Justia Juvenile Law Opinion Summaries

Before committing a minor to the California Division of Juvenile Justice (DJJ), the state’s most restrictive placement for its most severe juvenile offenders, the law required the juvenile court to find both that the placement would probably benefit the minor, and that less restrictive options would be either ineffective or inappropriate. In this case, we address an issue anticipated, but not decided, in In re Carlos J., 22 Cal.App.5th 1 (2018), namely, what constitutes substantial evidence to support a DJJ commitment when the minor has submitted reliable evidence that such a placement would undermine the minor’s specific rehabilitative needs, and where the minor’s own history does not demonstrate that less restrictive options would not work? The Court of Appeal concluded the State had to provide some contrary evidence that would enable the juvenile court to make a comparative analysis of the placement options before it concludes the minor will probably benefit from DJJ, and that less restrictive options would be ineffective or inappropriate. Here, expert testimony indicated that placing this minor in DJJ would be counterproductive because it would likely assure his entrenchment in gang culture and, due to the ready availability of drugs in DJJ facilities, undermine efforts to treat and improve a significant substance abuse disorder that led to a single episode of violent criminal behavior over the course of a few hours. Beyond identifying that substance abuse treatment was available at DJJ, the State introduced no responsive evidence. So, as in Carlos J., the Court reversed and remanded in an opinion that focused "not on the substantive correctness of the juvenile court’s conclusion, but on the procedural requirement that there be evidence in the record to support whatever conclusion the court reaches." On remand, given intervening changes to the juvenile court law, the trial court had to first make a threshold finding as to whether juvenile justice realignment now precluded commitment to DJJ. View "In re Miguel C." on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal concluded that Penal Code section 3051, subdivision (h) does not violate equal protection, and the exclusion of offenders sentenced under the Three Strikes law from youth offender parole consideration is rationally related to a legitimate penal interest. The court also concluded that it lacks jurisdiction to rule on appellant's clam that the imposition of the five-year enhancement under Penal Code section 667, subdivision (a) resulted in an unauthorized sentence. Accordingly, the court affirmed the postjudgment order. View "People v. Moore" on Justia Law

S.H.R. petitioned the superior court for the appointment of a guardian of his person and for judicial findings that would enable him to petition the USCIS to classify him as a special immigrant juvenile (SIJ) under federal immigration law. The superior court denied both petitions.The Court of Appeal concluded that S.H.R. had the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence the facts supporting SIJ status. Because the trial court found his evidence did not support the requested findings, S.H.R. has the burden on appeal of showing that he is entitled to the SIJ findings as a matter of law. In this case, S.H.R. has failed to meet his burden by failing to prove parental abandonment or neglect and that reunification was not viable. Therefore, the court affirmed the superior court's denial of the SIJ petition. The denial of the SIJ petition rendered the guardianship petition moot, and thus the court also affirmed the denial of that petition. View "S.H.R. v. Rivas" on Justia Law

Moore was convicted of murder (Penal Code 187) and robbery (section 211); a jury found true the special circumstance that the murder was committed during a robbery (190.2(a)(17)). Moore sought habeas relief, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence for the robbery-murder special-circumstance finding.The California Supreme Court ordered the court of appeal to consider “whether [Moore’s] youth at the time of the offense should be one of the factors considered under” precedent in which the California Supreme Court examined the felony-murder special circumstance, Penal Code 190.2(d). Under that provision, a person who is guilty of murder but is not the “actual killer” and who aids or abets the commission of certain felonies that result in death may be sentenced to death or life without the possibility of parole if that person is a “major participant” and acts with “reckless indifference to human life.”On remand, the court of appeal vacated the conviction. A defendant’s youth at the time of the offense should be a factor in determining whether that defendant acted with reckless indifference to human life under section 190.2(d). Considering the totality of the circumstances, including the fact that Moore was only 16 at the time of his offenses, the court found insufficient evidence to establish that Moore acted with the requisite reckless indifference to human life. View "In re Moore" on Justia Law

N.B. was removed from her parents’ care in 2008 when she was one year old. Her grandmother, Catherine, cared for her became her legal guardian in 2012. A maternal aunt also became a co-guardian. Years later N.B. struggled with her mental health and Catherine had trouble managing her care. The juvenile court found that N.B. was suffering serious emotional damage. Services were provided. She was released to her maternal aunt’s care after she said she did not feel safe returning to Catherine’s care. The maternal aunt became “overwhelmed” and returned her to Catherine. N.B. continued to suffer mental health issues.A petition under section 388 sought to terminate the guardianship rights of the maternal aunt and the family maintenance services. Catherine and the aunt had lied about N.B.’s whereabouts and well-being, and asked N.B. to lie during home visits. N.B. was placed in a foster home. N.B. “stabilized.” The Agency recommended terminating Catherine’s legal guardianship. Catherine objected.The juvenile court observed that there was not “any doubt on anybody’s part that [Catherine] loves [N.B. and] that she is committed to [N.B.]” but expressed concern that Catherine’s behavior was contributing to N.B.’s problems. The court terminated the legal guardianship of Catherine and the maternal aunt. The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting Catherine’s argument the Agency was required to “follow the procedures and requirements of section 387” to terminate her guardianship. View "In re N.B." on Justia Law

When he was 17 years old, M.W. assaulted his girlfriend. After a Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 petition was filed, seeking to have him declared a ward of the juvenile court, M.W. admitted to willful infliction of corporal injury. The juvenile court adjudged M.W. a ward of the court and ordered him to reside in his mother’s home under the probation department’s supervision and to complete a 52-week “Batterer’s Intervention Program” because M.W. had a “pattern of engaging in violent behavior, as well as inappropriateness with females.”M.W. requested that the court order the probation department to pay for the program. M.W. had already enrolled in the program at a cost of $153 per month, approximately $1,800 for the 52-week program. The court denied M.W.’s request. The court of appeal reversed. Under the Welfare and Institutions Code, neither M/W/ nor his mother is liable for the costs of his treatment program. A court may not impose liability on a minor’s parents unless authorized by statute; a minor may be liable for costs only in very limited instances. The People cite no authority to support an order imposing the costs of the Batterer’s Intervention Program on M.W. or his family. View "In re M.W." on Justia Law

A juvenile wardship petition charged Noah with several crimes, such as motor vehicle burglaries and vandalism; he entered a plea admitting one felony motor vehicle burglary count. While Noah’s wardship was ongoing, a supplemental juvenile wardship petition alleged Noah, then 14 years old, committed attempted robbery and caused or permitted an elder or dependent adult to suffer. A video showed Jacqueline, the 88-year-old victim, leaving a restaurant. As she opens the car door, a young man runs up. Her husband, Philippe, got into the driver’s seat. When Jacqueline steps aside to let the young man pass, he grabs her purse and starts to run, dragging Jacqueline behind the car, where she falls, slams into the ground, and rolls, still holding the purse. A police officer took fingerprints from where the young man touched the car; they matched Noah’s. Jacqueline was still on the ground when the officer arrived; she was confused and bleeding.The juvenile court sustained the allegations and found the attempted robbery adjudication qualified as an offense under Welfare and Institutions Code section 707(b) and committed Noah to a ranch facility for 12 months with a 180 day “aftercare period.” The court of appeal affirmed. Noah’s adjudication for attempted robbery is an offense described in Penal Code section 1203.09 and falls within Welfare and Institutions Code section 707(b). Substantial evidence showed Noah’s intent to rob Jacqueline and that he inflicted great bodily injury. View "In re Noah S." on Justia Law

A juvenile wardship petition (Welfare and Institutions Code section 602(a)) alleged that Matthew had committed assault with a deadly weapon and assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury; that Matthew had personally inflicted great bodily injury on the victim and had caused the victim to suffer great bodily injury resulting in paralysis and had personally used a deadly weapon, a knife. The juvenile court found true all of the allegations except for the paralysis enhancement; dismissed count two and the accompanying enhancement, at the request of the prosecutor; declared Matthew a ward of the court; and placed Matthew on probation with conditions.The court of appeal reversed, finding that Matthew’s pre-arrest statements to police were made during a custodial interrogation without the required Miranda warnings and that the admission of those statements was prejudicial. While Matthew was told at the start of the interrogation that he was not under arrest, and the police officers who were present did not handcuff him or unholster their weapons, the interview was initiated by police, who had just heard from another that Matthew had stabbed the victim. The entire interrogation was an attempt to get Matthew to admit that he stabbed the victim and to provide additional incriminating information. View "In re Matthew W." on Justia Law

Defendant Joseph Jackson sought a youth offender parole hearing under Penal Code section 3051 as a result of his conviction in 1998 that included two counts of first-degree murder with multiple special circumstances, which counts resulted in a sentence of two consecutive terms of life without the possibility of parole (LWOP). Defendant was 19 years old when he committed the homicides. In his October 2019 motion, defendant argued section 3051 violated his equal protection rights because he allegedly “is entitled to the same protections as any other person who violated the law at the same age whether it was murder without special circumstances, robbery, kidnapping or any other crime.” The trial court in November 2019 denied the motion, finding that defendant was statutorily ineligible for relief and that there was a rational basis for carving out from section 3051 offenders such as defendant who were convicted of first-degree special circumstance murder and sentenced to LWOP. On appeal, defendant reiterated his trial court argument that section 3051’s exclusion of persons over 18 years of age with LWOP sentences from its parole hearing provisions violated the constitutional guarantee of equal protection. Upon de novo review, the Court of Appeal concluded the carve out to section 3051 for offenders such as defendant serving a LWOP sentence for special circumstance murder was not an equal protection violation. View "California v. Jackson" on Justia Law

J.J. was alleged to have committed forcible lewd conduct with a minor. The juvenile court declared him incompetent to stand trial, suspended the delinquency proceedings, and ordered remediation services in juvenile hall. After 12 months, the court found that J.J. still had not attained competency. Although the maximum period for remediation under Welfare and Institutions Code section 709 is 12 months, the court ordered his continued confinement pending finalization of an exit order and post-release services to assist his reentry into the community. Section 709(h)(5)(C) allows confinement of certain juveniles for up to 18 months if “necessary and in the best interests of the minor and the public’s safety.”The court of appeal held that the juvenile court lacked authority to order J.J.'s continued confinement beyond the remediation period for a purpose other than restoration to competency, which would potentially violate his due process rights. Once the court determined that J.J. had not attained competency at the end of the statutory remediation period, no further confinement could be ordered given the record in J.J.’s case. The purpose of section 709 is to protect a minor from juvenile proceedings during incompetency and to provide remediation services with the goal of restoring the minor to competence. Section 709(h)(5) does not permit the involuntary confinement of a minor beyond the statutory remediation period for the purpose of arranging postrelease services that are not designed to restore competency. View "J.J. v. Superior Court" on Justia Law