Pursuant to a plea bargain, minor K.W. admitted one count of robbery; counts alleging kidnapping, brandishing, and vandalism were dismissed. After he completed probation, he moved to seal the record under Welfare and Institutions Code section 786. He was not eligible for sealing, because robbery was one of the crimes listed in section 707(b). The trial court reduced the adjudication to the lesser included offense of grand theft, which was not a section 707(b) offense. The court then granted the motion to seal. The State appealed, contending: (1) the juvenile court lacked the authority to reduce the adjudication; and (2) reducing the adjudication violated the plea bargain. The Court of Appeal determined the statutes the juvenile court cited did not give it authority to reduce the conviction. Further, the Court held Welfare and Institutions Code section 782, which would allow the juvenile court to “set aside the findings and dismiss the petition” in the interest of justice, did not authorize the juvenile court to reduce an adjudication, at least when doing so would violate a plea bargain, as it would have here. Judgment was therefore reversed. View "In re K.W." on Justia Law

After police arrested their mother, 10-year-old J. and her half-brothers were found at a homeless encampment and detained by the Alameda County Social Services Agency, which filed a juvenile dependency petition. At a paternity inquiry, Mother testified that Father is J.’s father. Mother and Father lived together until J. was two years old. Father had participated in Nevada child support proceedings, acknowledged J. as his child, and was subject to a child support order. Father had regular visits with J. After the Agency filed an amended petition naming Father as J.’s alleged father, the court declared the children dependents of the court, and placed the children with their maternal grandfather. The court held a later hearing, ordered a legal guardianship by the grandfather, then dismissed the dependency.During the proceedings, Father maintained his relationship with J. and consistently stated that he wanted custody. Father repeatedly contacted the Agency and provided a birth certificate showing his name as J.’s father. Court-appointed attorneys represented Father but he was unrepresented during critical proceedings and none of the attorneys took action on his behalf. At the dismissal hearing, the court noted that no counsel was present on Father’s behalf and acknowledged that the prior proceeding, without Father's counsel present "was an error.” Contrary to Welfare and Institutions Code 316.2(b), and California Rule 5.635(g), the court clerk never provided Father with notice of the procedure he should follow to establish that he is J.’s father and to protect his parental rights. The court of appeal reversed the juvenile court orders, finding that Father was prejudiced by the failure to comply with the notice requirements. View "In re J.W.-P." on Justia Law

Deputies responded to a domestic violence report. J.E. had left the house. J.E.'s Mother signed a citizen’s arrest form for battery. The deputies saw J.E. outside, went to J.E. in their marked patrol car, identified themselves, and told J.E. they needed to escort her home. J.E. ignored their commands. The deputies grabbed her arms. J.E. began “flailing,” spit at the deputies, and kicked another vehicle, causing a dent. The deputies placed J.E. in the patrol car. J.E. kicked an officer in the stomach.A juvenile wardship petition alleged misdemeanor battery upon a peace officer and misdemeanor resisting, obstructing, or delaying a peace officer. Mother reported that J.E. had previously hit her and threatened to kill her. School records showed J.E. was suspended twice for being physically aggressive and making threats toward staff and was disciplined several times for unexcused absences, disrupting class, using profanity, and being under the influence of marijuana. Mother testified that J.E. was 11 when she began living with Mother, having previously lived with her grandmother. Mother stated she never taught J.E. the difference between right and wrong and never taught J.E. to respect police commands. The court found that J.E. understood the wrongfulness of her conduct, sustained the wardship petition, and placed J.E. on probation. The court of appeal affirmed, finding sufficient evidence that J.E. appreciated the wrongfulness of her conduct, as required for minors under the age of 14. (Pen. Code 26). View "In re J.E." on Justia Law

In these consolidated appeals, the Supreme Court held that under the clear and unambiguous language of several relevant statutes, a juvenile court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to waive two individuals into adult criminal court because neither fit the definition of a "child" at the time their respective delinquency petitions were filed.The State filed juvenile delinquency petitions against D.P. and N.B. for committing, when they were under the age of eighteen, what would be felony child molesting if committed by an adult. Both individuals were twenty-one or older at the time the delinquency petitions were filed. The State requested that D.P. and N.B. be waived into adult criminal court, and D.P. and N.B. moved to dismiss their respective cases for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The motion to dismiss was denied in D.P.'s case and was granted in N.B.'s case. The Supreme Court affirmed the juvenile court's dismissal in N.B. and reversed in D.P. and remanded with instructions to grant the motion to dismiss, holding that a juvenile court does not have subject matter jurisdiction to waive an alleged delinquent offender into adult criminal court if the individual is no longer a "child." View "D.P. v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the circuit court sentencing Defendant to life in prison plus fifty years, holding that the violent offender statute is not applicable to youthful offenders for purposes of consideration of probation, even if they are sentenced after they have reached the age of majority.Defendant committed the crimes for which he was convicted when he was seventeen years old. The district court transferred the charges to circuit court for Defendant's prosecution as a youthful offender. Defendant was nineteen years old when he pleaded guilty pursuant to plea agreements to murder, first-degree robbery, and other crimes. Under the assumption that Defendant was ineligible for probation, the trial court imposed a life sentence with a fifty-year sentence to run consecutively. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment, holding (1) Kentucky's Juvenile Code and relevant caselaw support the conclusion that the violent offender statute is not applicable to youthful offenders for purposes of consideration of probation, even if they are sentenced after they reach the age of eighteen years and five months; and (2) the trial court erred in failing to consider probation or other forms of conditional discharge as possible alternatives. View "Thomas v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

While 17-year-old I.M. was a ward of the court and on probation, the District Attorney filed a supplemental Welfare and Institutions Code section 602(a) petition. I.M. admitted to a felony grand theft allegation; robbery and violation of probation allegations were dismissed. The court ordered I.M. detained in juvenile hall for a period not to exceed her maximum custody time of three years four months, or until the age of 21, and imposed probation conditions, including that she “report any police contacts” to the probation officer within 24 hours and successfully complete all parts of the County Institution Program, GIM, while detained. The court rejected I.M.’s objection on due process grounds as no date certain was set for termination of the custodial commitment and probation would be allowed to determine whether I.M. successfully completed the GIM program.The court of appeal remanded the requirement that I.M. report “any police contacts” as unconstitutionally vague and overbroad, leaving "one to guess what sorts of events and interactions qualify as reportable.” The court otherwise affirmed. The juvenile court did not delegate to the probation officer the authority to determine the length of the custodial commitment; the court scheduled a review hearing and made sure the minor and counsel were aware of the ability to file a petition to modify the disposition order. View "In re I.M." on Justia Law

Applying the principles of Miller v. Alabama, (2012) 567 U.S. 460, the California Supreme Court in People v. Gutierrez, (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1354, 1361, held that Penal Code section 190.5, subdivision (b), which prescribes a sentence of life without parole or a term of 25 years to life for a 16- or 17-year-old defendant found guilty of special circumstances murder, "authorizes, and indeed requires" consideration of the youth-related mitigating factors identified in Miller before imposing life without parole on a juvenile homicide offender. Legislation enacted shortly before the decision in Gutierrez now provides for youth offender parole hearings at statutorily prescribed points, including Senate Bill No. 394 for youth offenders sentenced to life without parole.In this case, defendant was sentenced to life without parole for murder during an attempted robbery committed when he was 17 years old. The Court of Appeal held that the sentencing court is statutorily required to consider youth-related mitigating factors before imposing life without parole. When, as here, the record is at the very least ambiguous as to whether the sentencing court understood its obligation to consider youth-related mitigating factors at sentencing before making the discretionary sentencing decision required by section 190.5, subdivision (b), remand is appropriate. Finally, the court held that defendant's sentence for aggravated assault should have been stayed under section 654. The court affirmed defendant's convictions and remanded for resentencing. View "People v. Ochoa" on Justia Law

In 2016, A.M. became a ward of the Alameda County Juvenile Court and was placed on probation but absconded from his mother’s home. In 2017, A.M. admitted to assault with force likely to produce bodily injury in exchange for dismissal of a related robbery count. He was placed at Camp Sweeney and absconded. A warrant was issued for his arrest. He was released to home supervision on GPS monitoring. A.M. removed his GPS monitor and absconded. A month later, A.M., then 16 years old, was arrested in possession of a loaded automatic handgun, suspected methamphetamine, pills believed to be opioids, and a digital scale. He waived his Miranda rights and admitted he was a gang member. A.M. appealed the juvenile court’s subsequent order placing him in a short-term residential therapeutic program (STRTP), arguing that under Welfare and Institutions Code 706.5, 706.6, the probation department was required to, but did not, convene a child and family team (CFT) meeting before the disposition hearing.The court of appeal considered the matter although A.M. has been released from the STRTP. The issues are of public importance and likely to recur and continue to evade review. The juvenile court erred in placing a minor in an STRTP based upon a probation department recommendation that failed to consider the input of a CFT. View "In re A.M." on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction for conspiracy to violate the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), as well as narcotics-conspiracy and firearm-possession charges related to his membership in the 10th Street Gang of Buffalo, New York. Defendant, who was seventeen years old at the time, participated in a double murder and was sentenced to life imprisonment.The Second Circuit rejected defendant's challenges to the introduction into evidence of a gun seized from his home; the denial of his motion for a mistrial based on a Bruton violation; the denial of his Batson challenges, and the denial of his requests for certain jury charges. However, the court held that the district court imposed defendant's sentence without explicitly considering his age at the time of the double murders, and thus violated the principle recognized in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 471 (2012), that children are constitutionally different from adults for purposes of sentencing. Miller stated that those under the age of eighteen are different because the distinctive attributes of youth diminish the penological justifications for imposing the harshest sentences on juvenile offenders, even when they commit terrible crimes. Therefore, the court affirmed defendant's conviction but vacated his sentence, remanding for resentencing in light of Miller. View "United States v. Delgado" on Justia Law

Minor was adjudged a ward of the juvenile court for crimes he committed when he was 11 years old. Afterwards, Senate Bill No. 439 amended Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 to provide that any minor who is between the ages of 12 years and 17 years, when he or she violates any law is within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court and may be adjudged to be a ward of that court.The Court of Appeal held that the juvenile court's jurisdiction over the minor terminated, by operation of law, when that amendment went into effect. While the court concluded that, under the procedural posture of this case, minor is not entitled to dismissal of the proceedings, including the original charges and wardship determination, that occurred prior to January 1, 2019, the court also concluded that the juvenile court now lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate the alleged violations of probation that occurred after the amendment's effective date. The juvenile court's order denying minor's notice and motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction under section 602(a) is affirmed insofar as the motion sought dismissal of proceedings. The court affirmed the order in all other respects. View "The People v. David C." on Justia Law