The trial court concluded that section 5-615 of the Juvenile Court Act, 705 ILCS 405/5-615, was unconstitutional, and ordered a continuance under supervision in a case involving a minor, rejecting a negotiated plea agreement. The minor had been the subject of multiple charges and had failed to appear for court dates. The Illinois Supreme court vacated. The provision at issue grants a State’s Attorney, among others, authority to object to the entry of an order of continuance under supervision in a juvenile case before a finding of guilt. The court noted that juvenile proceedings are fundamentally different from criminal proceedings, a difference which extends to the role of the state. The purposes and objectives of the Juvenile Court Act are protective in nature, to correct and rehabilitate, not to punish, and the Act lists the State’s Attorney among those who would undoubtedly be concerned with the children’s best interests. The State’s Attorney has a duty to see that justice is done not only to the public at large, but to the accused as well. In this case, the state exercised its authority under section 5-615 in accordance with that duty.View "In re Derrico G." on Justia Law

Mother appealed the juvenile dependency court's jurisdictional orders based on its findings that Mother has a history of substance abuse which renders her incapable of providing her teenage daughter with regular care and supervision. The dependency court further found that Mother's drug abuse endangered her daughter's health and safety, and places her daughter at risk of physical harm. The court concluded that substantial evidence supported the dependency court's finding that Mother suffers from a substance problem. The court concluded, however, that the evidence does not support the dependency court's finding that her substance abuse has caused or is causing a substantial risk of harm to the daughter. Accordingly, the court reversed the dependency court's orders. View "In re Rebecca C." on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment for a murder he committed when he was sixteen years old. More than fifteen years later, Defendant filed an amended postconviction motion challenging his life imprisonment sentence. The district court denied the motion. After Defendant appealed, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Miller v. Alabama, which held that the Eighth Amendment forbids a state sentencing scheme that mandates life in prison without the possibility of parole for a juvenile offender convicted of homicide. The Supreme Court reversed in this case, holding (1) the rule announced in Miller applied retroactively to Defendant; and (2) Defendant’s sentence was unconstitutional under Miller, and therefore, Defendant was entitled to be resentenced. Remanded. View "State v. Mantich" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of two counts of first degree felony murder and other charges arising from three shootings. At the time of the shootings, Defendant was fifteen years old. Defendant was sentenced to two life terms without the possibility of parole for the murder counts. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s convictions in all respects but vacated the sentences of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, holding that the life imprisonment sentences were unconstitutional under Miller v. Alabama, in which the U.S. Supreme Court held that it is unconstitutional to sentence a juvenile convicted of a homicide to a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.View "State v. Castaneda" on Justia Law

Juvenile Trevor G. was arraigned on a delinquency petition alleging he had endangered the welfare of a minor. He moved to dismiss the petition because none of the State's witnesses against him were present, and therefore the State could not proceed with its case. The State acknowledged none of its witnesses were present and did not object to the motion, but requested leave to file for reconsideration if it learned there was a good reason why its witnesses did not show. The case was dismissed for lack of prosecution, and the State did not move for reconsideration. A few months later, the State refiled its petition. Trevor moved to dismiss, arguing that the adjudicatory hearing was outside the statutory time limit. The court again held a hearing, and again the witnesses did not show. The Court denied Trevor's motion, finding that because Trevor initiated the dismissal, the State was not barred from re-filing. The Supreme Court granted the trial court's request for interlocutory appeal. The issue before the Court was whether the trial court erred in its conclusion that the statutory time limits for the State to re-file its delinquency petition for lack of prosecution was not violated because the dismissal was initiated by the juvenile. The Supreme Court concluded that the trial court erred in its interpretation, and reversed the order denying Trevor's motion to dismiss. View "In re Trevor G." on Justia Law

Responding to a report of underage drinking in a home, officers found a group celebrating eighth grade graduation. Police asked the teens to step outside individually for breathalyzer testing. Seven tested positive for alcohol. Police arrested them and notified their parents. In the morning, a juvenile worker arrived at the police station, and, after speaking with a judge, indicated that the children were to be detained for a court appearance the next day. At the regional juvenile detention center, the minors underwent routine fingerprinting, mug shots, and metal-detection screening. During a hygiene inspection and health screening, they were required to disrobe completely for visual inspection to detect “injuries, physical abnormalities, scars and body markings, ectoparasites, and general physical condition.” A same-sex youth worker observed the juveniles for several minutes from a distance of one to two feet, recording findings for review by an R.N. The minors were required to shower with delousing shampoo. They were released the following day. The charges were dropped. In a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the district court granted partial summary judgment in favor of the juveniles, based on a “clearly established right for both adults and juveniles to be free from strip searches absent individualized suspicion” that negated a qualified immunity defense. The Sixth Circuit reversed, stating that no clearly established principle of constitutional law forbids a juvenile detention center from implementing a generally applicable, suspicionless strip-search policy upon intake into the facility.View "T. S. v. Doe" on Justia Law

Between December 11, 2011 and January 1, 2012, the Billings Police Department responded to more than 200 reports of vandalism. B.W., a youth, admitted to having committed acts of vandalism on December 22, 2011 and December 29, 2011. The youth court adjudicated B.W. a delinquent youth for having committed criminal mischief, common scheme and ordered B.W. to pay $78,702 in restitution, which represented the total damages sustained over the eleven-day vandalism spree. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the youth court erred in concluding that B.W. was jointly and severally liable for the full amount of restitution for damages where the State did not establish that B.W. was accountable for the crimes of others in which Defendant did not participate. Remanded for a new restitution hearing.View "In re B.W." on Justia Law

Officer Woelkers saw 15-year-old J.G. walking across a parking lot toward his brother, D.G. Woelkers parked his patrol vehicle, without turning on lights or siren, and “casually” approached the brothers. He was wearing his uniform. J.G. said they were going to a party. Officer Klier arrived in his patrol vehicle to “assist.” Woelkers asked D.G. for identification, and D.G. gave him a Honduran identification card. J.G. stated that he had no identification and gave a name. J.G. Woelkers ran a check and learned that no California driver’s license or identification card had issued to either boy. The boys consented to a pat-down and the officers found nothing illegal. Meanwhile, two more officers arrived, displaying a gun. J.G. agreed to a search of his backpack. Woelkers located a semiautomatic pistol inside. The D.A. filed a petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602(a) alleging felony possession of a concealed firearm by a minor. J.G. first admitted that allegation, then successfully moved to withdraw his plea, and moved to suppress the pistol from being introduced into evidence. The juvenile court denied the motion. The court of appeal reversed. The totality of the circumstances would have conveyed to a reasonable person—juvenile or adult—that he was not free to refuse the request. Woelkers clearly conveyed that he suspected the brothers of unlawful activity. He asked them whether they had anything “illegal,” conducted a records check, and searched them, physically restraining them, while the police presence and show of force grew. View "In re J.G." on Justia Law

Juvenile J.M. argued the criminal statutes regarding the intentional concealment of a weapon(La. R.S. 14:95(A)), and the possession of a handgun by a juvenile (La. R.S. 14:95.8), failed to meet the requirement of strict scrutiny under the state constitutional provision securing the right to keep and bear arms. The juvenile court declared La. R.S. 14:95(A) unconstitutional as applied to juveniles, and found a portion of La. R.S. 14:95.8 should have been severed from the statute. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court found the juvenile court erred in both of its rulings. The Supreme Court held both statutes constitutional and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "In the interest of J.M. " on Justia Law

Defendant was a juvenile when he was charged with attempted first-degree intentional homicide, which is an offense enumerated in Wis. Stat. 938.183(1)(am). At the preliminary hearing held pursuant to Wis. Stat. 970.032(1), the circuit court stated that “there is probable cause to believe a felony has been committed” and ordered that the adult court retain original jurisdiction over Defendant. At issue on appeal was whether the adult court failed to find probable cause of a violation of the specific crime charged under section 938.183(1), as required by 970.032(1) for an adult court to retain exclusive original jurisdiction over a juvenile. The Supreme Court concluded that the bindover and prosecution of Defendant in adult court were proper, holding that the circuit court made the finding required by section 970.032(1) that there was probable cause to believe Defendant committed the specific section 938.183(1) crime charged in the complaint. View "State v. Toliver" on Justia Law