Relying on Idaho Criminal Rule 47, Jane Doe filed a motion to modify disposition requesting that the juvenile court place her back on probation after sentence had been imposed, and modify its previous computation of credit for time served. The juvenile court held that Doe’s motion was actually a motion to reduce sentence under Idaho Criminal Rule 35 (a rule which has not been incorporated into the Idaho Juvenile Rules) and concluded that it did not have jurisdiction to consider Doe’s motion. Doe appealed the juvenile court’s decision to the district court. The district court affirmed the decision, holding that Rule 47 did not grant jurisdiction to reduce the sentence, but that jurisdiction existed under Idaho Code sections 20-505 and 20-507. The district court held that whether the sentence should be modified was a discretionary call and that the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in declining to place Doe back on probation or incorrectly calculate Doe’s credit for time served. The Idaho Supreme Court agreed with the district court’s decision to affirm the magistrate court’s denial of Doe’s motion to modify disposition, but took the opportunity to explain there was no jurisdiction for the juvenile court to modify the juvenile’s sentence once it had been imposed and the time for appeal had run. View "Idaho v. Jane Doe (Juvenile)" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals vacating in part the juvenile court's order and determining that the juvenile court erred in ordering $65 in restitution to rekey three household locks where the corresponding keys were stolen during an armed robbery, holding that, pursuant to the "direct result" requirement of Md. Crim. Proc. (CP) 11-603(a), the restitution award was proper.G.R. pleaded involved to charges of robbery, second-degree assault, and openly carrying a dangerous weapon. The circuit court found G.R. liable for $120 in restitution, including $65 to rekey the locks of three homes of which the keys were stolen. The Court of Appeals vacated the restitution order, concluding that the costs of rekeying the locks was not a direct result of the underlying robbery. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that G.R.'s robbery directly resulted in a substantial decrease of value of the locks because it brought into question the underlying security of the homes the stolen house keys belonged to, and therefore, the decision to rekey the locks was not an intervening act but a necessary action taken to maintain the security of the homes to which the keys belonged. View "In re G.R." on Justia Law

C.W. was born in 2002. His father, Rusty, moved to Louisiana and started a new family. Before Rusty left, the four-year-old daughter of a friend had accused him of sexual abuse. Rusty had practically no contact with C.W. In Louisiana, Rusty was arrested on aggravated rape charges and spent 10 months in jail. Rusty admitted having sexual intercourse with a third minor, claiming it had been consensual. C.W. entered the child dependency system at age 10. During a “trial home visit” with Rusty, C.W. deteriorated, experiencing trouble in school, conflict with his father, sexual misbehavior and trouble with the law. Rusty sent C.W. to live in a Louisiana children’s group home at the urging of local law enforcement officials. Meanwhile, in California, C.W.'s mother, Heather, had overcome homelessness and drug addiction and become gainfully employed. Heather sought C.W.’s return. The Sonoma County juvenile court terminated his dependency case when C.W. was 16, awarding sole legal and physical custody to Rusty. While an appeal was pending, Louisiana authorities removed C.W., on an emergency basis, from Rusty’s custody, and sent C.W. to California. The court of appeal reversed, first noting that under the Uniform Child Custody Enforcement Act, California has continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over the permanent disposition of C.W.’s custody. The juvenile court abused its discretion. Rusty participated in barely any reunification services, engaged in no sexual abuse counseling, and lives far from local child welfare officials. View "In re C.W." on Justia Law

In these appeals arising from juvenile proceedings involving Michael N. and his parents (Parents), the Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that this Court lacked jurisdiction to consider the issues raised by the County Attorney's Office and that the issues raised by Parents in their appeals had either been waived or had no merit.After an appeal to the court of appeals and the State's dismissals and refilings of petitions, Parents separately moved to dismiss based on lack of service. Parents also moved, unsuccessfully, for recusal of the trial judge. The juvenile court ordered that the County Attorney's office be removed as counsel for the State and ordered the appointment of a special commissioner. Thereafter, the juvenile court denied the motions to dismiss and entered a detention order requiring that Michael remain in the temporary custody of the Nebraska Department of Health and Human Services. Multiple appeals were then filed. The Supreme Court held (1) this Court lacked jurisdiction over the County Attorney's Office's appeal from the order removing it from the case and appointing a special prosecutor; (2) Parents' appeals of the order denying their motions to dismiss and the detention order had been waived; and (3) there was no merit to Parents' arguments challenging the order overruling their motions to recuse. View "In re Interest of Michael N." on Justia Law

Minor, age 16, admitted to carjacking with a personal firearm use enhancement. The probation officer recommended the juvenile court adjudge Minor a ward of the court; remove him from parental custody; commit him to a county institution for a period not to exceed maximum custody time of 12 years, or until age 21, whichever occurs first; and that the court order Minor to participate in the County Institution Program, YOTP [Youthful Offender Treatment Program] and successfully complete all phases, follow all treatment requirements, and obey all rules. Over defense counsel’s objection, the court adopted the recommendation of YOTP commitment, “to meet [Minor’s] rehabilitative needs while keeping the community safe.” The court concluded that a lesser restrictive alternative would not be appropriate and declined to order a fixed term. The court noted that if Minor completed a “perfect” YOTP program, he would be held for about 10 months; otherwise, the maximum period would be until his 21st birthday. The court set a “YOTP review date” for December 2018, seven months away. The court of appeal affirmed the order, rejecting Minor’s contention that it impermissibly delegates to the probation officer the authority to determine the length of commitment. At review hearings, Minor may inform the juvenile court if he disagrees with the assessment of his progress. View "In re J.C." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeal upholding the juvenile court's finding that H.W. possessed an "other instrument or tool with intent feloniously to break or enter" within the meaning of Cal. Penal Code 466, holding that the pair of pliers that H.W. was in possession of when he was apprehended were not an "other instrument or tool" within the meaning of section 466.H.W., a minor, entered a Sears department store with the intent to steal a pair of jeans. When H.W. was apprehended and searched, he had in possession the jeans and a pair of pliers approximately ten inches in length, with a half-inch blade. The juvenile court sustained the burglary tool possession allegation brought against H.W. The Court of Appeal upheld the juvenile court's determination. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the record did not support the conclusion that H.W. intended to use the pliers to do anything other than remove the anti-theft tag from the jeans; and (2) therefore, there was insufficient evidence to support the section 466 allegation. View "In re H.W." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the circuit court denying Appellant a resentencing hearing and imposing a life sentence with parole eligibility pursuant to the Fair Sentencing of Minors Act (FSMA), holding that the circuit court erred in sentencing Appellant under the FSMA because Appellant committed his crime before the effective date of the FSMA.In 1996, Appellant was convicted of capital murder and received a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without parole. Appellant was sixteen years old at the time of the crime. After the United States Supreme Court decided Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), Appellant filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus. The circuit court issued the writ, vacated Appellant's sentence, and remanded the case for resentencing. Before Appellant's resentencing hearing was held, the general assembly passed the FSMA, which eliminated life without parole as a sentencing option for juvenile offenders and extended parole eligibility to juvenile offenders. The circuit court retroactively applied the FSMA to Appellant and resentenced him to life imprisonment with the possibility of parole after thirty years. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a resentencing hearing, holding that Harris v. State, 547 S.W.3d 64, controls this appeal and that the circuit court erred by sentencing Appellant under the FSMA. View "Miller v. State" on Justia Law

Castillero was charged with serious sexual offenses that occurred when he was 14-15 years old. The juvenile court found him unfit for juvenile adjudication and transferred the matter to a court of criminal jurisdiction. In adult/criminal court, Castillero pleaded guilty to four crimes and agreed to serve 40 years in prison. Before sentencing, the trial court denied Castillero’s request for transfer back to juvenile court for a hearing under the procedures set out in Proposition 57, which took effect in November 2016, after Castillero’s original juvenile court hearing. The court of appeal vacated. Proposition 57 significantly amended Welfare and Institutions Code sections 602 and 707. Now, if a prosecutor wishes to try an accused minor as an adult, the prosecutor must file a motion in the juvenile court requesting a transfer to adult/criminal court. The juvenile court must conduct a “transfer hearing.” Under prior law, the juvenile court was bound by a rebuttable presumption that the defendant was not fit for the juvenile court system; under current law, there is no such presumption. In a transfer hearing under current law, the court must consider five factors but has broad discretion in weighing them. The court noted that, because of Castillero’s age, two of the charges against him are not subject to transfer. View "People v. Castillero" on Justia Law

Defendant, then a minor, was directly charged and tried as an adult. Defendant's convictions and sentence were affirmed on appeal, and the matter was remanded to the trial court for the limited purpose of permitting him to make a record of information relevant to his eventual youth offender parole hearing. After the appellate opinion was filed, but before remittitur issued, voters eliminated prosecutorial discretion to file charges against certain juvenile defendants directly in a court of criminal (adult) jurisdiction. Furthermore, after the remittitur issued and proceedings on remand took place, but while the appeal following those proceedings was pending, the Legislature gave trial courts discretion to strike firearm enhancements.The Court of Appeal held that, under the unique circumstances of this case, and in light of the California Supreme Court's conclusion that Proposition 57 applies to all juveniles whose cases were filed directly in adult court and whose convictions were not final at the time of its enactment, the trial court should have entertained and granted defendant's motion for a juvenile fitness/transfer hearing. The court also held that whether defendant may receive the benefit of Senate Bill No. 620 depends on the outcome of his juvenile fitness/transfer hearing. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "People v. Hargis" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the circuit court denying Appellant a resentencing hearing and imposing a life sentence with parole eligibility pursuant to the Fair Sentencing of Minors Act (FSMA), holding that Appellant was entitled to a new sentencing hearing based on this Court’s recent decision in Harris v. State, 547 S.W.3d 64.Appellant received a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without parole for a crime he committed when he was seventeen years old. After the United States Supreme Court decided Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), Appellant filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The circuit court granted the writ, vacated Appellant’s life without parole sentence, and remanded his case to the circuit court for resentencing. Before the resentencing hearing was held, the general assembly passed the FSMA, which eliminated life without parole as a sentencing option for juvenile offenders and extended parole eligibility to juvenile offenders. The circuit court proceeded to sentence Appellant under the new penalty provisions of the FSMA. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because Appellant committed his crime before the effective date of the FSMA, the penalty provisions of the Act did not apply to him. View "Howell v. State" on Justia Law