In 2009, C.B. (an adult male), along with his fiancee K.M.H (“the victim”) and her two daughters, J.H. (age 7) and A.H (age 4), and C.B.’s 11-year-old son J.B. were living together in a two-story rented house in a rural area surrounded by farmland and woods, and situated near the town of Wampum. K.M.H. was found dead with a single shotgun wound to the head shortly after C.B. had left for work for and J.H. and C.B. had left for school. K.M.H. was pregnant at the time of her death. The focus of the police investigation turned from K.M.H.'s ex-boyfriend to J.B., when police found that the ballistics of the shotgun pellets found in the victim matched that found on the shotgun seized from the residence. It was determined that J.B. had learned how to shoot this gun for hunting, and that the clothes J.B. wore to school the morning of the shooting had trace gunshot residue on them. The juvenile court issued written findings of fact adjudicating J.B. delinquent of criminal homicide for the death of K.M.H. and of her unborn child. J.B. filed a notice of appeal from the dispositional order, following which the juvenile court directed J.B. to prepare and file a statement of matters complained of on appeal. The juvenile court did not find J.B.’s weight of the evidence claim waived due to his failure to file a post-dispositional motion. Instead, the juvenile court ruled that J.B.’s weight of the evidence claim had been “adequately addressed . . . in its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law issued on April 13, 2012 and supplemental Opinion issued on April 20, 2012.” The Supreme Court found that J.B. faced procedural rules that made optional the filing of a post-dispositional motion, and which did not otherwise specify how a weight of the evidence claim was to be presented in the first instance to the juvenile court in order to preserve it for appellate review. Furthermore, J.B. presented his weight of the evidence claim to the lower court by raising it in his Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement, in which he comprehensively set forth specific reasons why, in his view, the juvenile court’s adjudication was against the weight of the evidence. The Supreme Court concluded that a finding of J.B.’s weight of the evidence claim to be waived under the circumstances of this case would have been manifestly unjust. The Court remanded this case back to the juvenile court to allow J.B. to file a post-dispositional motion nunc pro tunc. View "In the Interest of J.B." on Justia Law

Appellant, a juvenile, was charged with committing criminal mischief for damaging the property of Cedars Teaching, Learning, & Connecting group home (Cedars Home) while she was a participant in its program. While the charges were pending final disposition, Appellant ran away from other placements several times. Although another group home accepted Appellant at its location, the juvenile court ordered intensive supervised probation at the Youth Rehabilitation and Treatment Center (YRTC), pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. 43-286(1)(b)(ii), finding that all levels of probation supervision and options for community-based services had been exhausted and that intensive supervised probation was appropriate. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) section 43-286 requires that before a juvenile is placed in YRTC, the Office of Probation Administration must consider what would be a reliable alternative to commitment at YRTC and report its findings to the court; and (2) applying section 43-286 to the present case, Appellant’s placement at YRTC was premature. Remanded. View "In re Interest of Nedhal A." on Justia Law

Juvenile defendant J.M. was charged with simple battery and simple criminal damage to property. On February 25, 2013, J.M. appeared to answer the petition and entered a denial of the allegations. Pursuant to La. Ch. Code art. 877, the state had ninety days from the date of the answer hearing to adjudicate the case (here, until May 26, 2013). The juvenile court set a trial date of March 26, 2013. Defendant failed to appear for trial and an arrest warrant was issued for her arrest. Service was never rendered on the defendant. On April 17, 2013, the warrant was recalled when defendant appeared in court and a new trial date of May 14, 2013 was set. On May 13, 2013, for reasons unclear from the record, the State expressly requested an extension of the adjudication deadline from May 26, 2013 to May 28, 2013 without objection. The juvenile court granted the extension and set a hearing date of May 28, 2013. On that date, the state requested a second continuance of the adjudication hearing. The juvenile court denied the state’s motion to continue, noting the State had already been granted additional time and finding no good cause to grant an additional continuance. Critically, the State did not object to or seek review of this ruling, but instead entered a nolle prosequi and dismissed the case. The same day, the State filed a new petition alleging the same delinquent acts. An answer hearing for the refiled petition was set for June 11, 2013. On June 11, 2013, the record reflected service was not made on the defendant and a new hearing date was set for June 25, 2013. On that date, the juvenile court judge was absent and the matter was delayed until July 16, 2013. On that date, 141 days from the original answer hearing, J.M. appeared in court to answer the refiled petition. J.M. once again denied the allegations and moved to dismiss the petition, arguing the state violated the time limitations found in Louisiana Children’s Code Article 877. The juvenile court denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss. J.M. noticed intent to seek review of that ruling and appealed. The court of appeal granted defendant’s writ application and reversed the ruling of the juvenile court, dismissing the case on the basis that the state failed to adjudicate the matter within the time limitations provided in the Children’s Code. The State appealed the court of appeal’s decision, which the Supreme Court granted. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeal ruling. View "Louisiana in the interest of J.M." on Justia Law

Jose became a dependent of the Mendocino County juvenile court in 2008. He was placed in a group home, from which he ran away in 2013. Subsequent wardship petitions under Welfare and Institutions Code 602(a) alleged that Jose, 15 years old, had committed the misdemeanor of contributing to the delinquency of a minor, in connection with his younger girlfriend running away from home; the felonies of battery for the benefit of a gang and participation in criminal street gang activity; and misdemeanor resisting or obstructing a peace officer. County probation and social services departments recommended that the court assume delinquency jurisdiction over Jose. The court found that Jose’s “needs [would be] best served by proceeding in the delinquency court” and terminated the dependency proceeding. The juvenile court granted Jose’s motion to dismiss the gang-activity count and reduced the battery count to a simple misdemeanor battery. The court ordered Jose to attend the Bar-O-Boys Ranch in Del Norte County with a maximum commitment term of one year and six months. The court of appeal held that Jose was properly treated as a delinquent, but that there was insufficient evidence he contributed to the delinquency of a minor, and remanded. View "In re Jose O." on Justia Law

At a hearing before a Juvenile Court judge, a juvenile admitted to sufficient facts with respect to two counts of indecent assault and battery on a person fourteen or older. The juvenile subsequently filed a motion seeking relief from the obligation to register as a sex offender. A judge denied the juvenile’s motion for relief from registration, determining that the juvenile posed a risk of reoffense and would be required to register with the Sex Offender Registry Board. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the judge’s ultimate determination that the juvenile should not be relieved of the obligation to register as a sex offender did not constitute an abuse of her discretion. View "L.L. v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

A 2006 juvenile delinquency petition alleged that then-16-year-old J. unlawfully took or drove a motor vehicle; received stolen property; and committed conspiracy. J. entered a negotiated admission to count 1 as reduced to a misdemeanor; counts 2 and 3 were dismissed. The juvenile court established wardship and placed him on probation in the custody of his parents. Months later, that court ordered J. to pay restitution of $2,357.65, jointly and severally with a co-responsible. At a subsequent hearing, the probation officer stated that J. had not made any payment, but had agreed to begin making bi-weekly payments. As of about five months later, he had paid $251, leaving a balance of $2,106.65. About three months later, J. cut off his electronic monitoring device and ran away. After he was apprehended, J. acknowledged the restitution debt. The court later signed an Order for Restitution and Abstract of Judgment, for J. and his parents and a co-responsible to pay the restitution, terminated probation, and dismissed the wardship. The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting an argument that the order must be vacated because it was issued after J. turned 21 years old, the age at which the juvenile court’s jurisdiction terminated. View "In re J.V." on Justia Law

For the second time, Croft sought the Seventh Circuit’s approval to pursue a successive petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 2254, relying primarily on the 2012 Supreme Court decision, Miller v. Alabama, that the Eighth Amendment forbids sentences of mandatory life in prison without parole for juvenile offenders. Because he was 17 when he committed murder, aggravated kidnapping, and aggravated sexual assault, Croft argues that his sentence of natural life imprisonment without parole for the murder is unconstitutional under Miller. The Seventh Circuit denied the petition, stating that even if it were to hold that Miller applies retroactively on collateral review, Miller is inapplicable to Croft’s case. Life sentences for murder are discretionary under Illinois law, a critical difference from the situation presented in Miller, which considered only “mandatory life-without-parole sentences for juveniles.” The sentencing court explicitly stated that it had considered the presentence report, which discussed Croft’s age. The appellate court underscored the discretionary nature of Croft’s sentence when it reviewed the ample justifications supporting it, including the fact that Croft’s crimes were among the most brutal the court had ever seen. View "Croft v. Williams" on Justia Law

A petition was filed under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 alleging that the 16-year-old minor had committed a misdemeanor violation of Penal Code section 653.22, loitering with intent to commit prostitution. The minor moved to exclude evidence on the ground that she was a victim of human trafficking. The minor called as witnesses, Investigator Robison of the Concord Police Department Special Victims Unit and Sergeant Price of the Concord Police Department Special Enforcement Team. The court found there was insufficient evidence that the minor was a victim of human trafficking and denied the motion. At the contested jurisdictional hearing, Officers Robison and Price repeated their prior testimony regarding the events and circumstances they observed leading to the minor’s arrest. The court found the allegation that the minor loitered with intent to commit prostitution to be true, declared the minor a ward of the juvenile court, placed her on probation, and ordered her to reside in her father’s home. Among other probation conditions, the court ordered her to attend school regularly and “use [her] best efforts in doing well.” The appeals court affirmed, rejecting claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and that the conditions of probation were unconstitutionally vague. View "In re M.D." on Justia Law

Fifteen-year-old D.S. was accused of harassing a peer during an after-school confrontation. The State filed a petition alleging that D.S. had committed a delinquent act, specifically harassment in the third degree. After an adjudicatory hearing, the juvenile court concluded that the State had proven beyond a reasonable doubt that D.S. committed harassment in the third degree by means of intimidation. The court then adjudicated D.S. to have committed a delinquent act. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that there was insufficient evidence in the record to support the finding that D.S. committed harassment, and therefore, the juvenile court erred when it adjudicated D.S. delinquent under the harassment statute. Remanded for an order dismissing the petition. View "In re Interest of D.S." on Justia Law

Appellant, a juvenile, was convicted and sentenced. The Supreme Court reversed Appellant’s sentence, instructing that, if a sentence of life according to law was imposed, the district court must specify a period of parole ineligibility. The district court did as instructed and imposed a sentence of life according to law with the specification that Appellant was eligible for parole on the sentence after thirty-five years. The Supreme Court vacated the sentence imposed by the district court, holding that Appellant should be resentenced because the district court did not consider the analysis from Miller v. Alabama “in light of the entire sentencing package.” View "Sen v. State" on Justia Law