In 1995, Wilson, White and Carr, all age 17, approached a Pomona bank, wearing masks and carrying handguns. One of them fired at the security guard who stood outside the bank. The guard fled and alerted police. Inside the bank, they told the customers to “hit the deck.” Theresa Hernandez, a bank employee, was shot and killed during the robbery. The three fled in a car driven by Smith. Another car occupied by Brown also waited nearby. White later admitted to his girlfriend that he had shot Hernandez during the robbery because he thought she was activating an alarm. Brown was arrested. Wilson, Carr and White turned themselves into the police a few days after the robbery. Wilson, sentenced to life imprisonment without parole, sought habeas relief in 2013, asserting, that under the principles announced by the Supreme Court in Miller v. Alabama (2012) the sentence violated the Eighth Amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment and that he is entitled to be resentenced based on the individual sentencing factors that the Miller Court directed trial courts to consider when sentencing a juvenile offender for a homicide conviction. The court of appeal vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing. View "In re: Wilson" on Justia Law

A.L., a minor, was charged with felony second degree robbery of another minor, personally using a handgun. The juvenile court held a contested jurisdictional hearing; testimony focused on the sequence of events and on A.L.’s relative culpability. During closing argument, the juvenile court noted that it “didn’t think there was any evidence” of the section 12022(b) enhancement, which requires personal use of a deadly or dangerous weapon. The prosecutor indicated that A.L. had been mistakenly charged under section 12022(b) and should have been charged with the section 12022(a) enhancement, for vicarious liability when another principal is armed. She moved to amend the petition to conform to proof. A.L.’s attorney objected. The judge concluded that A.L. would not be unfairly surprised or prejudiced by the change, permitted the amendment, sustained the second degree robbery allegation, and found true the section 12022(a) enhancement. At the dispositional hearing, the juvenile court adjudged A.L. a ward of the juvenile court with a maximum period of confinement of six years, including one year for the section 12022(a) enhancement. The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting an argument that the court violated A.L.’s due process rights by allowing amendment of his delinquency petition during closing arguments. View "In re A.L." on Justia Law

E.W. was fifteen years old, in the custody of the Department for Children and Families (DCF), and living in a foster home when in 2013, a Vermont state trooper in uniform arrived at E.W.'s foster home to investigate a break-in and motor-vehicle theft. E.W.'s foster father then spoke privately with E.W. and told him not to say anything to the officer until the foster father contacted DCF. When asked what he and E.W. discussed, the foster father responded, "[h]onesty," explaining that he was "trying to encourage E.W. to be honest," and how "[i]t's not always easy to do the right thing." He denied specifically directing E.W. to do the right thing, however, or telling him that he had to speak with the officer. The foster father telephoned for guidance from E.W.'s guardian ad litem (GAL), who told him that "[u]sually the attorneys do not like the children interviewed unless they are there." The GAL then attempted to reach E.W.'s attorney, leaving a voice mail, and then spoke with the foster father again. The GAL advised him to be present during any conversation between E.W. and the police officer. The GAL could not reach E.W.'s attorney. The interview was not recorded; no Miranda warnings were given. The foster father was present throughout. He recalled that the officer "asked E.W. about where the car was," informing him that the police "were aware" he had taken it to Derby "but didn't know where it had gone after that." The foster father also recalled that he twice interrupted the officer's questioning to speak privately with E.W. when it appeared that "the floodgates . . . opened" and E.W. started making admissions to offenses beyond those that the officer had described. E.W. was subsequently charged with two counts of burglary, four counts of unlawful trespass in an occupied residence, three counts of petit larceny, one count of unlawful mischief, and one count of operating a vehicle without owner consent. He moved to suppress his statements to the officer and dismiss all counts, asserting violations of his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights as well as his rights under Chapter I, Article 10 of the Vermont Constitution. The trial court denied the motion, concluding that E.W. was not in custody at the time of the interrogation, and that Miranda warnings were therefore not required. E.W. then entered a conditional plea to all counts except the unlawful-mischief count, which was dismissed by the State, and reserved his right to appeal the suppression ruling. On appeal, E.W. argued that his motion to suppress should have been granted under both the federal and state constitutions. After review, the Supreme Court concluded that E.W. was in custody, and his motion to suppress should have been granted. The trial court's judgment was reversed. View "In re E.W." on Justia Law

Israel was born in Mexico in 1999 and is not a U.S. citizen. He came to the U.S. with his mother in 2005 and has no contact with his father in Mexico He was adjudged a ward of the juvenile court as a result of admitting to misdemeanor receiving of stolen property. Israel requested that the court make findings that would qualify him for special immigrant juvenile (SIJ) status under federal law (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(27)(J), which would allow Israel to pursue regularization of his immigration status. The juvenile court declined to make findings that reunification “with one or both” parents was not viable due to abuse, neglect, or abandonment; that Israel was a dependent of a juvenile court or committed or placed with a state agency; and that it was not in his “best interest” to be returned to Mexco. The court of appeal remanded. USCIS currently interprets and applies section 1101(a)(27)(J) to include, as “SIJ eligible children” those who may be living in this country “with a foster family, an appointed guardian, or the non-abusive parent” and the trial court did not make a finding on whether it is in Israel’s best interest to return to Mexico. View "In re Israel O." on Justia Law

Defendant Jose Arturo Hernandez was convicted of two counts of attempted murder and five other charges and sentenced to 61 years to life in prison for crimes he committed when he was 16 years old. On appeal, he argued he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel because: (1) his attorney did not move to suppress his confession; and (2) his attorney did not object to his sentence as violating the constitutional proscription against cruel and unusual punishment. After review, the Court of Appeal found no ineffective assistance in counsel’s failure to move to suppress the confession because such a motion would have had no merit. The Court did conclude, however, that under recent decisions from the United States and California Supreme Courts, defendant’s sentence was unconstitutional. Accordingly, the Court of Appeal reversed and remanded for resentencing consistent with those decisions. View "California v. Hernandez" on Justia Law

Defendant K.S. was arrested and charged with driving while intoxicated and refusing to submit to a breath test. As he was being transported to the Watchung Borough police station, defendant struck and attempted to spit blood onto the arresting officer. In addition to the above offenses, defendant was charged and ultimately indicted for third-degree aggravated assault on a law enforcement officer, fourth-degree throwing bodily fluids at a law enforcement officer, third-degree resisting arrest, and fourth-degree criminal mischief. Following his indictment, defendant sought admission into the Pretrial Intervention Program (PTI). The PTI director recommended denial of defendant s PTI application because of the assaultive nature of the offense and because of defendant s pattern of past anti-social behavior. After denial of his PTI application, defendant filed a motion to compel admission claiming that the prosecutor failed to consider whether his bipolar disorder and mental illness contributed to his conduct. The trial court remanded the matter to the prosecutor for consideration of the medical report provided by defendant. The prosecutor responded by letter explaining that the report had been considered and confirming the denial of defendant s admission into PTI. The trial court subsequently denied defendant s motion, concluding that the denial of his PTI application was not an abuse of discretion. After his motion was denied, defendant entered into a negotiated plea agreement in which he agreed to plead guilty to the charges in exchange for the State s recommendation to dismiss the driving while intoxicated charge. The State also agreed to recommend a non-custodial probationary sentence, community service, and restitution. Defendant was sentenced in accordance with the plea agreement and later appealed, challenging the denial of his PTI application. Because the record included no admissions of conduct to support the truth of the allegations in defendant's dismissed adult charges and diverted and dismissed juvenile charges, those charges were not appropriate factors to be considered in deciding whether to admit defendant into PTI. The Supreme Court therefore reversed the Appellate Division and remanded the case to the prosecutor for reconsideration of defendant s eligibility for PTI. View "New Jersey v. K.S." on Justia Law

In March 1985, a juvenile court found true the allegation that Luis Ramon Aparicio committed battery with serious bodily injury after he dislocated a victim's nose by pushing the victim's head onto concrete. Aparicio was 15 years old at the time. In August 1986, Aparicio attacked a victim with a knife. In October 1988, Aparicio suffered his first strike conviction for robbery when he and three cohorts robbed two victims of their stereos. During the struggle, one of the assailants stabbed one of the victims. Aparicio was sentenced to 365 days in jail and three years of formal probation, but probation was ultimately revoked and he was sentenced to three years in prison. In June 1989, Aparicio suffered his second strike conviction after he pleaded guilty to attempted robbery after trying to rob three victims with an ice pick. He received a two-year prison sentence. In 1992, Aparicio received a three-year prison term for possessing PCP and marijuana. In 1996, Aparicio was convicted of battery and resisting a police officer. He received probation, but probation was later revoked. In 1997, Aparicio was convicted of his commitment offense after burglarizing a car. During the reading of his guilty verdict, Aparicio attacked a marshal and attempted to remove his gun. He received a 27-years-to-life prison sentence under the Three Strikes Law. Aparicio received nine write-ups while incarcerated. In February 1998, he received administrative punishment after pinching a female prison employee on the buttocks and grabbing her thigh. In June 1998, he headbutted another inmate. In October 1998, he flooded his cell. In February 1999, he flooded his cell and threw urine at an officer. In December 2000, he obstructed a peace officer by refusing to accept a new cellmate. In 2001, 2005 and 2007, he engaged in mutual combat with other inmates. In November 2012, he stole desserts from the dining hall. A psychologist examined Aparicio, finding that he suffered from antisocial personality disorder and posed a low-moderate risk of committing a future violent offense. Nonetheless, she concluded that Aparicio did not pose an unreasonable risk to public safety if released. In November 2013, the trial court denied Aparicio's petition for recall of sentence after reviewing the petition, Aparicio's criminal history, prison history and mental health evaluation. Aparicio appealed. The Court of Appeal found no abuse of discretion and affirmed the order. Appellant subsequently sought rehearing arguing section Penal Code section 1170.18 (effective November 5, 2014) as part of Proposition 47 (the Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act) changed the definition of "unreasonable risk of danger to public safety" as it applied to inmates petitioning for recall of their third-strike life sentence under section 1170.126. The Court of Appeal declined to address that new issue and affirmed the order without prejudice to appellant petitioning for relief from the superior court under section 1170.18. View "California v. Aparicio" on Justia Law

The issue central to this appeal centered on the filing of a type of report about a juvenile offender: whether a special sex offender disposition alternative (SSODA) evaluation should be filed in the official juvenile court file and therefore be open to the public. The legislature has explicitly defined the contents of the official juvenile court file as "the petition or information, motions, memorandums, briefs, findings of the court, and court orders." Since the SSODA evaluation does not fit within any of these categories, the Supreme Court held that it was not a part of the official juvenile court file. Consequently, it was subject to the general rule that all juvenile records not in the official juvenile court file must be kept confidential. View "Washington v. A.G.S." on Justia Law

In December 2012, a reporter for the Cincinnati Enquirer requested the court docket showing the cases Hamilton County Juvenile Court Judge Tracie Hunter had presided over during December. The juvenile court administrator sent to the Enquirer the requested documents, but the documents were redacted to provide only the initials of the juveniles. The Enquirer filed this action in mandamus seeking a writ ordering Judge Hunter to reveal the names of the juveniles. The First District Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the Enquirer and ordered Judge Hunter to produce unredacted copies of her docket. In January 2014, the Supreme Court disqualified Judge Hunter from acting as a judge. The Court then dismissed this appeal, as a live controversy no longer existed here because Judge Hunter no longer had power to provide access to the requested records. View "State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Hunter" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review was whether the Superior Court erred in holding the right of a juvenile accused to be confronted with a witness against him conferred by the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution was violated where the juvenile court admitted into evidence an out-of-court, video-taped, forensic interview of a child complainant under the Tender Years Hearsay Act (“TYHA”), even though defense counsel did not cross-examine the child complainant who had taken the witness stand at the juvenile’s contested adjudication hearing. In light of the unique circumstances of this case (wherein the Commonwealth conceded continued questioning of the unconversable child complainant on direct examination would have been futile, and the juvenile court suggested she be removed from the witness stand), the Supreme Court held the admission of the recorded forensic interview of the child complainant violated the juvenile accused’s right to confrontation under the Sixth Amendment. Accordingly, the Court affirmed. View "In the Interest of: N.C." on Justia Law