Justia Juvenile Law Opinion Summaries

In 2009, Lopez was convicted in criminal court of murder and related charges based on his actions at age 17. In 2019, the court recalled his sentence and resentenced him under Penal Code section 1170(d)(1) to remove a gang-benefit enhancement in light of an intervening California Supreme Court decision. Before the resentencing, Lopez moved to have a juvenile court hold a transfer hearing based on 2016’s Proposition 57, which eliminated prosecutors’ ability to directly file charges against minors in criminal court; a juvenile court must first conduct a “transfer hearing” to determine whether a matter should remain in juvenile court or be transferred to adult court. The trial court denied the motion concluding that Proposition 57 did not apply despite the resentencing, because Lopez’s original sentence became final before Proposition 57 took effect.The court of appeal conditionally reversed and remanded for a juvenile court to conduct a transfer hearing. Because section 1170(d)(1) resentencing replaces the original sentence, the only sentence that matters is the new sentence, which is not final because a resentenced defendant can still obtain review from the California Supreme Court or the U.S. Supreme Court. The mere existence of the resentence makes the original sentence irrelevant. Lopez is entitled to a retroactive transfer hearing. View "People v. Lopez" on Justia Law

Consistent with People v. Elizalde (2015) 61 Cal.4th 523, the Court of Appeal held that the routine booking question exception to Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436, categorically applies to all of the core booking questions enumerated in Pennsylvania v. Muniz (1990) 496 U.S. 582, 601-602, and authorizes the admission of the defendant's answers to those specific questions into evidence without the need to assess those questions' incriminatory nature on a case-by-case basis.The Court of Appeal affirmed the juvenile adjudication in this case, holding that the trial court did not err in admitting the officer's testimony regarding the minor's answers to the booking questions about his age and date of birth, both of which fall squarely within Muniz's categories of basic biographical data. Therefore, there was sufficient evidence to support the juvenile court's adjudication. View "The People v. J.W." on Justia Law

In 2014, a jury convicted Lizarraga of second-degree murder and found that he personally used a firearm in connection with the shooting of a rival gang member. Lizarraga was 17 years old when he committed the crime. He was sentenced to 40 years to life in state prison. After his first appeal, Lizarraga filed a “Franklin” habeas corpus petition, requesting an opportunity to make a record relevant to his eventual youth offender parole hearing. The court granted the petition and set a hearing date. Lizarraga next moved for a transfer hearing in juvenile court under the Public Safety and Rehabilitation Act of 2016 (Proposition 57). The trial court denied the motion.The court of appeal affirmed, concluding that Lizarraga’s case was final when he requested the transfer hearing. Proposition 57 does not apply to final judgments. The Franklin hearing aside, Lizarraga’s case was final in June 2016, upon expiration of the time to seek U.S. Supreme Court review. The court rejected an argument that whenever a Franklin hearing is scheduled, finality is undone and all intervening changes in the law are in play. Lizarraga’s equal protection challenge is without merit. No “equal protection violation aris[es] from the timing of the effective date of a statute lessening the punishment for a particular offense.” View "People v. Lizarraga" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal affirmed defendant's sentence of life without the possibility of parole plus one year for robbery and felony murder with a special circumstance finding under Penal Code section 190.2, subdivision (a)(17), which mandates a sentence of death or life in prison without the possibility of parole. Defendant was 18 years old at the time that he stabbed and killed a 15 year old boy.The court held that the felony murder special circumstance statute is not unconstitutionally vague as applied to defendant where the trial court instructed the jury on the independent felonious purpose rule, and defendant had notice of the conduct proscribed by section 190.2 and does not claim discriminatory prosecution. The court explained that the fact that the prosecutor had discretion to charge defendant under two statutes with different penalties does not render the statutory scheme unconstitutional. The court also held that defendant's sentence is not cruel and unusual under the Eighth Amendment; defendant forfeited his right to challenge the restitution fine and assessments; and the trial court's sentencing minute order and the abstract of judgment must be corrected because the trial court erred in imposing a parole revocation fine. View "People v. Montelongo" on Justia Law

Pursuant to a plea bargain, minor K.W. admitted one count of robbery; counts alleging kidnapping, brandishing, and vandalism were dismissed. After he completed probation, he moved to seal the record under Welfare and Institutions Code section 786. He was not eligible for sealing, because robbery was one of the crimes listed in section 707(b). The trial court reduced the adjudication to the lesser included offense of grand theft, which was not a section 707(b) offense. The court then granted the motion to seal. The State appealed, contending: (1) the juvenile court lacked the authority to reduce the adjudication; and (2) reducing the adjudication violated the plea bargain. The Court of Appeal determined the statutes the juvenile court cited did not give it authority to reduce the conviction. Further, the Court held Welfare and Institutions Code section 782, which would allow the juvenile court to “set aside the findings and dismiss the petition” in the interest of justice, did not authorize the juvenile court to reduce an adjudication, at least when doing so would violate a plea bargain, as it would have here. Judgment was therefore reversed. View "In re K.W." on Justia Law

After police arrested their mother, 10-year-old J. and her half-brothers were found at a homeless encampment and detained by the Alameda County Social Services Agency, which filed a juvenile dependency petition. At a paternity inquiry, Mother testified that Father is J.’s father. Mother and Father lived together until J. was two years old. Father had participated in Nevada child support proceedings, acknowledged J. as his child, and was subject to a child support order. Father had regular visits with J. After the Agency filed an amended petition naming Father as J.’s alleged father, the court declared the children dependents of the court, and placed the children with their maternal grandfather. The court held a later hearing, ordered a legal guardianship by the grandfather, then dismissed the dependency.During the proceedings, Father maintained his relationship with J. and consistently stated that he wanted custody. Father repeatedly contacted the Agency and provided a birth certificate showing his name as J.’s father. Court-appointed attorneys represented Father but he was unrepresented during critical proceedings and none of the attorneys took action on his behalf. At the dismissal hearing, the court noted that no counsel was present on Father’s behalf and acknowledged that the prior proceeding, without Father's counsel present "was an error.” Contrary to Welfare and Institutions Code 316.2(b), and California Rule 5.635(g), the court clerk never provided Father with notice of the procedure he should follow to establish that he is J.’s father and to protect his parental rights. The court of appeal reversed the juvenile court orders, finding that Father was prejudiced by the failure to comply with the notice requirements. View "In re J.W.-P." on Justia Law

Deputies responded to a domestic violence report. J.E. had left the house. J.E.'s Mother signed a citizen’s arrest form for battery. The deputies saw J.E. outside, went to J.E. in their marked patrol car, identified themselves, and told J.E. they needed to escort her home. J.E. ignored their commands. The deputies grabbed her arms. J.E. began “flailing,” spit at the deputies, and kicked another vehicle, causing a dent. The deputies placed J.E. in the patrol car. J.E. kicked an officer in the stomach.A juvenile wardship petition alleged misdemeanor battery upon a peace officer and misdemeanor resisting, obstructing, or delaying a peace officer. Mother reported that J.E. had previously hit her and threatened to kill her. School records showed J.E. was suspended twice for being physically aggressive and making threats toward staff and was disciplined several times for unexcused absences, disrupting class, using profanity, and being under the influence of marijuana. Mother testified that J.E. was 11 when she began living with Mother, having previously lived with her grandmother. Mother stated she never taught J.E. the difference between right and wrong and never taught J.E. to respect police commands. The court found that J.E. understood the wrongfulness of her conduct, sustained the wardship petition, and placed J.E. on probation. The court of appeal affirmed, finding sufficient evidence that J.E. appreciated the wrongfulness of her conduct, as required for minors under the age of 14. (Pen. Code 26). View "In re J.E." on Justia Law

While 17-year-old I.M. was a ward of the court and on probation, the District Attorney filed a supplemental Welfare and Institutions Code section 602(a) petition. I.M. admitted to a felony grand theft allegation; robbery and violation of probation allegations were dismissed. The court ordered I.M. detained in juvenile hall for a period not to exceed her maximum custody time of three years four months, or until the age of 21, and imposed probation conditions, including that she “report any police contacts” to the probation officer within 24 hours and successfully complete all parts of the County Institution Program, GIM, while detained. The court rejected I.M.’s objection on due process grounds as no date certain was set for termination of the custodial commitment and probation would be allowed to determine whether I.M. successfully completed the GIM program.The court of appeal remanded the requirement that I.M. report “any police contacts” as unconstitutionally vague and overbroad, leaving "one to guess what sorts of events and interactions qualify as reportable.” The court otherwise affirmed. The juvenile court did not delegate to the probation officer the authority to determine the length of the custodial commitment; the court scheduled a review hearing and made sure the minor and counsel were aware of the ability to file a petition to modify the disposition order. View "In re I.M." on Justia Law

Applying the principles of Miller v. Alabama, (2012) 567 U.S. 460, the California Supreme Court in People v. Gutierrez, (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1354, 1361, held that Penal Code section 190.5, subdivision (b), which prescribes a sentence of life without parole or a term of 25 years to life for a 16- or 17-year-old defendant found guilty of special circumstances murder, "authorizes, and indeed requires" consideration of the youth-related mitigating factors identified in Miller before imposing life without parole on a juvenile homicide offender. Legislation enacted shortly before the decision in Gutierrez now provides for youth offender parole hearings at statutorily prescribed points, including Senate Bill No. 394 for youth offenders sentenced to life without parole.In this case, defendant was sentenced to life without parole for murder during an attempted robbery committed when he was 17 years old. The Court of Appeal held that the sentencing court is statutorily required to consider youth-related mitigating factors before imposing life without parole. When, as here, the record is at the very least ambiguous as to whether the sentencing court understood its obligation to consider youth-related mitigating factors at sentencing before making the discretionary sentencing decision required by section 190.5, subdivision (b), remand is appropriate. Finally, the court held that defendant's sentence for aggravated assault should have been stayed under section 654. The court affirmed defendant's convictions and remanded for resentencing. View "People v. Ochoa" on Justia Law

In 2016, A.M. became a ward of the Alameda County Juvenile Court and was placed on probation but absconded from his mother’s home. In 2017, A.M. admitted to assault with force likely to produce bodily injury in exchange for dismissal of a related robbery count. He was placed at Camp Sweeney and absconded. A warrant was issued for his arrest. He was released to home supervision on GPS monitoring. A.M. removed his GPS monitor and absconded. A month later, A.M., then 16 years old, was arrested in possession of a loaded automatic handgun, suspected methamphetamine, pills believed to be opioids, and a digital scale. He waived his Miranda rights and admitted he was a gang member. A.M. appealed the juvenile court’s subsequent order placing him in a short-term residential therapeutic program (STRTP), arguing that under Welfare and Institutions Code 706.5, 706.6, the probation department was required to, but did not, convene a child and family team (CFT) meeting before the disposition hearing.The court of appeal considered the matter although A.M. has been released from the STRTP. The issues are of public importance and likely to recur and continue to evade review. The juvenile court erred in placing a minor in an STRTP based upon a probation department recommendation that failed to consider the input of a CFT. View "In re A.M." on Justia Law