Justia Juvenile Law Opinion Summaries

Sixteen-year-old defendant Adrian Vela and one of his fellow gang members confronted two suspected rival gang members. Vela’s accomplice pulled out a gun and shot the two victims, killing one of them. Charged as an adult, a jury found Vela guilty of murder, attempted murder, and found true the related firearm and gang allegations. Vela made several interrelated claims of instructional error concerning accomplice liability, and Vela raised two constitutional challenges to his 72 years to life sentence. In the unpublished parts of its opinion, the Court of Appeal found no reversible error with respect to the trial court’s jury instructions. Furthermore, the Court found Vela’s sentence did not violate either the equal protection clause or the Eighth Amendment. In the published portion of its opinion, the Court of Appeal conditionally reversed the judgment because of Proposition 57. “Vela is retroactively entitled to a transfer hearing because his case is not yet final on appeal. If, after conducting the hearing, the juvenile court judge determines that Vela’s case should be transferred to a court of criminal jurisdiction, then his convictions will be reinstated. . . . But if the juvenile court determines that Vela is amenable to rehabilitation, and should remain within the juvenile justice system, then his convictions will be deemed juvenile adjudications. The juvenile court is then to impose an appropriate disposition within its discretion under juvenile court law.” View "California v. Vela" on Justia Law

Alameda County Social Services recommended termination of the parental rights of Mother so that her son, Christian, could be adopted by Christian’s paternal grandmother and her husband, who live in Denmark. The juvenile court agreed, selecting adoption as the permanent plan, and ordered a case plan calling for Christian to undergo weekly therapy. Because of delays and scheduling issues, Christian attended fewer sessions than planned. In the meantime, his grandparents visited Christian several times in the U.S. Christian was upset when his visits with his mother were suspended and he was informed that he would be moving to Denmark. At a post-permanency review hearing, Christian’s counsel argued that Christian needed additional services to prepare for the move and that a planned trip should be delayed; the court nonetheless approved an extended trip to Denmark, while agreeing that Christian would benefit from additional therapy. In the meantime, the court of appeal reversed the order terminating parental rights because Mother had met her burden of establishing the beneficial-relationship exception to adoption. The court of appeal then concluded that approving the trip was proper under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.3(g) to protect Christian’s stability and to facilitate and expedite his adoption. View "In re Christian K." on Justia Law

At all relevant times, minor D.P. was a ward of the court and a probationer under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602, plus he was not in custody. The prosecuting attorney, filed a subsequent section 602 petition against him not five, but 39 judicial days after receiving the affidavit from the probation officer. The trial court found that under Welfare and Institutions Code section 653.5(d), this petition was untimely and dismissed it. The State appealed. The Court of Appeal reversed: the five-day time limit of section 653.5 (d) was directory, rather than mandatory; this means that a petition filed in violation of the five-day time limit was nevertheless valid. View "In re D.P." on Justia Law

B.F. and C.W. lived in Calaveras County with a blended family that included six children, ranging from one to 15 years of age. Most of the family attended a Little League baseball game on April 27, 2013, leaving the house at approximately 7:00 a.m. Appellant I.F. then age 12, and his sister L.F., age 8, were home alone on that morning; during the course of the morning, someone entered L.F.’s bedroom and stabbed her to death. Later that day, and in the days that followed, I.F. made a series of inconsistent and cumulatively incriminating statements to police. A petition was filed under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 alleging that I.F. committed murder and personally used a knife in the commission of the offense. Following a contested jurisdictional hearing, the juvenile court sustained the petition and found true the allegation that I.F. personally used a knife in the commission of the crime. I.F. appealed, arguing the juvenile court erroneously admitted his pre-arrest statements in violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). After review, the Court of Appeal agreed that two of four challenged statements were inadmissible. Because the Miranda error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt under Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967), the Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "In re I.F." on Justia Law

Defendant Daniel Marsh, one month shy of his 16th birthday, stalked a Davis neighborhood at night and randomly selected the home of two victims to satisfy a long-standing (and oft-expressed) desire to kill, after which he mutilated their bodies. He was found guilty by jury of two counts of first degree murder (finding that he personally used a deadly weapon in each instance) and sustained allegations of three special circumstances. Defendant was found sane at the time of the offenses. After making an individualized assessment of the appropriateness of the sentence, the trial court imposed an indeterminate life sentence with a minimum term of 52 years. The case was not fully briefed until July 2017. On appeal, defendant argued Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) and Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005), which respectively prohibited the mandatory punishment of life without parole for minors for any offense, or the death penalty under any circumstances, even for minors who commit homicide. Both cases applied in the context of a sanity determination, requiring the resurrection of the doctrine abrogated under California law in which an “irresistible impulse” test was applied to determine a defendant’s sanity. Defendant argued on appeal to the Court of Appeal that the sanity phase had to be reversed and retried with instructions on this rejected standard. In the published portion of its opinion, the Court of Appeal noted that in supplemental briefing, defendant had “deeply disturbed mental functioning,” that did not of itself align with the criteria absolving a defendant on the ground of insanity. The judgment of the criminal court was conditionally reversed and the matter remanded to the juvenile court with direction to hold a juvenile transfer hearing to determine defendant’s suitability for treatment in juvenile or criminal court within 90 days of the issuance of the Court of Appeals’ remittitur. If the juvenile court determined that defendant was the proper subject of criminal proceedings, it shall reinstate the criminal judgment. If the juvenile court finds that it would not have transferred defendant to a court of criminal jurisdiction, then it shall deem defendant’s convictions to be juvenile adjudications and conduct a dispositional hearing within its usual time frame. View "California v. Marsh" on Justia Law

The school’s principal recommended that M.N., a seventh grader, be expelled, based upon allegations that M.N. had committed sexual assault or sexual battery upon a 13-year-old female student on multiple occasions while the two rode a school bus. The district's administrative panel conducted a hearing and recommended expulsion, finding that M.N. had committed or attempted to commit sexual assault or committed sexual battery, and also committed sexual harassment. Unsuccessful with the District’s Governing Board and the Santa Clara County Board of Education, M.N. filed sought mandamus relief. The superior court concluded there was substantial evidence to support the finding that M.N. had committed sexual battery so that the District was required by statute to expel him for one year. The court remanded for consideration of whether the evidence justified the exercise of statutory discretion to suspend expulsion. M.N. argued that the sexual battery finding was unsupported by any competent evidence of the element of specific intent, i.e., that M.N.’s unwanted touching was “for the specific purpose of sexual arousal, sexual gratification, or sexual abuse” (Pen. Code, 243.4(e)(1)) and that evidence of such specific intent was entirely hearsay. The court of appeal affirmed, concluding that there was substantial evidence—including competent, admissible, nonhearsay evidence—to support the finding of sexual battery. View "M.N. v. Morgan Hill Unified School District" on Justia Law

People v. Sanchez's, (2016) 63 Cal.4th 665, limitations do not render social service reports inadmissible in status review hearings held pursuant to the Welfare and Institutions Code. In this case, petitioner sought extraordinary writ review of the juvenile court's order terminating reunification services and setting the matter for a permanency plan hearing. Petitioner contended that the superior court erred when it considered a social services report in the absence of its primary author, and thus prevented his cross-examination of her at the 12-month status review hearing. The court denied the petition, holding that the juvenile court's consideration of the report did not violate petitioner's due process rights. View "J.H. v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

People v. Sanchez's, (2016) 63 Cal.4th 665, limitations do not render social service reports inadmissible in status review hearings held pursuant to the Welfare and Institutions Code. In this case, petitioner sought extraordinary writ review of the juvenile court's order terminating reunification services and setting the matter for a permanency plan hearing. Petitioner contended that the superior court erred when it considered a social services report in the absence of its primary author, and thus prevented his cross-examination of her at the 12-month status review hearing. The court denied the petition, holding that the juvenile court's consideration of the report did not violate petitioner's due process rights. View "J.H. v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

At age of 19, defendant Montrell Woods shot Kenny Hernandez to death during a confrontation between the two men at an apartment complex. A jury found defendant guilty of second degree murder and of being a felon in possession of a firearm and also found he personally discharged a firearm causing death. The trial court sentenced defendant to a term of 15 years to life for the murder and to a consecutive term of 25 years to life for the firearm enhancement under Penal Code section 12022.53. At the time of defendant’s sentencing, the enhancement statute provided that “[n]otwithstanding [Penal Code s]ection 1385 or any other provision of law, the court shall not strike an allegation under this section or a finding bringing a person within the provisions of this section.” On appeal, defendant argued the trial court erred by failing to bifurcate the possession of a firearm charge from the murder charge, the court erroneously excluded evidence of the victim’s propensity for violence, the prosecutor committed two acts of misconduct, the court committed multiple instances of instructional error, and cumulative error resulted. Defendant also argued should have been remanded to the trial court so that he can make an adequate record for a future youth offender parole hearing and so that the trial court can exercise its discretion as to whether to strike the firearm enhancement based on a recent change to Penal Code section 12022.53 that took effect on January 1, 2018. In the unpublished portion of its opinion, the Court of Appeal found no merit to defendant’s claims of trial court error and prosecutorial misconduct. In the published portion of its opinion, the Court concluded defendant already had sufficient opportunity to make a record of information relevant to his eventual youth offender parole hearing, but agree that remand was necessary to allow the trial court to exercise its discretion as to whether to strike the firearm enhancement under the recent amendment to Penal Code section 12022.53. View "California v. Woods" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed a dispositional order entered after the juvenile court sustained allegations that he committed misdemeanor sexual battery when he touched the breast of a female high school classmate. In the published portion of the opinion, the Court of Appeal held that the condition of probation forbidding him from using, owning or possessing depictions of nudity was unconstitutionally overbroad. View "In re Carlos C." on Justia Law