Justia Juvenile Law Opinion Summaries

This appeal arose out of Victor Garrett and Erion Varnado’s participation in armed robberies and an attempted armed robbery in November 2008. Both Garrett and Varnado were 17 years old when the offenses were committed, but were tried as adults. A jury convicted Garrett of six counts of second degree robbery, two counts of kidnapping for robbery, one count of attempted robbery, and one count of assault with a firearm. For each of the offenses, the jury found true the allegation Garrett personally used a firearm, and as to the assault with a firearm, that Garrett personally discharged a firearm. Garrett was sentenced to serve a total of 74 years and 4 months to life in prison. Varnado was also convicted by a jury of two counts of second degree robbery, one count of attempted robbery, and one count of assault with a firearm. The jury also found true the allegation Varnado personally used a firearm during the assault and attempted robbery. However, the jury found Varnado not guilty of four counts of robbery. The jury was unable to reach a verdict as to: the two counts of kidnapping to commit robbery, whether Varnado personally used a firearm during the second degree robberies, or he discharged a firearm during the attempted robbery. The trial court declared a mistrial as to the counts and enhancements for which the jury could not reach a verdict. On retrial, Varnado was convicted of the remaining two counts of second degree robbery, and the jury found true the allegation he used a firearm during these robberies. The second jury was not asked to decide whether Varnado discharged a firearm during the attempted robbery. Varnado was sentenced to serve a total of 31 years to life in prison. Both appealed. The Court of Appeal found no reversible error and affirmed each defendant's convictions and sentence. View "California v. Garrett" on Justia Law

In early 2016, petitioner (the State) initiated a prosecution against real party in interest, a minor who was detained at juvenile hall, by directly filing a criminal complaint against him in adult court. Preliminary hearings occurred on May 26, 2016, and on June 10, 2016, and the State filed an information charging real party in interest with felony violations. On November 8, 2016, the voters passed Proposition 57. As relevant here, Proposition 57 eliminated the State's ability to directly file charges against a juvenile offender in adult court and instead authorized the State to file “a motion to transfer the minor from juvenile court to a court of criminal jurisdiction.” On November 16, 2016, real party in interest filed a motion requesting “a fitness hearing in juvenile court pursuant to recently enacted legislation via Proposition 57.” After considering written opposition from the State, who argued Proposition 57 could not be applied to real party in interest’s case retroactively, the trial court granted the motion on November 29, 2016. The State then appealed. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded lacked merit. "Our order requesting an informal response notified real party in interest that a peremptory writ might issue unless it showed good cause to the contrary. All parties received 'due notice,' and 'it appears that the petition and opposing papers on file adequately address the issues raised by the petition, that no factual dispute exists, and that the additional briefing that would follow issuance of an alternative writ is unnecessary to disposition of the petition.'" In reliance on these rules, and because the Court agreed that the issue posed by the petition was an important one warranting speedy resolution, the Court of Appeal resolved the petition by way of a formal written opinion denying relief. View "California v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

The juvenile court dismissed Joshua R.’s juvenile adjudication after he successfully completed probation. The court declined to seal his record, however, because of an ongoing probation condition stating he was not permitted to own a firearm before he turned 30 years old. Joshua argued this was error. The Court of Appeal agreed: "[t]he pertinent issue is whether the substantive Penal Code section addressing future firearm ownership for minors in his situation conflicts with the Welfare and Institutions Code section requiring the juvenile court to seal records upon the successful completion of probation. We conclude these statutes can be harmonized to effect the purposes of each." View "In re Joshua R." on Justia Law

Defendant, sixteen-years-old at the time of the crimes, was convicted of one count of second degree murder and two counts of attempted willful, premeditated, and deliberate murder. The court concluded that defendant's Batson/Wheeler motions were properly denied where the totality of the relevant facts dispel any inference of a discriminatory intent on the part of the prosecutor in exercising her peremptory challenges to excuse three African-American prospective jurors; defendant's April 13, 2013 statement to the police was properly admitted where he validly waived his Miranda rights and his post-Miranda statement was voluntary; and defendant's Eighth Amendment challenge to his 80 year to life prison sentence has been rendered moot where the legislature has enacted Penal Code section 3051, and in light of the holding in People v. Franklin, where defendant will be entitled to a youth offender parole hearing with a meaningful opportunity for release after 25 years of incarceration. The court remanded the matter for the trial court to follow the procedures outlined in Franklin to see if defendant is entitled to a hearing to present evidence relevant to his future youthful offender parole hearing. View "People v. Jones" on Justia Law

In May 2015, police detained defendant M.F. at his high school after he gave one of his teachers a letter stating that she "should be worried about getting shot." When detained, he was wearing an empty holster. The police searched M.F.'s backpack and found journals that described a plan to kill individuals associated with schools that he had attended. The journals also contained a list of supplies that he would need to carry out his plan and "hit lists" of potential victims, with various types of "punishments" (such as wound, torture, death, rape, or a combination thereof) next to each name. In addition, one journal entry indicated that M.F. had been "faking it" while participating in anger management and counseling following his 2013 expulsion. At home, police searched M.F.'s bedroom and found 20 rounds of live ammunition, several replica firearms, gun magazines, gun cleaning equipment and gun holsters, including one for a Glock firearm, a handgun case, a folding knife, black ski masks and a balaclava. Police also found tactical gear, including a ballistic helmet, vest and armor plates. Several items found in M.F.'s bedroom had been checked off on his supply list. M.F. told police that he had been involved in a militia for several years, admitted having borrowed a Glock and a rifle from militia members, and that the militia had given him body armor, which he said he used "mostly" for his job as a paintball referee. He claimed that his journal entries were intended to be cathartic and he had no intention of physically harming anyone. Regarding his participation in anger management and decision-making counseling in 2014, he admitted that the programs had been ineffective in helping him appropriately channel his anger. M.F. appealed a juvenile court's disposition order declaring him a ward of the court, committing him to a residential program, and setting probation conditions. He contended the court erred by: (1) admitting cumulative and prejudicial testimony and exhibits at the disposition hearing; (2) committing him to a 480-day residential program; (3) imposing an unconstitutionally overbroad probation condition restricting his possession of electronic devices; (4) designating one of his offenses as a felony without a proper section 702 finding; and (5) failing to deduct his predisposition custody credits when calculating his maximum term of confinement. The Court of Appeal concluded the juvenile court erred in imposing an overly broad probation condition regarding electronic devices and in failing to deduct predisposition custody credits when determining M.F.'s maximum time of confinement. The Court reversed the disposition order in part, and remanded for the juvenile court to modify its order to include: (1) a more narrowly tailored probation condition, and (2) a deduction of M.F.'s predisposition custody credits in its determination of his maximum period of confinement. In all other respects, the Court affirmed the order. View "In re M.F." on Justia Law

Ray M. appealed an Imperial County juvenile court order denying his motion to conduct a new assessment under Welfare and Institutions Code section 241.11 and declaring him a delinquent ward under section 602. Ray filed his motion after the Kern County juvenile court determined he should be deemed a ward, and not a dependent, without providing notice to his dependency attorney or to the Imperial County court as required by section 241.1 and California Rules of Court, rule 5.512.2 Ray also argued, and the Imperial County Department of Social Services conceded, that the juvenile court erred at the outset of the dependency by failing to provide notice as required by the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). The Court of Appeal agreed with Ray that because the Kern County juvenile court did not comply with the notice requirements set forth in section 241.1 and rule 5.512, the Imperial County juvenile court had the authority to revisit the Kern County court's assessment under section 241.1. Accordingly, the Court reversed the orders and remanded the case for the juvenile court assigned to hear Ray's dependency matter to conduct a new assessment under section 241.1 and, if Ray was deemed a dependent, to comply with the notice provisions of ICWA. View "In re Ray M." on Justia Law

A petition filed under Welfare and Institutions Code 602 alleged that E.G. committed four offenses. He pled no contest to battery causing serious bodily injury and grand theft; the remaining charges were dismissed. The offenses E.G. pled no contest to were “wobblers,” offenses (Penal Code 17(b)(3)) that “are chargeable or, in the discretion of the court, punishable as either a felony or a misdemeanor.” The petition alleged them as felonies. The juvenile court placed E.G. on probation and committed him to a youth facility for nine months. The court of appeal remanded, finding the juvenile court had not exercised its discretion to declare the offenses misdemeanors or felonies as required by statute. Months later, E.G. moved to have his offenses reduced to misdemeanors under section 17(b), stating that the juvenile court had declared the offenses to be felonies. The state did not dispute this statement, although no such declaration was made on remand. The juvenile court denied the motion, finding that section 17(b)(3) did not apply in juvenile proceedings. A bench officer subsequently stated he had declared the offenses to be felonies at disposition and did so again. The court then terminated E.G.’s wardship and probation. Holding that the “wobbler” provision applies in juvenile proceedings, the court of appeal remanded to allow the juvenile court to exercise its discretion. View "In re E.G." on Justia Law

D.R., born in November 2004, lived with her maternal grandmother since she was an infant and was “thriving” in her grandmother’s care. D.R.’s two half siblings lived separately with mother and their father in the same apartment building. Dependency proceedings were initiated in 2013, following a violent incident involving the father of D.R.’s two half-siblings. Mother failed to comply with reunification plans. D.R.’s father, who initially was described as “whereabouts unknown,” eventually was located living at the home of his mother and stepfather. Father had been convicted of statutory rape of D.R.’s mother and did not see D.R. after he was released from incarceration. His name was not on D.R.’s birth certificate. Father visited D.R. for a four-month period during the dependency proceedings, after which he stopped visiting. Father did not attend conjoint therapy with D.R. As D.R.’s permanent plan, the juvenile court selected legal guardianship over adoption by her grandmother. The court of appeal reversed, holding that the trial court was required to select the more permanent plan of adoption. No substantial evidence supported the court’s rationale for selecting legal guardianship instead of adoption. View "In re D.R." on Justia Law

In 2013, in Contra Costa County Juvenile Court, defendant pleaded no contest to felony theft. The court declared him a ward of the state. A year later, a new petition alleged defendant unlawfully possessed a firearm. He pleaded no contest to a misdemeanor variant of the charge. The following year, prior to a disposition hearing on the new charge, defendant’s case was transferred to the San Francisco Juvenile Court (Welfare and Institutions Code section 750) because his family had moved. The San Francisco Juvenile Court re-declared defendant a ward, placed him with his mother, and kept intact orders of the transferor court. Days later, defendant filed a Proposition 47 petition in the San Francisco Juvenile Court to reduce his felony theft offense to misdemeanor larceny. The San Francisco court denied his petition, ruling only the Contra Costa Juvenile Court had jurisdiction to act on defendant’s petition, citing Penal Code 1170.18(a), which states that a defendant “may petition for a recall of sentence before the trial court that entered the judgment of conviction.” The court of appeal reversed. Proposition 47 is not intended to undercut an important goal of the juvenile justice system, to preserve and support the family unit. View "In re I.S." on Justia Law

While J.S. was a dependent of the juvenile court, a delinquency petition was filed alleging that she committed vandalism and used force and violence against another minor. The juvenile court declared her a "dual status" child, making her both a dependent and a ward of the court. On appeal, J.S. argued that: (1) the juvenile court erred by failing to dismiss the delinquency petition and declaring her a dual status youth; (2) the court erred by detaining her in juvenile hall pending placement in a residential treatment facility; and (3) she was prejudiced by being declared a ward. The Court of Appeal rejected J.S.'s arguments and affirmed the judgment. View "In re J.S." on Justia Law