Justia Juvenile Law Opinion Summaries

A.H., a minor, was adjudged a ward of the juvenile court after admitting to grand theft and violating probation conditions, including disobeying his mother, leaving home without approval, and violating curfew. After further violations—failing to attend mentorship meetings and testing positive for THC—the probation department recommended out-of-home placement in a short-term residential therapeutic program (STRTP), citing A.H.’s mental health conditions and his mother’s unwillingness to house him due to safety concerns. The probation department did not submit a statutorily required case plan before the disposition hearing, although it later provided one after the court’s order.The Superior Court of Contra Costa County held several hearings, ultimately ordering A.H.’s placement in an STRTP without first reviewing a case plan as required by Welfare and Institutions Code sections 706.5 and 706.6, and relevant California Rules of Court. A.H.’s counsel objected to the lack of a case plan, but the court proceeded with the placement order and deferred consideration of certain recommendations pending receipt of the case plan. The case plan was provided at a subsequent hearing, but the court did not indicate it had reviewed it before proceeding.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case. While the appeal became moot when the juvenile court vacated the placement order, the appellate court exercised its discretion to address the issue due to its public importance and likelihood of recurrence. The court held that the statutory scheme requires probation to submit, and the juvenile court to consider, a case plan before ordering foster care placement. The failure to do so constituted an abuse of discretion. After deciding the merits, the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal as moot. View "In re A.H." on Justia Law

A young adult, H.T., was adjudicated a ward of the court after admitting to a crime and was committed to a secure youth treatment facility. Upon completion of his baseline term, the juvenile court prepared to discharge him to probation supervision in the community. However, finding suitable housing proved difficult due to probation conditions: H.T. could not live with his mother, was ineligible for community organization housing due to a registration requirement, and could not be placed in the probation department’s usual facility because of its proximity to a high school. H.T. requested that the court order the County of Sacramento to pay for his stay at a transitional housing facility.The Superior Court of Sacramento County initially granted H.T.’s request for 30 days of housing but later declined to order further payments, concluding it lacked statutory authority to require the County to pay for H.T.’s housing. The court instead directed the probation department to provide hotel vouchers and other support. H.T. appealed the orders denying his requests for continued payment of rent at the transitional housing facility.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case. It held that the juvenile court had discretion under Welfare and Institutions Code section 900, subdivision (b), to order the County to pay for the support and maintenance of a ward, including necessary housing expenses. The appellate court found that the lower court misinterpreted its authority and abused its discretion by failing to recognize the full scope of its statutory power. The Court of Appeal vacated the juvenile court’s order and remanded the matter for the juvenile court to exercise its discretion under the correct legal standard, specifically to determine whether payment for H.T.’s housing was necessary at the relevant time. View "In re H.T." on Justia Law

A defendant committed several serious offenses, including first-degree murder and attempted murder, when he was 17 years old. In 2002, a jury convicted him of these crimes, and he was sentenced to a total term of 79 years to life with the possibility of parole. The sentence included both determinate and indeterminate terms, with firearm enhancements. The crimes occurred in 2000, and the defendant was not sentenced to life without the possibility of parole (LWOP), but rather to a lengthy term that could be considered the functional equivalent of LWOP.Years later, the defendant filed a petition in the Superior Court of Ventura County seeking recall of his sentence under Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (d)(1)(A), which allows for resentencing of juvenile offenders sentenced to LWOP. The trial court granted the petition, reasoning that the defendant’s 79-year-to-life sentence was functionally equivalent to LWOP, relying on the reasoning in People v. Heard (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 608 and People v. Sorto (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 435. The court recalled the sentence, conditionally reversed the conviction and sentence, and certified the matter to juvenile court for further proceedings under Proposition 57. Meanwhile, the defendant received a youth offender parole hearing under Penal Code section 3051, but was found unsuitable for parole.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Six, reviewed the case. It held that the defendant was not eligible for relief under section 1170(d)(1)(A) because he was not sentenced to LWOP, and that subsequent legislative changes, specifically section 3051, rendered the Heard rule moot. The court concluded that since the defendant had already received a parole hearing, he was not serving the functional equivalent of LWOP. The appellate court reversed the trial court’s orders. View "P. v. Lara" on Justia Law

A child, R.L., was injured in a car accident while his father was driving under the influence of alcohol and his mother was holding him on her lap without a car seat. Both parents were young, and neither had a prior criminal record or child welfare history. The accident resulted in R.L. suffering a nondisplaced skull fracture, but he was discharged from the hospital after a few days and appeared to be recovering well. Following the incident, the family was provided with a car seat, and both parents expressed remorse for their actions. The mother continued to care for R.L. in her parents’ home, and the father had no contact with the child after the accident due to his pending criminal case.The Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) filed a dependency petition in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, alleging that R.L. was at risk of harm due to parental neglect and the father’s alleged ongoing alcohol abuse. The juvenile court detained R.L. from his father but released him to his mother under supervision. After considering evidence and arguments, the juvenile court found that the incident was isolated, both parents were remorseful, and there was no evidence of ongoing substance abuse or risk of harm. The court dismissed the petition, declining to take jurisdiction over R.L.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, reviewed whether the evidence compelled a finding of jurisdiction as a matter of law under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b). The appellate court held that a single episode of endangering conduct, without evidence of likely recurrence or ongoing risk, did not warrant jurisdiction. The order dismissing the dependency petition was affirmed. View "In re R.L." on Justia Law

Two children, Claudia and Leila, were declared dependents of the court after an incident in which their parents, Wendy C. (Mother) and Michael M. (Father), engaged in a domestic altercation in the children’s presence, with Father under the influence of methamphetamine and in possession of a knife. The Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (the Department) filed petitions alleging parental substance abuse and failure to protect the children. The juvenile court sustained these allegations, removed the children from Father’s custody, and initially placed them with Mother. Later, after Mother failed to comply with court-ordered counseling and tested positive for drugs, the children were removed from her care as well. Reunification services were terminated, and the court ultimately found the children adoptable, terminating both parents’ rights and designating the current caretaker as the prospective adoptive parent.Mother appealed the termination of her parental rights, arguing that the Department and the juvenile court failed to comply with the inquiry requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) and the California Indian Child Welfare Act (Cal-ICWA). The Department had interviewed the parents, both grandmothers, and a paternal aunt, all of whom denied knowledge of Indian ancestry. However, the Department did not inquire of other extended family members, including the maternal grandfather, maternal aunt, maternal uncle, and paternal grandfather, despite having or being able to obtain their contact information.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Seven, held that the Department did not fulfill its duty under section 224.2, subdivision (b), to interview all reasonably available extended family members regarding possible Indian ancestry. The court conditionally reversed the orders terminating parental rights and remanded the case for further ICWA and Cal-ICWA inquiry and compliance. If the children are found to be Indian children, a new hearing must be held; otherwise, the original orders will be reinstated. View "In re Claudia R." on Justia Law

A defendant was convicted of first-degree murder and attempted murder for crimes committed at age 17, alongside an adult codefendant. The jury found true allegations of gang involvement and personal use of a firearm, resulting in an aggregate sentence of 75 years to life, plus additional time for unrelated carjacking offenses. After serving 15 years, the defendant petitioned for recall and resentencing under California Penal Code section 1170(d), arguing that his sentence was the functional equivalent of life without parole and that he met several statutory eligibility criteria, including having committed the offense with an adult codefendant.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County reviewed the petition, held a hearing, and denied relief. The court found that none of the eligibility criteria were satisfied, reasoning that the adult codefendant’s conviction had been vacated under a separate statute and that the defendant had not shown sufficient rehabilitation. The court also considered the defendant’s juvenile record and prison disciplinary history, concluding that he lacked potential for rehabilitation.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the trial court’s factual findings for substantial evidence and interpreted the statutory language de novo. The appellate court held that the defendant satisfied the criterion of having committed the offense with an adult codefendant, as the adult was charged and convicted for the same incident, even though her conviction was later vacated due to a change in law. The court reversed the trial court’s order denying the petition and remanded the case for a resentencing hearing in accordance with section 1170(d), without expressing an opinion on the appropriate sentence. View "People v. Gomez" on Justia Law

A man was charged in 2002 with multiple sexual offenses involving three minor males. In 2003, he entered a plea agreement, pleading no contest to several counts of committing lewd acts on children aged 14 or 15 and one count of oral copulation with a victim under 16, which was amended from a charge of forcible oral copulation to a nonforcible offense. He did not admit to using force or violence in his plea, but the factual basis for the plea referenced police reports describing acts involving force. He was sentenced to state prison in accordance with the plea agreement.In 2005, two psychologists evaluated him for commitment as a Mentally Disordered Offender (MDO) under California Penal Code section 2962. A chief forensic psychiatrist certified that he met the criteria, including having committed a crime involving force or violence, based on documentary evidence such as probation and police reports. The Board of Parole Hearings affirmed the certification. He did not challenge the certification in superior court at that time. He remained in custody under annual recommitment petitions, and his only prior challenge was an unsuccessful appeal of a 2022 recommitment order.After that, he filed a habeas corpus petition in Fresno County Superior Court in 2023, arguing that his conviction did not qualify as an MDO offense and that reliance on hearsay in the probation report violated his constitutional rights. The superior court denied the petition, finding the probation report admissible and sufficient to establish use of force.The California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, reviewed the case. It held that a habeas corpus petition is a proper vehicle to challenge an initial MDO certification based on static factors, even years later. The court found that the evidence was sufficient under the law at the time of certification, and that subsequent changes in evidentiary standards were not retroactive. The court also found no ineffective assistance of counsel. The petition for writ of habeas corpus was denied. View "In re Grinder" on Justia Law

A 16-year-old committed a violent home invasion, during which he sexually assaulted his former neighbor at knifepoint. He was convicted by a jury of multiple offenses, including rape, sodomy, oral copulation, robbery, burglary, and related enhancements. The original sentence was a combination of determinate and indeterminate terms, ultimately resulting in a total sentence of 44 years to life in prison, with parole eligibility at age 60 after a later modification.After serving more than 15 years, the defendant petitioned the Superior Court of Tulare County for recall and resentencing under California Penal Code section 1170(d), arguing that his sentence was the functional equivalent of life without parole (LWOP) and that excluding him from resentencing relief violated equal protection principles. The trial court denied the petition, finding that his sentence was not functionally equivalent to LWOP and that, under People v. Heard, he was not eligible for relief.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, considered whether the functional equivalency analysis from People v. Contreras, which is rooted in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, should apply to equal protection challenges under section 1170(d). The court declined to import the Eighth Amendment standard, instead applying a rational basis review as articulated in recent California Supreme Court decisions. The court held that the Legislature could rationally distinguish between juveniles sentenced to explicit LWOP and those, like the appellant, sentenced to lengthy terms with parole eligibility within their expected lifetimes. The court concluded that section 1170(d)’s limitation to LWOP sentences does not violate equal protection as applied to a 44-years-to-life sentence. The trial court’s denial of the petition was affirmed. View "People v. Baldwin" on Justia Law

A married couple with a young child became involved in a physical altercation at their home, during which the father, while intoxicated, struck the mother multiple times. During the incident, the mother was holding their infant son, and the father accidentally hit the child in the face, though the child was not injured. The mother sustained injuries, including a lacerated lip and a cut foot. The police responded, and the father was arrested for domestic violence and child endangerment. Both parents later gave conflicting accounts to social workers, with the mother initially reporting prior incidents of domestic violence, including while she was pregnant or breastfeeding, but later recanting some statements. The father admitted to slapping the mother but denied hitting the child or prior violence.The Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services filed a dependency petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (a) and (b), alleging risk of harm to the child due to domestic violence and the father’s substance abuse. The Superior Court of Los Angeles County detained the child from the father, released him to the mother, and ordered services for both parents. At the combined jurisdictional and dispositional hearing, the court found the mother’s initial statements credible, sustained the domestic violence and substance abuse allegations, declared the child a dependent, and removed him from the father’s custody.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, reviewed the case. The court held that substantial evidence supported the jurisdictional findings under both subdivisions (a) and (b) based on the parents’ history of domestic violence in the child’s presence, including the incident where the father accidentally struck the child. The court also found substantial evidence supported the removal order, given the ongoing risk and the parents’ lack of accountability. The appellate court affirmed the juvenile court’s findings and orders. View "In re Miguel J." on Justia Law

After the birth of A.M., the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services became involved due to concerns about the mother’s substance abuse and the father’s alleged failure to protect A.M. from the mother. The juvenile court initially placed A.M. with her father, who lived with his sister Martha and other family members, and later awarded him sole physical custody. Years later, the father was incarcerated after police found a gun and pills in his car. Before going to prison, he arranged for Martha to care for A.M., providing her with necessary documents and a notarized letter for temporary custody. However, when the mother learned of the father’s incarceration, she refused to return A.M. to Martha after a visit. The mother’s care was found to be inadequate, with evidence of substance abuse, neglect, and unsafe living conditions, leading to A.M. being placed back with Martha.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County detained A.M. from both parents, citing concerns about the father’s criminal history and the mother’s conduct. The court found that the father’s incarceration and criminal actions impaired his ability to parent and protect A.M., and removed A.M. from both parents under various provisions of the Welfare and Institutions Code. Both A.M.’s counsel and the father’s counsel argued that the father had made an appropriate care plan, but the court disagreed and ordered removal.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, reviewed the case. It held that a juvenile court may not remove a child from an incarcerated parent solely due to incarceration if the parent has made a suitable plan for the child’s care. The court found no substantial evidence that the father’s plan posed a risk to A.M. and reversed the portion of the order removing A.M. from her father, remanding for further proceedings as appropriate. View "In re A.M." on Justia Law