In April 2016, M.H. was born with a positive toxicology screening for methamphetamine and cocaine; his mother has a history of substance abuse and psychiatric illness. The identity of his father was unknown. Days later, M.H. was placed in the foster home where he remains. M.H.’s great-aunt E.W., who resides in Minnesota, expressed an interest in having M.H. placed with her. Mother’s services were terminated and E.W’s home was approved. The court granted the foster parents the status of de facto parents.The agency report described M.H. as a happy child with a positive relationship with his foster family; during five visits, the child was comfortable with E.W., who is 66 and has raised five children and has close ties to her extended family. The child welfare worker opined that with proper services M.H. would overcome the grieving process and settle into his new placement and that he had considered culture, heritage, and family connections. M.H. is African-American and his foster family is not. The court of appeal affirmed a ruling in favor of the foster family, rejecting an argument that the court disregarded the statutory preference for relative placement (Welf. & Inst. Code 361.3) in favor of the statutory preference for caretaker placement (section 366.26(k)). Neither preference applies; the trial court was best able to make the hard call of which placement was in M.H.’s best interests. View "In re M.H." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s denial of Keshaud Hunt’s motion to transfer his case charging him with multiple felonies arising from two armed robberies to juvenile court. Hunt was fifteen years old when he committed the offenses underlying the charges. The Court also affirmed the district court’s denial of Hunt’s request for disposition under the Nebraska Juvenile Code and imposition of consecutive prison sentences. The Court held (1) the district court’s basis for retaining jurisdiction over Hunt was supported by appropriate evidence, and therefore, the court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to transfer the case to juvenile court; and (2) there was no abuse of discretion in the sentences imposed. View "State v. Hunt" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals affirmed the order of the Appellate Division ruling that Teri W.’s ten-year probation sentence was legal. Teri W. pleaded guilty to one count of sexual abuse in the first degree, a class D felony sex offense, for an offense she committed when she was seventeen years old. Supreme Court deemed her conviction vacated and replaced by a youthful offender finding and sentenced her to ten years’ probation. On appeal, Teri W. argued that her probation sentence illegally exceeded the five-year maximum for undesignated class E felonies. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the sentence was lawful. View "People v. Teri W." on Justia Law

Sixteen-year-old defendant Adrian Vela and one of his fellow gang members confronted two suspected rival gang members. Vela’s accomplice pulled out a gun and shot the two victims, killing one of them. Charged as an adult, a jury found Vela guilty of murder, attempted murder, and found true the related firearm and gang allegations. Vela made several interrelated claims of instructional error concerning accomplice liability, and Vela raised two constitutional challenges to his 72 years to life sentence. In the unpublished parts of its opinion, the Court of Appeal found no reversible error with respect to the trial court’s jury instructions. Furthermore, the Court found Vela’s sentence did not violate either the equal protection clause or the Eighth Amendment. In the published portion of its opinion, the Court of Appeal conditionally reversed the judgment because of Proposition 57. “Vela is retroactively entitled to a transfer hearing because his case is not yet final on appeal. If, after conducting the hearing, the juvenile court judge determines that Vela’s case should be transferred to a court of criminal jurisdiction, then his convictions will be reinstated. . . . But if the juvenile court determines that Vela is amenable to rehabilitation, and should remain within the juvenile justice system, then his convictions will be deemed juvenile adjudications. The juvenile court is then to impose an appropriate disposition within its discretion under juvenile court law.” View "California v. Vela" on Justia Law

Sixteen-year-old defendant Adrian Vela and one of his fellow gang members confronted two suspected rival gang members. Vela’s accomplice pulled out a gun and shot the two victims, killing one of them. Charged as an adult, a jury found Vela guilty of murder, attempted murder, and found true the related firearm and gang allegations. Vela made several interrelated claims of instructional error concerning accomplice liability, and Vela raised two constitutional challenges to his 72 years to life sentence. In the unpublished parts of its opinion, the Court of Appeal found no reversible error with respect to the trial court’s jury instructions. Furthermore, the Court found Vela’s sentence did not violate either the equal protection clause or the Eighth Amendment. In the published portion of its opinion, the Court of Appeal conditionally reversed the judgment because of Proposition 57. “Vela is retroactively entitled to a transfer hearing because his case is not yet final on appeal. If, after conducting the hearing, the juvenile court judge determines that Vela’s case should be transferred to a court of criminal jurisdiction, then his convictions will be reinstated. . . . But if the juvenile court determines that Vela is amenable to rehabilitation, and should remain within the juvenile justice system, then his convictions will be deemed juvenile adjudications. The juvenile court is then to impose an appropriate disposition within its discretion under juvenile court law.” View "California v. Vela" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the separate juvenile court transferring Steven S.’s case to county court, holding that there was no abuse of discretion in the transfer.The State charged Steven, a juvenile, with escape and simultaneously filed a motion to transfer Steven’s case from juvenile court to county court. The juvenile court concluded that the State had proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the matter should be transferred to county court. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, upon the Court’s de novo review of the record, the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in ordering that Steven’s case be transferred to county court. View "In re Interest of Steven S." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s convictions of two counts of first degree murder and two counts of use of a deadly weapon to commit a felony, holding that Defendant’s assignments of error were without merit.On appeal, Defendant argued that the district court erred by not admitting photographs he claimed supported his defense that another individual committed the murders and that his collective sentence of ninety to 140 years’ imprisonment was the functional equivalent of a sentence of life imprisonment. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding (1) the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the photographs by reasoning that the small amount of relevance was outweighed by Neb. Evid. R. 403; and (2) Defendant, who was a juvenile at the time the crimes were committed, received the protections required by Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012). View "State v. Trotter" on Justia Law

Alameda County Social Services recommended termination of the parental rights of Mother so that her son, Christian, could be adopted by Christian’s paternal grandmother and her husband, who live in Denmark. The juvenile court agreed, selecting adoption as the permanent plan, and ordered a case plan calling for Christian to undergo weekly therapy. Because of delays and scheduling issues, Christian attended fewer sessions than planned. In the meantime, his grandparents visited Christian several times in the U.S. Christian was upset when his visits with his mother were suspended and he was informed that he would be moving to Denmark. At a post-permanency review hearing, Christian’s counsel argued that Christian needed additional services to prepare for the move and that a planned trip should be delayed; the court nonetheless approved an extended trip to Denmark, while agreeing that Christian would benefit from additional therapy. In the meantime, the court of appeal reversed the order terminating parental rights because Mother had met her burden of establishing the beneficial-relationship exception to adoption. The court of appeal then concluded that approving the trip was proper under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.3(g) to protect Christian’s stability and to facilitate and expedite his adoption. View "In re Christian K." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the disposition of the juvenile court that ordered Juvenile placed in a residential group home, holding that the out-of-home placement order complied with Neb. Rev. Stat. 43-251.01(7).Section 43-251.01(7) requires that a juvenile not be placed out of his or her home as a dispositional order unless all available community-based resources have been exhausted and there is a significant risk of harm to the juvenile or community by maintaining the juvenile in the home. Here, the juvenile court, in a written disposition order, placed Juvenile on probation for two years and ordered her to reside at a Boys Town group home. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the out-of-home placement complied with the requirements of the statute. View "In re Interest of Keyanna R." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the disposition of the juvenile court that ordered Juvenile placed in a residential group home, holding that the out-of-home placement order complied with Neb. Rev. Stat. 43-251.01(7).Section 43-251.01(7) requires that a juvenile not be placed out of his or her home as a dispositional order unless all available community-based resources have been exhausted and there is a significant risk of harm to the juvenile or community by maintaining the juvenile in the home. Here, the juvenile court, in a written disposition order, ordered Juvenile placed at Boys Town group home. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the out-of-home placement complied with the requirements of the statute. View "In re Interest of Nicholas K." on Justia Law