Justia Juvenile Law Opinion Summaries

Five teenagers attacked a 61-year-old man in his driveway. The incident was captured on security cameras. Minor’s teacher identified him from photographs. San Francisco Police Sergeant Smith contacted Minor’s mother, stating that he was investigating a crime and needed to meet with Minor, age 15. Officer Martinez, who spoke Spanish, accompanied Smith to the home. Martinez’s body camera recorded the events. Mother led them to Minor’s bedroom, where he was sleeping, and stayed in the room. Smith handed Minor a “Juvenile Know Your Rights” form and told Minor, “I’m going to read you your rights just because you’re a juvenile… you’re not under arrest.” When asked if he understood each statement, Minor answered “Yes.” Minor was largely unresponsive but eventually said that he hit the victim. Smith then placed Minor under arrest.The court of appeal affirmed a juvenile court order placing Minor on probation. Although police must arrange for the youth to consult with counsel before interrogating a 15-year-old in custody, (Welf. & Inst. Code 625.6(a)), the statute does not provide for exclusion of the minor’s statements as a remedy. Minor’s constitutional rights were not violated. Minor knowingly waived his Miranda rights and was not subjected to deception or trickery. The court struck, as vague, a probation condition, requiring Minor to “[c]onsult with the Probation Officer without hesitation when you are in need of advice.” View "In re Anthony L." on Justia Law

After D.W. was found unfit for juvenile treatment based on the allegation that, at age 17, he committed second degree murder under the theory of natural and probable consequences, the juvenile court transferred his case to adult court. Then the California Legislature eliminated liability for murder under the theory of natural and probable consequences.The Court of Appeal held that D.W. was entitled to a new transfer hearing and remanded to the juvenile court to vacate its orders transferring his case to adult court. The court held that D.W. was eligible for transfer irrespective of his liability for murder, and because any change in D.W.'s liability for murder would have no effect on the transfer decision itself. The court reasoned that eliminating the requirement that the People prove a prima facie case leaves the minor with no opportunity to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence of the offense alleged. Furthermore, the Judicial Council amended certain rules of court in light of Proposition 57 to retain the requirement that the People establish a prima facie case of the alleged offense. The court held that the juvenile court must consider D.W.'s fitness in light of the offense alleged in the petition. The court explained that the gravity of the offense alleged in the petition was not irrelevant to the court's evaluation of a minor's fitness for juvenile treatment, and the juvenile court would not presume that the juvenile court would find D.W. unfit if he were alleged to have committed an assault with a deadly weapon on a natural and probable consequences theory rather than second degree murder. View "D.W. v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal joined the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Districts in holding that Senate Bill No. 1391, which eliminates the district attorneys' ability to seek transfer of 14 and 15 year olds from juvenile court to criminal court, is constitutional.Petitioner, who was 15 years old at the time of the offenses, sought a writ of mandate requiring the trial court to vacate its order denying his motion to remand his case to juvenile court. The court granted a peremptory writ of mandate directing the superior court to vacate its order, and remanded his case to the juvenile court. View "Narith S. v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Jones is serving a sentence of life in prison without the possibility of parole (LWOP) for a 1994 murder he committed when he was 19 years old. In 2018, Jones filed a petition to recall his sentence, citing Penal Code 1170(d)(2), which applies to a defendant who is serving an LWOP sentence for an offense committed when the defendant was “under 18 years of age” and who has been incarcerated for at least 15 years.The court of appeal upheld the denial of relief, rejecting an argument that section 1170(d)(2) violates equal protection because it denies LWOP offenders ages 18-25 the same opportunity to petition for resentencing that is afforded to similarly-situated juvenile offenders without any rational basis for doing so. LWOP offenders who were 18-25 years old when they committed their offenses are adult offenders, not similarly situated to juvenile offenders. The U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly found that “children are constitutionally different from adults for purposes of sentencing.” To determine the age at which the diminished culpability of a youthful offender should no longer result in a categorically different sentence, a line must be drawn. The Legislature could reasonably decide that for LWOP offenders, the line should be drawn at age 18, rather than at some later date when the brain is fully developed. Drawing a bright line at age 18 establishes an objective and easily implemented measure, which has been used by the U.S. Supreme Court. View "In re Jones" on Justia Law

The Santa Clara County District Attorney filed juvenile wardship petitions (Welf. & Inst. Code 602(a)) alleging that R.E., born in June 2000 and a ward of the juvenile court since 2016, committed two first-degree burglaries and moved to transfer R.E. to adult criminal court. (section 707(a)) In June 2017, R.E. had been ordered to a ranch program following his involvement in carjacking, vehicle theft, and robbery. He completed the program's custodial portion but, after testing positive for drugs and missing school, was returned to the ranch. R.E. was “failed” from the program. R.E.’s supervising probation counselor testified that although he had recommended that R.E. return to the ranch, his recommendation had changed because there would not be enough time for R.E. to complete all of the programs before he turned 19; the ranch and aftercare program could not accommodate 19-year-olds. The juvenile court granted the motion to transfer, noting that, despite believing that R.E. was amenable to treatment as a juvenile, it “need[ed] the ability to use custody as an incentive” and “confinement [in county jail] would not be an available disposition under juvenile law if [he] were found to have violated probation after turning 19.” The court of appeal vacated the transfer order. The juvenile court erred in concluding it would not have the authority to order R.E. into custody if he violated probation after turning 19. View "R.E. v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment entered after the juvenile court sustained a juvenile delinquency petition for assault with force likely to produce great bodily injury and attempted second degree robbery. The court held that the juvenile defendant's liability as an aider and abettor of the assault was based on his joint participation in an extremely dangerous situation that he helped create. In this case, defendant entered into the convenient store with his codefendant and escaped together; the jury could reasonably infer that they were jointly engaged in a robbery; and the natural and probable consequences of which included resistance by any of the defendants to avoid capture. The court rejected defendant's non-developed brain theory contention, and held that this contention confused criminal capacity with aider and abettor liability which focuses on whether a criminal act was a natural and probable consequence of another criminal act. View "People v. R.C." on Justia Law

At 11:20 p.m., Gosuwin, carrying a pursed and holding an iPhone, saw two “young black men” wearing hoodies coming around the corner. One pushed her to the ground. The assailants pulled her bag and phone away, then continued on Market Street toward the Embarcadero. Gosuwin went to a nearby building, where a security guard called the police. Gosuwin did not see any weapons on her assailants. An officer used the “Find My iPhone app.” Gosuwin’s phone was “pinging” on the Embarcadero. Officer found Gosuwin’s purse there. At 11:29 p.m., officers received a dispatch call and went to the area to look for the “robbery suspects.” They noticed Jeremiah and J.A., both juveniles. One was wearing a hoodie. During the ensuing stop, an officer instructed Jeremiah to face a wall with his legs spread and his arms above his head. He did so. There was nothing about Jeremiah’s appearance, behavior, or actions to indicate that Jeremiah was armed and dangerous. A pat-down search revealed two phones in Jeremiah’s pocket. One phone’s background picture and password matched Gosuwin’s phone. The juvenile court denied a motion to suppress and ordered Jeremiah transferred to Alameda County where a previous wardship petition alleging second-degree robbery was pending. The court of appeal reversed the jurisdiction and disposition orders. The officer who conducted the pat-down did not present specific and articulable facts to support a reasonable suspicion that Jeremiah was armed and dangerous. The court declined to recognize a rule that would validate essentially any “pat-search” of a suspected robber who is lawfully detained following a report of a fresh robbery. View "In re Jeremiah S." on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant O.C., appealed an order denying her petition to seal her juvenile court records and related records in the custody of law enforcement and other agencies. She claimed the court was required to seal her records under Welfare & Institutions Code section 786 because she satisfactorily completed her juvenile court probation in April 2011. The Court of Appeal affirmed denial. O.C. was not qualified to seal her records under section 781 because: (1) she was convicted of six felonies in May 2018, after the juvenile court’s jurisdiction over her terminated in April 2011; and (2) in denying O.C.’s sealing petition, the court found that O.C. had not obtained rehabilitation since April 2011, based on the facts underlying her six felony convictions. View "In re O.C." on Justia Law

Michael Damion Jude Medrano was convicted by jury on one count of first-degree murder, two counts of second degree robbery, and one count of assault with force likely to produce great bodily harm. Medrano was 19 years old when he committed the offenses. He was sentenced to 25 years to life, plus seven. Medrano was sentenced in December 2017, one and one-half years after the California Supreme Court decided California v. Franklin, 63 Cal.4th 261 (2016), which held that when a juvenile offender receives an indeterminate life sentence, the offender must be “given adequate opportunity at sentencing to make a record of mitigating evidence tied to his youth.” The Court remanded the case to the trial court to determine whether the juvenile offender had been given an adequate opportunity to make such a record. Medrano asked the Court of Appeal to give him the same relief that was granted in Franklin. But because Medrano was sentenced one and one-half years after Franklin, and because nothing in the record indicated Medrano lacked an adequate opportunity at sentencing to make a record of mitigating youth-related evidence, the Court found no basis to order the same relief that the Supreme Court granted in Franklin. It noted, however, that the Supreme Court recently held that a juvenile offender whose conviction and sentence were final could file a motion under Penal Code section 1203.01 for the purpose of making a record of mitigating youth-related evidence. View "California v. Medrano" on Justia Law

This case centered on the validity of a a changed law that raised the minimum age at which a juvenile could be tried in criminal court. The new law amended a provision of the “Public Safety and Rehabilitation Act” (Proposition 57), which the voters approved in 2016 with the express goals of reducing prison spending, emphasizing rehabilitation for youth offenders, and limiting prosecutorial authority over the decision to try a minor as an adult. To advance these goals, Proposition 57 eliminated prosecutors’ ability to directly file charges against minors ages 14 to 17 in criminal court, requiring them instead to seek the juvenile court’s permission by way of a transfer hearing. In 2018, the Legislature enacted the law at issue here, Senate Bill Number 1391 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess., "SB 1391"), which eliminated prosecutors’ ability to seek transfer hearings for 14 and 15 year olds, effectively raising the minimum age a child can be tried as an adult from 14 to 16. The change affected B.M.’s prosecution for murder. SB 1391 became effective after the Riverside County District Attorney had filed a wardship petition against the then 15-year-old, and had moved to transfer her to criminal court. While the transfer motion was pending, the juvenile court (respondent Riverside County Superior Court) ruled the new law was invalid because it did not further what it identified as Proposition 57’s goal of giving judges the authority to transfer 14 to 17 year olds to criminal court. B.M. sought mandamus relief, arguing the trial court misinterpreted Proposition 57's purpose in declaring SB 1391 invalid. The Court of Appeal agreed, finding SB 1391 furthered each of Proposition 57’s express purposes, including the one concerned with limiting prosecutorial discretion. The Court therefore granted B.M.’s petition for a writ of mandate and directed the juvenile court to vacate its order declaring SB 1391 invalid. View "B.M. v. Superior Court" on Justia Law