Defendant, a juvenile male, appealed the district court's adjudication of delinquency on six counts of aggravated sexual abuse in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2241(c). The court concluded that the district court had subject matter jurisdiction over the juvenile delinquency proceedings and that section 2241(c) is not unconstitutionally vague. The court rejected defendant's claim that the district court erred applying the means rea element of section 2241(c), denying the Rule 29 motion for judgment of acquittal as to Counts 3 and 5 because there was insufficient evidence of anal penetration, and admitting the hearsay statements of a victim through the testimony of a social worker under Rule 803(4). The court remanded the portion of the district court's judgment to allow specific consideration of defendant's suspension request where Rule 35(a)'s fourteen-day time limit had expired and there was no record of whether the district court weighed factors bearing on the suspension while it had jurisdiction to do so. Accordingly, the court vacated the district court's disposition decision, remanded for consideration of all disposition options, including a suspension of delinquency, and affirmed in all other respects. View "United States v. Juvenile Male" on Justia Law

Mother appealed from a juvenile court order declaring her two daughters dependents of the court based on mother's failure to provide for the children. The court concluded that, because jurisdiction was proper based on Father's conduct, the court need not consider whether it was also proper based on Mother's conduct. In the alternative, the court concluded that Mother waived the issue of whether substantial evidence supported jurisdiction based on her failure to provide. Further, there was sufficient evidence regarding Mother's failure to protect the minors from Father's conduct. Accordingly, the court affirmed the juvenile court's jurisdictional order. View "In re A.R." on Justia Law

Respondent was charged as a juvenile with several firearms-related offenses. The State filed a motion seeking a discretionary transfer of Respondent’s case to the regular criminal docket of the superior court pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. 46b-127(b)(1). The trial court granted the State’s motion. Respondent appealed. The Appellate Court dismissed the appeal for lack of a final judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the a transfer order made pursuant to the discretionary transfer provision in section 46b-127(b)(1) is not a final judgment for purposes of appeal, as the clear intent of the Legislature is to prohibit interlocutory appeals from discretionary transfer orders. View "In re Tyriq T." on Justia Law

Mother appealed from an order terminating her parental rights to her son, contending that the juvenile court erred in finding that the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), 25 U.S.C. 1901-1963, did not apply. Mother had the right to appeal the juvenile court's order at the dispositional hearing but she did not do so. She only challenged the juvenile court's failure to provide notice under the ICWA approximately one and a half years later which was after the juvenile court terminated parental rights. Accordingly, the court held that Mother failed to timely appeal the juvenile court's order and affirmed the judgment. View "In re Isaiah W." on Justia Law

A.M.M.-H. was sentenced in an extended juvenile jurisdiction proceeding in which he was given both a juvenile sentence and an adult sentence. The adult sentence was stayed pending successful completion of his juvenile sentence. After A.M.M.-H. violated the terms of conditional release on his juvenile sentence the district judge revoked conditional release and ordered A.M.M.-H. to serve his adult prison sentence. The court of appeals affirmed the district court. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) in this case, the district judge had discretion to determine whether A.M.M.-H.’s violation of the terms of conditional release warranted revocation of the stay of the adult sentence; and (2) because the record was unclear as to whether the district judge knew he had discretion not to execute the adult sentence upon a finding of violation of the terms of A.M.M.-H.’s conditional release, the case must be remanded for reconsideration of the State’s motion to revoke. View "In re A.M.M.-H." on Justia Law

Mother challenged a juvenile court order terminating jurisdiction over her son and ordering regular visitation for the son's paternal grandmother, contending that the visitation order impermissibly infringed on her fundamental parenting rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. Mother also argued that the trial court abused its discretion in denying her petition requesting that the court terminate or modify the order for the son to visit the paternal grandmother. The court concluded that the juvenile court did not violate Mother's fundamental parenting rights by issuing an order granting the paternal grandmother visitation where the juvenile court was authorized by statute to issue a visitation order, the visitation order did not infringe on Mother's fundamental right to parent; and the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in denying Mother's petition seeking modification of the visitation order. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "In re J.T." on Justia Law

Minor Zachary Stringer was charged with the murder of his younger brother, Justin. The jury found Zachary guilty of the lesser-included offense of manslaughter. The trial court sentenced Zachary to twenty years, with ten years to serve and ten years of post-release supervision, with five years reporting. Zachary appealed his conviction and sentence, arguing: (1) the trial court erred by allowing multiple gruesome photographs of the victim and the crime scene into evidence; and (2) the trial court erred in denying his motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV). Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed Zachary's conviction and sentence.View "Stringer v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

The State charged appellant "Kevin R." with possessing a weapon on school grounds. Prior to his adjudicatory hearing before a family court judge, Appellant moved for a jury trial on the grounds the federal and state Constitutions guaranteed him the right to a jury trial. The judge denied the motion and proceeded to hear Appellant's case in a bench trial. Ultimately, the judge adjudicated Appellant delinquent and deferred sentencing until an evaluation of Appellant was completed. The sentencing hearing was conducted before a second family court judge, who sentenced Appellant to an indeterminate period of time not to exceed his twenty- first birthday. The judge then suspended the sentence and placed Appellant on probation until his eighteenth birthday. On appeal, Appellant contended the family court judge erred in denying his motion for a jury trial. Recently, the South Carolina Supreme Court held a juvenile did not have a constitutional right to a jury trial in adjudication proceedings. However, the Court's decision in that case was not dispositive as it was presented with additional arguments raised by Appellant and the Amici Curiae. After consideration of these issues, the Court adhered to its decision in the earlier case, and affirmed the family court. View "In the Interest of Kevin R." on Justia Law

The State appealed the district court’s decision to affirm the magistrate court’s holding that it did not have jurisdiction over John (2012-10) Doe because he was twenty-one years of age when the State filed its petition in juvenile court. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the district court.View "Idaho v. John Doe (2012-10)" on Justia Law

Father appealed the juvenile court's order removing his three-year-old daughter from his custody for a single occasion of disciplining her by spanking her with a belt on her legs and buttocks. The court concluded that, given all the circumstances, the evidence with respect to the risk of harm to the child if Father were allowed back to the home, does not satisfy the requisite "clear and convincing" standard of proof. Further, there may be less drastic alternatives than an order requiring Father to leave the home. Accordingly, the court reversed the order to the extent it requires Father to remain outside the home and otherwise affirmed the remaining findings. View "In re A.E." on Justia Law