Justia Juvenile Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioner was convicted of second-degree murder and sentenced to 15 years to life in prison. The offense was committed in 1979, when petitioner was 17 years old. In 1982, at age 20, he pled guilty to assault with a deadly weapon on a peace officer and possession of a deadly weapon by a prisoner and was sentenced to four years, to be served consecutively to his life sentence. In 2015, after serving 35 years in prison, petitioner was found suitable for parole as a youthful offender under Penal Code 3051, effective in November 2015. Petitioner claimed that his release date was recalculated as November 2, 2017, based on a correction in his credit earning status. In June 2016, petitioner filed a habeas corpus petition challenging the legality of his continuing incarceration. The trial court denied relief, concluding that section 3051 does not exempt a youthful offender granted parole from serving a consecutive sentence for an offense committed in prison, citing section 1170.1(c), which provides that a consecutive sentence for an in-prison offense “shall commence from the time the person would otherwise have been released.” The court of appeal granted relief; section 1170.1(c), does not apply to petitioner’s case because his in-prison offense was committed before he was 23 years old, so he was entitled to release at the end of his indeterminate sentence pursuant to section 3051(d). View "In re Trejo" on Justia Law

Garcia died in August 2011 after receiving multiple stab wounds. Mendoza, Martell, and Ramirez were convicted following a joint trial, for second degree murder (Pen. Code 187, 189) with gang enhancements (section 186.22(b)) for killing Garcia. On rehearing, the court of appeal affirmed, rejecting arguments that the trial court erred by: excluding statements of a co-perpetrator; allowing the prosecutor to commit misconduct during the opening statement; admitting unduly prejudicial evidence of gang-related intimidation; failing to properly instruct the jury regarding voluntary intoxication, the required mental state for guilt as an aider and abettor, and the evidence necessary to prove the gang enhancement; allowing the prosecution to commit misconduct during its examination of a prosecution witness; admitting unduly prejudicial out-of-court statements; admitting unduly prejudicial evidence of prior convictions to prove a pattern of criminal gang activity; and allowing the gang expert to show unduly prejudicial slides in the slideshow that accompanied his expert testimony. The court also rejected a claim of ineffective assistance and a claim that Proposition 57, the Public Safety and Rehabilitation Act of 2016, should be applied retroactively to Ramirez because he was 16 years old at the time of the offense and his judgment was not final when voters approved Proposition 57. View "People v. Mendoza" on Justia Law

A.T. is enrolled in high school. Her attendance is regular; she earns passing grades. She was riding with another minor in a car driven by her brother, also a minor with no delinquent history. Police stopped the car because its registration had expired. No one inside the vehicle possessed a valid driver’s license. Police arrested her brother for driving without a license. During an inventory search, officers found a handgun inside a backpack, in the trunk. A.T. waived her Miranda rights, and told police that her brother had found the gun that morning; they had agreed to put it in her backpack inside the car trunk to show to their father. The father of her brother’s girlfriend subsequently reported the gun was stolen from him. The juvenile court denied A.T.’s request to be released to her mother’s custody pending the disposition of charges. A.T. alleges the court improperly considered her refusal to accept a “package-deal” plea bargain and the suitability of the Vallejo neighborhood where her mother lives in an apartment, in deciding to detain her. The girl was released, upon pleading guilty to a misdemeanor, after serving 16 days in custody. A.T. moved to withdraw her plea. The court of appeal directed the lower court to decide that motion, considering that “[t]he Legislature has indicated that children should be released except under certain specific conditions of ‘immediate and urgent necessity’” and that the record reveals no such necessity. View "A.T. v. Superior Court" on Justia Law