Based on a Welfare and Institutions Code section 300(b)(1) petition, A.G, then four years old, was placed into protective custody after his mother, S.B., twice drove a car in which A.G. was a passenger while she was under the influence. Mother's reunification services were terminated at the 12-month review hearing. At a selection and implementation hearing, S.G. requested a contested hearing on statutory exceptions to adoption and the termination of parental rights: the beneficial parental relationship and the sibling relationship. The court found her offer of proof insufficient, denied her request for a contested hearing, found the minor adoptable, and terminated S.G.'s parental rights.The court of appeal reversed the denial of a contested hearing. The offer of proof must address two components of the parental relationship exception: the parent’s regular contact with the child and the existence of a beneficial parent-child relationship. It need not address whether the existence of that relationship constitutes a compelling reason for determining that termination would be detrimental to the child. S.G.'s offer of proof was adequate, addressing both her regular contact with A.G. and the existence of a beneficial parent-child relationship. Because the termination of parental rights is at stake, the court, particularly where the parent’s regular contact with the child is not in dispute, should exercise caution before denying a contested hearing and should construe the parent’s offer of proof liberally. View "In re A.G." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals' decision vacating a juvenile's adjudications for first-degree forcible sexual offense and second-degree sexual exploitation of a minor and a disposition order but reversed the court's holding that there was insufficient evidence to support the juvenile's attempted-larceny admission, holding that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter a new dispositional order as to that offense.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the trial court erred by denying the juvenile's motions to dismiss second-degree sexual exploitation of a minor and first-degree forcible sexual offense; (2) the trial court did not err by accepting the juvenile's admission of attempted larceny; (3) the level 3 disposition and commitment order entered by the trial court must be vacated; and (4) the matter cannot be remanded for the entry of a new disposition order because the trial court's jurisdiction terminated when the juvenile turned eighteen years old. View "In re J.D." on Justia Law

Defendant, a minor high school student, made criminal threats when he posted a photo of a realistic looking replica gun on his Snapchat account, which was visible to about 60 people he identified as friends. The caption stated, "Everybody go to school tomorrow. I'm taking gum."The Court of Appeal affirmed defendant's conviction, holding that the juvenile court's findings are supported by substantial evidence. The juvenile court rejected defendant's testimony that he was joking as not credible and inconsistent with what defendant told a school police detective who investigated the threats. In this case, the record contains sufficient evidence defendant intended his Snapchat post to be understood as a threat and that he willfully threatened to kill or cause great bodily injury; a reasonable trier of fact could have found defendant intended to threaten an expansive group of people, which included the two individuals at issue; considering the surrounding circumstances, including the notoriety of previous school shootings, defendant's story was sufficiently specific and unequivocal to convey the threat of a school shooting the next day; and the threat was immediate and reasonably placed the two individuals in fear. View "The People v. A.G." on Justia Law

Several boys broke into two homes, one of which was owned by a man old enough to be considered an “at-risk” victim. When that man returned home, he happened upon one of the boys holding the "spoils of an ill-conceived, juvenile burglary." The others, including B.D., remained outside, oblivious to the elderly man’s arrival. All the boys quickly fled. By this opinion, the Colorado Supreme Court addressed the scope of complicitor liability for a fact that aggravates the punishment for theft; namely, an at-risk victim’s presence. Based on the plain language of the controlling statutes, the Supreme Court concluded that a complicitor need not be aware that an at-risk victim was present because it was a strict liability sentence enhancer and not an element of the offense. Accordingly, the Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and remanded the case for the district court to reinstate the adjudication and sentence. View "Colorado in the Interest of B.D." on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of kidnapping Maria Eloiza and her five-year-old son, resulting in the deaths of both. Defendant was 16-years-old at the time he committed the offense, and the district court sentenced him to the statutorily mandated term of life imprisonment. The Supreme Court subsequently held in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 465 (2012), that a mandatory life without parole for those under the age of 18 at the time of their crimes violates the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments. Based on Miller, the district court granted defendant's motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence under 28 U.S.C. 2255. After the district court sentenced defendant to 50 years' imprisonment, defendant appealed.The Eighth Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court did not clearly err in finding defendant competent to proceed with resentencing. In this case, the district court was entitled to base its competency determination on the BOP doctor's psychological evaluation concluding that defendant had been restored to competency. The court also held that the district court did not plainly err by calculating an advisory Guidelines range of life imprisonment under USSG 2A1.1; the district court considered the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) sentencing factors, including defendant's youth; and defendant's sentence, a downward variance from the Guidelines range of life, was not substantively unreasonable. View "United States v. Barraza" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions of first-degree murder, one count of attempted first-degree murder, and one count of aggravated arson, holding that no error occurred in the proceedings below.Defendant was fourteen years old when he committed the crimes for which he was convicted. On appeal, Defendant argued, among other things, that the court's certification to try him as an adult violated Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, holding (1) the trial court did not err when it denied Defendant's motion to suppress incriminating statements Defendant made to police; (2) there was no prosecutorial error; (3) Defendant's Apprendi issue was unpreserved for appeal; (4) the district court did not abuse its discretion in applying Kan. Stat. Ann. 38-2347(e) and authorizing adult prosecution; and (5) the court abused its discretion in applying the factors set out in K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 38- 2347(e) to authorize a juvenile's adult prosecution. View "State v. Vonachen" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals concluding that the juvenile court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate R.B. delinquent, holding that the timing requirements of Ohio Rev. Code 2152.84 are not jurisdictional.The juvenile court adjudicated R.B. delinquent, classified him as a sex offender, and imposed a disposition that included probation. After a second sex-offender-classification hearing the juvenile court kept R.B.'s classification the same. R.B. appealed, arguing that the juvenile court was required to hold the review hearing and and issue its decision on the precise day his disposition ended and because the juvenile court did not do so, it lost jurisdiction to continue his classification. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding (1) the language "upon completion of the disposition" found in section 2152.84(A)(1) requires only that the court's review take place within a "reasonable time" of the juvenile's completion of his disposition; and (2) section 2151.23(A)(15) vests the juvenile court with jurisdiction to carry out its requirements under the classification statutes, independent of whether the delinquent child has reached the age of twenty-one. View "In re R.B." on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant D.H. (minor) had a history of defiant and criminal behavior, resulting in him being placed on formal probation in two juvenile delinquency matters. Throughout his probationary period, D.H. violated the law and the terms and conditions of his probation. While still on probation, the juvenile court dismissed the Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 petitions and terminated D.H.'s probation as unsuccessfully completed based on a joint request from the San Bernardino County Children and Family Services (CFS) and the probation department to transfer jurisdiction to the dependency court under section 300. D.H. requested the juvenile court seal his section 602 juvenile delinquency records, and the juvenile court denied his request. On appeal, D.H. argued the juvenile court was required to seal his records under Welfare and Institutions Code section 786 (e). Alternatively, he contended the juvenile court abused its discretion in denying his motion to seal his records under section 786(a). Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "In re D.H." on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed defendant's 55-year sentence imposed for his conviction of participating in a pattern of racketeering activity evidenced by his role in the murder of four teenagers. Defendant was 15 years old at the time of the offense and a member of the MS-13 gang when he participated in the execution-style murders of four members of a rival gang.The court assumed, for purposes of this appeal, that the district court was required to consider the factors in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), in determining that a sentence of 55 years, not subject to parole, was warranted for a defendant fifteen years old at the time of the homicide crimes. Even with this assumption, the court concluded that the district court considered the Miller factors and reasonably concluded that a further departure was not warranted. Acknowledging the broad scope of a sentencing judge's discretion and taking into account the care taken by the sentencing judge in exercising that discretion, the court concluded that defendant's sentence is not unreasonable in any legally cognizable sense. Finally, the court noted that defendant's sentence illustrates the unfortunate consequences of eliminating parole. Nevertheless, it is a sentence that a conscientious district judge concluded was appropriate and, upon review, the court affirmed. The court considered defendant's remaining arguments and found them to be without merit. View "United States v. Portillo" on Justia Law

After receiving a citizen’s tip that Black males in a Mercedes were “acting shady,” four San Diego Police Department (SDPD) officers drove to the scene in two marked vehicles, activating emergency lights in one. Parking behind the Mercedes, the officers positioned themselves beside each of its four doors and asked the three teenagers inside for their names and identification. A records check later indicated that the driver was on probation subject to a Fourth Amendment waiver. The officers searched the vehicle and recovered a loaded firearm and sneakers linking the minors to a recent robbery. The minors moved to suppress the evidence found in the car, claiming their initial detention was not supported by reasonable suspicion. Finding the encounter was consensual rather than a detention, the juvenile court denied the motions. Two of the minors pleaded guilty to a subset of the charges originally filed. In a consolidated appeal, two of the minors, Edgerrin J. and Jamar D. challenged the denial of their motions to suppress, arguing the juvenile court erred in finding the encounter consensual, and claimed the citizen’s tip did not establish reasonable suspicion to detain them. To this, the Court of Appeal agreed on both points. However, the Court found conflicting evidence as to whether officers knew other facts that might furnish reasonable suspicion for the stop, or justify the detention and search pursuant to Edgerrin’s active Fourth Amendment waiver. Because the rationale for its ruling made it unnecessary for the juvenile court to address these other issues, judgment was reversed and remanded for a new hearing to permit it to assess witness credibility and reach factual findings in the first instance. View "In re Edgerrin J." on Justia Law