Justia Juvenile Law Opinion Summaries

Defendants Harquan Johnson and KeAndre Windfield were each convicted of one count of murder and one count of attempted murder, and assault with a semi-automatic firearm, along with gun discharge and gang enhancement allegations as to the murder and attempted murder counts. The charges arose from the shooting of two members of their own gang, the Ramona Blocc Hustlas, resulting in the death of one of them. Both defendants were sentenced to prison for 90 years to life. They appealed raising various claims. In the original opinion, filed August 2014, the Court of Appeal affirmed both defendants' convictions, but reversed Johnson’s sentence pursuant to California v. Gutierrez, 58 Cal.4th 1354 (2014), because, as a juvenile at the time of the crime, his sentence of 90 years to life was the functional equivalent of a term of life without possibility of parole and we directed other modifications of the sentence and abstracts of judgment. In November 2014, the California Supreme Court denied both defendants’ petitions for review, but, on its own motion, issued a grant-and-hold of review as to defendant Johnson, for consideration pending review in In re Alatriste, S214652, In re Bonilla, S214960, and California v. Franklin, S217699. In May 2016, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Franklin (63 Cal.4th 261 (2016)), and retransferred his case to the Court of Appeal with directions reconsider Johnson’s sentence. The appellate court issued a second opinion in September 2016, affirming those portions of the original opinion pertaining to issues not subject to the grant and hold, and reconsidered Johnson's sentence. Defendants again successfully petitioned for review; the Supreme Court retransferred the cases to the Court of Appeal with directions to reconsider the case in light of California v Canizales, 7 Cal.5th 591 (2019), and California v. Perez, 3 Cal.App.5th 612 (2016). Judgment was modified per direction, and defendants again appealed. In April 2020, the Supreme Court again transferred this matter to the appellate court to reconsider in light of Senate Bill 620 (Stats. 2017, ch. 682). After reconsideration, the Court of Appeal affirmed both defendants' convictions. As to Windfield, a hearing was warranted for both defendant and the State to make an accurate record of defendant’s characteristics and circumstances at the time of the offense, and to amend his abstract of judgment fix a date error. As to Johnson, the case was remanded for the limited purpose of a fitness hearing: if not fit, Johnson's convictions were to be reinstated; if the juvenile court found it would not have transferred Johnson to be tried as an adult, it should treat his convictions as juvenile adjudications and impose an appropriate "disposition" within its discretion. In addition, the court could exercise its discretion whether to strike or dismiss any of the firearm enhancements within the meaning of Senate Bill No. 620. View "California v. Windfield" on Justia Law

E.P., a minor in a juvenile delinquency proceeding, challenged a July 2020, decision by respondent Yolo County Superior Court, which denied his motion to physically appear in juvenile court in the presence of the judge at court hearings. Petitioner claimed the court’s decision, as well as certain temporary local rules (Super. Ct. Yolo County, Temporary COVID-19 Local Rules) issued by the court in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, conflicted with Welfare and Institutions Code section 679 and the emergency rules related to COVID-19 adopted by the Judicial Council and contained in appendix I of the California Rules of Court. The Court of Appeal concluded that, consistent with section 679 and the case law interpreting it, the emergency rules required a court obtain a minor’s consent before conducting a hearing in a juvenile delinquency proceeding remotely. Accordingly, the respondent superior court erred in denying petitioner’s motion to physically appear in court at his juvenile hearings. To the extent the court’s temporary local rules required all hearings in juvenile delinquency proceedings be conducted remotely absent a finding of good cause, the rules were in conflict with both section 679 and the emergency rules. View "E.P. v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed the trial court's decision sustaining a petition for first degree burglary with a person present, contending that the trial court erred in denying his Brady/Johnson motion for an in camera review and discovery of the arresting officer's confidential personnel file. In People v. Galan (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 6, the Court of Appeal upheld the denial of a motion to inspect the confidential personnel file of a police officer.The court held that there, as here, there was no good cause for discovery. In this case, defendant cites no authority, and the court has found none, that a Brady/Johnson motion may be used as a fishing expedition to disclose confidential personnel files that have no logical link to the 911 call, the arrest, the charges, a defense, or the impeachment of a witness. Accordingly, the court affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "People v. M.C." on Justia Law

Based on a Welfare and Institutions Code section 300(b)(1) petition, A.G, then four years old, was placed into protective custody after his mother, S.B., twice drove a car in which A.G. was a passenger while she was under the influence. Mother's reunification services were terminated at the 12-month review hearing. At a selection and implementation hearing, S.G. requested a contested hearing on statutory exceptions to adoption and the termination of parental rights: the beneficial parental relationship and the sibling relationship. The court found her offer of proof insufficient, denied her request for a contested hearing, found the minor adoptable, and terminated S.G.'s parental rights.The court of appeal reversed the denial of a contested hearing. The offer of proof must address two components of the parental relationship exception: the parent’s regular contact with the child and the existence of a beneficial parent-child relationship. It need not address whether the existence of that relationship constitutes a compelling reason for determining that termination would be detrimental to the child. S.G.'s offer of proof was adequate, addressing both her regular contact with A.G. and the existence of a beneficial parent-child relationship. Because the termination of parental rights is at stake, the court, particularly where the parent’s regular contact with the child is not in dispute, should exercise caution before denying a contested hearing and should construe the parent’s offer of proof liberally. View "In re A.G." on Justia Law

Defendant, a minor high school student, made criminal threats when he posted a photo of a realistic looking replica gun on his Snapchat account, which was visible to about 60 people he identified as friends. The caption stated, "Everybody go to school tomorrow. I'm taking gum."The Court of Appeal affirmed defendant's conviction, holding that the juvenile court's findings are supported by substantial evidence. The juvenile court rejected defendant's testimony that he was joking as not credible and inconsistent with what defendant told a school police detective who investigated the threats. In this case, the record contains sufficient evidence defendant intended his Snapchat post to be understood as a threat and that he willfully threatened to kill or cause great bodily injury; a reasonable trier of fact could have found defendant intended to threaten an expansive group of people, which included the two individuals at issue; considering the surrounding circumstances, including the notoriety of previous school shootings, defendant's story was sufficiently specific and unequivocal to convey the threat of a school shooting the next day; and the threat was immediate and reasonably placed the two individuals in fear. View "The People v. A.G." on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant D.H. (minor) had a history of defiant and criminal behavior, resulting in him being placed on formal probation in two juvenile delinquency matters. Throughout his probationary period, D.H. violated the law and the terms and conditions of his probation. While still on probation, the juvenile court dismissed the Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 petitions and terminated D.H.'s probation as unsuccessfully completed based on a joint request from the San Bernardino County Children and Family Services (CFS) and the probation department to transfer jurisdiction to the dependency court under section 300. D.H. requested the juvenile court seal his section 602 juvenile delinquency records, and the juvenile court denied his request. On appeal, D.H. argued the juvenile court was required to seal his records under Welfare and Institutions Code section 786 (e). Alternatively, he contended the juvenile court abused its discretion in denying his motion to seal his records under section 786(a). Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "In re D.H." on Justia Law

After receiving a citizen’s tip that Black males in a Mercedes were “acting shady,” four San Diego Police Department (SDPD) officers drove to the scene in two marked vehicles, activating emergency lights in one. Parking behind the Mercedes, the officers positioned themselves beside each of its four doors and asked the three teenagers inside for their names and identification. A records check later indicated that the driver was on probation subject to a Fourth Amendment waiver. The officers searched the vehicle and recovered a loaded firearm and sneakers linking the minors to a recent robbery. The minors moved to suppress the evidence found in the car, claiming their initial detention was not supported by reasonable suspicion. Finding the encounter was consensual rather than a detention, the juvenile court denied the motions. Two of the minors pleaded guilty to a subset of the charges originally filed. In a consolidated appeal, two of the minors, Edgerrin J. and Jamar D. challenged the denial of their motions to suppress, arguing the juvenile court erred in finding the encounter consensual, and claimed the citizen’s tip did not establish reasonable suspicion to detain them. To this, the Court of Appeal agreed on both points. However, the Court found conflicting evidence as to whether officers knew other facts that might furnish reasonable suspicion for the stop, or justify the detention and search pursuant to Edgerrin’s active Fourth Amendment waiver. Because the rationale for its ruling made it unnecessary for the juvenile court to address these other issues, judgment was reversed and remanded for a new hearing to permit it to assess witness credibility and reach factual findings in the first instance. View "In re Edgerrin J." on Justia Law

Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, asserting that the denial of a youth offender parole hearing under Penal Code section 3051 violates his right to equal protection of the laws and constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. Petitioner, who was 21 years old at the time of the offense, was convicted of two counts of first degree murder and the jury found true the allegation that he personally used a firearm in the commission of the robbery. The jury also found true the special circumstance allegations that he committed multiple murders and murder during the commission of robbery. Petitioner was sentenced to two consecutive terms of life without the possibility of parole (LWOP).The Court of Appeal held that the amendment to section 3051 did not provide any relief to petitioner who had committed an LWOP offense after he had attained 18 years of age. The court rejected petitioner's equal protection argument, disagreeing that youth offenders sentenced to LWOP and those youth offenders sentenced to parole-eligible life terms are similarly situated with respect to the Legislature's first goal, which is to calibrate sentences in accordance with youthful offenders' diminished culpability. Furthermore, even if the court assumed petitioner is similarly situated to non-LWOP indeterminately-sentenced youth offenders aged 18 to 25, the court still would find no equal protection violation. Finally, the court held that petitioner's LWOP sentence did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. View "In re Williams" on Justia Law

Kevin was charged in juvenile court with a murder he allegedly committed at age 17. A contested hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code section 707(a)(1) lasted several days. The juvenile court was presented with evidence demonstrating both the heinousness of the crime and that Kevin was raised by a loving family, had no prior criminal history, suffered little past trauma, and had no significant psychological or behavioral issues. Kevin’s juvenile hall behavior was exemplary. The juvenile court concluded that Kevin was unfit for the juvenile system and transferred him to criminal court, acknowledging “a certain tragedy” in its ruling. The court of appeal remanded for reconsideration. The court’s findings regarding section 707’s gravity and criminal-sophistication criteria are supported by substantial evidence but the court improperly evaluated section 707’s rehabilitation criterion, which it deemed its “most significant” consideration. A court cannot determine a juvenile’s rehabilitative needs based solely on the gravity of the offense, and the standard seven-year parole consideration period that applies to juveniles committed to the Department of Juvenile Justice for murder does not establish a presumptive rehabilitation period. View "Kevin P. v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

In 2009, Lopez was convicted in criminal court of murder and related charges based on his actions at age 17. In 2019, the court recalled his sentence and resentenced him under Penal Code section 1170(d)(1) to remove a gang-benefit enhancement in light of an intervening California Supreme Court decision. Before the resentencing, Lopez moved to have a juvenile court hold a transfer hearing based on 2016’s Proposition 57, which eliminated prosecutors’ ability to directly file charges against minors in criminal court; a juvenile court must first conduct a “transfer hearing” to determine whether a matter should remain in juvenile court or be transferred to adult court. The trial court denied the motion concluding that Proposition 57 did not apply despite the resentencing, because Lopez’s original sentence became final before Proposition 57 took effect.The court of appeal conditionally reversed and remanded for a juvenile court to conduct a transfer hearing. Because section 1170(d)(1) resentencing replaces the original sentence, the only sentence that matters is the new sentence, which is not final because a resentenced defendant can still obtain review from the California Supreme Court or the U.S. Supreme Court. The mere existence of the resentence makes the original sentence irrelevant. Lopez is entitled to a retroactive transfer hearing. View "People v. Lopez" on Justia Law