Justia Juvenile Law Opinion Summaries

G.F., a minor, moved to seal the records pertaining to his dismissed petition alleging that he possessed a sharpened letter opener on school grounds. The Court of Appeal held that G.F. was entitled to have his records sealed under Welfare and Institutions Code section 786, because the statute is intended to apply to minors, like G.F., who successfully complete an informal program of supervision after a delinquency petition has been filed against them. The court explained that, once a petition has been filed, as it was here, the minor's program of supervision is governed by section 654.2, not section 654. Accordingly, the court reversed the trial court's denial of the motion to dismiss. View "In re G.F." on Justia Law

Defendant was sentenced to life without parole (LWOP) for special circumstance murder. While defendant's original appeal was pending, the United States Supreme Court decided Miller v. Alabama, (2012) 567 U.S. 460, which held that mandatory LWOP sentences for juvenile homicide offenders violated the Eighth Amendment. In defendant's first appeal, the Court of Appeal reversed the judgment and remanded to the trial court to reconsider defendant's LWOP sentence after applying the individualized sentencing criteria set forth in Miller. After the trial court again imposed an LWOP sentence, defendant appealed once more. In supplemental briefing, defendant argued that Proposition 57, the Public Safety and Rehabilitation Act of 2016 applied retroactively to his case. In the published portion of this opinion, the Court of Appeal held that the suitability hearing provisions of Proposition 57 are not retroactive. View "People v. Marquez" on Justia Law

Although the Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act (Proposition 47) applies generally to juveniles as held in Alejandro N. v. Superior Court, (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 1209, the search for statutory intent calls for a more narrow and limited approach, which focuses on the statutory language and settled case law interpreting this language. Applying this approach, the Court of Appeal held that defendant's juvenile adjudication for a violation of Penal Code section 243.4 was not a prior conviction as used in Health and Safety Code section 11377 and did not disqualify him from misdemeanor sentencing. Accordingly, the court reversed the trial court's finding that defendant's offense constituted a felony instead of a misdemeanor. View "People v. Zamora" on Justia Law

Where a ward’s compliance with probation conditions (Welfare and Institutions Code section 786) has been satisfactory for dismissal purposes, the court must seal the ward’s records in accordance with the statute.A 2014 section 602 wardship petition charged A.V., age 15, with felony possession of marijuana for sale and misdemeanor possession of concentrated cannabis. A.V. admitted the truth of the allegations. The court placed A.V. on probation on the conditions, among others, that he complete 150 hours of community service work, write a 1,000-word essay about the effects of marijuana on the adolescent brain, refrain from using or possessing alcohol or drugs, and complete outpatient substance abuse counseling. While on probation, A.V. twice tested positive for marijuana use and spent time in juvenile hall. Ultimately, citing A.V.’s “record of successfully completing probation programs, excellent reports from his school, and his family support network,” the probation department recommended “that all proceedings be dismissed.” The court agreed to dismiss the proceedings but refused to seal the records. The court of appeal remanded to have the records sealed. View "In re A.V." on Justia Law

Oswaldo, age 14, was declared a ward of the court and placed on probation after he admitted the allegation of a Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 petition that he committed misdemeanor battery on the property of a school, park, or hospital. The court dismissed an allegation of felony resisting an officer. Another section 602 petition, filed a month later, alleged two counts of felony vandalism causing damage of over $400. Days later, the probation officer filed a notice, alleging that Oswaldo had violated probation by failing to obey all laws, comply with his court-ordered curfew, attend school and behave appropriately in school. He admitted the first count, reduced to a misdemeanor; the second count and probation violation allegations were dismissed. The court removed Oswaldo from parental custody and ordered conditions of probation, to which Oswaldo objected, including that Oswaldo “not be in any specific locations where gang members are known by him to meet or gather or specific locations known by him for gang-related activity or specified by his probation officer or a parent, in writing, as involving gang-related activity, nor shall he participate in any gang-related activity.” The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting an argument that the condition was unconstitutionally vague for lacking an express knowledge requirement. View "In re Oswaldo R." on Justia Law

R.S. acknowledged that he did not object to two issues he raised on appeal to the Court of Appeal; the Court determined R.S. forfeited those issues. R.S. was found trespassing on school grounds as a nonstudent. Officers detained him after he became belligerent. One of the officers suffered a hairline fracture to his thumb during the struggle. R.S. was arrested in connection with a robbery outside of a Starbucks approximately two months later. At the police station, R.S. at first denied punching the victim in the head, later admitting to striking the victim. R.S. conceded that he attacked the victim to steal his iPhone. At the disposition hearing, the juvenile court imposed, among others, the following probation conditions: "Minor shall submit [his] person, property, or vehicle, and any property under [his] immediate custody or control to search at any time, with or without probable cause, with or without a search warrant, by any law enforcement officer or peace officers, probation officers, school officials or officers, and any other state security officers or agents engaged in the lawful performance of their duties [search condition]." "The minor shall not knowingly be in any privately owned vehicle with more than one person the minor knows or reasonably should know is under the age of 18 unless accompanied by a parent or legal guardian, a responsible adult, or with permission of the probation officer [supervision condition]." R.S. challenged these two conditions, arguing the search condition was unconstitutionally overbroad and vague while the supervision condition was unconstitutionally vague. Because he was making facial challenges to the conditions, R.S. argues his claims of error raised pure questions of law that the Court of Appeal should review. The Court disagreed, concluding R.S. forfeited these challenges by not raising them sooner. View "In re R.S." on Justia Law

The trial court complied with California Rules of Court, rule 5.651(b)(2)(D) by sufficiently considering I.V.'s educational needs. I.V. appealed a dispositional order adjudging him a ward of the court pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 and placing him on formal probation, subject to various terms and conditions. On appeal, I.V. argued the juvenile court erroneously imposed a probation condition requiring him to enroll in the Reflections Day Center Treatment Program without making necessary findings about his special educational needs under Rule of Court 5.651(b)(2)(D). I.V. also argued that a probation condition allowing warrantless searches of his "person, property, vehicle, and any property under his/her immediate custody or control" was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad because it may encompass searches of his electronic devices and data. The Court of Appeal affirmed. View "In re I.V." on Justia Law

Sixteen-year-old defendant Adrian Vela and one of his fellow gang members confronted two suspected rival gang members. Vela’s accomplice pulled out a gun and shot the two victims, killing one of them. The prosecutor directly filed charges against Vela in “adult” criminal court. The jury found Vela guilty of murder, attempted murder, and found true the related firearm and gang allegations. Vela makes several interrelated claims of instructional error concerning accomplice liability. Vela also raises two constitutional challenges to his 72 years to life sentence. In the unpublished parts of its opinion, the Court of Appeal found the trial court committed no instructional errors. Further, Vela’s sentence did not violate either the equal protection clause or the Eighth Amendment. In the published portion of its opinion, the Court conditionally reversed the judgment: the electorate recently approved Proposition 57, which emphasized juvenile rehabilitation, prosecutors can no longer directly file charges against a minor in an “adult” criminal court. Vela was retroactively entitled to a transfer hearing because his case was not yet final on appeal. If, after conducting the hearing, the juvenile court judge determines that Vela’s case should be transferred to a court of criminal jurisdiction, then his convictions and sentence will be reinstated. But if the juvenile court determined that Vela was amenable to rehabilitation, and should remain within the juvenile justice system, then his convictions would be deemed juvenile adjudications. View "California v. Vela" on Justia Law

B.M., seventeen years old, appealed from a juvenile court order declaring her a ward of the court and ordering her to serve 90 days in a juvenile justice facility. The juvenile court sustained a petition charging that B.M. committed a felony assault with a deadly weapon (a butter knife) in violation of Penal Code section 245, subdivision (a)(1). The court rejected B.M.'s claim that the juvenile court erroneously admitted statements she made to the police in violation of Miranda v. Arizona. The court concluded that the evidence was sufficient to support the finding that the butter knife she used was a deadly weapon. Consistent with an express direction from the California Supreme Court and time-honored rules on appeal, the court affirmed the trial court's factual finding that the instant butter knife was a deadly weapon because it was used in a manner capable of producing great bodily injury. The court disagreed with In re Brandon T. to the extent that it held to the contrary. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "In re B.M." on Justia Law

Edward, then age 14, grabbed a handbag from a 66-year-old woman and was apprehended by a police officer who saw him with the bag. A wardship petition alleged misdemeanor grand theft from the person (Pen. Code, 487(c)). Edward admitted the allegation. Edward was adjudged a ward of the court, placed on probation, and ordered to complete a six-month residential program at a youth rehabilitation facility, followed by a 90-day conditional release/parole period. The juvenile court probation conditions, including: “The minor shall not knowingly associate with anyone known to the minor to be a gang member or associated with a gang, or anyone who the [probation officer] informs the minor to be, a gang member or associated with a gang” and “[T]he minor is not to be on a school campus unless he’s enrolled.” The court of appeal struck the gang condition, upheld the campus condition, and remanded for specification of the maximum term of confinement and calculation of credit for time served. Without evidence of gang affiliation or association with gang members or risk of gang involvement on Edward’s part, the gang condition was not tailored to his future criminality, but the campus condition was not impermissibly vague. View "In re Edward B." on Justia Law