Justia Juvenile Law Opinion Summaries

In 1996, defendant Clifton Gibson was tried as an adult and convicted of first degree murder with special circumstances, assault with a firearm, and robbery. These offenses were committed when he was 17 years old, with two adult codefendants. Gibson was ultimately sentenced to life without possibility of parole (LWOP) for the murder, consecutive to a determinate term of 12 years, four months, in prison. In 2014, he filed a petition to recall his sentence pursuant to Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (d)(2), which was denied by the trial court on the ground he failed to demonstrate he had been rehabilitated or that he was remorseful. Defendant appealed. On appeal, defendant argued the trial court: (1) improperly limited applicability of section 1170, subdivision (d)(2) relief to juvenile defendants who did not actually kill the victim; (2) abused its discretion in denying the petition despite evidence to support the existence of all the statutory factors; and (3) “flouted Miller [v. Alabama, 132 S.Ct. 2455 (2012)] and Gutierrez[58 Cal.4th 1354 (2014)].” Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "California v. Gibson" on Justia Law

After his stepfather, Donald, assaulted his mother, Heidi, in Alexander’s presence, Alexander, then three years old, became the subject of a dependency petition. At the time, Donald, Alexander’s biological father, Joel, and Michael, the man with whom Heidi was living at the time of Alexander’s birth, had competing motions pending. Two weeks after the dependency petition was filed, the family court ruled that both Michael and Joel qualified as presumed parents and designated both under Family Code section 7612(c), which authorizes multiple presumed parents. Considering itself bound by that order, the juvenile court found both Michael and Joel to be presumed parents, but subsequently denied Michael visitation. The court found that Donald also satisfied the requirements for presumed parent status and designated him as such. The court of appeal held that the juvenile court erred in finding Michael to be a presumed parent. Because Welfare and Institutions Code section 316.2 grants exclusive jurisdiction over paternity issues to the juvenile court upon the filing of a dependency petition, the family court order on which the juvenile court relied, issued subsequent to the filing, was void. The court found no error in the designation of Donald as a presumed parent, which was supported by substantial evidence. View "In re Alexander P." on Justia Law

Minor and his friends entered an Oakland home through a back window and took a watch, a camera, and loose change. They were apprehended blocks away. The dispositional report noted that Minor had a “difficult” relationship with his mother and admitted he had experimented with drugs and alcohol and had associated with members of the Norteños gang. Minor was in danger of failing most of his middle school classes. He had significant behavioral issue. The juvenile court placed Minor under the supervision of the probation department and imposed probation conditions, including a 6:00 p.m. curfew, a no-contact order as to the victim and Minor’s co-offenders, and requirements that Minor attend school, complete his school work, remain drug-free, submit to regular drug testing, and submit to a search of his person, residence, vehicles, containers, and “electronics, including passwords.” Minor unsuccessfully moved to delete the electronic search condition. The court stated that Minor “has some fairly substantial drug issues” and “we need to use the electronics to make sure we can monitor the purchase, or sales, usage [of drugs].” The court of appeal affirmed, holding that the condition was not overbroad, was reasonably related to potential future criminality, and was necessary to ensure compliance with other conditions. View "In re J.E." on Justia Law

Sixteen-year-old M.H. used his smartphone to surreptitiously record a fellow high school student, Matthew B., in a school bathroom stall while Matthew was either masturbating or jokingly pretending to do so. The video, taken inside the bathroom, but about 20 feet away from the bathroom stall, did not show Matthew's face, but did reveal his distinctive socks and shoes, which were visible in the gap between the stall wall and the floor. M.H. uploaded the 10-second video to Snapchat with the caption, "I think this dude is jacking off [sic]." M.H. intended the video to be funny and to get a laugh. But about two weeks later, Matthew took his own life, stating in a suicide note, "I can't handle school anymore and I have no friends." The San Diego County District Attorney's Office filed a juvenile delinquency petition alleging M.H. engaged in an unauthorized invasion of privacy by means of a cell phone camera. The trial court found true the allegation that M.H. violated Penal Code section 647(j)(1). The trial court sentenced M.H. to probation on numerous conditions, including several restricting his use of social media. On appeal, M.H. argued: (1) no substantial evidence supported the juvenile court's finding that he had the requisite specific intent "to invade Matthew's privacy" as required by section 647(j)(1); (2) (raised for the first time on appeal) section 647(j)(1) incorporated by reference the elements of the tort of invasion of privacy, and assuming that to be true, he asserts there is a "newsworthy" defense that immunizes him from criminal liability in this case; and (3) (also for the first time on appeal) section 647(j)(1) violated his First Amendment rights. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "In re M.H." on Justia Law

Elijah C. signed a document waiving the one-year statute of limitations for petty theft as a condition of entering a diversion program for first-time offenders. The court held that a minor’s purported waiver of the statute of limitations for an offense is not valid, when that waiver was made without consultation with counsel and before a petition against the minor was filed. Although Elijah did not yet have the right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment because no petition had yet been filed, he faced what was in effect a critical stage of the prosecution. Accordingly, the court reversed the juvenile court's order overruling the demurrer. View "In re Elijah C." on Justia Law

A petition was filed with the juvenile court alleging that George F. committed a lewd and lascivious act upon a child under the age of 14, and that George willfully annoyed and molested a child under the age of 18. The State offered to dismiss count 1 if George admitted to count 2. George admitted to count 2 and the juvenile court found a factual basis for that admission. The court then granted the State's motion to dismiss count 1, declared George a ward of the court, and ordered him to juvenile probation on various terms and conditions. George appealed, contending that the conditions of his probation restricting his use of electronics or requiring the submission of those electronics to search were invalid under "California v. Lent (15 Cal.3d 481 (1971)) and (2) unconstitutionally overbroad. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "In re George F." on Justia Law

In 1997, defendant, age 17, left a residential treatment center without authorization and bought a pistol, intending to rob and kill people and to settle gang scores. Defendant arrived in Monterey, obtained ammunition, and connected with three acquaintances. They drove around, stopping at the Monterey Wharf, where two women, drinking coffee, did not hear defendant demand money. Defendant fired nine shots at them. One woman died immediately; the other survived, but had brain operations and suffered permanent injuries. The four changed cars to escape detection. They drove to Seaside, where defendant's friend shot a pedestrian six times. She died immediately. Days later, defendant gave his gun and bullets to a friend, stating that the gun was “heated.” Defendant was arrested that day. He was convicted of two first degree murders, attempted premeditated murder, and aggravated mayhem. The court rejected defendant’s claim that he was suffering from a mental illness that reduced his culpability; noted that “all of the doctors” characterized defendant as argumentative, explosive, controlling, defiant, resistant to feedback, and a danger to society, with poor impulse control; stated that defendant “must never be allowed the possibility of drawing another breath in freedom,” and sentenced defendant to two consecutive life without parole terms, a consecutive term of 15-years-to-life, and two consecutive terms of 25-years-to-life. His appeals and habeas petition were unsuccessful. The court of appeal affirmed denial of defendant’s 2014 petition for recall and resentencing (Penal Code section 1170(d)(2)). View "People v. Willover" on Justia Law

In this case, the juvenile court at the dispositional hearing determined that Ivan N. (the minor), who had admitted to a felony sex offense, should have been placed out of his home for treatment in a community-based organization (CBO), which could include, if necessary, education at a juvenile court school. During further dispositional proceedings, the court denied the minor's motion for an additional hearing to consider whether he could be returned to his high school of origin after he received a short period of such treatment. On appeal, the minor contends the juvenile court erred in denying his motion and he should be entitled to further hearings on his educational preferences (i.e., returning him to his school of origin), as a person who fits the definition of a "foster child" under Education Code section 48853.5, subdivision (a) by remaining "the subject of a petition filed under [section 602]." After review, the Court of Appeal concluded the juvenile court was correct in determining that the Education Code provisions and related California rule of court relied upon by the minor (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.651) did not require it to grant a separate hearing on the request. "The procedures created by Education Code section 48853.5, subdivisions (a) through (g) were intended to be primarily directory toward state and local educators and their designated staff educational liaisons who act on behalf of foster children. Education Code section 48853.5, subdivision (h) carves out an exception to those administrative procedures, and prevents interference with the discretion granted to a juvenile court that has made section 602 jurisdictional findings that a minor is a ward of the court, to make related placement orders giving the probation officer the authority to determine the appropriate placement for the ward. Once the true findings on the section 602 petition were made, the procedures of section 727 controlled the minor's dispositional proceedings. Based on the court's placement order under section 727, subdivision (a)(4), the probation officer could exercise authority without regard to the definitions of a "foster child" in Education Code section 48853.5, subdivision (a)." The Court affirmed the order and judgment. View "In re Ivan N." on Justia Law

In 2012, J.C., a minor. admitted to second-degree​ burglary by shoplifting (Penal Code 459 & 460(b)), then a felony. In 2014, the electorate passed Proposition 47, the Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act, which reduced several crimes from felonies to misdemeanors, including shoplifting, if the stolen property was worth less than $950. Proposition 47 also allowed a person serving a felony sentence for a crime reduced to a misdemeanor to petition for redesignation of the conviction and a reduction in sentence. J.C. petitioned to reduce her felony violation to a misdemeanor and to have her DNA record expunged from the state databank, on the theory she would not have been required to provide a DNA sample as a misdemeanant. The juvenile court reduced her violation to a misdemeanor, but declined to order expungement of her DNA record. The court of appeal affirmed the denial of expungement. After J.C.'s filing, the Legislature enacted Assembly Bill 1492, prohibiting granting a request for expungement in connection with a petition for recall of sentence under Proposition 47. Because Bill 1492 clarifies, rather than changes, the meaning of the relevant provisions of Proposition 47, it applies to requests for expungement made prior to its enactment. View "In re J.C." on Justia Law

In 2013 and 2014, minor Y.A. had two petitions filed against her alleging offenses for unrelated incidents. For each petition, she was adjudged a ward of the juvenile court and placed on probation. Y.A. satisfactorily completed the terms of probation for only the offense alleged in the later-filed petition, which was then dismissed and all records pertaining to it sealed. Records relating to the prior petition were not sealed. The issue in this appeal was whether, under Welfare and Institutions Code section 786, a juvenile court could seal the records pertaining to a prior petition against a minor when the minor satisfactorily completed probation for an offense alleged in a later-filed petition. Based on the plain language of the statute, the Court of Appeal concluded it could not. View "In re Y.A.." on Justia Law