Justin B. was found delinquent for committing criminal sexual conduct with a minor in the first degree. The family court imposed the mandatory, statutory requirement that he register as a sex offender and wear an electronic monitor, both for life. Justin B. claimed the mandatory imposition of lifetime registration and electronic monitoring on juveniles was unconstitutional. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the family court. View "In the Interest of Justin B." on Justia Law

Order that juveniles submit to psychological evaluation before court ruling on motion to transfer for adult prosecution is not subject to immediate appellate review. Juveniles allegedly robbed a pharmacy. They were charged with Hobbs Act Robbery, 18 U.S.C. 1951(a), and possession of a firearm during that robbery, 18 U.S.C. 924(c). The government sought transfer for adult prosecution, 18 U.S.C. 5032 and moved to have the juveniles examined by government psychologists. The juveniles argued that the examinations—without counsel present—would violate their Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights. The magistrate granted the motion, ordering that the psychologists “not talk … about the specific allegations.” The district court affirmed. The Seventh Circuit dismissed an interlocutory appeal for lack of jurisdiction, without addressing the merits. The order did not fit within the “small class” of nonfinal orders that “finally determine claims of right separable from, and collateral to, rights asserted in the action, too important to be denied review and too independent of the cause itself to require that appellate consideration be deferred until the whole case is adjudicated.” The juvenile will not be irreparably harmed by failure to review his constitutional claims now; he can raise these same claims on an immediate appeal if the district court grants the motion to transfer. If the court denies that motion, the government will be prohibited from using at any subsequent prosecution any information obtained during the examination. View "United States v. Sealed Defendant Juvenile Male (4)" on Justia Law

Oswaldo, age 14, was declared a ward of the court and placed on probation after he admitted the allegation of a Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 petition that he committed misdemeanor battery on the property of a school, park, or hospital. The court dismissed an allegation of felony resisting an officer. Another section 602 petition, filed a month later, alleged two counts of felony vandalism causing damage of over $400. Days later, the probation officer filed a notice, alleging that Oswaldo had violated probation by failing to obey all laws, comply with his court-ordered curfew, attend school and behave appropriately in school. He admitted the first count, reduced to a misdemeanor; the second count and probation violation allegations were dismissed. The court removed Oswaldo from parental custody and ordered conditions of probation, to which Oswaldo objected, including that Oswaldo “not be in any specific locations where gang members are known by him to meet or gather or specific locations known by him for gang-related activity or specified by his probation officer or a parent, in writing, as involving gang-related activity, nor shall he participate in any gang-related activity.” The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting an argument that the condition was unconstitutionally vague for lacking an express knowledge requirement. View "In re Oswaldo R." on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit reversed and remanded the district court's grant of summary judgment in a suit against employees of a juvenile home, concluding that the district court erred by holding as a matter of law that defendants were entitled to qualified immunity. Plaintiff alleged that defendants violated his constitutional rights by housing him in prolonged solitary confinement, failing to educate him, and allowing him to be sexually abused. In this case, the district court addressed only the fact of juvenile court supervision in determining that defendants were entitled to qualified immunity, and its opinion did not contain sufficient detail to allow the court to review whether defendants were entitled to qualified immunity. View "Bradford v. Avery" on Justia Law

R.S. acknowledged that he did not object to two issues he raised on appeal to the Court of Appeal; the Court determined R.S. forfeited those issues. R.S. was found trespassing on school grounds as a nonstudent. Officers detained him after he became belligerent. One of the officers suffered a hairline fracture to his thumb during the struggle. R.S. was arrested in connection with a robbery outside of a Starbucks approximately two months later. At the police station, R.S. at first denied punching the victim in the head, later admitting to striking the victim. R.S. conceded that he attacked the victim to steal his iPhone. At the disposition hearing, the juvenile court imposed, among others, the following probation conditions: "Minor shall submit [his] person, property, or vehicle, and any property under [his] immediate custody or control to search at any time, with or without probable cause, with or without a search warrant, by any law enforcement officer or peace officers, probation officers, school officials or officers, and any other state security officers or agents engaged in the lawful performance of their duties [search condition]." "The minor shall not knowingly be in any privately owned vehicle with more than one person the minor knows or reasonably should know is under the age of 18 unless accompanied by a parent or legal guardian, a responsible adult, or with permission of the probation officer [supervision condition]." R.S. challenged these two conditions, arguing the search condition was unconstitutionally overbroad and vague while the supervision condition was unconstitutionally vague. Because he was making facial challenges to the conditions, R.S. argues his claims of error raised pure questions of law that the Court of Appeal should review. The Court disagreed, concluding R.S. forfeited these challenges by not raising them sooner. View "In re R.S." on Justia Law

The trial court complied with California Rules of Court, rule 5.651(b)(2)(D) by sufficiently considering I.V.'s educational needs. I.V. appealed a dispositional order adjudging him a ward of the court pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 and placing him on formal probation, subject to various terms and conditions. On appeal, I.V. argued the juvenile court erroneously imposed a probation condition requiring him to enroll in the Reflections Day Center Treatment Program without making necessary findings about his special educational needs under Rule of Court 5.651(b)(2)(D). I.V. also argued that a probation condition allowing warrantless searches of his "person, property, vehicle, and any property under his/her immediate custody or control" was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad because it may encompass searches of his electronic devices and data. The Court of Appeal affirmed. View "In re I.V." on Justia Law

Sixteen-year-old defendant Adrian Vela and one of his fellow gang members confronted two suspected rival gang members. Vela’s accomplice pulled out a gun and shot the two victims, killing one of them. The prosecutor directly filed charges against Vela in “adult” criminal court. The jury found Vela guilty of murder, attempted murder, and found true the related firearm and gang allegations. Vela makes several interrelated claims of instructional error concerning accomplice liability. Vela also raises two constitutional challenges to his 72 years to life sentence. In the unpublished parts of its opinion, the Court of Appeal found the trial court committed no instructional errors. Further, Vela’s sentence did not violate either the equal protection clause or the Eighth Amendment. In the published portion of its opinion, the Court conditionally reversed the judgment: the electorate recently approved Proposition 57, which emphasized juvenile rehabilitation, prosecutors can no longer directly file charges against a minor in an “adult” criminal court. Vela was retroactively entitled to a transfer hearing because his case was not yet final on appeal. If, after conducting the hearing, the juvenile court judge determines that Vela’s case should be transferred to a court of criminal jurisdiction, then his convictions and sentence will be reinstated. But if the juvenile court determined that Vela was amenable to rehabilitation, and should remain within the juvenile justice system, then his convictions would be deemed juvenile adjudications. View "California v. Vela" on Justia Law

B.M., seventeen years old, appealed from a juvenile court order declaring her a ward of the court and ordering her to serve 90 days in a juvenile justice facility. The juvenile court sustained a petition charging that B.M. committed a felony assault with a deadly weapon (a butter knife) in violation of Penal Code section 245, subdivision (a)(1). The court rejected B.M.'s claim that the juvenile court erroneously admitted statements she made to the police in violation of Miranda v. Arizona. The court concluded that the evidence was sufficient to support the finding that the butter knife she used was a deadly weapon. Consistent with an express direction from the California Supreme Court and time-honored rules on appeal, the court affirmed the trial court's factual finding that the instant butter knife was a deadly weapon because it was used in a manner capable of producing great bodily injury. The court disagreed with In re Brandon T. to the extent that it held to the contrary. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "In re B.M." on Justia Law

Edward, then age 14, grabbed a handbag from a 66-year-old woman and was apprehended by a police officer who saw him with the bag. A wardship petition alleged misdemeanor grand theft from the person (Pen. Code, 487(c)). Edward admitted the allegation. Edward was adjudged a ward of the court, placed on probation, and ordered to complete a six-month residential program at a youth rehabilitation facility, followed by a 90-day conditional release/parole period. The juvenile court probation conditions, including: “The minor shall not knowingly associate with anyone known to the minor to be a gang member or associated with a gang, or anyone who the [probation officer] informs the minor to be, a gang member or associated with a gang” and “[T]he minor is not to be on a school campus unless he’s enrolled.” The court of appeal struck the gang condition, upheld the campus condition, and remanded for specification of the maximum term of confinement and calculation of credit for time served. Without evidence of gang affiliation or association with gang members or risk of gang involvement on Edward’s part, the gang condition was not tailored to his future criminality, but the campus condition was not impermissibly vague. View "In re Edward B." on Justia Law

Petitioner was convicted of second-degree murder and sentenced to 15 years to life in prison. The offense was committed in 1979, when petitioner was 17 years old. In 1982, at age 20, he pled guilty to assault with a deadly weapon on a peace officer and possession of a deadly weapon by a prisoner and was sentenced to four years, to be served consecutively to his life sentence. In 2015, after serving 35 years in prison, petitioner was found suitable for parole as a youthful offender under Penal Code 3051, effective in November 2015. Petitioner claimed that his release date was recalculated as November 2, 2017, based on a correction in his credit earning status. In June 2016, petitioner filed a habeas corpus petition challenging the legality of his continuing incarceration. The trial court denied relief, concluding that section 3051 does not exempt a youthful offender granted parole from serving a consecutive sentence for an offense committed in prison, citing section 1170.1(c), which provides that a consecutive sentence for an in-prison offense “shall commence from the time the person would otherwise have been released.” The court of appeal granted relief; section 1170.1(c), does not apply to petitioner’s case because his in-prison offense was committed before he was 23 years old, so he was entitled to release at the end of his indeterminate sentence pursuant to section 3051(d). View "In re Trejo" on Justia Law