The State filed a petition alleging that Samantha C. was a juvenile as defined by Neb. Rev. Stat. 43-247(3)(b) for being habitually truant from school. Samantha argued that the juvenile court could not adjudicate her under section 43-247(3)(b) because her school had failed to comply with the remedial measures set forth in the compulsory education statutes. The juvenile court rejected Samantha’s argument and entered an order adjudicating Samantha as being habitually truant from school. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the State was not required to first prove Samantha’s school’s compliance with the compulsory education statutes because the Nebraska Juvenile Code and the compulsory education statutes are separate statutory enactments with distinct purposes and goals; and (2) the State met its burden of proving that Samantha was habitually truant from school under section 43-247(3)(b). View "In re Samantha C." on Justia Law

While imprisoned after being convicted of several offenses, defendant J.S. was declared a Mentally Disordered Offender (MDO) pursuant to Penal Code1 section 2962. In Spring 2012, J.S. was placed on parole and began her initial one-year term of involuntary treatment. After the Board of Parole Hearings (BPH) rejected her challenge to her MDO classification and initial commitment, she filed a petition requesting counsel and judicial review, pursuant to section 2966 (b). That petition, however, was not heard within the initial year of commitment. A year later, the trial court granted the People's motion to dismiss the petition as "moot" on that basis. Defendant argued on appeal to the Court of Appeal that she was entitled to have her petition heard on the merits, because it was filed during the initial year of commitment, and even though the initial term was already completed, her petition was not moot. The Court of Appeal agreed, and therefore reversed the order dismissing defendant's petition. View "California v. J.S." on Justia Law

In 2007, a juvenile court adjudicated Mendez guilty of second-degree unlawful possession of a firearm. If committed by an adult, the offense is a felony punishable by up to five years in prison. In 2012, after Mendez had become an adult, a park ranger found him in possession of a shotgun. Based on the juvenile adjudication, the federal government charged him with violating 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), which makes it unlawful for a person to possess a firearm if he View "United States v. Mendez" on Justia Law

The employers were formerly contributing members of the Teamsters Local Union No. 293 Pension Plan. In 2007-2008 each employer reached an agreement with the Plan to terminate its membership. They were required to pay, and have paid, “withdrawal liability” reflecting each employer’s share of unfunded, vested pension benefits under the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act, 29 U.S.C. 1381–1461. Under the Act, if the plan is terminated altogether by a “mass withdrawal” of the remaining members within three years, the earlier withdrawing members may be subject to additional “reallocation liability.” Disputes about the amount of such reallocation liability are subject to mandatory arbitration. The employers claim that a 2009 mass withdrawal was expedited to occur within the three-year period in order that they would be subject to reallocation liability. The Plan trustees sought more than $12 million in additional funds from the employers. The district court dismissed their suit for failure to complete arbitration. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The Act requires that the claim of “sham” mass withdrawal be arbitrated. View "Knall Beverage, Inc. v. Teamsters Local Union No. 293 Pension Plan" on Justia Law

On March 1, 2013, the juvenile court adjudicated Marcella G. for a misdemeanor law violation and committed Marcella to the Office of Juvenile Services (OJS), an agency of the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS). On July 5, 2013, DHHS filed a motion seeking to transfer Marcella from a group-home to a youth rehabilitation and treatment center (YRTC) as a condition of intensive supervised probation (ISP). The juvenile court sustained the motion and approved the transfer of Marcella to a YRTC without making the transfer as a condition of ISP. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) under Neb. Rev. Stat. 435-247.02(2), on and after July 1, 2013, a juvenile court can commit a juvenile to OJS for placement at a YRTC only as part of an order of ISP; and (2) but because Marcella had already been committed to OJS for placement at a level less restrictive than a YRTC before July 1, 2013 and transferred to a YRTC after July 2, 2103, subsection (2) did not apply; and (3) therefore, the juvenile court acted within its authority when its transferred Marcella to the YRTC without making the placement as part of an order of ISP. View "In re Marcella G." on Justia Law

Sacramento Police received a call from Kennedy High School that there was "an uncontrollable, irate student in the hallways." While in the principal's office, the minor called his mother; he became more and more irate as he talked, "screaming [and] yelling" and pacing the floor. The responding officer asked the minor to sit down and calm down, but the minor did not listen. The minor slammed or threw the phone down on the table. About three to five seconds after the minor failed to obey the order to sit down and calm down, the officer detained him "based on [the officer's] safety and safety of the school and also the [minor]'s." The officer advised the minor he was being detained and ordered him to put his hands on his head with his fingers interlaced. In an attempt to put a control hold on the minor by grabbing the minor's interlaced hands with one hand and grabbing the minor's elbow from underneath with the other hand, the minor turned, pulled away, and started to walk away. The officer performed an arm bar takedown on the minor and detained him on the floor; he then handcuffed him and took him out to his squad car. After obtaining briefing from the parties on the legal and factual issues, the juvenile court issued a ruling sustaining both charges. As to the resisting charge, the court found that the minor's conduct before his detention was sufficient to justify the detention. The minor appealed the order of the juvenile court declaring him a ward of the court, arguing that one of the two allegations the court sustained was supported by sufficient evidence and that the other was founded on an unconstitutional statute. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "In re J.C." on Justia Law

"Kyle" had been adjudicated delinquent on three occasions prior to the offense giving rise to this appeal. The first two adjudications involved minor offenses that did not meet N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-44(d)(3)'s predicate requirement of first- or second-degree offense adjudications. Also, neither of those adjudications resulted in his commitment to a juvenile detention facility. However, in March 2008 Kyle was adjudged delinquent of second-degree aggravated assault and was sentenced, consistent with a plea-agreement, to twenty-four months' incarceration at the New Jersey Training School. Kyle was subsequently placed in the Juvenile Intensive Supervision Program (JISP). Kyle's participation in the program was terminated after he was deemed noncompliant. The Family Part court, however, dismissed the JISP violation and discharged the few months remaining on Kyle's sentence, noting his approaching eighteenth birthday. Less than two months later, Kyle committed the act of delinquency resulting in his current sentence and this appeal. The Supreme Court held that N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-44(d)(3) requires two separate previous predicate adjudications for the imposition of an extended-term sentence on a juvenile, including one that resulted in incarceration in a juvenile or adult facility, exclusive of the adjudication for which the disposition court is sentencing the juvenile. The Court reversed the extended-term sentence. View "New Jersey in the Interest of K.O." on Justia Law

M.G. was charged in a petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 with felony carrying of a concealed firearm on his person. After the juvenile court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence, M.G. entered an admission he committed the charged offense, but declined to stipulate the offense was a felony rather than a wobbler. The trial court rejected his argument, declared a wardship, and placed M.G. with his parent subject to conditions of probation. The court of appeal reversed and remanded for proceedings to determine whether M.G. is suitable for deferred entry of judgment and, if not, whether the offense is a felony or misdemeanor. View "In re M.G." on Justia Law

R.S., a teenaged child under eighteen years of age, engaged in an evening of “teenage shenanigans,” in which he and a group of contemporaries painted offenses messages on cars parked at a memorial service. Following hearings in juvenile session, a district court adjudicated R.S. guilty of second-degree criminal mischief by complicity and order him alone to pay the full amount of restitution to the owner of one of the defaced cars that was damaged in the incident. The circuit court and court of appeals affirmed the adjudication and restitution order. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence to support the adjudication of R.S.’s juvenile public offender status; and (2) the district court may, in weighing the best interest of the child in a juvenile disposition, order one party to pay the entire amount of restitution, despite other individuals’ possible involvement in the acts of vandalism.View "R.S. v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Wershe was 17 years and 10 months old when he was arrested in Detroit and charged with various drug crimes. He was convicted of possession with the intent to deliver more than 650 grams of cocaine, and, in 1988, was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole. At sentencing, Wershe was 18 years and 7 months old. In 1992, the Michigan Supreme Court declared the life-without-parole penalty for simple possession unconstitutional. Wershe’s first opportunity for parole was denied in 2003. In 2012, the Parole Board determined that it had no interest in taking action on his case and scheduled Wershe’s next interview for 2017. Wershe brought suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against Michigan Parole Board members, alleging that the parole consideration process did not afford him a meaningful opportunity for release in violation of his rights to due process and to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. The district court sua sponte dismissed for failure to state a claim pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act. The Sixth Circuit affirmed denial of Wershe’s due-process claim, but vacated with respect to the Eight Amendment because the district court failed to consider the impact of Wershe’s youth at the time of the crime and his arrest. View "Wershe v. Combs" on Justia Law