Appellant was employed by Employer at a store located on property owned by Casino (Employer and Casino henceforth referred to as “Casino”). Appellant was engaged to Fiancé when Fiancé filed a complaint with the Nevada Gaming Control Board (NGCB) regarding some of Casino’s slot machines. Casino subsequently terminated Appellant’s employment. Appellant filed suit against Casino alleging that Casino terminated her employment in retaliation for Fiancé’s complaint to the NGCB. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim because Nevada has not recognized a cause of action for third-party retaliatory discharge. The Supreme Court affirmed, thus declining to recognize a common law cause of action for third-party retaliatory discharge, holding that the district court properly dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim. View "Brown v. Eddie World, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2014 the Third Circuit decided King v. Governor of the State of New Jersey, rejecting a challenge brought by licensed counselors to the constitutionality of Assembly Bill A3371, a statute banning the provision of “sexual orientation change efforts” (SOCE) counseling to minors. A similar challenge was filed by a 15-year-old minor seeking to undergo SOCE counseling and by his parents. The Third Circuit affirmed dismissal. Having decided, in King, that the statute did not violate the First Amendment rights of those wishing to “speak” the message of SOCE, the court concluded that the statute does not violate the rights of those who wish to receive that message. The court also rejected a parental rights claim. The fundamental rights of parents do not include the right to choose a specific type of provider for a specific medical or mental health treatment that the state has reasonably deemed harmful. View "Doe v. Governor of New Jersey" on Justia Law

Andrew is the biological father of Emilio, born in July 2013. Katherine is Emilio’s biological mother. Andrew and Katherine never married. Before Emilio was born, Andrew and Katherine had broken up. Katherine had become aware that Andrew could be violent and unpredictable. In September 2012, he yelled at and pushed Katherine’s mother; he pled guilty to possession of metal knuckles and trespassing and was put on probation. After Katherine became pregnant, several incidents occurred that confirmed her belief that Andrew could be violent and unpredictable. Katherine sought to have Emilio adopted by a couple in San Francisco, who filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of Andrew. After a trial, the court found that although Andrew was Emilio’s biological father, he had not established that he was Emilio’s presumed father within the meaning of Adoption of Kelsey S., with the attendant right to withhold consent to Emilio’s adoption. The court concluded it would be would be in Emilio’s best interests to terminate Andrew’s parental rights. The court of appeal affirmed, finding that substantial evidence supported a finding that Andrew is not a “Kelsey S. father,” and that the court did not abuse its discretion in terminating Andrew’s parental rights. View "Adoption of Emilio G." on Justia Law

The juvenile court declared A.R., age four, a dependent of the court and ordered him to remain in the custody of both parents under the supervision of the Department of Family and Children’s Services. A.R.’s presumed father and mother were not married. At disposition in January 2014, the court ordered family maintenance services for both parents. In March 2014, father moved out of the home not pursuant to any court order. He eventually disengaged from services without addressing his alcoholism or marijuana use. Using the Request to Change Court Order form (JV-180), the Department requested modification of the dispositional order. A September 2014 order made removal findings, continued A.R. under the care, custody, and control of mother under the Department’s supervision, provided family maintenance services for only A.R. and mother, and provided supervised visitation for father. The court of appeal affirmed. There was evidence of changed circumstances sufficient to justify the court’s modification of its prior order. Although the removal findings were not supported by substantial evidence, the error was harmless. At the time of the findings, father had already moved out of the home and A.R. was no longer actually in father’s physical custody. View "In re A.R." on Justia Law

Petitioner, the prosecuting attorney of Ohio County, West Virginia, filed a juvenile petition against J.Y., a twelve-year-old boy charged with possession of a deadly weapon on the premises of an educational facility. Specifically, J.Y. possessed the deadly weapon with the express intent to intimidate another student. The circuit court dismissed the petition, finding that J.Y. was not competent to stand trial and that the charged offense did not involve “an act of violence against a person.” Petitioner sought a writ of prohibition to prevent the circuit court judge from dismissing the juvenile petition, asserting that J.Y. was charged with an offense that involved “an act of violence against a person” within the meaning of W. Va. Code 27-6A-3 given the potential for harm to other students that existed as a result of J.Y.’s actions. The Supreme Court granted the requested writ, holding that J.Y.’s actions indicated that he posed a risk of physical harm and severe emotional and psychological harm to children, and therefore, J.Y. committed an offense involving an act of violence against a person within the meaning of section 27-6A-3. View "State ex rel. Smith v. Hon. David J. Sims" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of murder in the second degree for the shooting of a fourteen-year-old. Defendant was seventeen years and five months old at the time of his arrest for the shooting. Defendant appealed the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress incriminating statements that he made to the police after waiving his Miranda rights, arguing that their introduction at trial was error given the common-law rule that, ordinarily, a juvenile must be given a meaningful opportunity to consult with an interested adult before waiving his Miranda rights, an opportunity he did not have. Several years after Defendant was convicted, the Legislature enacted St. 2013, ch. 2013 (2013 act), which amended various statutory provisions to treat seventeen year olds as juveniles. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Defendant’s conviction, holding (1) the 2013 act did not affect this case because it is prospective in its application and does not modify the interested adult rule; but (2) the interest adult rule is now extended, on a prospective basis, to seventeen year old defendants. View "Commonwealth v. Smith" on Justia Law

In this case, the Third District Court of Appeal read Graham v. Florida as creating a homicide-case exception to the categorical rule against sentencing a juvenile offender to life without parole for a nonhomicide crime. The court’s reading would permit a juvenile to be sentenced to life without parole for a nonhomicide offense if the juvenile also committed a homicide in the same criminal episode. Applying this homicide-case exception, the Third District held that Defendant’s life-without-parole sentences for certain nonhomicide offenses committed as a juvenile were constitutional under Graham because Defendant also committed a homicide in the same criminal episode. The Supreme Court quashed the Third District’s decision, holding that Graham’s categorical rule leaves no room for the homicide-case exception recognized by the state’s Second, Third, and Fourth District Courts of Appeal. Remanded with instructions that Lawton be resentenced for the nonhomicide offenses of attempted first-degree murder with a firearm and armed robbery with a firearm. View "Lawton v. State" on Justia Law

A Minnesota jury convicted Martin of first-degree murder, committed at age 17. Martin received a mandatory life sentence without possibility of release. The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed and rejected a challenge to the jury’s composition under Batson. Martin filed a habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. 2254. While it was pending, the U.S. Supreme Court held that mandatory life sentences without parole for defendants who commit homicide before age 18 violate the Eighth Amendment. Martin argued that Miller applied retroactively to him. The district court denied the petition. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. Miller does not apply retroactively on collateral review. The Minnesota Supreme Court did not unreasonably determine that the trial court properly rejected Martin’s Batson challenge. View "Martin v. Symmes" on Justia Law

R.T. was born in 1996. When R.T. was 14, she began running away for days at a time, not attending school, falsely reporting that her mother abused her, and at least once throwing furniture. R.T. began having children when she was 15. Mother went looking for R.T. whenever she left home; arranged for R.T. to live with mother’s parents because R.T.’s grandfather used to work with troubled juveniles and because R.T.’s false reports were made when R.T. and mother were alone; called the police for help; and asked the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services for assistance. She declined to voluntarily submit R.T. to the Department’s jurisdiction. R.T. remained “out of control.” The Department filed a petition to declare then-17-year-old R.T. a dependent of the juvenile court under Welf. & Inst. Code 300(b)(1). The court asserted jurisdiction, denying mother’s motion to dismiss, and issued a dispositional order authorizing the Department to place R.T. elsewhere while reunification services were provided. The Department placed her back with her grandparents. The court of appeal affirmed. Regardless of parental blameworthiness, when a child faces a substantial risk of serious physical harm, a parent’s inability to supervise or protect a child is enough to invoke dependency jurisdiction. View "In re R.T." on Justia Law

A petition filed in 2008 by the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) alleged that D.A., born late 2007, and his half-brother Z.S., born early 2006, were at risk of harm under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300. The children had been living with mother, who had a history of violent altercations with father in the children’s presence and were placed together in foster care. In 2009 father was incarcerated. DCFS recommended that family reunification services be terminated. Mother gave birth to K.A. in 2009. Father was found to be K.A.’s presumed father. K.A. had tested positive for marijuana at birth and mother’s marijuana use interfered with her ability to care for him. In 2013 the court terminated parental rights and finalized the adoptions of the children. The court of appeal dismissed father’s appeal as untimely and an appeal by maternal grandmother for lack of standing. Father, who failed to maintain contact with DCFS, visited the children only sporadically, and often did not appear at noticed hearings even while not incarcerated, did not explain how the result of the hearing would have been different if there had been perfect compliance with notice requirements. View "In re Z. S." on Justia Law