no consequences would follow an admission that D hit the victim and rejected repeated denials, making plain that anything less than an admission was unacceptable. The detective stated that whatever happened was a mistake, and everybody makes mistakes, and was explicit about the admission that would suffice—an admission that D. hit the baby once .D eventually admitted to hitting the infant once. D., functioning at the level of a seven- or eight-year-old, was especially vulnerable and susceptible to police coercion. View "In re D.L.H." on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted in 2013 for criminal sexual assault and criminal sexual abuse, based on acts he allegedly committed in 2012, when he was 17 years old. At the time of the alleged offenses, the Juvenile Court Act only applied to those minors under 17 years of age, with limited exceptions. Effective January 1, 2014, the exclusive jurisdiction provision of the Juvenile Court Act was amended to apply to minors who were under 18 years of age, 705 ILCS 405/5-120, with a saving clause: “[t]he changes …apply to violations or attempted violations committed on or after the effective date of this amendatory Act.” Defendant filed, in 2014, a “Motion to Declare Adult Prosecution Unconstitutional,” alleging that the saving clause violated his equal protection rights under the federal and state constitutions. Defendant argued that he was similarly situated to 17-year-olds who allegedly committed offenses on or after the amendment’s effective date and there was no rational basis to treat him differently. The circuit court granted defendant’s motion, finding no rational basis for the different treatment. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed; it was reasonable for the legislature to distinguish between the two groups since applying the amendment to offenses committed before the effective date would require those cases to be transferred to the juvenile division and to begin anew. View "People v. Richardson" on Justia Law

The District Attorney filed a petition to declare sixteen-year-old R.V. (“Minor”) a ward of the juvenile court. When the juvenile court determined there was substantial evidence raising a doubt regrading Minor’s competency to stand trial, the court suspended proceedings and appointed a forensic psychologist to evaluate Minor. The expert’s report concluded that Minor was not competent to stand trial. The court rejected the expert’s opinion and concluded that Minor was competent to stand trial. The Court of Appeal affirmed, concluding that the juvenile court’s reasons for declining to accept the expert’s opinion were supported by substantial evidence in the record. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) under Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code 709, a minor is presumed competent and bears the burden of proving otherwise by a preponderance of the evidence; (2) a claim of insufficient evidence to support a juvenile court’s determination in a competency proceeding is reviewed deferentially under the substantial evidence test; and (3) the juvenile court under the circumstances could not reasonably have rejected the qualified expert’s opinion that Minor was not competent to proceed to trial. View "In re R.V." on Justia Law

Appellant, who was fifteen years old at the time, was charged with third-degree sexual abuse. Appellant was released from detention on a conditional order of release. The district court ordered that Appellant’s case be “informally adjusted” on the condition that Appellant move out of state to Oklahoma to live with his father. The existing order of release with its conditions was then terminated. Appellant and his mother were forced to comply with the order to avoid formal juvenile prosecution. When Appellant returned to Kentucky with his mother, the district court re-docketed the charges. The trial court eventually removed Appellant from his home and committed him to the Department of Juvenile Justice as a juvenile sexual offender for placement in an “appropriate facility.” The Supreme Court vacated the district court’s adjudication and disposition in this case, holding that the trial court erred when it changed the case from an informal adjustment to formal proceedings because once a case has been determined to be appropriate for an informal adjustment, the case cannot be returned to formal proceedings. View "Q.M. v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Ashley M., mother of minor P.R., appealed juvenile court orders terminating her parental rights. Her sole contention was that the court's decision was not supported by substantial evidence that there was good cause to deviate from the adoption placement preferences of the Indian Child Welfare Act. However, the Court of Appeal found that Ashley did not argue that her parental rights were improvidently terminated. Because her parental rights have been terminated, and she made no argument as to how alleged placement errors might be related to the termination decision, she lacked standing to challenge matters related to the minor’s placement. Her appeal was dismissed. View "In re P.R." on Justia Law