In the summer of 2022, two cousins, 17-year-old B.K. and 15-year-old S.K., visiting from Illinois, threw stolen fireworks into a Costco trash bin, causing a fire that resulted in property damage. The juveniles admitted to one delinquent act of criminal mischief each, while allegations of theft were dismissed by the State. Costco sought restitution for approximately $25,000, an amount initially considered by the State as “very unreasonable.” After a restitution hearing, the juvenile court issued a restitution order for $28,750, enforceable as a civil-judgment lien, holding the juveniles jointly and severally responsible for payment in full.The Court of Appeals affirmed the juvenile court's decision, holding that the restitution orders amount to enforceable judgment liens. The panel acknowledged that the governing statute does not expressly state that the restitution order is a judgment lien or that the juvenile court may enter the restitution order as a civil judgment. However, the court found the criminal restitution statute, which does consider a restitution order as a judgment lien, instructive.The Indiana Supreme Court reversed the lower court's decision, holding that the juvenile court lacked the authority to enforce its order as a civil-judgment lien. The court found that the juvenile restitution statute does not contain language that characterizes restitution as a civil judgment. The court also emphasized that Indiana courts must construe the juvenile code liberally to ensure that children within the juvenile justice system are treated as persons in need of care, protection, treatment, and rehabilitation. The court concluded that reading a judgment-lien provision into the Juvenile Restitution Statute runs counter to these statutory directives. The case was remanded for reconsideration of the restitution order in light of the court's holding. View "B. K. v. State of Indiana" on Justia Law

The appellant, A.G., was arraigned on four juvenile delinquency petitions for attempted robbery, attempted first degree assault, reckless conduct, and falsifying physical evidence when he was 17 years old. The Circuit Court found probable cause and determined that A.G. met the standard for secure detention, placing him at the Youth Detention Services Unit (YDSU). The State later filed a petition to certify A.G. as an adult and transfer the case to superior court, which remains pending. As A.G. was about to turn 18, a hearing was held to address his placement. The court ruled that A.G. would be transferred to the Hillsborough County House of Corrections (HOC) upon his eighteenth birthday.A.G. appealed this decision, arguing that the circuit court lacks authority to order his detention at the HOC. The Supreme Court of New Hampshire agreed, stating that the circuit court is a court of limited jurisdiction with powers conferred upon it by statute. The court found no statutory authority for the circuit court to detain A.G. at the HOC, as he has neither been adjudicated delinquent nor certified as an adult.The State argued that the circuit court could continue A.G.’s detention at YDSU, even after his eighteenth birthday, while awaiting action on the petition to certify him as an adult. The Supreme Court agreed, stating that the term "minor" in the relevant statute continues to apply to A.G. after his eighteenth birthday. The court reversed the trial court’s order transferring A.G. to the HOC and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "In re A.G." on Justia Law

The case involves a juvenile, Jose R., who was declared a ward of the court and committed to a secure youth treatment facility (SYTF) for a baseline term of three years with a maximum term of six years. This followed his admission, as part of a plea deal, that he had committed an assault with a semiautomatic firearm. The case arose from a shooting incident in which Jose and an adult man fired multiple gunshots, resulting in a victim's death. Initially, Jose was charged with first-degree murder, but the charge was later amended to assault with a semiautomatic firearm, which Jose admitted to.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County denied Jose's motion to apply his precommitment custody credits to his baseline term, instead applying the 395 days of precommitment custody credits against the maximum term. Jose appealed this decision, arguing that the court erred in applying his precommitment custody credits to his maximum term instead of his baseline term.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Second Appellate District Division Seven affirmed the lower court's decision. The appellate court found that the lower court did not err in applying Jose's precommitment custody credits to the maximum term of confinement. The court based its decision on the clear statutory language in section 875, subdivision (c)(1)(C), which states that precommitment custody credits must be applied against the maximum term of confinement. The court also rejected Jose's argument that the legislative scheme violated his right to equal protection of the laws. The court concluded that the legislative amendments did not violate equal protection principles, even if they resulted in less favorable treatment of precommitment credits. View "In re Jose R." on Justia Law

The case involves a minor, Andrew M., who tested positive for methadone at birth and was placed in foster care. His biological parents, S.M. and A.M., failed to reunify with him. Despite this, the juvenile court decided not to terminate the parents' parental rights, citing the parental-benefit exception, which applies if a parent shows that they maintained regular visitation with the child, the child has a substantial, positive, emotional attachment to the parents, and terminating that attachment would be detrimental to the child even considering the benefit of a new, adoptive home.The Superior Court of Orange County had previously ordered Andrew to be removed from parental custody and provided the parents with reunification services. However, the parents failed to reunify with Andrew and their services were terminated. The court then scheduled a permanency planning hearing.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Fourth Appellate District Division Three reviewed the case. Andrew's appointed appellate counsel argued that the juvenile court's decision not to terminate the parents' parental rights was an abuse of discretion. The Orange County Social Services Agency (SSA), although a respondent in this appeal, supported Andrew's counsel's position. The court agreed with Andrew's counsel and the SSA, concluding that the circumstances did not support the application of the parental-benefit exception. The court reversed the lower court's order and remanded the matter with instructions. View "In re Andrew M." on Justia Law

The case revolves around Audrey Mae Lessner, who was convicted of felony child abuse under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-503(b)(i) (2023) after a bench trial. The charges stemmed from an incident where Lessner, while babysitting an 11-year-old child identified as FF, spanked the child eleven times with a belt as punishment for lying. The spanking resulted in significant bruising on the child's thigh. Lessner appealed her conviction, arguing that the district court abused its discretion by denying her motion to continue the trial and that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to prove that she did not engage in reasonable corporal punishment.Prior to the trial in the District Court of Sweetwater County, Lessner had sought to represent herself, a request that the court granted after advising her of the risks. She later filed a motion for an extension of time, claiming that the prosecution was not assisting her in obtaining information for a subpoena. However, she later informed the court that she no longer needed an extension and was ready for trial. On the first day of the bench trial, Lessner filed a motion for an emergency hearing, asserting that she was not ready to proceed because the State was denying some discovery. The court denied her motion and proceeded with the trial.The Supreme Court of Wyoming affirmed the lower court's decision. It found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Lessner's motion to continue the trial. The court also found that the State presented sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the physical injury inflicted on the child was not the result of reasonable corporal punishment. The court noted that Lessner's actions, including her decision to use a belt to avoid injuring her hand and her refusal to stop spanking the child other than to rest her arm, did not represent a method of correction but rather an adult who had lost control of her own responses. View "Lessner v. The State of Wyoming" on Justia Law

In July 2023, the San Francisco Human Services Agency filed a petition alleging that three children were at risk due to the actions of their mother, M.S., and their alleged father, P.F. The Agency claimed that the children were at risk of suffering serious physical or emotional harm due to P.F.'s domestic violence towards M.S. and his substance abuse issues. The Agency also alleged that M.S. had allowed P.F. to stay in her home despite a restraining order against him. The juvenile court sustained the allegations in part, released the children to M.S., and ordered the family to participate in therapy. M.S. appealed this decision.The lower courts had previously reviewed this case and made several findings. The juvenile court found that the children were at substantial risk of suffering serious physical and/or emotional harm due to the domestic violence perpetrated by P.F. towards M.S. The court also found that P.F. had substance abuse issues which impeded his ability to care for the children. The court denied M.S.'s request to dismiss the case, declared the children dependents of the court, and ordered M.S. and the children to participate in family therapy.The Court of Appeal of the State of California First Appellate District Division Three affirmed the decision of the lower court. The court held that an alleged father constitutes a “parent” within the meaning of section 300, subdivision (b)(1). The court also found that substantial evidence supported the juvenile court’s declaration of dependency and that the court did not abuse its discretion by not granting M.S.'s request to dismiss the case and instead ordering family therapy. View "In re A.F." on Justia Law

The case involves two petitioners, Daniel Dilly, Superintendent of the Rubenstein Juvenile Center (RJC), and Nancy Oldaker, Health Services Administrator at RJC, who were held in contempt of court by Judge Kurt Hall of the Circuit Court of Lewis County, West Virginia. The contempt charges arose from an incident involving a resident of RJC, identified as D.P., who suffered a broken jaw during a fight with other residents. The court had ordered that D.P. be taken off RJC grounds for an X-ray and that his mother be notified of his medical appointments. The court found that these orders were not adequately followed by the petitioners.The Circuit Court of Lewis County held a hearing to review D.P.'s placement and medical care, resulting in a "Medical Care Order" that directed RJC to schedule an appointment for D.P. with his oral surgeon and to allow D.P.'s mother to attend the appointment. The court also ordered RJC to provide a report concerning the incident that led to D.P.'s injury. When these orders were not fully complied with, the court held a "show cause" hearing and found both Superintendent Dilly and Ms. Oldaker in contempt of court, fining each of them $250.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia found that procedural errors in the lower court's contempt proceedings deprived the court of jurisdiction to impose such sanctions. The court noted that the lower court failed to provide the petitioners with adequate notice that they were facing indirect criminal contempt proceedings and did not afford them jury trials before imposing the fines. The court concluded that the contempt orders were void and granted the petitioners' requested writs of prohibition, thereby preventing the lower court from enforcing the contempt orders. View "State ex rel. Dilly v. Hall" on Justia Law

James Massey was charged with gross sexual imposition, a class AA felony, and child abuse, a class C felony. The charges stemmed from an incident involving a minor, identified as T.T. During the trial, the State presented testimonies from T.T., law enforcement, medical staff, and a psychologist. Massey, in his defense, testified on his own behalf. The jury found Massey guilty of both charges.The case was first heard in the District Court of Cass County, East Central Judicial District. At the close of the State's case, Massey moved for a judgment of acquittal under N.D.R.Crim.P. 29, which the court denied. The jury found Massey guilty of both charges, and he subsequently appealed the convictions.The case was then reviewed by the Supreme Court of North Dakota. Massey argued that the jury instruction for gross sexual imposition was improper and that the State's closing arguments constituted prosecutorial misconduct. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision. The court found no error in the use of "willfully" as the required mens rea in the jury instructions. Although the court acknowledged that the State made an improper "golden rule" argument during closing arguments, it concluded that Massey failed to demonstrate how he was prejudiced by these comments. The court affirmed the judgment of conviction. View "State v. Massey" on Justia Law

In 2013, a minor identified as A.M. was tried as an adult and convicted for first-degree murder of a rival gang member, which he committed at the age of 14. He was sentenced to 26 years to life in prison. In 2021, the superior court conditionally reversed the judgment and ordered a transfer hearing under Proposition 57, which prohibits trying a minor as an adult without a judicial determination of their fitness for juvenile court. The juvenile court conducted the hearing, granted the district attorney’s motion to transfer A.M.’s case to criminal court, and reinstated the judgment.A.M. appealed, arguing that his case should not have been transferred because he was 14 years old when he committed his crime. He also contended that Assembly Bill 333, which amended various provisions of Penal section 186.22, required striking the gang-murder special circumstance. The Court of Appeal of the State of California Second Appellate District agreed with both of A.M.’s contentions.The court held that Senate Bill 1391, which amended Proposition 57 to prohibit the transfer of 14- and 15-year-olds to adult criminal court, applied to A.M.'s case. The court reasoned that when the superior court conditionally reversed A.M.'s conviction and sentence, his case became nonfinal, and thus, Senate Bill 1391 applied. The court also held that Assembly Bill 333 applied retroactively to A.M.'s case, requiring the vacating of the jury's gang-murder special circumstance finding. The court reversed the order granting the district attorney’s motion to transfer A.M.’s case to criminal court, vacated the true finding on the gang-murder special circumstance, and struck the requirement for A.M. to register as a gang offender. The case was remanded to the juvenile court for further proceedings. View "In re A.M." on Justia Law

The case involves a legal malpractice claim filed by minors N.W.M. and E.M., through their parents, against their former guardian ad litem (GAL), Patrice Langenbach, and her employer, the Defender Association of Philadelphia. The minors alleged that Langenbach acted negligently throughout her representation of them in a dependency matter and a corresponding termination of parental rights matter. The trial court dismissed all claims on grounds of immunity, asserting that Langenbach and the Defender Association were immune from suit under the doctrine of quasi-judicial immunity.On appeal, the Superior Court reversed the trial court's decision, holding that it was not within its authority to extend such immunity to GALs. The Superior Court maintained that it was not its role to make policy decisions or to expand existing legal doctrines, which it considered to be the prerogative of the Supreme Court or the General Assembly.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the Superior Court's decision, concluding that GALs in juvenile dependency cases do not operate as an arm of the court and, therefore, are not entitled to quasi-judicial immunity. The court also clarified that the Superior Court is authorized to address novel legal issues, including those involving policy considerations. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the Supreme Court's opinion. View "N.W.M. v. Langenbach" on Justia Law