Justia Juvenile Law Opinion Summaries

A suit was filed on behalf of a minor, Jonnie, alleging that Jonnie, while a kindergartner at in the Hollister School District, was sexually molested at school by another male kindergartener on two occasions. The District sought an order compelling Jonnie to submit to an independent mental examination, which would include personal interviews of Jonnie and his parents by Dr. Kuo, a psychiatrist, and psychological testing of Jonnie by Dr. Hall, a psychologist. The superior court granted the motion. After imposing a stay, the court of appeal vacated the order insofar as it authorized collateral interviews of Jonnie’s parents. The court exceeded its authority under Code of Civil Procedure section 2032.020.1 View "Roe v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

The minor approached a parked vehicle, banged on the window, and demanded that the occupants open the door. Both saw a gun. The minor demanded their wallets and cell phones. The victims complied. The minor fled. Police located and stopped the getaway car. In the police car, the minor told his friend that he had used a loaded gun, and might and “have to go away.” One victim identified the minor and both identified their property. A petition under Welfare and Institutions Code 602 . The minor admitted one robbery charge with a modified enhancement and admitted possession of a firearm capable of being concealed. The court committed the minor to Division of Juvenile Facilities for six years on the robbery charge, staying an additional period of eight months on the possession charge. The court of appeal affirmed. Despite the “near-absurdity of the rule,” a minor is only eligible for DJF if his “most recent offense” is DJF eligible. This minor was found to have committed robbery, which, alone, would expose him to a DJF commitment. He was also found to have committed gun possession, which is not DJF-eligible. The possession offense arguably occurred before the robbery, but even if the offenses were simultaneous, the “most recent offense” rule did not eliminate a court’s discretion to imposeDJF commitment if a minor is currently violent. View "In re M.L." on Justia Law

A juvenile wardship petition alleged that Trenton committed petty theft and other crimes. Under a negotiated disposition, the juvenile court sustained amended misdemeanor allegations of second degree commercial burglary and ammunition possession; remaining counts were dismissed. Trenton was placed on probation in his mother’s home. A supplemental wardship petition was later filed, alleging that Trenton had committed one felony count of discharging a firearm with gross negligence, implicating “The Gang Violence and Juvenile Crime Prevention Act.” Trenton appeared for arraignment, represented by counsel. The attorney waived formal reading and advisement of rights and entered a plea of not guilty. The court scheduled a contested jurisdictional hearing. There was no discussion about the possibility of a deferred entry of judgment (DEJ). Following a contested hearing, the court sustained an amended felony count for being a minor in possession of a firearm, dismissed the original count, and committed Trenton to a rehabilitation facility for six months. The court of appeal remanded, holding that the juvenile court erred by failing to conduct a hearing into eligibility for a DEJ. After a minor is properly notified of eligibility for a DEJ, the juvenile court has a duty to evaluate whether the minor is suitable for one. View "P. v. Trenton D." on Justia Law

Defendant, a minor student, committed burglary in violation of Penal Code section 459 because he stole another student's cell phone out of a school locker. Defendant petitioned to change his juvenile felony burglary offense to a misdemeanor shoplifting offense under Proposition 47. The court affirmed the order denying defendant's petition for recall of sentence because the court, looking at the ordinary meaning of the statute, does not believe that the voters enacting Proposition 47 understood a public high school to be a commercial establishment or a theft from a school locker to be “shoplifting.” Therefore, the trial court correctly found defendant's burglary offense ineligible for reclassification. View "People v. J.L." on Justia Law

Minor J.B. appealed a condition of probation that the trial court imposed after he was convicted of petty theft. On appeal to the Court of Appeal, J.B. argued the trial court unconstitutionally imposed a condition of probation that required him to permit searches of and disclose all passwords to his electronic devices and social media sites. Because there was no evidence connecting the juvenile’s electronic device or social media usage to his offense or to a risk of future criminal conduct, the Court of Appeal concluded the condition was unreasonable. Accordingly, the Court modified the judgment to strike this condition. View "In re J.B." on Justia Law

Appellant, 16 years old when the petition underlying this appeal was filed, had a troubled history. Since 1999, her family has had 36 child welfare referrals from Lake, Shasta, Siskiyou and Solano Counties; it had five voluntary family maintenance cases between 2002 and 2014 but did not fulfill any of the suggested or requested services. Appellant appealed juvenile court orders continuing her as a ward of the court under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 and committing her to the custody of the probation officer for placement in "New Foundations." She argued: (1) there was insufficient evidence to support the court's finding that she resisted or obstructed a peace officer; (2) the court erred in failing to dismiss the section 602 petition (which she claimed impermissibly increased her maximum confinement time); and (3) the court abused its discretion in terminating her status as a section 300 dependent child and adjudging her a delinquent minor. After review, the Court of Appeal agreed with her first contention and therefore reversed the orders. View "In re Amanda A." on Justia Law

Patrick, age 17, burglarized a neighbor’s home with an adult cousin who was on parole. Patrick admitted to a juvenile wardship petition allegation of second degree burglary. Patrick told the probation officer who prepared a report for the hearing that he stole because he wanted marijuana and did not want to ask his parents for money and that he smoked marijuana up to three times a day and had not attended school regularly for a long time because of his marijuana use. The court adjudged Patrick a ward and placed him on probation, with conditions requiring him to “[s]ubmit person and any vehicle, room or property [and] any electronics and passwords under your control to search by Probation Officer or peace office[r] with or without a search warrant at any time.” Defense counsel objected, arguing there was no nexus between electronics and the burglary. The court of appeal declined to strike the condition entirely, but modified the reference to electronics to read: Submit all electronic devices under your control to a search of any text messages, voicemail messages, call logs, photographs, e-mail accounts and social media accounts, with or without a search warrant, at any time of the day or night, and provide the probation or peace officer with any passwords necessary to access the information specified. View "In re Patrick F." on Justia Law

Defendant, a minor named in two Welfare and Institution Code 602 petitions, was detained in juvenile hall for 294 days while receiving services to assist him in gaining competence after being declared incompetent to stand trial. At the end of that 294 day period, the delinquency court reinstated proceedings based on findings that minor was competent and he had “exaggerated” his inability to understand the nature of the proceedings. The court rejected defendant's argument that the delinquency court erred in finding competency despite the report of an evaluator that defendant did not understand the nature of the proceedings; the delinquency court did not comply with the standard required by Dusky v. United States; and the delinquency court held him to the standard of competence applicable to adults, rather than the broader standard applied to juveniles. Assuming there was undue delay without evidence of progress toward attaining competency, or a violation of the Protocol or section 709, no structural error is involved. The court concluded that any error was harmless and reversal is inappropriate. Further, the court rejected defendant's equal protection claim where defendant is not similarly situated to persons who fall under the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act, Welf. & Inst. Code 5000 et seq. The court concluded, however, that Probation condition No. 9 is modified to provide as follows: “You must go to school each day. You must be on time to each class. You must follow the rules of behavioral conduct set forth by school personnel. You must receive passing grades in each graded subject.” The court affirmed in all other respects. View "People v. Albert C." on Justia Law

Petitioners were 13-year-old girls who were dependents of the juvenile court. While they were residing at the Polinsky Children's Center, they knocked over a vending machine and took items from inside it. When staff confronted them, petitioners fled but later returned to the Center. Staff then reported the incident to police, who arrested petitioners and booked them into Juvenile Hall. The district attorney filed petitions in the juvenile court alleging petitioners committed two misdemeanors, petty theft and vandalism. The district attorney asked the court to declare them wards. The probation officer prepared detention reports recommending petitioners be detained in Juvenile Hall, on the unexplained grounds they were likely to flee the court's jurisdiction and such detention was necessary for the protection of person or property and of petitioners. The reports included detention screening forms that showed no grounds for mandatory secure detention and that petitioners' risk assessment scores did not warrant discretionary secure detention. Petitioners promptly challenged the detention orders by filing petitions for peremptory writs of mandate in the first instance directing the juvenile court to vacate the orders. The Court of Appeal treated the petitions as petitions for writs of habeas corpus. The Court of Appeal agreed with the parties that the juvenile court erred by ordering petitioners' detention in Juvenile Hall pending further hearing. The juvenile court made no findings regarding its decision to order petitioners' continued detention in Juvenile Hall. Accordingly, the Court of Appeal granted petitioners' petitions. View "In re Bianca S." on Justia Law

Petitioner Steven R., a minor, admitted a concealed weapon allegation in a section 602 petition filed in San Francisco County Juvenile Court. The court then transferred the case to Sacramento County Juvenile Court for disposition. (section 750). The Sacramento County District Attorney filed a section 777 notice of probation violation based on the same conduct alleged in the San Francisco petition and moved to dismiss the petition (section 782) in order to make Steven eligible for commitment to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Division of Juvenile Facilities (DJF) under the terms of section 733, subdivision (c). This case was about the application of an unambiguous provision of the Welfare & Institutions Code to the dismissal of the section 602 petition following the transfer of the petition from the juvenile court in one county to the juvenile court in another county for disposition. Steven petitioned the Court of Appeal asking for a writ of mandate directing the trial court to: (1) vacate its order granting the motion to dismiss the petition; and (2) dismiss the notice of probation violation. The Court denied the petition summarily. Thereafter, the California Supreme Court granted review and transferred the matter back to the Court of Appeal with directions to vacate its order and to issue an order to show cause why relief should not be granted to Steven. Having complied with the Supreme Court’s order and having considered the parties’ arguments, the Court of Appeal concluded that the juvenile court exceeded its jurisdiction in dismissing the petition because section 782, which authorized dismissal of a section 602 petition, specifically stated that “[a] judge of the juvenile court in which a petition was filed may dismiss the petition.” Because the petition in question was not filed in Sacramento, the juvenile court was without jurisdiction to dismiss it. Therefore, the Court granted Steven’s petition and directed issuance of a writ of mandate. View "Steven R. v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law