T.W. became a ward of the juvenile court in 2010. The petition alleged felony robbery and receiving stolen property. T.W. robbed the victim of her purse and was found in possession of a stolen ATM card and cell phone. The order states: “The minor has waived [his] right to a trial, to remain silent … the admission is made freely and voluntarily. There is a factual basis for the admission. … Count 1 … Dismissed on motion of DA … Count 2 … True as admitted … with counsel’s consent.” In 2014, T.W. filed a petition for modification. His maximum term of confinement was three years four months. The petition states: “Pursuant to Proposition 47, a violation of Penal Code 496 and possessed property valued at less than $950 [sic] is now a misdemeanor and carries a maximum confinement term of 12 months.” The District Attorney argued that T.W. posed an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety, so resentencing was not appropriate, and that “retroactive resentencing” did not apply to negotiated dispositions. The court ruled Proposition 47 applies to juvenile cases, but denied the petition because the sentence was based on a negotiated disposition. The court of appeal vacated, finding that T.W. is entitled to petition for modification of his sentence, notwithstanding the plea agreement, and remanded for a determination of unreasonable risk to public safety, View "T.W. v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed the trial court's denial of his request to seal his juvenile records, which contain at least 14 incidents. Section 781, subdivision (a) grants the court discretion to seal the juvenile's delinquency records unless the juvenile has committed an offense specified under section 707, subdivision (b). In this case, defendant has not committed any of the enumerated offenses that would render him statutorily ineligible to have his records sealed. The court found no error in the trial court's consideration of the seriousness of the offense in deciding whether to seal defendant's records; the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding defendant was not yet rehabilitated; the trial court did not violate due process by refusing to seal the juvenile records; and, therefore, the court affirmed the trial court's order denying defendant's petition to seal his records. View "In re J.W." on Justia Law

After his 18th birthday, Robert Wheeler was charged with, and pled guilty to, first degree child rape and first degree child molestation for offenses he committed when he was 13 or 14 years old that came to light when he was 17 and a half. His convictions had been final since 2006. The Court of Appeals held that the validity of Wheeler's guilty plea was not an appealable issue because the trial court did not independently review and rule on it; rejected Wheeler's claim of ineffective assistance, reasoning that counsel was not obligated to advance an argument that was unlikely to succeed; and dismissed Wheeler's personal restraint petition as untimely. Wheeler contended on appeal that the Washington Supreme Court had the authority to, and should have, revisited his previously rejected claim that his plea was involuntary because he was misinformed of the maximum sentences for his crimes. He also challenged his convictions as the product of unconstitutional preaccusatorial delay and sought to avoid the time bar for collateral attack by claiming he had newly discovered evidence that the State delayed filing charges until Wheeler aged out of juvenile court. The Supreme Court rejected Wheeler's arguments, and affirmed the Court of Appeals. View "Washington v. Wheeler" on Justia Law

The Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services filed a petition, alleging that four minors were at risk of physical harm and emotional damage due to their mother’s conduct. The petition stated that mother had regularly complained (or prompted others to complain) that father physically or sexually abused the children, that these complaints were false, and that mother’s conduct subjected the children to repeated sexual assault examinations and law enforcement interviews, all of which had severe negative consequences on the children: All four had expressed suicidal thoughts; two were placed in involuntary mental health holds; one had gained 40 pounds; and all four were chronically absent from, or tardy to, school. Mother moved to dismiss the petition because she and father are already litigating custody in family court. The trial court granted the motion. The court of appeal reversed, stating that to rob the Department of its chance to prove its allegations is to elevate judicial economy above the protection of children, in contravention of the Legislature’s express declaration that dependency jurisdiction be construed broadly. View "In re Nicholas E." on Justia Law

In 2010, 13-year-old D.W. admitted misdemeanor battery on a school employee and in exchange for dismissal of two counts of making criminal threats. D.W. was adjudged a ward of the court in Contra Costa County, placed on probation and housed in a group home. D.W. committed probation violations necessitating new placements and was the subject of a Stanislaus County wardship petition charging vehicle theft and driving without a license. In 2013, the court ordered D.W. placed in the Youth Offender Treatment Program for two years 244 days, or until age 21. In 2013, Contra Costa County filed another petition, stating that D.W‘s adoptive parents were unable to accept responsibility for him and charging D.W. with felony battery by gassing on the person of an employee of the juvenile detention facility and felony possession of a dagger. The court allowed amendment to the petition during a contested jurisdiction hearing, adding a charge of battery with injury on a peace officer, The court of appeal amended the order to reflect that D.W. committed a battery against a peace office.. Amendment to the petition did not violate D.W.‘s due process rights, but the record did not contain substantial evidence that the battery caused an injury as defined by Penal Code 243 (f)(5). View "In re D.W." on Justia Law

Sellers was sentenced to 15 years’ imprisonment for being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition under 26 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1) and under 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(1) of the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA). The Second Circuit remanded for resentencing. Application of the ACCA was error. Sellers’s 2001 state conviction for criminal sale of a controlled substance did not qualify as one of the “three previous convictions” necessary to apply the ACCA because he was adjudicated as a youthful offender for that offense under New York law, 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(1). The youthful offender designation “set aside” the conviction. View "United States v. Sellers" on Justia Law

In 2009, E.J.D. entered a plea of no contest to battery on juvenile detention officers. The court determined that the proceedings should be designated as an extended-jurisdiction juvenile prosecution and sentenced E.J.D. to a term in a juvenile correction facility and to an adult criminal sentence. The court stayed the adult criminal sentence on the condition that E.J.D. not violate the provisions of the juvenile sentence and on the condition that he not commit a new offense. The State subsequently moved to revoke the stay of execution of the adult sentence based on numerous disciplinary violations committed by E.J.D. Thereafter, E.J.D. moved for a lesser sentence and a durational departure from his sentence. The district court denied E.J.D.’s motion and ordered him committed to the custody of the Department of Corrections. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the statutory scheme does not allow modification of an adult sentence after a determination that a juvenile has violated the terms and conditions of an extended jurisdiction juvenile prosecution; and (2) the court of appeals correctly determined that the evidence supported the district court’s decision to revoke the stay of execution of the adult sentence. View "In re E.J.D." on Justia Law

In 2006, the Alameda County District Attorney filed a wardship petition (Welf. & Inst. Code, 602) alleging Keith, then age 15, took and drove a van owned by Thomas (Veh. Code, 10851(a)) and received, withheld, or concealed the stolen van (count two, Pen. Code, 496). The juvenile court determined the amount of restitution was $2,180 and amended count two to charge misdemeanor receiving stolen property. Keith admitted that charge in exchange for dismissal of count one. The court adjudged Keith a ward of the court, placed him on probation, and ordered him to pay the restitution. Keith did not appeal. Keith appeared at status hearings, but defaulted on his restitutionary debt. In 2011, Keith failed to appear. The court issued a warrant for his arrest “to expire on [Keith’s 21st birthday, in December 2011].” The warrant was never served. Keith did not appear at any subsequent hearings. In 2014 the court ruled that it had authority to issue an abstract of judgment permitting collection of Keith’s unpaid restitutionary debt. The court recalled the outstanding warrant, terminated Keith’s probation “unsatisfactorily,” dismissed his wardship, and issued an abstract of judgment requiring Keith to pay restitution. The court of appeal held that the court had authority to do so. View "In re Keith C." on Justia Law

In 1992, while he was still a minor, Appellant was adjudicated delinquent for committing the equivalent of an operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated (OVI) offense. Appellant was not represented by counsel during the adjudication. In 2011, Appellant was convicted of OVI offenses that became felonies under the enhancing provision of Ohio Rev. Code 4511.19(G)(1)(d). The State added Appellant’s juvenile OVI adjudication to his four prior adult convictions to reach the “five or more” offenses threshold required to enhance his sentence under section 4511.19(G)(1)(d). Appellant moved to suppress the evidence of his juvenile adjudication, arguing that the adjudication violated his constitutional right to counsel. The trial court overruled the motion to suppress. Appellant was subsequently convicted of two counts and used Appellant’s 1992 juvenile adjudication as an OVI enhancement tool. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for resentencing, holding that an adjudication of delinquency may not be used to enhance the penalty for a later offense under section 4511.19(G)(1)(d) when the adjudication carried the possibility of confinement, the adjudication was uncounseled, and there was no effective waiver of the right to counsel. View "State v. Bode" on Justia Law

In 1999, Willover was convicted of two counts of first degree murder, attempted premeditated murder, mayhem, and giving false information to a peace officer. The jury found true special circumstances and firearm enhancements. The trial court sentenced Willover, who was 17 years old at the time he committed the offenses, to two consecutive terms of life without possibility of parole (LWOP) for the murders and stayed the terms for the remaining counts and enhancements. The court of appeal modified the sentence for the attempted premeditated murder to life with the possibility of parole. In 2014, Willover filed a petition for habeas corpus, arguing that he is entitled to be resentenced because the trial court improperly presumed that LWOP was the appropriate sentence for the murders, in violation of Miller v. Alabama, in which the Supreme Court held that “mandatory life without parole for those under the age of 18 at the time of their crimes violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on ‘cruel and unusual punishments.’ ” The court of appeal vacated the sentence and remanded. The transcript of the sentencing hearing does not “clearly indicate” that the trial court would have reached the same result if it had applied the Miller factors. View "In re Willover" on Justia Law