Justia Juvenile Law Opinion Summaries

In 2017, a minor admitted to two counts of assault with intent to commit rape and was initially placed in a Level B program. Due to multiple probation violations, the juvenile court later committed him to the Division of Juvenile Justice (DJJ) in 2019. After being discharged from DJJ in April 2023, the juvenile court imposed a probation condition requiring the minor to register as a sex offender under Penal Code section 290.008. The minor appealed, arguing that this requirement violated his equal protection rights because it treated him differently from minors who committed similar offenses after the juvenile justice realignment, which closed DJJ and transferred responsibilities to county facilities.The Superior Court of Sacramento County upheld the probation condition, rejecting the minor's equal protection argument. The court found that the sex offender registration requirement did not involve a loss of liberty and thus did not implicate a fundamental right, applying the rational basis standard of review. The court reasoned that the Legislature could have determined that minors in county facilities have a lower risk of recidivism due to more effective treatment, justifying the differential treatment.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that the rational basis standard applied because the sex offender registration requirement did not involve a fundamental right or suspect classification. The court found that a rational basis existed for the differential treatment, as the Legislature could have reasonably concluded that minors already in DJJ custody posed a higher risk of recidivism and required continued registration to protect public safety. Thus, the court found no equal protection violation and affirmed the dispositional order. View "People v. I.B." on Justia Law

In a juvenile wardship proceeding, the minor's counsel declared a doubt about the minor's competency to stand trial. Consequently, the juvenile court suspended the proceedings and referred the minor for a competency evaluation. The court's protocol mandated the disclosure of the minor's mental health records to the court-appointed expert for evaluation. The minor objected, citing the psychotherapist-patient privilege under California Evidence Code section 1014. The court overruled the objection and ordered the disclosure, prompting the minor to file a writ petition challenging this decision.The Contra Costa County Superior Court overruled the minor's objection, stating that Welfare and Institutions Code section 709 permits the compelled disclosure of all available records, including mental health records, for competency evaluations. The court also referenced Evidence Code section 1025, which it interpreted as allowing such disclosures in competency proceedings. The minor's request for a stay to seek appellate review was denied, leading to the filing of the writ petition.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that Evidence Code section 1016 renders the psychotherapist-patient privilege inapplicable in juvenile competency proceedings once the minor's counsel declares a doubt about the minor's competency. The court reasoned that the issue of the minor's mental or emotional condition is tendered by the minor through their counsel, thus falling under the patient-litigant exception to the privilege. The court denied the minor's writ petition and dissolved the partial stay of the juvenile court's order. View "T.M. v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

The case involves the removal of a newborn child, N., from her mother, C.J., due to the mother's substance abuse and mental health issues. The Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) placed N. with a foster caregiver, who was a trial attorney for the County Counsel’s office. Maternal aunt (aunt) requested placement of N. shortly after her birth, but DCFS failed to assess her for over a year despite repeated requests from mother’s counsel, N.’s counsel, and aunt herself. During this period, visitation between N. and her family was severely limited, with the caregiver dictating the visitation schedule.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County repeatedly ordered DCFS to assess aunt for placement, but DCFS did not comply. Eventually, aunt’s home was approved for placement, but DCFS still did not move N. to aunt’s care, deferring to the caregiver’s objections. By the time the court considered aunt for placement, over a year had passed, and the court found it was too late to apply the relative placement preference. The court also found that it was not in N.’s best interest to move her due to her bond with the caregiver.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court found that DCFS’s delays in evaluating aunt for placement and the court’s lackluster response to the family’s pleas for supportive services were prejudicial. The court concluded that the juvenile court erred by failing to apply the relative placement preference under section 361.3 and that the error was prejudicial. The appellate court reversed the order terminating mother’s reunification services, the order denying mother’s section 361.3 motion, and the order terminating her parental rights, and remanded for further proceedings. The court also directed DCFS and the juvenile court to ensure compliance with the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) requirements. View "In re N.J." on Justia Law

The case involves a mother, J.R., who appealed the juvenile court’s dispositional findings and orders concerning her son, Dominic. The Riverside County Department of Public Social Services (the Department) had previously received multiple referrals alleging general neglect, sexual abuse, and at-risk sibling abuse within the family. The allegations primarily centered around the mother’s fiancé, Brandon, who was accused of sexually abusing the mother’s daughter, S.R., over several years. Despite these allegations, the mother denied any knowledge of the abuse and refused to cooperate with the Department’s investigations.The Superior Court of Riverside County found that the mother failed to protect her children from Brandon’s abuse and sustained allegations under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (b)(1) and (j). The court removed Dominic from the mother’s custody, granted sole physical and legal custody to Dominic’s father, Richard, and ordered monitored visitation for the mother.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case. The court found insufficient evidence to support the jurisdictional findings under section 300(b)(1) and section 300(j) as to Dominic. The court noted that there was no evidence that Dominic was at substantial risk of physical harm or sexual abuse. The court emphasized that the allegations against the mother were specific to her failure to protect S.R. from sexual abuse, and there was no evidence that Dominic faced a similar risk.The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal as to S.R. as abandoned, reversed the dispositional findings and orders as to Dominic, and vacated the true findings on the jurisdictional allegations with directions to dismiss the petition as to Dominic. View "In re S.R." on Justia Law

Brandon H. was the subject of three juvenile wardship petitions. He sought to have the first and third petitions dismissed and sealed under Welfare and Institutions Code section 786. The juvenile court denied his request, reasoning that the sustained allegations in the second petition precluded the dismissal and sealing of any of the petitions. The court failed to consider each petition individually.The Contra Costa County Superior Court initially adjudged Brandon a ward of the court and placed him on probation following the first petition, which alleged felony grand theft. While on probation, a second petition was filed, alleging second-degree robbery and other offenses, which was sustained, and Brandon was committed to a treatment program. A third petition, filed in San Francisco County, alleged felony grand theft and misdemeanor battery. Brandon admitted to these charges, and the case was transferred back to Contra Costa County, where his wardship continued. Upon completing probation, Brandon requested the dismissal and sealing of the first and third petitions, which the court denied, treating the petitions as a single entity.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court held that the juvenile court erred by not considering each petition individually for dismissal and sealing under section 786. The appellate court found that the third petition must be dismissed and sealed as Brandon met the criteria for satisfactory completion of probation for that petition. However, the first petition could not be dismissed and sealed because Brandon did not meet the criteria due to new findings of wardship for felony offenses during the probation period for the first petition. The appellate court remanded the case to dismiss and seal the third petition but affirmed the decision regarding the first petition. View "In re Brandon H." on Justia Law

Mother, Lidia P., appealed the juvenile court's denial of her request for a restraining order against Father, Luis M., despite findings of domestic violence. The court found that Father had committed multiple acts of domestic violence against Mother and one of her children but declined to issue a restraining order, reasoning it was unnecessary since the parents no longer lived together. Instead, the court orally ordered both parents to stay away from each other.The Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services filed a petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, alleging that the children, A.P. and D.P., were at substantial risk of harm due to domestic violence between the parents, Mother's mental and emotional problems, Father's severe epilepsy, improper use of child safety restraints, marijuana use, and physical abuse of A.P. The juvenile court sustained some of these allegations, including those related to domestic violence and physical abuse, and removed the children from both parents. Mother then sought a restraining order, which the court initially granted temporarily but later denied permanently, opting instead for a mutual stay-away order.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case. The court found that the juvenile court erred in denying the restraining order based on the parents' physical separation and the issuance of a non-CLETS stay-away order. The appellate court held that physical separation and non-CLETS orders are not adequate substitutes for the protections provided by a restraining order, which is enforceable by law enforcement. The appellate court reversed the juvenile court's decision and remanded the case for a new hearing on Mother's restraining order request, emphasizing that the juvenile court must use the correct legal standard in its determination. View "In re A.P." on Justia Law

In 2015, J.M., then 17, broke into a 72-year-old woman's home, assaulted her with intent to commit rape, and stole $900. The People filed charges directly in adult criminal court under former section 707. A jury found J.M. guilty of assault with intent to commit rape during a burglary, attempted rape, and first-degree robbery, with an elder abuse enhancement. He was sentenced to 14 years to life.J.M. appealed, arguing that Proposition 57, which eliminated direct charging of juveniles in adult court, should apply retroactively. The California Supreme Court in People v. Superior Court (Lara) agreed, holding that Proposition 57 applies retroactively to nonfinal cases. The Court of Appeal conditionally reversed J.M.'s judgment and remanded for a juvenile transfer hearing. The juvenile court, after a hearing, transferred J.M. to adult court, reinstating his sentence. J.M.'s appeal of this order was dismissed, but he later successfully petitioned for habeas corpus, leading to the reentry of the transfer order and this appeal.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court found that recent amendments to section 707, which raised the prosecution's burden of proof and required specific findings regarding a minor's amenability to rehabilitation, apply retroactively to J.M.'s case. The court conditionally reversed the transfer order and remanded for a new transfer/amenability hearing under the amended law. If the juvenile court again transfers J.M. to adult court, the criminal court must conduct a new sentencing hearing considering recent ameliorative changes in sentencing laws. View "In re J.M." on Justia Law

The case involves Santiago Gonzalo Canales, who was convicted for lewd acts and continuous sexual abuse of children. Canales sexually abused his stepdaughter and niece for over a decade, both of whom were under the age of 14 during the abuse. He was charged with four counts, including lewd acts on his niece and continuous sexual abuse of his niece and stepdaughter. The trial lasted eight days, and the jury convicted Canales on all counts, sentencing him to 60 years to life in prison.Canales appealed his convictions, challenging two different jury instructions. He argued that the first instruction did not identify the correct mental states for the offense of continuous sexual abuse. The court upheld the instruction, stating that it was in line with the presumption of mandatory culpability. Canales's second challenge was to another instruction, which the court assumed was given in error, but held that the error was harmless. Canales also forfeited a third challenge. However, on his fourth point, the court agreed with both parties that Canales must be resentenced.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Second Appellate District affirmed Canales's convictions, vacated his sentence, and remanded the case for resentencing without applying the One Strike law. View "People v. Canales" on Justia Law

This case involves a mother, D.R., who appealed jurisdiction and disposition orders related to her six children, all of whom were adjudged dependents of the juvenile court under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300. D.R. argued that the dependency petitions were deficient, some of the sustained jurisdictional allegations lacked substantial evidence, and her constitutional rights were violated by depriving her of her right to present additional evidence at the continued jurisdiction and disposition hearing for two of the children, and by what she characterized as a violation of her due process right to a speedy contested jurisdictional hearing.The children's fathers were not parties in this appeal. The children were born to three different fathers, referred to as father M., father V., and father H. The mother had been married to father H., but they separated after an incident of domestic violence. Father H. had a history of alcohol abuse and criminal offenses, mostly related to driving under the influence. The mother had sole legal and physical custody of the two children she had with father H., G.H. and B.H.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Fourth Appellate District Division Two found that some of the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings lacked the support of substantial evidence, requiring reversal of the jurisdictional and dispositional orders for four of the children. The court otherwise affirmed and remanded the matter for further proceedings. View "In re B.H." on Justia Law

The case involves a mother, Brittany B., who appealed from juvenile court orders that found her two children, B.D. and C.D., to be persons described by Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b), and placed them under the supervision of the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS). The juvenile court sustained a petition based on allegations that C.D. was born with a positive toxicology screen for opiates, and that the mother’s substance abuse placed both children at substantial risk of serious physical harm. The mother contended that the evidence was insufficient to support the court’s jurisdictional findings.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County had previously reversed the orders. The mother had tested positive for opiates during her pregnancy and at the time of C.D.'s birth. However, C.D. did not display any symptoms of withdrawal, and the mother was attentive to both children. The DCFS did not seek to detain the children, but it did open a case and seek court supervision.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Second Appellate District Division Three agreed with the mother's contention and reversed the juvenile court's orders. The court found that while the mother had used prescription drugs during her pregnancy, there was no substantial evidence that the children had suffered or were at risk of suffering serious physical harm or illness as a result of the mother's substance abuse. The court also found that the mother's refusal to voluntarily submit to drug testing did not provide sufficient evidence of a substantial risk of harm to the children. The court concluded that the evidence was insufficient to support the juvenile court's jurisdictional findings under section 300, subdivision (b). View "In re B.D." on Justia Law