Justia Juvenile Law Opinion Summaries

Vilches, the father and guardian of Doe (age 7), took her to Leao for treatment. Vilches later sued Leao to compel the release of Doe’s therapy records. Under Health and Safety Code 123110, the personal representative of a minor is entitled to access the minor’s patient records unless “[t]he health care provider determines that access to the patient records ... would have a detrimental effect on the provider’s professional relationship with the minor patient or the minor's physical safety or psychological well-being. The decision of the health care provider ... shall not attach any liability to the provider unless the decision is found to be in bad faith. Leao indicated she had determined that it would have a detrimental impact on Doe’s ability to trust in general, and would negatively impact the patient-counselor relationship. She was also concerned that Vilches would use the records to coach his daughter's responses in a court evaluation in an upcoming custody proceeding.The court of appeal affirmed summary judgment in favor of Leao, rejecting an argument that the absence of bad faith does not immunize a therapist’s determination from judicial review and that section 123110 creates a presumption of entitlement to disclosure. The statute does not require separate determinations for each type of patient record. When the provider makes the detriment determination, a plaintiff must show bad faith to compel disclosure. View "Vilches v. Leao" on Justia Law

Mother has seven children by several different fathers: the child at issue in this case—Jayden M. (born 2021). On November 19, 2021, the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (the Department) filed a petition asking the juvenile court to exert jurisdiction over Jayden on two grounds. On May 2, 2022, the juvenile court held the dispositional hearing. The court removed Jayden from Mother’s custody and also bypassed reunification services under subdivisions (b)(10) and (b)(11) of section 361.5. More specifically, the court found by clear and convincing evidence that bypass was proper under these provisions because (1) Mother’s reunification services or parental rights for Jayden’s older half-siblings had been terminated, and (2) Mother’s most recent four months of effort to address her drug addiction—did not eliminate the court’s “concerns” in light of her 20-year history of drug abuse problems and prior dependency cases. On appeal, Mother’s chief argument on appeal is that the juvenile court’s order bypassing reunification services was not supported by the record.   The Second Appellate District affirmed the juvenile court’s order. The court held that the juvenile court’s finding is further supported by evidence that Mother has repeatedly relapsed after treatment and/or periods of sobriety in the past. This finding is consistent with the conventional wisdom and practical reality that short and recent periods of sobriety are often not enough to counter a longstanding pattern of use and relapse. Thus, substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding that the effort underlying Mother’s brief period of sobriety after decades of drug abuse is not “reasonable.” View "In re Jayden M." on Justia Law

S.B. (father) appealed from the juvenile court’s order terminating his parental rights over his daughter H.B. pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code1 section 366.26. Father contends only that the juvenile court erred in finding the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA) inapplicable based on the record of inquiry made by the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (Department) with H.B.’s extended family members.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court explained that the Department inquired about Indian ancestry with representatives from both sides of two generational levels of H.B.’s family. It contacted every person its interviewees identified as a likely source of information about ancestry. The juvenile court had an adequate basis on which to conclude the Department fulfilled its inquiry obligations under section 224.2, subdivision (b), and that neither the Department nor the court had reason to know or believe that H.B. is an Indian child. Under the court’s deferential standard of review, the juvenile court did not need the Department to contact every unnamed extended family member that had attended a court hearing, regardless of difficulty in doing so, to reach its conclusion. View "In re H.B." on Justia Law

Under the California Fostering Connections to Success Act, certain dependents and wards of the juvenile court may remain under the court’s "continuing jurisdiction" and receive financial assistance as “nonminor dependents” until they turn 21 years old (Welf. & Inst. Code 303(b); 11403) under the “AB12” program.Jonathan, born in 2003, has been diagnosed with autism spectrum disorder and other mental health and developmental conditions; he suffered a chaotic childhood characterized by neglect, abuse, and homelessness. In recommending termination of his transitional jurisdiction, Probation wrote, Jonathan wants the benefits of utilizing the program, “but his actions and behavior indicate[] he is not willing to uphold his obligations set forth in the mutual agreement or case plan.” Jonathan continued to not provide documentation of his employment or his enrollment in a training program; he deflected questions about his living situation. At two continued hearings, Jonathan was not present. The probation officer reported having texted and emailed Jonathan that week without a response and that Jonathan also missed an appointment with a transitional housing provider. The juvenile court terminated AB12 services, stating “[T]he law requires him to meet certain requirements, and he hasn’t been meeting those requirements, and he’s had multiple opportunities.”The court of appeal reversed. The juvenile court erred in terminating transition jurisdiction without considering Jonathan’s best interests. View "In re Jonathan C.M." on Justia Law

After mother was released from a section 5150 hold, the Agency and mother agreed to a safety plan whereby 11-month-old S.F. would remain in maternal grandmother’s care. Mother violated the safety plan. Father was then residing in New York but was providing monetary assistance to mother and minor. Mother and her boyfriend alleged she received threatening text messages from father. The Agency detained S.F. and filed a petition alleging failure to protect under Welfare and Institutions Code 300(b)(1), alleging that “father has anger management issues and “reported that he used to abuse crack cocaine and alcohol but that he is about 2 years sober.” Father desired to take custody and was willing to move to California. He alleged that he and his sister had been “physically present” and helped care for minor until minor was three months old.The juvenile court adjudicated S.F. a dependent of the court. The court of appeal reversed in part. The jurisdictional findings, the dispositional order removing S.F. from father’s custody, and the orders requiring father to engage in substance abuse testing and treatment are not supported by substantial evidence. The juvenile court adequately complied with the Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. 1901. The Agency had a reason to believe, but did not have sufficient information to determine there was a reason to know, S.F. was an Indian child. View "In re S.F." on Justia Law

Newborn A.H. was placed in a foster home. The Agency reported that it had denied a request for placement by J.B., a “nonrelative extended family member” (NREFM, Welf. & Inst. Code 362.7). J.B. filed a “Relative Information,” requesting that A.H. live with her. The Agency objected on the ground that J.B. was not a relative for purposes of the proceedings. The juvenile court agreed, stating that it independently considered placement with several relatives or with J.B. and denied placement with those individuals “for the reasons stated in the Social Worker’s Report.” J.B. filed a section 388 “Request to Change Court Order.” The juvenile court summarily denied J.B.’s petition, finding that the request did not state new evidence or a change of circumstances, and did not promote A.H.’s best interest. J.B. filed a notice of appeal. The Agency reported that in the dependency case of A.H.’s half-sibling, J.B. “created a division” between the Agency and the parents, falsely accusing the caregiver of neglect. The juvenile court terminated parental rights, selecting adoption as the permanent plan.The court of appeal dismissed J.B.’s appeal from the denial of her petition, the refusal to consider her relative information form, and the placement order. Although J.B. may have an “interest” in A.H. that is sufficient for filing a section 388 petition, she does not have a legally cognizable interest in A.H.’s placement such that she has standing to challenge the juvenile court’s placement decision. View "In re A.H." on Justia Law

The County of San Diego filed a test claim with the Commission on State Mandates seeking reimbursement from the State for costs the County incurred to prepare for, and attend, criminal proceedings known as "Franklin" proceedings. The Commission denied the County’s test claim, finding the costs at issue were not reimbursable because the laws on which the County based its test claim—Penal Code sections 3041, 3046, 3051, and 4801, as added and amended by Statutes 2013, chapter 312, Statutes 2015, chapter 471, and Statutes 2017, chapter 684—did not expressly require counties to participate in Franklin proceedings. Alternatively, the Commission found the County was not entitled to reimbursement because the Test Claim Statutes fell within an exception to the mandatory reimbursement requirement, which applied when a law changes the penalty for a crime. The County sought judicial review, but the trial court denied relief for the same reasons articulated by the Commission in its decision denying the test claim. Like the Commission and the trial court, the Court of Appeal concluded the County was not entitled to mandatory reimbursement from the State because the Test Claim Statutes changed the penalties for crimes. "In our view, these laws change the penalties for crimes because they make the vast majority of youth offenders in the State eligible to receive a youth offender parole hearing and, as a result, many youth offenders are released from prison years or even decades earlier than they would have been if they had served out their original sentences." Given this determination, the Court determined it was unnecessary to decide whether the Test Claim Statutes imposed a mandate on counties to carry out a new program or a higher level of service. View "County of San Diego v. Com. on State Mandates" on Justia Law

The Agency filed a Welfare and Institutions Code section 300 petition on behalf of eight children, alleging sexual abuse. Mother initially indicated that her deceased mother “had some Native ancestry.” Father reported “no Native American ancestry.” Days later, Mother reported that “she is not Native American and she paid for genetic testing.” At the detention hearing, Mother’s counsel represented that Mother has no Indian ancestry that she knows. The juvenile court responded: "Maybe there was a misunderstanding. I’ll make a finding that the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA, 25 U.S.C. 1901) does not apply.” Mother's ICWA-020 form indicated “no Indian ancestry as far as I know.” Father's form indicated “None.” The maternal aunt and the paternal grandfather both reported no documented information about Native American ancestry.After the contested hearing, the juvenile court declared dependency. A maternal cousin, the grandfather, and an aunt attended. The court again asked about Native American ancestry. The parents responded no. The court's finding that ICWA did not apply was included in the order.The parents did not challenge the jurisdictional findings or the dispositional orders but alleged that the Agency failed to satisfy its initial duty of inquiry into the children’s possible Native American heritage. The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting their contention that the Agency was required to interview five additional extended family members, acknowledging that the Agency and the juvenile court have an “affirmative and continuing” duty of inquiry. View "In re E.W." on Justia Law

M.C. (mother) appealed the termination of parental rights to two of her children (the children) under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. She contends that the juvenile court failed to determine whether it had jurisdiction over the children under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (the UCCJEA). The Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (the Department) responded that by failing to raise the issue, mother forfeited her right to raise it on appeal; alternatively, the Department argued that substantial evidence supports the court’s assertion of jurisdiction in this case. Mother also contended the juvenile court and the Department failed to comply with the inquiry requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA) and related California statutes.   The Second Appellate District concluded the forfeiture doctrine does not bar mother’s challenge to the juvenile court’s compliance with the UCCJEA, and the error requires conditional reversal of the parental rights termination orders with directions to the court to undertake the process that the UCCJEA requires. This disposition will permit mother to raise the unopposed ICWA arguments she makes on appeal. The court explained that here, the usual benefit from the application of the forfeiture doctrine—to encourage parties to bring issues to the trial court—would not be conferred under the facts of this case. Thus, although the Department or mother could have done more to urge the juvenile court to undertake the UCCJEA process, the objective facts supporting the need for such a process were readily apparent from the record. View "In re L.C." on Justia Law

The Department of Children and Family Services detained infant boy S.S. at birth, based on exigency, alleging his parents abused drugs and S.S. was born testing positive for various drugs. The juvenile court detained S.S. from his parents and placed him with his maternal aunt and uncle. The mother and father both denied Indian ancestry. The maternal aunt, however, said that the mother might have Yaqui heritage. The Department, in turn, notified the Pascua Yaqui tribe, which replied S.S. was not eligible for membership: the tribe would not intervene. The Department never asked paternal extended family members about the possibility of Indian ancestry. The court terminated parental rights in favor of a permanent plan of adoption by the maternal aunt and uncle, who were the caretakers and prospective adoptive parents. The mother appealed. At issue is the federal Indian Child Welfare Act, sections 1901 and following title 25 of the United States Code (the Act, or ICWA) and its California counterpart.   The Second Appellate District conditionally reversed the juvenile court’s finding that ICWA does not apply and remanded the matter to the juvenile court with directions to order the Department to inquire of the three paternal extended family members previously identified whether S.S. may be an Indian child. The court explained that the Department’s failure prejudices tribes. The Department had contact information for three extended paternal family members but did nothing with it, thus denying tribes the benefit of the statutory promise. It would be a miscarriage of justice to deny tribes the benefit of this legislation. View "In re S.S." on Justia Law