A.L. was in a fight with her sister violent enough for police to be called. An officer grabbed A.L.’s arm, stating “I saw you kick her when she was down.” She pulled away. Another officer took her other arm. She dropped to the pavement, kicking and scratching the officer before biting him. He punched A.L. and put her in handcuffs. The District Attorney filed a juvenile wardship petition under Penal Code sections 243(b) (battery on a peace officer); 69 (resisting a peace officer by force); and 148(a)(1) (resisting a peace officer). Resisting an officer and forcefully resisting an officer require actual knowledge that an officer is engaged in the performance of duty. The juvenile court stated: “Whether you think the police have the right to detain you or stop you or hold onto you, the law in this state says you don’t get to resist” and sustained the allegations. The court of appeal affirmed, finding the judge's comment not so ambiguous as to require reversal. The court may have found that the statutes were violated so long as the officers were performing their duty, without regard to A.L.’s awareness of that fact, or may have been referring only to section 243(b) and correctly describing the law. The court expressly found that the necessary elements for all three offenses had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt; those elements include the actual knowledge requirement of sections 69 and 148(a)(1). View "In re A.L." on Justia Law

E.C. alleged she was sexually assaulted on the premises of Pass Christian High School. The Youth Court adjudicated the alleged perpetrators not delinquent. Later, Roy and Kimberly Cuevas, individually, and on behalf of their minor daughter, E.C., filed a negligence action seeking damages from the Pass Christian School District associated with the alleged assault. Pass Christian unsuccessfully sought the records from the youth-court action to use in its defense in the civil case. It argued on appeal that the youth-court judge abused her discretion in denying its requests for disclosure of the youth-court records and trial transcripts relating to the three minor perpetrators. It also argued it would be denied due process and fairness if the sworn testimony of E.C. were not released due to the confidentiality rules protecting the subjects of youth-court actions. The Mississippi Supreme Court reversed and remanded for the circuit court to conduct an in camera review of the youth-court record to determine whether any of it should have been disclosed. View "In the Interest of M.D.G. v. Harrison County Youth Court of Mississippi" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was a Family Court order adjudging appellant Joseph Baker, Jr., a minor child, delinquent for having committed an act of Rape in the Second Degree. Initially, Baker was charged with three counts of Rape in the Second Degree. Count Two was voluntarily dismissed by the State before trial. At trial, the Family Court judge found Baker delinquent on Count One and acquitted him on Count Three. On appeal, Baker argued the judgment of delinquency for the one count of Rape in the Second Degree should be reversed because of evidentiary errors made by the Family Court judge at trial. The Delaware Supreme Court agreed that errors were made and reversal was required. View "Baker v. Delaware" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal held that Local Rule Seven of the McCourtney Courthouse Policies, effective August 13, 2019, is invalid; the rule was adopted in violation of state law; the local rule conflicts with California law; the goal of expediting proceedings cannot justify denying mother the opportunity to present relevant evidence; and the court may control courtroom proceedings through case-specific orders. In this case, the juvenile court refused to permit mother to testify or to call witnesses in a juvenile dependency matter set for a contested dispositional hearing, because her counsel had not filed a joint trial statement as required by the local rule.The court also held that, even had the local rules here been properly adopted and enforceable, the juvenile court's ruling barring mother from testifying and examining her daughter on the statements contained in a report to the court because she had failed to submit the joint trial statement would run afoul of Code of Civil Procedure section 575.2. Furthermore, the sanction imposed was disproportionate to the conduct it punished. Accordingly, the court reversed the dispositional orders and remanded to the juvenile court with instructions to conduct a new dispositional hearing without reference to the local rule. View "In re Harley C." on Justia Law

Minor J.S. appealed a dispositional order adjudging him a ward of the court pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 and placing him on formal probation, subject to various terms and conditions. At the time of the incident that led to the charges against J.S., in October 2017, the victim, John Doe, was nine years old and lived with his grandmother in Contra Costa County, California. That month, a family friend and her son and two nephews, 12-year-old J.S. and his brother R.R., were temporarily staying at Doe's home. The family friend's nephews stayed in Doe's room with him. Doe woke up and turned on the light in his room. At that time, R.R. was still sleeping and J.S. was in the bathroom getting ready for school. When J.S. returned to the bedroom, he told Doe to suck his "private part," and said that if Doe did not do it, J.S. would hurt Doe. J.S. exposed his penis and "showed" Doe what he wanted Doe to do. Doe was afraid that J.S. would hurt him, so he got on the ground and began to orally copulate J.S. Doe's grandmother discovered the pair; police were ultimately called. J.S. denied the sequence of events. On appeal, J.S. argued that certain probation conditions that permitted searches of his electronic devices and imposed limitations on his use of computers, the Internet, and social networking Web sites were unconstitutionally overbroad and should be stricken in their entirety. In the alternative, J.S. contended that the conditions at issue should have been stricken and the case remanded to allow the trial court to determine whether the conditions can be narrowly tailored to serve the state's interest in rehabilitation. Finding no abuse of discretion or other reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "In re J.S." on Justia Law

Christopher Shanahan appealed a district court decision denying his motion to correct an allegedly illegal sentence imposed in 1997. In the Fall of 1995, Shanahan and two friends devised a scheme to rob a convenience store in Grant, Idaho, and use the money to travel to Las Vegas, Nevada. Once there, they planned to join a gang and lead a life of crime. Shanahan argued his indeterminate life sentence, with the first thirty-five years fixed, for the murder he committed as a juvenile in 1995 was equivalent to a life sentence without the possibility of parole. Therefore, he argued that under Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) and persuasive precedent from other states, he was entitled to a new sentencing where his youth and its attendant characteristics could be properly considered. Otherwise, he argued, his sentence violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. The district court denied the motion on the basis that Miller was inapplicable to Shanahan’s sentence and, even if it applied, the sentencing court heard testimony regarding his age and mental health prior to sentencing him. Finding no reversible error, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed Shanahan's conviction. View "Idaho v. Shanahan" on Justia Law

In May 2014, Contra Costa County Children & Family Services filed dependency petitions, seeking the detention of children born in 2008 and 2011. The maternal grandparents took the children. Mother was out of contact for a month. The whereabouts of both fathers, D.B. and M.C., were also unknown. Mother and M.C. were eventually located in San Mateo County and did not contest the petition. The matter was transferred to San Mateo County. The dispositional report detailed domestic violence, mental illness, drug use, and another pregnancy. In February 2015, the juvenile court removed the children from parental custody and declared them juvenile court dependents. Reunification services were ordered and the children were eventually returned to mother. The following years involved transfers between the counties, several incidents of violence, psychiatric hospitalization, the birth of a fourth child, drinking, and neglect. The children suffered many problems. The court terminated services, finding that the family had received more than 55 months of services since the initial detention, and set the matter for a section 366.26 hearing so that permanent out-of-home placements could be developed. The court of appeal upheld the orders, rejecting arguments that there were reasonable means short of removal to protect the minors and that the minors’ possible Indian heritage was not properly investigated or notice provided to relevant tribes as required under the Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. 1901. View "M.L. v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal reversed the juvenile court's decision sustaining a Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 petition and finding that A.C. violated his conditions of probation by making criminal threats. The court held that statements A.C. made to a counselor are admissible because they do not fall within the psychotherapist-patient privilege. The court also held that there was insufficient evidence to support the findings that A.C. violated his probation conditions. View "People v. A.C." on Justia Law

Defendants Keith Daron Syling, Roger Schoolcraft, David Kunihiro and Audra Smith were officers or employees of the Alamogordo Police Department (APD) who were allegedly responsible for the public release of information regarding the arrest of a juvenile, A.N, in violation of New Mexico law. Plaintiffs A.N. and her mother, Katherine Ponder brought this action against Defendants and others, asserting claims under federal and state law. Defendants appealed the district court’s denial of their motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ equal protection claim under 42 U.S.C. 1983 based on qualified immunity. The Tenth Circuit concluded Defendants were on notice they would violate A.N.’s right to equal protection under the law if they intentionally and without a rational basis differentiated between her and similarly situated juvenile arrestees in applying New Mexico’s laws against the disclosure of juvenile arrest and delinquency records. As a result, “any reasonable official in [Defendants’] shoes would have understood that he was violating” Plaintiffs’ equal protection rights by these actions. Therefore, the Court affirmed the district court's judgment denying them qualified immunity on Plaintiffs' equal protection claim. View "A.N. v. Alamogordo Police Department" on Justia Law

The State of New Jersey charged fourteen-year-old D.M. with delinquency based on conduct which, if committed by an adult, would constitute first-degree aggravated sexual assault. The State alleged D.M. committed acts of sexual penetration against an eleven-year-old acquaintance, Z.Y. With the parties’ consent, the Family Part judge considered the lesser-related charge of third-degree endangering the welfare of a child. In this appeal, the issue presented for the New Jersey Supreme Court's review centered on whether a juvenile could be adjudicated delinquent for endangering the welfare of a child when the juvenile and his alleged victim were fewer than four years apart in age and the Family Part judge made no findings of sexual penetration, force, or coercion. An Appellate Division panel reversed the juvenile adjudication, reasoning that the Legislature did not intend for the endangering statute, N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a)(1), to support a delinquency adjudication based on a juvenile’s sexual contact with another minor fewer than four years younger than he, in the absence of a finding of sexual penetration, force, or coercion. The New Jersey Supreme Court did not concur with the Appellate Division panel’s construction of the endangering statute. Although the Legislature may decide that statute: "nothing in the current text of N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a)(1) precludes the adjudication in this case. We decline to rewrite the statute’s plain language in this appeal." The Court concluded, however, that the Family Part court’s adjudication had to be reversed: "When the court, at the disposition hearing, disavowed critical aspects of its previously-stated factual findings and characterized its decision to adjudicate D.M. under the lesser-related offense as a humanitarian gesture, it undermined its determination as to both offenses. In this extraordinary setting, it is unclear whether the State met its burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that D.M. violated N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a)(1)." View "New Jersey in the Interest of D.M." on Justia Law