Petitioner was involved in a fist-fight with another high school student, Dylan P., who suffered a broken nose and damaged sinuses. Pursuant to a plea agreement, Petitioner admitted involvement in the alleged affray. The juvenile court determined that Petitioner committed the offense of affray and placed him on probation. The circuit court subsequently amended Petitioner’s probation to require Petitioner to pay partial restitution for the medical offenses incurred by Dylan P. for treatment of his injuries suffered during the affray. The intermediate appellate court affirmed the order of restitution. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) trial courts are not statutorily authorized to order restitution in favor of a person who is a voluntary and willing participant in the crime or delinquent activity that caused his or her injury; and (2) because Dylan P. fought willingly with Petitioner, the circuit court erroneously required Petitioner to pay restitution to Dylan P. View "In re Tyrell A." on Justia Law

In August 2000, when Jimmy Williams, Jr. was 15 years old, he was convicted of murder made capital because it was committed during a robbery. In accordance with the applicable law at the time of Williams's sentencing, the trial court sentenced Williams to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, the only possible sentence and one that was mandatory. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed Williams's conviction and sentence. In June 2013, Williams petitioned the circuit court, asserting that under the rule announced by the United States Supreme Court in "Miller v. Alabama," (132 S.Ct. 2455 (2012)), the mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole to which he was sentenced in 2000 for an offense committed when he was 15 years old was unconstitutional and, consequently, that he was entitled to be resentenced based on the individualized sentencing factors discussed in Miller. The issue in this case presented for the Alabama Supreme Court's review was whether "Miller" applied retroactively to Williams' case. Because Miller did not categorically forbid a sentence of life imprisonment without parole for a juvenile defendant and because Miller did not apply retroactively, Williams's sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole was legal. The Alabama Supreme Court concluded the Court of Criminal Appeals did not err in denying Williams the relief he requested. View "Ex parte Jimmy Williams, Jr." on Justia Law

Aaron S. was adjudged a dependent minor when he was 16 years old and became a non-minor dependent when he turned 18,Welf. & Inst. Code, 11400(v). The juvenile court terminated dependency jurisdiction shortly before Aaron turned 19, finding that by not enrolling in school or having a job, Aaron failed to participate in his Transitional Independent Living Case Plan. Aaron claimed that the Santa Clara County Department of Family and Children’s Services did not provide him a 90-day transition plan. The court of appeal affirmed. Even assuming the issue was not forfeited, termination without proof of a 90-day transition plan was harmless here because the Department separately provided information to Aaron regarding each of the categories that would have been included in the plan. For housing, employment, educational and continuing support services information, the emancipation letter that was mailed to Aaron before the termination hearing referred him to his Independent Living Program case manager and provided contact information for Transitional Housing Program providers. That letter also informed Aaron he was eligible for health benefits through Medi-Cal, and the section 391 report indicated the Department mailed Aaron a copy of the advanced health care directive form. View "In re Aaron S." on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of murder in the second degree and received a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment with eligibility for parole after fifteen years. Defendant was fifteen years old at the time of the offense. Defendant appealed, arguing, among other things, that his mandatory life sentence constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and article 26 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) a mandatory life sentence with eligibility for parole after fifteen years for a juvenile homicide offender convicted of murder in the second degree does not offend the Eighth Amendment or article 26 or other constitutional rights; and (2) Defendant’s challenges to his underlying conviction were without merit. View "Commonwealth v. Okoro" on Justia Law

In 2013, Gregory Diatchenko filed the present action seeking a declaration that, because he was seventeen at the time he committed the offense leading to his conviction of murder in the first degree, his mandatory sentence of life without parole was unconstitutional. Following Miller v. Alabama, the Supreme Judicial Court determined that the mandatory imposition of such a sentence was unconstitutional. The Court held that a juvenile homicide offender who receives a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment must be afforded the opportunity for release on parole. Diatchenko and another petitioner, both of whom became immediately eligible for parole pursuant to the Court’s decision in Diatchenko I, contended that, to ensure their opportunity for release through parole was meaningful, they must have access to counsel, access to funds for counsel and for expert witnesses, and an opportunity for judicial review of the decision on their parole applications. The Supreme Judicial Court agreed with the petitioners, holding (1) the procedural protections of representation by counsel and the opportunity to obtain expert assistance in connection with that initial parole hearing are necessary for juvenile homicide offenders serving a mandatory life sentence; and (2) such offenders are entitled to limited judicial review of a parole board decision denying initial parole. View "Diatchenko v. District Attorney" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Javante Scott appealed the sentence he received at a resentencing hearing, when the trial court imposed the same 120-years-to-life term as at his original sentencing. Defendant was tried as an adult and convicted of three counts of attempted murder with firearm enhancements. Defendant argued the sentence is cruel and unusual because it imposed a de facto life sentence on him as a juvenile offender. The State argued that a new statute, Penal Code section 3051,1 which guaranteed defendant a future parole eligibility hearing, rendered the sentence constitutional. After review, the Court of Appeal held that section 3051 complied with the central constitutional requirement that the State provide a juvenile offender with a meaningful opportunity to obtain release within his or her expected lifetime. Accordingly, the Court affirmed. View "California v. Scott" on Justia Law

In 1994, at age 14, Ruelas admitted committing felony assault with a deadly weapon and misdemeanor annoying or molesting a child. Three years later, while Ruelas was still a minor, the juvenile court found true allegations that he had committed three felonies: robbery, assault with a deadly weapon, and vehicle theft and committed Ruelas to the California Youth Authority. Upon his release, Ruelas was required to register as a sex offender because of his section 647.6 adjudication. In 2012, Ruelas sought relief on equal protection grounds, arguing that mandatory sex offender registration for a juvenile who is adjudicated of violating Penal Code section 647.61 and committed to the Division of Juvenile Facilities only after committing another offense, but not for a juvenile who is adjudicated of violating section 647.6 and never committed to the Division of Juvenile Facilities, violated the equal protection clauses of the federal and state Constitutions. The trial court rejected the argument. On rehearing, the court of appeal affirmed. Ruelas is not similarly situated for purposes of mandatory sex offender registration to juvenile violators of section 647.6 who were never committed to the Division of Juvenile Facilities. View "Ruelas v. Superior Court.\" on Justia Law

Mother had legal and physical custody; Father had visitation. Mother obtained a restraining order, prohibiting Father from harassing or contacting Mother except to facilitate visitation, and requiring him to stay 100 yards away from her, her home, her workplace and her vehicle. In 2013, Mother submitted a declaration that Father contacted her through calls and texts every day; followed her; waited outside her house; harassed her in the street; picked up the children without informing her; and denigrated her to the children. The restraining order was made permanent. A month later, the Department of Children and Family Services received a report that Mother had left the children (ages 12 and 10) unsupervised and allowed them to ride their bicycles around the neighborhood unsupervised. In interviewing Mother, the caseworker learned of domestic violence committed by Father before their separation and that Father had repeatedly violated the restraining order, which was traumatizing to the children, especially when she called the police to report violations. Mother reported that Father did not mistreat the children. The court of appeal reversed the juvenile court’s order asserting jurisdiction. A finding that Father’s conduct placed the children at risk of emotional injury could not support jurisdiction under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300(b), which requires proof of physical harm or substantial risk of such harm. View "In re Jesus M." on Justia Law

In 1998, after being beaten by men in a park, G, age 17, and his friend took the friend’s father’s handgun to the assailants’ house. G held the gun to a woman’s head and threatened to shoot. Men, holding baseball bats, came out of the house. G threatened them, but then left. A juvenile wardship petition (Pen. Code 602(a)), alleged: assault with a handgun; criminal threats by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury; and possession of a concealable firearm. The juvenile court committed him to the juvenile ranch facilities. G successfully completed the program and was released on probation four months later. He worked in the family business and attended community college. In 2006, he enlisted in the Army. He was promoted to the rank of sergeant and received Commendation Medals for service in Iraq and numerous other commendations and awards. G obtained a degree from California State University. In 2013, G unsuccessfully sought to seal his juvenile record. The court of appeal affirmed, stating that G is a valuable member of society; sealing his juvenile records would acknowledge his achievements. However, courts have no authority to rewrite a statute. G falls within an exception to Section 781(d) as a person who committed an offense listed in section 707(b) when he was over 14 years old. View "In re G.Y." on Justia Law

In Miller v. Alabama, the U.S. Supreme Court held that mandatory sentencing schemes that impose on juvenile offenders a term of life imprisonment without parole violate the Eighth Amendment. At issue in this case was whether a life sentence without parole may be imposed on a juvenile homicide offender in the exercise of the sentencing authority’s discretion. Defendant, who was seventeen years old at the time of the crimes leading to his convictions, was convicted of murder and other crimes. Defendant was sentenced to a total effective sentence of 100 years imprisonment, which was the functional equivalent to life without the possibility of parole. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) in considering whether to sentence a juvenile to a discretionary sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, the sentencer is required to take into account the factors that Miller deemed constitutionally significant before determining that such severe punishment is appropriate; and (2) in light of the uncertainty of Defendant’s sentence upon due consideration of the Miller factors, a new sentencing proceeding must be held that conforms with the dictates of Miller. View "State v. Riley" on Justia Law