The Court of Appeal concluded that Penal Code section 3051, subdivision (h) does not violate equal protection, and the exclusion of offenders sentenced under the Three Strikes law from youth offender parole consideration is rationally related to a legitimate penal interest. The court also concluded that it lacks jurisdiction to rule on appellant's clam that the imposition of the five-year enhancement under Penal Code section 667, subdivision (a) resulted in an unauthorized sentence. Accordingly, the court affirmed the postjudgment order. View "People v. Moore" on Justia Law

S.H.R. petitioned the superior court for the appointment of a guardian of his person and for judicial findings that would enable him to petition the USCIS to classify him as a special immigrant juvenile (SIJ) under federal immigration law. The superior court denied both petitions.The Court of Appeal concluded that S.H.R. had the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence the facts supporting SIJ status. Because the trial court found his evidence did not support the requested findings, S.H.R. has the burden on appeal of showing that he is entitled to the SIJ findings as a matter of law. In this case, S.H.R. has failed to meet his burden by failing to prove parental abandonment or neglect and that reunification was not viable. Therefore, the court affirmed the superior court's denial of the SIJ petition. The denial of the SIJ petition rendered the guardianship petition moot, and thus the court also affirmed the denial of that petition. View "S.H.R. v. Rivas" on Justia Law

Moore was convicted of murder (Penal Code 187) and robbery (section 211); a jury found true the special circumstance that the murder was committed during a robbery (190.2(a)(17)). Moore sought habeas relief, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence for the robbery-murder special-circumstance finding.The California Supreme Court ordered the court of appeal to consider “whether [Moore’s] youth at the time of the offense should be one of the factors considered under” precedent in which the California Supreme Court examined the felony-murder special circumstance, Penal Code 190.2(d). Under that provision, a person who is guilty of murder but is not the “actual killer” and who aids or abets the commission of certain felonies that result in death may be sentenced to death or life without the possibility of parole if that person is a “major participant” and acts with “reckless indifference to human life.”On remand, the court of appeal vacated the conviction. A defendant’s youth at the time of the offense should be a factor in determining whether that defendant acted with reckless indifference to human life under section 190.2(d). Considering the totality of the circumstances, including the fact that Moore was only 16 at the time of his offenses, the court found insufficient evidence to establish that Moore acted with the requisite reckless indifference to human life. View "In re Moore" on Justia Law

N.B. was removed from her parents’ care in 2008 when she was one year old. Her grandmother, Catherine, cared for her became her legal guardian in 2012. A maternal aunt also became a co-guardian. Years later N.B. struggled with her mental health and Catherine had trouble managing her care. The juvenile court found that N.B. was suffering serious emotional damage. Services were provided. She was released to her maternal aunt’s care after she said she did not feel safe returning to Catherine’s care. The maternal aunt became “overwhelmed” and returned her to Catherine. N.B. continued to suffer mental health issues.A petition under section 388 sought to terminate the guardianship rights of the maternal aunt and the family maintenance services. Catherine and the aunt had lied about N.B.’s whereabouts and well-being, and asked N.B. to lie during home visits. N.B. was placed in a foster home. N.B. “stabilized.” The Agency recommended terminating Catherine’s legal guardianship. Catherine objected.The juvenile court observed that there was not “any doubt on anybody’s part that [Catherine] loves [N.B. and] that she is committed to [N.B.]” but expressed concern that Catherine’s behavior was contributing to N.B.’s problems. The court terminated the legal guardianship of Catherine and the maternal aunt. The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting Catherine’s argument the Agency was required to “follow the procedures and requirements of section 387” to terminate her guardianship. View "In re N.B." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted Guernsey County Juvenile Court Judge David Bennett's motion to dismiss this habeas corpus action against him and sua sponte dismissed this action as to Muskingum County Juvenile Court Magistrate Erin Welch, holding that the petition was procedurally defective and failed to state a claim for relief.Petitioner filed an amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of his minor son, E.G., naming Judge Bennett and Magistrate Welch as respondents and alleging that E.G.'s current detention was illegal. The Supreme Court dismissed the action because (1) the amended petition was defective for failure to satisfy Ohio Rev. Code 2725.04(D); (2) Petitioner failed to name a proper respondent; and (3) Petitioner's amended petition failed to stat a valid claim for habeas relief. View "Gomez v. Bennett" on Justia Law

When he was 17 years old, M.W. assaulted his girlfriend. After a Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 petition was filed, seeking to have him declared a ward of the juvenile court, M.W. admitted to willful infliction of corporal injury. The juvenile court adjudged M.W. a ward of the court and ordered him to reside in his mother’s home under the probation department’s supervision and to complete a 52-week “Batterer’s Intervention Program” because M.W. had a “pattern of engaging in violent behavior, as well as inappropriateness with females.”M.W. requested that the court order the probation department to pay for the program. M.W. had already enrolled in the program at a cost of $153 per month, approximately $1,800 for the 52-week program. The court denied M.W.’s request. The court of appeal reversed. Under the Welfare and Institutions Code, neither M/W/ nor his mother is liable for the costs of his treatment program. A court may not impose liability on a minor’s parents unless authorized by statute; a minor may be liable for costs only in very limited instances. The People cite no authority to support an order imposing the costs of the Batterer’s Intervention Program on M.W. or his family. View "In re M.W." on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the denial of Defendant's Mass. R. Crim. P. 30(a) motion seeking to vacate his remaining sentences after he was paroled from his life sentence for murder and remanded the matter to the superior court for a hearing, holding that the motion judge failed to consider the specific circumstances and unique characteristics of Defendant as a juvenile.In 1996, Defendant, who was seventeen, committed crimes that resulted in his guilty plea to murder in the second degree, armed assault with intent to murder, and illegal possession of a firearm. Defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment for murder and two sentences of five to seven years' imprisonment for the assaults to run concurrent to each other but consecutive to the life sentence. After Defendant was paroled from his life sentence he moved to vacate the remaining sentences and for resentencing under Rule 30(a). The motion judge denied the motion. The Supreme Judicial Court remanded the matter to consider whether Defendant's sentences comported with article 26 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, holding (1) 120 Code Mass. Regs. 200.08 distinguishes parole for life sentences from other sentences and is therefore invalid; and (2) because Defendant already served the aggregate minimum of his sentences, he was immediately entitled to a parole hearing. View "Commonwealth v. Sharma" on Justia Law

A juvenile wardship petition charged Noah with several crimes, such as motor vehicle burglaries and vandalism; he entered a plea admitting one felony motor vehicle burglary count. While Noah’s wardship was ongoing, a supplemental juvenile wardship petition alleged Noah, then 14 years old, committed attempted robbery and caused or permitted an elder or dependent adult to suffer. A video showed Jacqueline, the 88-year-old victim, leaving a restaurant. As she opens the car door, a young man runs up. Her husband, Philippe, got into the driver’s seat. When Jacqueline steps aside to let the young man pass, he grabs her purse and starts to run, dragging Jacqueline behind the car, where she falls, slams into the ground, and rolls, still holding the purse. A police officer took fingerprints from where the young man touched the car; they matched Noah’s. Jacqueline was still on the ground when the officer arrived; she was confused and bleeding.The juvenile court sustained the allegations and found the attempted robbery adjudication qualified as an offense under Welfare and Institutions Code section 707(b) and committed Noah to a ranch facility for 12 months with a 180 day “aftercare period.” The court of appeal affirmed. Noah’s adjudication for attempted robbery is an offense described in Penal Code section 1203.09 and falls within Welfare and Institutions Code section 707(b). Substantial evidence showed Noah’s intent to rob Jacqueline and that he inflicted great bodily injury. View "In re Noah S." on Justia Law

The issue presented for the New Jersey Supreme Court's consideration was whether defendant Zakariyya Ahmad’s statement to police -- which occurred when defendant was 17 years old and without his being advised of his Miranda rights -- was properly admitted at his trial for multiple offenses related to the murder of a cafe owner in Newark, New Jersey. The Appellate Division affirmed, agreeing that defendant was questioned as “part of an investigatory procedure rather than a custodial interrogation” and that Miranda was therefore not implicated. The Supreme Court found admission of the statement was harmful error: a reasonable 17-year-old in defendant’s position would have believed he was in custody and not free to leave, so Miranda warnings were required. View "New Jersey v. Ahmad" on Justia Law

Juvenile J.S. appealed a circuit court’s finding of delinquency based on petitions alleging criminal mischief, simple assault and attempted simple assault. The petitions were filed after a series of events in September 2020 at the Mount Prospect Academy, a non-secure detention facility whose students are placed there due to behavioral issues. At the close of the State’s case at the adjudicatory hearing, the court granted the juvenile’s motion to dismiss one of the petitions for insufficiency of evidence, and denied his motions to dismiss the remaining petitions for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The latter motions argued that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the State failed to comply with RSA 169- B:6, III and IV. On appeal, the juvenile argued the trial court “erred as a matter of law in determining that, on the undisputed facts in the record here, Mount Prospect Academy is not a school.” Accordingly, he contended the court erred by failing to dismiss the delinquency petitions. The New Hampshire Supreme Court upheld the trial court’s determination on the facts presented in this case, that Mount Prospect was not a “school” for purposes of RSA 169-B:6, III and IV. Accordingly, the Court upheld the trial court’s denial of the motions to dismiss and affirm the finding of delinquency. View "In re J.S." on Justia Law