Justia Juvenile Law Opinion Summaries

A.H., a minor, was adjudged a ward of the juvenile court after admitting to grand theft and violating probation conditions, including disobeying his mother, leaving home without approval, and violating curfew. After further violations—failing to attend mentorship meetings and testing positive for THC—the probation department recommended out-of-home placement in a short-term residential therapeutic program (STRTP), citing A.H.’s mental health conditions and his mother’s unwillingness to house him due to safety concerns. The probation department did not submit a statutorily required case plan before the disposition hearing, although it later provided one after the court’s order.The Superior Court of Contra Costa County held several hearings, ultimately ordering A.H.’s placement in an STRTP without first reviewing a case plan as required by Welfare and Institutions Code sections 706.5 and 706.6, and relevant California Rules of Court. A.H.’s counsel objected to the lack of a case plan, but the court proceeded with the placement order and deferred consideration of certain recommendations pending receipt of the case plan. The case plan was provided at a subsequent hearing, but the court did not indicate it had reviewed it before proceeding.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case. While the appeal became moot when the juvenile court vacated the placement order, the appellate court exercised its discretion to address the issue due to its public importance and likelihood of recurrence. The court held that the statutory scheme requires probation to submit, and the juvenile court to consider, a case plan before ordering foster care placement. The failure to do so constituted an abuse of discretion. After deciding the merits, the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal as moot. View "In re A.H." on Justia Law

A 13-year-old juvenile pleaded guilty to fourth degree assault and was placed under community supervision with several conditions, including abstaining from alcohol. Over several months, she repeatedly violated these conditions, including using alcohol, failing to report to her probation officer, and leaving her home. The State sought multiple bench warrants, ultimately arguing that her actions, including a suicide attempt while intoxicated, posed a serious threat to public safety. The juvenile court issued a bench warrant, finding that her conduct met the “serious threat to public safety” standard required by a court rule, JuCR 7.16.On appeal, the Washington Court of Appeals determined that the facts did not meet JuCR 7.16’s “serious threat to public safety” requirement, as the connection between her actions and a threat to public safety was too attenuated. However, the appellate court also held that JuCR 7.16 irreconcilably conflicted with RCW 13.40.040, a statute with less restrictive prerequisites for issuing juvenile arrest warrants. The majority concluded that JuCR 7.16 was substantive, not procedural, and therefore invalid because it conflicted with the legislature’s authority over substantive law. A dissenting judge disagreed, viewing the rule as procedural.The Supreme Court of the State of Washington reversed the Court of Appeals. It held that JuCR 7.16 is a procedural rule governing the issuance of warrants and falls within the court’s inherent, constitutional, and statutory authority. The court further held that JuCR 7.16 and RCW 13.40.040 can be harmonized, requiring courts to satisfy both sets of prerequisites before issuing a warrant. The court also clarified that “serious threat to public safety” under JuCR 7.16 does not include threats solely to the juvenile’s own safety. The Supreme Court declined to recuse itself from the case. View "State v. A.M.W." on Justia Law

A child was born in Connecticut in July 2024 to parents who both resided in Connecticut at the time of the birth. The mother, who had previously lived in Massachusetts and had a long history with the Massachusetts Department of Children and Families (DCF), moved to Connecticut several months before the birth, enrolling in a Connecticut healthcare program and living in a domestic violence shelter there. The father had also been living in Connecticut. The Massachusetts DCF, concerned about the child’s welfare due to the mother’s history and a recent domestic violence incident involving the father, arranged to take emergency custody of the child at the Connecticut hospital immediately after birth.Two days after the child’s birth, the Massachusetts DCF filed a care and protection petition in the Hampden County Division of the Juvenile Court Department, seeking temporary custody. The Juvenile Court granted temporary custody to the department without determining the basis for jurisdiction. Later, after hearings, a Juvenile Court judge found that Massachusetts had default jurisdiction under the Massachusetts Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (MCCJA), and subsequently, after joint conferences with a Connecticut judge, concluded that Massachusetts was the appropriate forum because Connecticut had declined jurisdiction. The parents and the child sought interlocutory appeal, and the Appeals Court allowed it. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts then transferred the case on its own initiative.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that the Juvenile Court lacked jurisdiction under the MCCJA because Connecticut was the child’s “home state,” as the child lived there from birth with the parents. The Court found that Massachusetts did not have default, emergency, or appropriate forum jurisdiction, as Connecticut had not declined jurisdiction before the Massachusetts court issued custody orders. The Supreme Judicial Court remanded the case for dismissal due to lack of jurisdiction. View "Care and Protection of Faraj" on Justia Law

A mother appealed the dismissal of a neglect case brought against her by the State of Wyoming. The case involved her two children, AB and JC. The mother was arrested for drug-related charges, and the children were placed in protective custody. JC was released to his father, who had primary custody, while AB was released to his paternal grandfather and later to his father, who lived in Texas. The State filed a neglect petition, and the juvenile court held hearings, during which the mother denied the allegations. The court initially placed AB with his paternal grandfather and later with his father.The juvenile court found the children had been neglected and ordered continued placement with their fathers while the mother completed a case plan. The State moved to dismiss the neglect petition after the mother made progress on her case plan and AB's father sought custody. The juvenile court initially dismissed the petition but vacated the dismissal after the mother objected. The court later set a permanency review hearing and maintained the status quo, allowing the mother to continue working on her case plan.The State again moved to dismiss the case, noting the mother’s progress and the existence of custody agreements for both children. The juvenile court dismissed the neglect petition, and the mother appealed. The Wyoming Supreme Court found the appeal moot because the State had dismissed the neglect action, and the mother had physical custody of AB. The court concluded that any judgment would have no practical effect on the existing controversy and dismissed the appeal. The court also determined that none of the exceptions to the mootness doctrine applied in this case. View "In the Interest Of: AB and JC" on Justia Law

C.C. is the mother of B.F. and I.F. In November 2021, she left the children with their paternal uncle, who provided a stable home. In November 2022, the children came under the protective custody of the Cass County Human Service Zone (CHSZ) due to concerns of parental abandonment. The whereabouts of A.F., the father, were unknown. In March 2023, the juvenile court adjudicated the children as needing protection and placed them in CHSZ custody for nine months, finding aggravating factors and adopting a reunification plan. In December 2023, CHSZ filed a petition to terminate C.C.'s parental rights but later amended it to extend CHSZ custody for nine months due to C.C.'s progress. In February 2024, the court granted CHSZ custody for an additional nine months with concurrent plans of reunification and termination.In October 2024, CHSZ petitioned to terminate C.C. and A.F.'s parental rights, citing C.C.'s failure to maintain progress on the reunification plan. C.C. attended the initial hearing and a status conference in December 2024 but failed to attend the February 2025 status conference. The court found C.C. and A.F. in default and terminated their parental rights, noting C.C.'s continued drug use, failure to secure stable housing and employment, and lack of consistent participation in visitations and services.The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the juvenile court's order. The court held that the juvenile court did not err in finding C.C. in default and that the evidence supported the termination of parental rights. The court also found no abuse of discretion in denying C.C.'s motion to vacate the default judgment and concluded that the termination did not violate C.C.'s constitutional due process rights. View "Interest of B.F." on Justia Law

In this dependency and neglect proceeding, the juvenile court found that K.L.W. ("Father") waived his statutory right to a jury trial by failing to appear for the trial in 2021. The court then incorrectly adjudicated Father's five children as dependent or neglected by default. In 2023, the juvenile court vacated the default judgment and scheduled a new adjudicatory trial, again finding that Father had waived his right to a jury trial by failing to appear in 2021. Father did not demand a jury trial during the twenty days before the bench trial and acknowledged the bench trial in a pretrial pleading. On the morning of the 2023 trial, Father objected to the waiver finding, but the court proceeded with the bench trial and adjudicated the children dependent or neglected.The Colorado Court of Appeals reversed the juvenile court's adjudicatory judgment, concluding that Father's 2021 waiver of a jury trial did not extend to the 2023 proceeding. The appellate court held that the 2023 trial was a new trial, and since Father appeared, he did not waive his right to a jury trial for the 2023 proceeding.The Supreme Court of Colorado reversed the appellate court's decision. The court held that even if the 2021 waiver was not binding for the 2023 trial, Father failed to demand a jury trial as required by statute and rule. The court found that Father's objection on the morning of the 2023 trial was not a valid or timely demand for a jury trial. The court emphasized that granting Father's objection would have delayed the proceedings, contrary to the children's best interests and the orderly administration of justice. Therefore, the juvenile court correctly conducted a bench trial, and the appellate court erred in reversing the adjudicatory judgment. View "People ex rel. Kay. W. v. K.L.W." on Justia Law

In January 2024, seventeen-year-old B.H. was held at Logansport Juvenile Correctional Facility. After being informed of a minor sanction, B.H. allegedly threatened and struck an officer, causing a lacerated nose. B.H. later explained he was upset due to news about his parents. Three months later, after B.H. turned eighteen, the State sought approval to file a juvenile delinquency petition for battery on a public safety officer. The trial court denied the request, citing "LACK OF JURISDICTION." The State filed a motion to correct error, arguing the court had jurisdiction since B.H. was under twenty-one and the act occurred before he turned eighteen. The court denied the motion, stating the case was filed after B.H. turned eighteen.The State then petitioned for an interlocutory appeal, which the trial court granted. The Indiana Court of Appeals accepted jurisdiction and reversed the trial court's decision, treating the order as a final judgment. The State missed the thirty-day deadline for filing its notice of appeal, but the Court of Appeals did not dismiss the appeal. B.H. petitioned for transfer to the Indiana Supreme Court, which was granted, vacating the Court of Appeals' opinion.The Indiana Supreme Court reviewed the case de novo. The court found that the trial court had subject-matter jurisdiction but focused on whether the State had the authority to appeal the order and whether the appeal was timely. The court concluded that the State forfeited its right to appeal by filing an untimely notice of appeal and failed to present extraordinarily compelling reasons to reinstate that right. Consequently, the Indiana Supreme Court dismissed the appeal. View "State of Indiana v. BH" on Justia Law

G.W. was taken into custody in the District of Columbia on a delinquency matter. Although released in that matter, the trial court ordered his detention under the Interstate Compact for Juveniles (ICJ) to be picked up by Virginia authorities on a different juvenile matter. When Virginia authorities did not take custody, the trial court dismissed the ICJ matter, but the District of Columbia Department of Youth Rehabilitation Services (DYRS) continued to detain G.W., interpreting the ICJ to require detention until all of G.W.'s juvenile matters in the District were resolved or until Virginia took custody or consented to his release.G.W. filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, arguing that DYRS had no authority under the ICJ to detain him once Virginia failed to take custody. DYRS opposed the petition, citing ICJ rules and an advisory opinion by the Interstate Commission for Juveniles. The Superior Court of the District of Columbia denied the petition, relying on the advisory opinion that interpreted the ICJ rules to require detention until charges in the holding state were resolved or there was consent from the demanding state.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case. Since the trial court's ruling, the Commission withdrew the advisory opinion, and both the Commission and the District of Columbia conceded that the ICJ rules did not require G.W.'s detention. The Court of Appeals agreed, holding that ICJ Rule 7-103 did not address detention and that ICJ Rule 6-102.2 required detention only until the demanding state returned the juvenile or the time period for doing so expired. Consequently, the Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the Superior Court. View "In re G.W." on Justia Law

A child, B.C.B., was born in a car where his parents were living. After being transported to a hospital, both B.C.B. and his mother tested positive for methamphetamine. The El Paso County Department of Human Services conducted a safety assessment and took temporary custody of B.C.B. due to the positive drug test. The Department filed a petition alleging that B.C.B. was dependent or neglected under Colorado law.The El Paso County District Court held an adjudicatory trial, where evidence was presented that B.C.B. had difficulty latching to breastfeed and exhibited symptoms potentially related to methamphetamine exposure. Three pediatricians testified about the potential long-term risks of methamphetamine exposure, although they could not definitively link the symptoms to the drug exposure. The jury found that B.C.B. was born affected by substance exposure and that his health or welfare was threatened by substance use. The trial court adjudicated B.C.B. as dependent or neglected and ordered continued custody with the Department.The Colorado Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's adjudication, concluding that the Department had not provided sufficient evidence to show that B.C.B. was adversely affected by substance exposure at birth. The majority held that a positive drug test alone was insufficient to establish dependency or neglect under the amended statute.The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed the case and concluded that a positive drug test at birth satisfies the first prong of the statute, indicating that the child was affected by substance exposure. The Court also found that the Department provided sufficient evidence to show that B.C.B.'s health or welfare was threatened by substance use, either directly or due to the mother's inability to care for the child properly. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision and upheld the jury's finding that B.C.B. was dependent or neglected. View "People ex rel. B.C.B. v. A.B." on Justia Law

Two children in the custody of the Department of Children and Families (DCF) appealed the dismissal of guardianship petitions filed by their great-aunt and great-uncle, who reside in Pennsylvania. The Juvenile Court dismissed the petitions, citing the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children (ICPC), as Pennsylvania had denied the placement due to the great-uncle's felony convictions from the 1990s. The children argued that the ICPC does not apply to out-of-state relatives seeking guardianship, while DCF contended that the appeal should be dismissed because the great-aunt and great-uncle, who are indispensable parties, did not appeal the dismissal.The Juvenile Court granted DCF's motion to dismiss the guardianship petitions, concluding that allowing the guardianship would violate the ICPC. The court noted that Pennsylvania's denial was based on the great-uncle's ineligibility to work or volunteer with children due to his felony convictions. The children filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied. They then filed timely notices of appeal, but the great-aunt and great-uncle did not.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the case and concluded that the absence of the great-aunt and great-uncle, who are indispensable parties, compelled the dismissal of the appeal. The court emphasized that it could not proceed without the relatives, whose rights would be affected by the decision. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed. View "Guardianship of Wilson" on Justia Law