Defendant was 15 years old and was a ward of the state, living in a residential treatment facility when he was charged with three counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault against a staff member. Pursuant to the Illinois automatic transfer statute (705 ILCS 405/5-130), his case was transferred from juvenile court to criminal court, where he was tried as an adult, convicted by a jury of all three counts, and sentenced to a total of 36 years in prison. The appellate court remanded for a new trial, holding that the circuit court had erred by admitting defendant’s confession. The court also concluded that evidence of the victim’s sexual history was admissible on remand under the “constitutional necessity” exception to the state rape shield statute (725 ILCS 5/115-7(a)). The Illinois Supreme Court reversed the appellate court’s exclusion of defendant’s confession and determination that evidence of the victim’s sexual history is admissible under an exception to the rape shield statute, rejected his ineffective assistance claim, and upheld the constitutionality of the automatic transfer statute. The court remanded to the appellate court for its initial consideration of defendant’s excessive-sentence claim. View "People v. Patterson" on Justia Law

L.D. was charged with the commission of a felony-grade delinquent act of unauthorized use of a movable. Although La.Ch.C. art. 854(A) required in this instance that L.D. appear to answer the delinquency petition within five days of filing because he was continued in custody, the district court set the answer hearing for the next available court date dedicated to juvenile matters, 27 days later. L.D. appeared at that time, objected to the untimeliness of the hearing, and asked for his release from custody and for dismissal of the delinquency petition. The juvenile judge found, consistent with a policy of that court, that the court’s scheduling constraints constituted "good cause" for the delay under La.Ch.C. art. 854(C). The court therefore declined to dismiss the petition and release L.D. from custody, and the juvenile did not seek immediate review of that ruling. The court adjudicated L.D. delinquent 21 days later, within the 30 days from the answer hearing afforded by La.Ch.C. art. 877(A). On appeal, L.D. contended that his adjudication hearing was nevertheless untimely and that the petition should therefore have been dismissed because each step in delinquency adjudication process "should be seen as carefully and closely placed, like dominoes in a row, and that by wrongly delaying the answer hearing, the juvenile court judge triggered a cascade, a rippling effect, that ended in an adjudication that should be viewed as untimely as well." The court of appeal found that the juvenile judge erred in denying L.D.’s motion for release based on failure to timely hold the answer hearing. The Supreme Court affirmed: "[w]e [. . .] agree with the court of appeal majority that the legislature did not subscribe to the rippling effect advocated by L.D., such that the slightest perturbation in the steady march of various time limits through the process results inexorably in the dismissal of a delinquency petition. The court of appeal noted, and all parties agree, that La.Ch.C. art. 854 specifies no remedy when the time afforded for an answer hearing is exceeded without good cause. The provisions of the Children’s Code governing delinquency proceedings otherwise contain several explicit time limits. [. . .] Only when the time afforded by La.Ch.C. art. 877 to commence the delinquency adjudication following the answer hearing is exceeded must the court dismiss the petition at the request of the juvenile." View "Louisiana in the Interest of L.D." on Justia Law

About 25 years ago, petitioners Russell McNeil and Herbert Rice Jr. were tried as adults and convicted of aggravated first degree murder for crimes committed while the petitioners were both a little over 17 years old. They were each given the mandatory minimum sentence for that crime-life in prison without the possibility of early release. In 2012, the United States Supreme Court issued its opinion in "Miller v. Alabama," (132 S. Ct. (2012)). Relying on "Miller," petitioners sought relief from their sentences on collateral review through personal restraint petitions (PRPs). While the PRPs were pending before the Washington Supreme Court, the legislature passed and the governor signed Second Substitute Senate Bill 5064, "the Miller fix." The State filed a motion to dismiss the PRPs, arguing the Miller fix made it impossible for petitioners to meet their threshold burden of showing they had suffered actual and substantial prejudice based on a constitutional error. The Washington Court denied the State's motion and deny the PRPs. View "In Re Pers. Restraint of McNeil" on Justia Law

San Mateo County Human Services received referrals indicating that Jaden (age 7), was chronically tardy and absent from school and routinely picked up late from his after-school program. His school behavior had deteriorated rapidly, including: refusing to go to class; hiding; throwing items; failing to complete assignments; grinding against another student; leaving school grounds; peeing in a sink; growling and clenching his fist when confronted for misbehaviors; and altercations with other students. Jaden had no close friendships. He refused to eat at his class table in the cafeteria, saying the smell of other foods made him gag. According to school staff, Jaden was exhibiting symptoms of anxiety and depression. Jaden admitted to hitting his mother; his mother had not pursued recommended health services. According to school staff, mother was“struggling with anxiety, and probable substance use. Mother took Jaden to the Daly City Police Department, stating that she could no longer handle him; she took Jaden home, but left him with his father for several days. The Agency had significant evidence that mother had an ongoing substance abuse problem. Domestic violence was a concern. Ultimately, the juvenile court terminated discretionary reunification services mother was receiving (Welfare and Institutions Code 361.2). The appeals court affirmed. When a minor is placed with a previously noncustodial parent at disposition under section 361.2, a reasonable services finding need not be made at subsequent hearings monitoring that placement. View "In re Jaden E." on Justia Law

Defendant, a ward of the juvenile court, appealed his conviction for charges related to his participation in a gang. The court reversed the convictions for two counts of active participation in a criminal street gang (counts 3 & 6) because substantial evidence did not establish that defendant promoted, furthered, or assisted in the perpetration of felonious conduct by at least two gang members. View "People v. Johnson" on Justia Law

In 2013, Governor Christie signed AB A3371 into law, providing: A person who is licensed to provide professional counseling ... shall not engage in sexual orientation change efforts with a person under 18 years of age. Plaintiffs provide licensed counseling to minor clients seeking to reduce or eliminate same-sex attractions and include providers of religious-perspective counseling. Plaintiffs describe their efforts as “talk therapy,” involving only verbal communication about potential “root causes” of homosexual behavior, such as childhood sexual trauma or a distant relationship with the same-sex parent, with discussion of “traditional, gender-appropriate behaviors and characteristics” and how the client can foster and develop those behaviors and characteristics. They challenged the law as a violation of their rights to free speech and free exercise of religion and asserted claims on behalf of their minor clients. The district court rejected the First Amendment claims and held that plaintiffs lacked standing to bring claims on behalf of their minor clients. The Third Circuit affirmed, reasoning that the statute is a regulation of professional speech that passes intermediate scrutiny. A3371 does not violate plaintiffs’ right to free exercise of religion, as it is a neutral and generally applicable law that is rationally related to a legitimate government interest. View "King v. Governor of NJ" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to first-degree murder, aggravated burglary, and conspiracy to commit aggravated burglary. Defendant was sixteen years old when he committed the crimes. After imposing an initial sentence, the district court resentenced Defendant to life in prison with the possibility of parole after serving for twenty-five years on the felony murder charge, to run consecutive to the previously imposed sentence for aggravated burglary of twenty to twenty-five years, and concurrent to the sentence for conspiracy to commit aggravated burglary. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded to the district court with instructions to resentence on all counts, holding that sentencing courts are required to provide an individualized sentencing hearing to weigh the factors for determining a juvenile’s diminished culpability and greater prospects for reform when, as in this case, the aggregate sentences result the functional equivalent of life without parole. Remanded for resentencing. View "Bear Cloud v. State" on Justia Law

Appellant was charged with several offenses stemming from two separate shootings. Appellant was age seventeen when the offenses were committed. After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of two counts of aggravated murder and sentenced to consecutive terms of life imprisonment without parole. On appeal, Appellant contended that his sentence amounted to cruel and unusual punishment. The court of appeals affirmed, holding (1) Appellant’s sentence was proper under Miller v. Alabama because the sentence imposed in this case was not mandatory but, rather, an exercise of the trial court’s discretion; and (2) the trial court did not violate the Eighth Amendment by failing to consider Appellant’s youth as a mitigating factor in sentencing Appellant. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the Eighth Amendment requires trial courts to consider youth as a mitigating factor when sentencing a child to life without parole for homicide, and the record must reflect that the court specifically considered the juvenile offender’s youth as a mitigating factor at sentencing when a prison term of life without parole is imposed; and (2) because Appellant might not have been given the benefit of the consideration of youth as a mitigating factor, his sentence did not comport with the procedural strictures of Miller.View "State v. Long" on Justia Law

I.T., who admitted to conduct that would be a Class B felony child molesting if committed by an adult, was ordered by the trial court to undergo therapeutic polygraph examinations. During one of those exams, I.T. admitted to molesting two other children. Based on those statements, the State filed a new delinquency petition. I.T. moved to dismiss the petition, arguing that the Juvenile Mental Health Statute, which bars a child’s statement to a mental health evaluator from being admitted into evidence to prove delinquency, barred the State’s evidence. The trial court granted the motion. The State appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the State may appeal a juvenile court order that suppresses evidence if doing so terminates the proceeding; and (2) the Statute’s limited immunity prohibits both use and derivative use of a juvenile’s statements to prove delinquency. View "State v. I.T." on Justia Law

The question presented to the Supreme Court here was what evidence a juvenile is entitled to in discovery prior to a bindover hearing. In this case, the State filed a motion asking the juvenile court to relinquish jurisdiction and to have the Juvenile bound over to the general division of the court of common pleas for prosecution as an adult. Because the State failed to obey a court order during discovery to turn over police reports relating to the juvenile’s case, the juvenile court dismissed the case without prejudice. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Juv. R. 24 applies in bindover hearings, which imposes a duty on the prosecuting attorney to disclose to a juvenile respondent all evidence in the State’s possession that is favorable to the juvenile and material either to guilt, innocence, or punishment; and (2) it is an abuse of discretion for a juvenile court to dismiss a case for a prosecuting attorney’s failure to comply with a discovery order without first performing an in camera inspection of the withheld evidence to determine whether the evidence is discoverable under Juv. R. 24. Remanded. View "In re D.M." on Justia Law