The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeal granting Anthony Cook's petition for writ of habeas corpus and remanded the matter to the court of appeal with directions to deny the petition, holding that resort to a petition for writ of habeas corpus was unnecessary in this case, at least in the first instance.Cook was convicted of two counts of first degree murder and one count of premeditated attempted murder. Cook, who was seventeen years old when he committed the murders, was sentenced to life with the possibility of parole for the attempted murder and five consecutive terms of twenty-five years to life for the murders and enhancements. Cook later filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus arguing that his sentence was cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment and Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012). The court of appeal granted the writ, holding that, in light of People v. Franklin, 63 Cal.4th 261 (2016), Cook was entitled to make a record before the superior court of mitigating evidence tied to his youth. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Cal. Penal Code 1203.01 provides an adequate remedy at law to preserve evidence of youth-related factors. View "In re Cook" on Justia Law

J.M. (aged 14) and another female minor attacked minor Jane at a cemetery. They took turns slapping, punching and kicking Jane and pulling her hair. Jane estimated that the attack lasted 10 minutes; her injuries included a fractured skull and broken nose. S.S. and J.M. recorded cell phone videos of the attack and shared them with friends. J.M. told a sheriff’s deputy that she wanted to take responsibility. J.M. entered into a plea agreement, admitting a felony charge of torture (Pen. Code, 206). The juvenile court declared J.M. a ward of the court (Welfare and Institutions Code section 6021) and committed her to the Division of Juvenile Justice (DJJ) for a maximum term of seven years. The court of appeal denied a habeas corpus petition, in which J.M. asserted ineffective assistance and that her admission was involuntary because it was based on counsel's advice that there was no minimum amount of time she would need to serve, that she could be released whenever her counselor determined she was ready for release, and that she would likely serve only about half of her term. The court held that mental health diversion under Penal Code sections 1001.35 and 1001.36 does not apply to juveniles in delinquency proceedings. The court ordered that the prohibition against J.M. possessing a “weapon” until age 30 be amended to substitute “firearm” for “weapon.” View "In re J.M." on Justia Law

In this post-conviction proceeding, petitioner Lydell White, a juvenile offender, was convicted along with his twin brother Laycelle for aggravated murder and murder. He contended on petition for post-conviction relief that the 800-month sentence he was serving for a single homicide was the functional equivalent of life without parole and was imposed without a hearing that satisfied the procedural and substantive requirements of the Eighth Amendment. The Oregon Supreme Court agreed, finding petitioner was not procedurally barred from seeking post-conviction relief, and that his sentence was subject to the protections of Miller v. Alabama, 567 US 460 (2012). “Because this record does not convince us that the sentencing court determined that petitioner’s crime reflects irreparable corruption, we reverse the decisions of the Court of Appeals and the post-conviction court and remand to the post-conviction court for further proceedings.” View "White v. Premo" on Justia Law

Along with his twin brother, Lydell, petitioner Laycelle White was charged with and convicted of aggravated murder and murder, receiving a sentence of life with the possibility of parole for the murder of one victim and an 800-month determinate sentence for the murder of the other. At the time, petitioner was 15 years old. In a petition for post-conviction relief, petitioner argued the 800-month sentence for one murder was a de facto life sentence without parole that had to comport with the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Miller v. Alabama, 567 US 460 (2012). Petitioner argued the record in this case, decided 17 years before Miller, did not establish that the trial court made the required “irreparable corruption” finding and that his sentence therefore was invalid. The Oregon Supreme Court agreed with this reasoning and reversed the decisions of the Court of Appeals, and of the post-conviction court, and remanded to the post-conviction court for further proceedings. View "White v. Premo" on Justia Law

A juvenile challenged his suspended manifest injustice disposition. The Court of Appeals dismissed his claim on ripeness grounds; the juvenile disagreed his claim was not yet ripe. Furthermore, the juvenile argued the trial court applied the wrong standard of proof during his sentencing hearing, and as a result, improperly imposed the manifest injustice disposition. The juvenile was convicted on two counts of unlawful imprisonment with sexual motivation, and one count of fourth degree assault without sexual motivation. Since he had no prior criminal history, the State recommended, and the trial court adopted, a manifest injustice disposition of 36 weeks' confinement to be suspended by a special sex offender disposition alternative (SSODA). The parties to this case agreed this case was moot, given the juvenile served his sentence by the time the matter reached the Washington Supreme Court. However, finding the issue presented was one of "continuing and substantial interest," the Washington Supreme Court considered the case, determining that the appropriate standard of proof, as found in controlling Washington case law, was "clear and convincing," or the civil equivalent of the criminal standard of beyond a reasonable doubt. The Supreme Court held manifest injustice dispositions suspended by SSODA are reviewable when imposed - juveniles do not need to wait for the disposition to be executed before challenging it. Therefore, the Court of Appeals' ruling to the contrary was overturned. The Court affirmed the juvenile's conviction and sentence. View "Washington v. T.J.S.-M." on Justia Law

The juvenile court found E.P. committed second degree burglary, possessed graffiti tools, received stolen property, and illegally possessed an alcoholic beverage. The Court of Appeal initially concluded that the evidence was insufficient to show that E.P. committed burglary when he stole items from locker rooms in a public ice hockey facility because the prosecution failed to prove that E.P. did not commit the new crime of shoplifting, as defined in Proposition 47. Because E.P. was not charged with shoplifting, the Court also concluded there was no bar to charging him with receiving stolen property. After the Court of Appeal issued its opinion, the California Supreme Court in California v. Colbert, 6 Cal.5th 596 (2019), held that “entering an interior room that is objectively identifiable as off-limits to the public with intent to steal therefrom is not shoplifting, but instead remains punishable as burglary.” The Supreme Court transferred the matter to the Court of Appeal with directions to vacate its decision and reconsider the case in light of Colbert. After review, the appellate court found Colbert did not change its conclusion that the prosecution failed to prove E.P. committed burglary. The evidence showed the locker rooms of the public ice hockey facility were not “objectively identifiable as off-limits to the public.” Accordingly, the Court reversed the finding E.P. committed burglary, but affirmed the findings he received stolen property and illegally possessed an alcoholic beverage. View "In re E.P." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court's order denying Appellant a resentencing hearing and imposing a life sentence with parole eligibility pursuant to the Fair Sentencing with Minors Act of 2017 (FSMA), holding that the penalty provisions of the FSMA did not apply to Appellant.In 2000, Appellant pled guilty to capital murder and received a mandatory sentence of life in prison without parole. Appellant was sixteen years old at the time of the murder. After the United States Supreme Court decided Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), the circuit court granted habeas relief and vacated Appellant's life-without-parole sentence and remanded his case for resentencing. Before a resentencing hearing was held, however, the General Assembly passed the FSMA, which eliminated life without parole as a sentencing option for juvenile offenders and extended parole eligibility to juvenile offenders. On remand, the circuit court sentenced Appellant under the FSMA to life in prison with parole eligibility after thirty years. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) because Appellant committed his crime before the effective date of the FMSA, the penalty provisions of the Act did not apply to him; and (2) Appellant was no longer serving a sentence to which parole eligibility could attach. View "Elliott v. State" on Justia Law

In this appeal from the judgment of the circuit court placing a juvenile accused of delinquency but found not competent to proceed in a mental health facility for a period of thirty-five years under a competency statute designed to address adult defendants and not juveniles, the Supreme Court dismissed the juvenile's appeal, holding that because new evidence suggested that the juvenile had since been restored to competency, the juvenile's appellate arguments were moot.The Legislature has not created any statutory procedure to protect a juvenile's due process right to competency. In the instant case, the circuit court concluded that W. Va. Code 27-6A-3, a statute addressing the pretrial competency of an adult criminal defendant, applied to J.C.'s juvenile proceeding. The circuit court ordered that J.C. be committed to a mental health facility for a maximum period of thirty-five years, as though J.C. was an adult. J.C. appealed. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that J.C.'s argument that the circuit court should not have applied section 3 to his case was rendered moot by a report opining that he had attained competency. View "State v. J.C." on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the motion judges' denial of two juveniles' motions to dismiss and remanded these matters to the juvenile court with directions to dismiss each case, holding that the amended definition of "delinquent child" should be applied retroactively to cases pending on July 12, 2018.On or after July 12, 2018, as a result of the enactment of St. 2018, ch. 69, a child who commits an offense before the age of twelve or who commits an infraction or a first offense of a misdemeanor for which the punishment is a fine or imprisonment for not more than six months can no longer be adjudicated a "delinquent child." These cases concerned juveniles who allegedly committed offenses before July 12, 2018 but whose cases remained pending before the juvenile court on or after that date. The juveniles filed motions to dismiss the charges against them on the grounds that the Act's definition of "delinquent child" should apply retroactively to their cases. The motion judges denied the motions. The Supreme Judicial Court granted the juveniles' interlocutory petitions for extraordinary relief pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3, holding that the juveniles in these cases were not subject to the Juvenile Court's jurisdiction. View "Lazlo L. v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Penal Code section 1170.95's petitioning procedure applies to a juvenile, like the one in this case, whose murder allegation was sustained by the juvenile court on a natural and probable consequences theory prior to the enactment of Senate Bill 1437, which amended the natural and probable consequences doctrine as it relates to murder. Because R.G. has not petitioned the court to have the conviction vacated and the corresponding commitment recalled, the Court of Appeal held that Senate Bill 1437 relief was premature. Accordingly, the court affirmed the juvenile court's order sustaining the allegation that R.G. committed second degree murder. View "People v. R.G." on Justia Law