Justia Juvenile Law Opinion Summaries

Tajay Johnson and Kevin Hairston were both convicted by jury of one count of second degree robbery, one count of carjacking, one count of kidnapping to commit robbery, and one count of kidnapping for the purpose of carjacking. Johnson was 17 years old when he committed the offenses. Charges were originally filed against him in criminal court. However, after voters enacted Proposition 57, the Public Safety and Rehabilitation Act of 2016 during the pendency of the criminal proceeding, Johnson’s case was transferred to juvenile court to determine whether he was fit to proceed as a juvenile or should be tried as an adult. Both defendants were ultimately sentenced to life with the possibility of parole for each of the kidnapping offenses. The sentences for robbery and carjacking were stayed under Penal Code section 654. The Court of Appeal agreed with defendants and the State that carjacking was a necessarily included lesser offense of kidnapping for the purpose of carjacking, and therefore reversed defendants’ convictions for carjacking. The Court further agreed with both parties that the abstracts of judgment had to be amended and that defendants’ sentences needed to be clarified. Defendants also challenged the imposition of various fines and fees as due process violations under California v. Dueñas, 30 Cal.App.5th 1157 (2019). The Court concluded some of those claims were forfeited, and as to the remainder any error was harmless. A $40 crime prevention fine was stricken as unauthorized. Johnson singly argued that with respect to his being tried as an adult, he had a statutory right to a waive the juvenile fitness hearing, and his attorney could not do so in his behalf. The Court disagreed with Johnson's contention. The matter was remanded for correction of abstract, and for imposition of a statutorily mandated $10 fine instead. View "California v. Johnson" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's order granting habeas relief to respondent under Penal Code section 3051. The People argued that the trial court wrongly found section 3051 applicable because respondent had already been granted parole on his indeterminate-term youth offense.The court held that, by the plain language of the statute, respondent was not entitled to a youth offender parole hearing at the time the statute became effective and thus was not entitled to the additional benefits afforded by the case law requiring immediate release upon parole under that statutory scheme. View "In re Howerton" on Justia Law

J.M., born in 2010, suffered an accident when he was 10 months old. Since the accident J.M. has resided at Children’s Hospital, suffering from anoxic brain injury, epilepsy, developmental delays, and bone disorders. He has gastrostomy and tracheal tubes and is nonverbal. In 2017, the Hospital declared him medically cleared for discharge, provided that two adults be trained as caregivers. J.M.’s father had never visited him; his mother’s visits were infrequent. The Santa Clara County Department of Family and Children’s Service filed a petition alleging that his parents were unwilling and/or unable to care for him and that they had a history of substance abuse. The Department recommended permanent legal guardianship by J.M.’s grandmother, who visited J.M. regularly and with whom J.M. had a positive emotional bond. J.M.’s siblings were also in her care. Grandmother completed some but not all of the training to care for J.M.; she had no plans to obtain accessible housing. Grandmother was not seeking placement of J.M. in her home. J.M. opposed the plan, arguing that the court lacked authority to appoint grandmother as legal guardian without him being in her physical custody and that the plan was not in his best interest because it would relieve the Department of any obligation to find a less restrictive placement. The court of appeal affirmed the adoption of the Department’s recommendation. Continued residence at the hospital may not be optimal, but grandmother is committed to J.M’s best interest and supports moving him to a suitable permanent care facility should that become available. The court asked the Department to continue to look for more permanent placement, View "In re J.M." on Justia Law

Minor recorded photographs and videos on his cellular phone of consensual sexual activity between himself and Jane Doe, both under 18 years old. He later extorted money from Doe by threatening to disclose the recordings to other students at their high school. He was placed on juvenile probation after admitting to felony possession of child pornography (Pen. Code 311.11(a)) and extortion (Pen. Code 518, 520). Minor argued that a probation condition requiring him to submit all electronic devices under his control to warrantless searches by the probation department and to provide passwords necessary to access information on those devices was unconstitutionally overbroad. The California Supreme Court granted review and transferred the matter to the court of appeal for reconsideration in light of its 2019 decision, In re Ricardo P. The court of appeal again upheld the condition, noting the direct relationship between minor’s offenses and his use of an electronic device. The search condition was appropriately tailored. View "In re Q.R." on Justia Law

In 2011, Dominick Humphrey pled guilty to four counts of robbery (counts 2, 3, 4 and 24). For three of these counts (counts 2, 3, and 4), Humphrey admitted that he used a deadly weapon (a knife) during the commission of the offenses, and used a firearm during the commission of one of the counts (count 24). Humphrey also admitted that he was 16 years old when he committed the crimes within the meaning of Welfare and Institutions Code section 707. The trial court sentenced Humphrey to prison for 19 years. Five years into Humphrey's sentence, an employee of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) wrote a letter to the superior court, stating that the abstract of judgment "may be in error, or incomplete[.]" In 2018, the trial court clarified that Humphrey was sentenced to 15 years for count 24 and the associated firearm enhancement and consecutive 16-month terms for counts 2, 3, and 4 (including their deadly weapon enhancements). An amended abstract of judgment was issued showing a sentence of 19 years in state prison. Thereafter, Humphrey moved to strike the firearm enhancement under Senate Bill No. 620. The trial court denied the motion because Humphrey's conviction became final before the enactment of Senate Bill No. 620. Appellate counsel filed a "Wende" brief, indicating that he had not been able to identify any arguable issue for reversal on appeal, but asked the Court of Appeal to review the record for error as Wende mandated. In reviewing the record, the Court discovered an issue to be briefed, and the parties were requested to brief whether the trial court erred in finding Humphrey ineligible for relief under Senate Bill 620 after the trial court acted to correct the abstract of judgment. Find that the trial court only made plain how the original sentence should have appeared on the amended abstract of judgment, the Court of Appeal determined Humphrey did not file a notice of appeal following the original 2011 sentence. His case became final in 2011. Senate Bill 620 took effect January 1, 2018, and Humphrey's was not entitled to retroactive application of the law to his sentence. Therefore the trial court did not err in denying his motion for resentencing. View "California v. Humphrey" on Justia Law

People v. Dueñas (2019) 30 Cal.App.5th 1157, does not apply to a mandatory minimum juvenile restitution fine. The Court of Appeal held that the trial court's order requiring M.B. to pay a $100 restitution fine does not violate his due process rights. To the extent that Dueñas purports to state a rule of California criminal procedure, the court questioned whether the Court of Appeal, as opposed to the Supreme Court, has the authority to do so. The court explained that it was not bound by a sister appellate court opinion and it was obligated to follow the California Constitution, Article 6, 13. Therefore, the court concluded that a $100 mandatory juvenile restitution fine did not result in a miscarriage of justice. View "People v. M.B." on Justia Law

After L.W. was charged in a juvenile wardship petition with committing sexual battery against two minor females, the juvenile court issued temporary restraining orders against defendant as to the two alleged victims under Welfare and Institutions Code, section 213.5 and rule 5.630 of the California Rules of Court.The Court of Appeal held that because the People presented no evidence of an emergency or other urgency and made no attempt to give defendant prior notice of their intent to seek the temporary restraining orders, the juvenile court erred in issuing those orders without notice. However, the court held that the juvenile court did not err in issuing the pre-adjudication three-year restraining order, because the order was a reasoned and reasonable response to defendant's conduct and the other relevant facts of the case. Furthermore, the order was entirely consistent with the public policy objectives underlying the juvenile delinquency laws generally and section 213.5 specifically. Accordingly, the court affirmed the three-year restraining order. View "People v. L.W." on Justia Law

Shortly before turning 18 Andrew committed an armed robbery; his accomplice shot and killed a police officer. After his conviction, Judge Brady sentenced Andrew to life in prison without the possibility of parole (LWOP), plus 24 years. The court of appeal reversed one special circumstance. On remand, Judge Brady sentenced Andrew to LWOP plus 24 years. After a second remand following the U.S. Supreme Court's Miller decision (2012), Judge Brady imposed LWOP plus 23 years, finding Andrew’s actions “were not those of an irresponsible or impulsive child," nor the product of peer pressure, coercion, or surprise and finding no realistic chance of rehabilitation. The court of appeal affirmed. The California Supreme Court returned the case with directions to consider whether legislation rendering juvenile LWOP defendants eligible for parole suitability hearings mooted Andrew’s challenge.While Andrew’s appeal was pending Proposition 57 eliminated a prosecutor’s ability to “direct file” charges in criminal court against minors of a certain age. These minors may be tried in criminal court only after the juvenile court conducts a transfer hearing to consider specific factors. The court rejected Andrew’s LWOP challenge but concluded he was entitled to a Proposition 57 hearing. The superior court granted the prosecution's motion to assign that hearing to Judge Brady. The court of appeal rejected a mandamus petition. A conditional reversal and limited remand for a Proposition 57 transfer hearing are not a “new trial” under Code of Civil Procedure section 170.61, which permits parties in civil and criminal actions to move to disqualify an assigned trial judge based on an allegation that the judge is prejudiced against the party. View "Andrew M. v. Superior Court of Contra Costa County" on Justia Law

During a physical fight between M.T. and the victim during which the victim’s cell phone and case dropped to the ground, another student picked up and stole the victim’s cell phone and case. The Contra Costa County District Attorney filed a section 602 petition, alleging M.T. had committed a misdemeanor battery against a fellow student on school property. The juvenile court placed M.T. on informal supervision for six months, with standard conditions of probation, stating that M.T. and her parents, and a coparticipant minor, would be jointly and severally liable to pay restitution under Welfare and Institutions Code section 654.2. Before a contested restitution hearing, the probation department filed a report stating it had received a victim impact and claim statement seeking restitution of $989 for the cell phone, cash located in the cell phone case, and copays for an emergency room visit and for three therapy visits. M.T. challenged the court ordering her “to pay restitution for a theft she was not involved in nor charged with.” The court of appeal dismissed, reasoning that the order is neither a judgment nor an order after judgment for which an appeal is authorized under section 800. View "In re M.T." on Justia Law

The Social Services Agency alleged that the children were exposed to domestic violence and substance abuse. The court declared the minors to be juvenile court dependents, removed them from parents’ care, and ordered reunification services. The Agency recommended termination of reunification and referral for selection of a permanent plan. The matter was set for a contested hearing. The parents' attorneys moved to compel discovery, seeking an order that copies of discovery be provided by the Agency to both parents at no cost. The Agency refused, arguing that it had fulfilled its discovery obligations by making discovery available for inspection in accordance with its usual protocol. Parents’ counsel was allowed to take pictures of documents or to otherwise copy them using their own supplies without charge. The Agency argued that requiring it to provide free discovery would violate separation of powers principles and constitute a gift of public funds. The juvenile court denied the motion, to avoid “acting in excess of its authority.”The court of appeal reversed. While no court rule, statute, or constitutional principle requires the order sought by parents, should a circumstance arise where an indigent parent’s meaningful access to the judicial process is impaired by discovery requirements, the juvenile court has the authority to fix the time, place, and manner of discovery upon terms and conditions as will serve the ends of justice. The court remanded to allow the court to exercise its discretion to decide whether any further discovery order is necessary in this case. View "In re William M.W." on Justia Law