Without holding a hearing, the juvenile court denied two requests by a mother (Karen) to modify an order denying her services to reunify with her three-year-old son and seven-month-old daughter, who had 13 fractures. Later, after holding a hearing, the court terminated her parental rights. The appeals court affirmed, holding that the failure to hold a hearing on the modification requests did not amount to reversible error. On the first request, Karen failed to allege a prima facie case. On the second request, Karen was given an opportunity to be heard, and the court made findings negating the appropriateness of reunification services. Her parental rights were properly terminated because substantial evidence supports showed that the potential benefit to the children from a continuing relationship with mother was outweighed by the benefits of adoption. View "In re G.B." on Justia Law

Defendant committed murder when he was seventeen years old. Defendant was subsequently convicted in the superior court of murder in the first degree and related weapons charges. While Brown was awaiting trial, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Miller v. Alabama, which held that mandatory life-without-parole sentences for juvenile homicide offenders violate the Eighth Amendment. The statutory sentencing scheme in Massachusetts requires, however, that all defendants over the age of fourteen who are convicted of murder in the first degree must be sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. Consequently, Defendant's sentencing was stayed until the Maine Supreme Court could render an opinion regarding the issue. The Supreme Court concluded that Defendant was entitled to the benefit of Miller and Commonwealth v. Diatchenko, in which the Court held that all life-without-parole sentences for juvenile offenders violate the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. Consequently, the Court held that Defendant may not be sentenced to life without parole. Remanded for sentencing. View "Commonwealth v. Brown" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented to the Supreme Court centered on whether the district court properly ordered the defendants to register as sex offenders pursuant to La. Rev. Stat. 15:542(A). The more precisely: whether the defendants, who, as adults, entered pleas of guilty to the charge of indecent behavior with a juvenile for conduct that occurred when the defendants were themselves under the age of 14 years old, had to register as sex offenders under the statute even though they would not have been required to register as such had they entered guilty pleas as juveniles in juvenile court at the time they committed the offenses. The Supreme Court found under the plain language of the statute that the defendants qualified as “[a]ny adult residing in this state who has pled guilty to … a sex offense as defined in R.S. 15:541…” and, therefore, must register as sex offenders pursuant to La. Rev. Stat. 15:542(A)(1). View "Louisiana v. I.C.S." on Justia Law

The Commonwealth filed five delinquency complaints against Defendant when he was seventeen years old based on the alleged sexual abuse of a victim. Defendant was summonsed into court on the complaints while he was still seventeen, but Defendant had turned eighteen by the time of his first scheduled court appearance and arraignment. The Commonwealth subsequently obtained youthful offender indictments against Defendant based on the portion of the alleged abuse that took place when Defendant was between fourteen and seventeen years old. The juvenile court subsequently reported to the Supreme Court questions concerning issues of the juvenile court's jurisdiction. The Supreme Court held (1) the term "apprehended" in Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 119, 72 is marked by the commencement of process, typically through a summons, provided the individual is able to the court at that time; (2) an individual may not be indicted as a youthful offender after he has turned eighteen for offenses he allegedly committed between the ages of fourteen and seventeen; and (3) a youthful offender indictment may not issue against an individual after his eighteenth birthday, regardless of whether a delinquency complaint on the same facts has been filed before the individual's eighteenth birthday.View "Commonwealth v. Mogelinski" on Justia Law

A series of burglaries occurred over several months in Bismarck involving more than $65,000 in stolen property and property damage. D.O. is a juvenile thought to be involved with the crimes. While investigating D.O.'s involvement, Detective Matthew Fullerton performed a probation search of D.O.'s residence, obtained information from a tipster and a confidential informant, searched publicly available information on D.O.'s Facebook page and performed a "cell tower dump" showing cell phone activity in the area of the burglaries at the time they occurred. D.O. appealed the juvenile court's order granting the State's motion to transfer D.O.'s case to the district court and denying D.O.'s suppression motion. D.O. argued law enforcement offered false or misleading testimony in support of the search warrant, that insufficient probable cause existed to justify the search warrant's issuance, that the juvenile court relied on out-of-court statements in violation of his statutory right to confrontation and that his case was inappropriately transferred to the district court. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Interest of D.O." on Justia Law

Judge Tracie Hunter of the Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas presided over the twelve cases against six juvenile defendants underlying this appeal. Judge Hunter issued entries revoking the Cincinnati Enquirer's permission to broadcast, televise, photograph, or record courtroom proceedings. The appellate court granted the Enquirer an alternative writ of prohibition ordering Judge Hunter to stay the enforcement of the documents revoking the Enquirer's permission to broadcast, televise, photograph, or record the courtroom proceedings. Judge Hunter subsequently allowed the Enquirer's reporters into the courtroom but did so subject to certain express conditions, including the condition that the Enquirer not publish the juveniles' names. The Enquirer filed a motion for contempt, arguing that Judge Hunter violated the appellate court's order by making the Enquirer's access to the courtroom subject to conditions. The court of appeals granted the Enquirer's contempt motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals did not abuse its discretion in granting the contempt motion for Judge Hunter's noncompliance with the appellate court's alternative writ. View "State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Hunter" on Justia Law

In an interlocutory appeal, the State appealed a trial court order that suppressed statements defendant-appellee N.A.S. made to police. The trial court found that N.A.S. was in custody when he made the statements, he did not waive his Miranda rights "knowingly, voluntarily or intelligently," and that the statements were involuntary. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that in the totality of the circumstances of this case, N.A.S. was not in custody when he made his statements, and that he spoke voluntarily. Accordingly, the Court reversed the trial court's suppression order and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Colorado v. N.A.S." on Justia Law

The girl, then 15, was charged with misdemeanor battery for allegedly striking a female classmate in the face and chest. A prosecution offer to recommend a continuance under supervision in return for a guilty plea was rejected and the case proceeded to trial. The victim and a security guard who had intervened testified. The accused minor testified that she had acted in self-defense. The trial judge entered a finding of guilt. The probation officer and the prosecution recommended probation, but defense counsel asked for a continuance under supervision. The judge said that the Juvenile Court Act precludes supervision for minors without the permission of the State’s Attorney, that the “approval provision” does not apply in the adult criminal system, and that the approval provision unconstitutional. The judge placed the minor on supervision, over the state’s objection. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed the supervision order as void and vacated the finding of unconstitutionality. The Juvenile Court Act has been interpreted to require that the possibility of supervision be considered before proceeding to a finding of guilt and adjudication as to delinquency. Here, supervision was not requested before the finding of guilt, so any objection by the prosecutor had become irrelevant. The minor lacked standing to raise the constitutional issue. The girl claimed ineffective assistance of counsel because she did not know she was giving up the opportunity for supervision by rejecting the plea offer, and that neither her attorney nor the court knew that supervision had to be requested before a finding of guilt. The court found that the minor had been prejudiced and remanded to allow her to request supervision at the appropriate time. Should the state object, a challenge to the validity of the approval provision could properly be raised.View "In re: Danielle J" on Justia Law

In 2010, two Fare Enforcement Officers entered a train car at the Rainier Beach station and instructed all passengers to present proof of fare. When FEO Willet asked fifteen-year-old K.L.B. and his two companions to present proof of fare payment, they gave him their bus transfers. FEO Willet informed them that while bus transfers used to be valid on the light-rail, they were no longer accepted. The three young males were instructed by FEO Willet to exit the train at the next station. The FEOs asked the three males for identification once they exited the train. All three were either unable or unwilling to provide identification. K.L.B. was temporarily detained at the Othello station. The King County Sheriff's Office was called to assist in identifying K.L.B. and his companions so they could potentially be cited for fare evasion. Deputy Adams then asked K.L.B. to identify one of his male companions. He responded that he did not know his companion's full name and that he: knew him only as '"Marty."' Deputy Adams returned to the station and used a computer database to identify "Marty." There was an assault warrant out for "Marty's" arrest. K.L.B. was charged with two counts of making a false or misleading statement to a public servant under RCW 9A.76. 175. K.L.B. was found guilty of making a false statement to FEO Willet (count II). He was found not guilty of making a false statement to Deputy Adams (count I). K.L.B. appealed to Division One of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed his conviction. K.L.B. argued that a Sound Transit FEO was not a "public servant" as defined in RCW 9A.04.110(23). He also argued that the definition of "public servant" was unconstitutionally vague and that to convict a person of making a false or misleading statement to a public servant, the State must prove that the defendant knew the statement was made to a public servant. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's conclusion that under the statute, FEO Willet was a public servant at the time K.L.B. made the false statement. The Supreme Court held that under these circumstances, because FEOs are not government employees, are not officers of government, and do not perform a governmental function, they are not "public servants" as defined by the statute. View "Washington v. K.L.B." on Justia Law

Petitioner, a juvenile, was arrested and charged with aggravated battery on a victim whom Petitioner knew or should have known was pregnant. Petitioner was on probation at the time of her arrest. Prior to the adjudicatory hearing, it was determined that Petitioner's risk assessment score on her risk assessment instrument (RAI) should be zero. The trial court then placed Petitioner in home detention. Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, arguing that because her risk assessment score was zero, the trial court could not place her in home detention. Petitioner did not submit a copy of her RAI with her petition. The court of appeal found (1) Petitioner was not required to submit the RAI to properly consider the petition, and (2) because Petitioner's RAI score was zero, the trial court erred in placing her in home detention. The Supreme Court quashed the court of appeal's decision, holding (1) a district court may not grant a juvenile's pre-adjudicatory habeas petition when the court is not presented with the juvenile's RAI; and (2) a juvenile may be placed in home detention with a risk assessment score of zero when the juvenile qualifies for home detention under the specific terms of the RAI. View "State v. S.M." on Justia Law