Justia Juvenile Law Opinion Summaries

A twelve-year-old child disclosed to a school counselor that she had been communicating with a twenty-six-year-old man, later identified as Eric Overton, via Snapchat. The child’s mother confirmed the communication, obtained evidence from the phone, and contacted law enforcement. The investigation revealed that Overton and the child had exchanged nude photographs and sexually explicit messages, and that Overton had picked up the child from her home on three occasions, during which they engaged in sexual intercourse. The child provided detailed testimony at trial regarding these encounters.The Hot Spring County Circuit Court presided over the trial, during which Overton objected to the prosecutor’s voir dire questioning about whether a conviction could be based on the testimony of a single credible witness. The court overruled the objection and denied a subsequent motion for mistrial, emphasizing that the jury would be instructed on the law at the end of the case. The jury was later instructed on the presumption of innocence and the State’s burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The jury found Overton guilty of rape and internet stalking of a child, and he was sentenced to life imprisonment on each count.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Arkansas reviewed whether there was substantial evidence to support the rape conviction and whether the circuit court erred in its handling of voir dire and jury instructions. The court held that the evidence, including the victim’s testimony, was sufficient to support the conviction, and that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying the mistrial. The court affirmed the convictions, finding no prejudicial error in the proceedings. View "Overton v. State" on Justia Law

Terry Break was convicted in 2021 of multiple child sexual abuse offenses, including rape, second-degree sexual assault, and sexual indecency with a child, involving three minor victims. He received six life sentences plus 488 years in prison and $425,000 in fines. His convictions were affirmed on direct appeal. Break then filed a Rule 37 petition for postconviction relief, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel on several grounds.The Boone County Circuit Court denied Break's petition. The court found that the State had provided sufficient evidence of "sexual gratification or desire" for the offenses, and thus, trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to challenge this element. The court also found that the prosecutor's comment during closing arguments, referring to Break as a "proven liar," was based on Break's own admissions and was not improper. Additionally, the court determined that the prosecutor's opening statement did not shift the burden of proof, as it referred to Break's demeanor during a recorded interview rather than his silence at trial. Lastly, the court acknowledged that the prosecutor's biblical reference during closing arguments was improper but concluded that Break failed to show that trial counsel's failure to object constituted ineffective assistance.The Arkansas Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the circuit court's decision. The court held that Break failed to demonstrate that his trial counsel's performance was deficient or that any alleged deficiencies prejudiced the outcome of his trial. The court emphasized that Break did not provide sufficient evidence to support his claims of ineffective assistance and that the decisions made by his trial counsel fell within the range of reasonable professional judgment. View "BREAK v. STATE OF ARKANSAS" on Justia Law

Hunter de la Garza, a former employee of the Northwest Arkansas Children’s Shelter, was convicted of raping a ten-year-old female resident of the Shelter. The incident occurred during an outing to a mall, where de la Garza followed the victim into a restroom, forcibly undressed her, and raped her. The victim disclosed the rape to her brother and a friend, and later to a professional interviewer. The Shelter’s staff observed behavioral changes in the victim consistent with sexual abuse. De la Garza was interviewed by police and provided inconsistent accounts of the events.The Benton County Circuit Court denied de la Garza’s motion for a directed verdict, finding sufficient evidence to support the conviction. The court also allowed testimony from another young female resident of the Shelter, who described similar abuse by de la Garza, under the “pedophile exception” to Rule 404(b) of the Arkansas Rules of Evidence. The jury found de la Garza guilty and sentenced him to life in prison. De la Garza’s motion for a new trial was denied.The Arkansas Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the conviction. The court held that the victim’s testimony, along with corroborating evidence, constituted substantial evidence to support the conviction. The court also found no abuse of discretion in admitting the testimony of the other young resident under the pedophile exception. Additionally, the court determined that de la Garza’s arguments regarding prosecutorial comments were not preserved for appeal, as he failed to contemporaneously object or request further relief during the trial. The court conducted a Rule 4-3(a) review and found no prejudicial error. View "HUNTER DE LA GARZA v. STATE OF ARKANSAS" on Justia Law

Christopher Segerstrom was convicted of capital murder for the 1986 killing of a four-year-old and was initially sentenced to life imprisonment without parole. He was 15 years old at the time of the crime. Following the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Miller v. Alabama, which prohibits mandatory life without parole for juvenile offenders, Segerstrom's sentence was vacated and remanded for resentencing. The Washington County Circuit Court resentenced him to life with the possibility of parole after thirty years without a hearing, which was reversed by the Arkansas Supreme Court, mandating a hearing to consider mitigating factors.Upon remand, Segerstrom's fitness to proceed was contested. The circuit court initially found him unfit due to schizophrenia but later deemed him fit after a year of treatment, based on a forensic evaluation by Dr. Melissa Wright. Segerstrom's defense presented conflicting expert testimony, but the court credited Dr. Wright's findings. On the day of the resentencing hearing, Segerstrom's counsel requested a continuance, claiming he was unresponsive due to medication, which the court denied.During the resentencing, the court admitted prior testimony from Dr. Joseph Halka, who performed the autopsy, over Segerstrom's objection. The court also rejected a nonmodel jury instruction proposed by Segerstrom, which emphasized the differences between juvenile and adult offenders as per Miller. The jury ultimately sentenced Segerstrom to life imprisonment.The Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's decisions, holding that substantial evidence supported the finding of Segerstrom's fitness to proceed, the denial of the continuance was not an abuse of discretion, the admission of Dr. Halka's testimony was proper, and the rejection of the proposed jury instruction was appropriate given the sentencing options. View "SEGERSTROM V. STATE OF ARKANSAS" on Justia Law

In 1980, Thernell Hundley was convicted of capital murder and rape, and received a life sentence without parole. In 2012, the Supreme Court ruled that life sentences without parole for juvenile offenders were unconstitutional, and Hundley's life sentence for capital murder was vacated. However, during his incarceration, Hundley had committed four additional felonies. As a result, the Jefferson County Circuit Court in Arkansas ruled that Hundley was ineligible for parole based on Arkansas Code Annotated section 16-93-607(c)(5), which states that inmates classified as fourth offenders are not eligible for parole.Hundley appealed this decision, arguing that his rape conviction should be vacated as it was merged with the capital murder charge, that he should be eligible for parole under the Fair Sentencing of Minors Act, and that his parole eligibility should be determined by the law in effect when he committed his first crimes in 1979. He also challenged the inclusion of his two Class D felony convictions in determining his parole eligibility.The Supreme Court of Arkansas upheld the circuit court's decision. The court ruled that Hundley's separate conviction for rape was not illegal and could not be vacated. The court further held that Hundley's parole eligibility was correctly determined based on the law in effect at the time he committed his last two felonies in 1988 and 1989, not the law at the time of his original crimes. The court also clarified that Hundley's parole ineligibility was based on his convictions for capital murder, rape, attempted first-degree murder and first-degree battery, not his two Class D felonies. View "Hundley v. Payne" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court granting Petitioner's motion for judgment on the pleadings, entering judgment in Petitioner's favor for the relief requested in his petition, and denying the Director of the Division of Correction's motion for summary judgment, holding that the circuit court erred.Petitioner pleaded guilty to first-degree murder and aggravated assault. After the General Assembly passed the Fair Sentencing of Minors Act (FSMA), which contained parole-eligibility provisions that applied retroactively to Petitioner, Petitioner filed a petition for declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, and mandamus relief seeking to resolve any uncertainty regarding the FSMA as applied to him. The circuit court granted Petitioner's motion for judgment on the pleadings and denied the Board's motion for summary judgment, finding that Ark. Code Ann. 16-93-621(a)(2)(A) applied retroactively to Petitioner's sentences. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court erred in its interpretation of section 16-93-621(a) and by finding that Petitioner was parole eligible after serving twenty-five years' imprisonment. View "Arkansas Parole Bd. v. Johnson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court's order denying Appellant a resentencing hearing and imposing a life sentence with parole eligibility pursuant to the Fair Sentencing with Minors Act of 2017 (FSMA), holding that the penalty provisions of the FSMA did not apply to Appellant.In 2000, Appellant pled guilty to capital murder and received a mandatory sentence of life in prison without parole. Appellant was sixteen years old at the time of the murder. After the United States Supreme Court decided Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), the circuit court granted habeas relief and vacated Appellant's life-without-parole sentence and remanded his case for resentencing. Before a resentencing hearing was held, however, the General Assembly passed the FSMA, which eliminated life without parole as a sentencing option for juvenile offenders and extended parole eligibility to juvenile offenders. On remand, the circuit court sentenced Appellant under the FSMA to life in prison with parole eligibility after thirty years. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) because Appellant committed his crime before the effective date of the FMSA, the penalty provisions of the Act did not apply to him; and (2) Appellant was no longer serving a sentence to which parole eligibility could attach. View "Elliott v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the circuit court denying Appellant a resentencing hearing and imposing a life sentence with parole eligibility pursuant to the Fair Sentencing of Minors Act (FSMA), holding that because Appellant had his sentence vacated pursuant to Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), Appellant was not subject to sentencing under the FSMA.Appellant was convicted of capital murder for an offense he committed when he was less than eighteen years of age. The jury sentenced Appellant to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Appellant's sentence was later vacated pursuant to Miller. Before the resentencing hearing, the Arkansas General Assembly passed the FSMA. The circuit court sentenced Appellant under the FSMA to a term of life imprisonment with the possibility of parole after thirty years. After the circuit court's order, the Supreme Court decided Harris v. State, 547 S.W.3d 64, in which the Court determined that individuals who had their sentences vacated pursuant to Miller were not subject to sentencing under the FSMA. On appeal, Appellant argued that his case should be controlled by Harris even where Harris was handed down after the circuit court's ruling. The Supreme Court agreed and remanded the case for resentencing in accordance with Harris. View "Williams v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the circuit court denying Appellant a resentencing hearing and imposing a life sentence with parole eligibility pursuant to the Fair Sentencing of Minors Act (FSMA), holding that the circuit court erred in sentencing Appellant under the FSMA because Appellant committed his crime before the effective date of the FSMA.In 1996, Appellant was convicted of capital murder and received a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without parole. Appellant was sixteen years old at the time of the crime. After the United States Supreme Court decided Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), Appellant filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus. The circuit court issued the writ, vacated Appellant's sentence, and remanded the case for resentencing. Before Appellant's resentencing hearing was held, the general assembly passed the FSMA, which eliminated life without parole as a sentencing option for juvenile offenders and extended parole eligibility to juvenile offenders. The circuit court retroactively applied the FSMA to Appellant and resentenced him to life imprisonment with the possibility of parole after thirty years. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a resentencing hearing, holding that Harris v. State, 547 S.W.3d 64, controls this appeal and that the circuit court erred by sentencing Appellant under the FSMA. View "Miller v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the circuit court denying Appellant a resentencing hearing and imposing a life sentence with parole eligibility pursuant to the Fair Sentencing of Minors Act (FSMA), holding that Appellant was entitled to a new sentencing hearing based on this Court’s recent decision in Harris v. State, 547 S.W.3d 64.Appellant received a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without parole for a crime he committed when he was seventeen years old. After the United States Supreme Court decided Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), Appellant filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The circuit court granted the writ, vacated Appellant’s life without parole sentence, and remanded his case to the circuit court for resentencing. Before the resentencing hearing was held, the general assembly passed the FSMA, which eliminated life without parole as a sentencing option for juvenile offenders and extended parole eligibility to juvenile offenders. The circuit court proceeded to sentence Appellant under the new penalty provisions of the FSMA. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because Appellant committed his crime before the effective date of the FSMA, the penalty provisions of the Act did not apply to him. View "Howell v. State" on Justia Law