Justia Juvenile Law Opinion Summaries

A juvenile born in 2007 was adjudicated at age 14 for habitual truancy and placed on indefinite probation. Over the next several years, he was adjudicated in four separate delinquency cases—primarily theft and assault-related—and placed on indefinite probation in each case. While still on probation in all five cases, the State filed a felony criminal complaint against him for attempted robbery. In response, the State moved in all juvenile cases for a finding that he was not amenable to rehabilitative services under the Nebraska Juvenile Code, requesting that the court terminate jurisdiction “unsuccessfully.”The Separate Juvenile Court of Sarpy County held a consolidated hearing, receiving evidence regarding the juvenile’s history, participation in probation and services, and recent criminal charges. The court found him nonamenable to rehabilitative services and ordered termination of both probation and the court’s jurisdiction, specifying that the record would not be sealed. The juvenile appealed these orders. The Nebraska Court of Appeals consolidated the appeals, and the Nebraska Supreme Court moved them to its docket to address statutory interpretation and procedural issues regarding Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-2,106.03.The Nebraska Supreme Court held that a finding of nonamenability under § 43-2,106.03 must be established by a preponderance of the evidence, with the State bearing the burden when it moves for such a finding. The Court affirmed the juvenile court’s determination of nonamenability, finding no abuse of discretion. However, it held there is no statutory authority for a juvenile court to terminate probation or jurisdiction based solely on a finding of nonamenability under § 43-2,106.03. The Supreme Court affirmed the nonamenability finding, but vacated the orders terminating probation and jurisdiction, remanding the cases for further proceedings. View "In re Interest of Johnny H." on Justia Law

The Clark County Department of Family Services filed a petition under Nevada law seeking protection for three minor children, alleging they were in need of protection from their father and stepmother. The allegations against the stepmother were withdrawn prior to trial. The juvenile court in Clark County conducted a full evidentiary hearing regarding the father and ultimately found that the allegations were not proven by a preponderance of the evidence, resulting in dismissal of the petition against him.Following this dismissal, both the Department and the minor children appealed the juvenile court’s order to the Supreme Court of Nevada. However, concerns arose regarding the appealability of such an order, as prior precedent—specifically In re A.B., 128 Nev. 764—held that orders from juvenile proceedings concerning child custody were not substantively appealable under Nevada Rule of Appellate Procedure (NRAP) 3A. The Supreme Court temporarily halted the appeal and directed appellants to show cause why jurisdiction existed.Upon review, the Supreme Court of Nevada found that the jurisdictional analysis in In re A.B. was flawed. The court determined that an order completely dismissing and thus finally resolving a petition for child protection under NRS Chapter 432B meets the definition of a final judgment under NRAP 3A(b)(1), because it disposes of all issues in the case. The court overruled In re A.B. to the extent that it held such orders were unappealable, clarifying that NRAP 3A(b)(1) allows an appeal from a final judgment entered by a district court—even when it arises from juvenile proceedings involving child custody. Therefore, the Supreme Court of Nevada held that the order dismissing the petition is appealable and allowed the appeal to proceed. View "IN RE: N.D." on Justia Law

After the birth of G.W., he resided with his mother at her parents’ home, and the father was frequently present. DCYF investigated an earlier incident involving the child rolling off a couch and closed it as unfounded. When the child was approximately five weeks old, he was seen by his pediatrician after his parents reported bleeding in his mouth, but no cause was identified. Later that day, following an argument, the mother witnessed the father throw the child onto a bed but left him in the father’s care overnight. The next day, the mother noticed the child’s left arm was immobile; she delayed seeking medical care despite advice from a pediatric nurse, only taking the child to the emergency room after further prompting. Medical examination revealed a broken left humerus, healed oral injuries, and a minor eye hemorrhage, with no medical explanation other than trauma.The New Hampshire Division for Children, Youth and Families (DCYF) filed petitions alleging abuse and neglect against both parents. At the 9th Circuit Court-Goffstown Family Division, a hearing was held on these petitions. The mother moved to suppress her statements to child protective service workers, arguing statutory violations during the investigation. The trial court denied the motion and, after hearing testimony from both parents, medical experts, and other witnesses, found by a preponderance of the evidence that the mother had both abused and neglected the child.On appeal, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed whether there was sufficient evidence for both findings and whether the statutory violations by DCYF required exclusion of certain evidence. The court held that there was insufficient evidence to support a finding that the mother committed an abusive act under circumstances indicating harm or threatened harm to the child’s life, health, or welfare, and reversed the abuse finding. However, it found sufficient evidence of neglect and determined that any statutory violations by DCYF were harmless error. The Supreme Court of New Hampshire thus affirmed the neglect finding and reversed the abuse finding. View "In re G.W." on Justia Law

A.H., a minor, was adjudged a ward of the juvenile court after admitting to grand theft and violating probation conditions, including disobeying his mother, leaving home without approval, and violating curfew. After further violations—failing to attend mentorship meetings and testing positive for THC—the probation department recommended out-of-home placement in a short-term residential therapeutic program (STRTP), citing A.H.’s mental health conditions and his mother’s unwillingness to house him due to safety concerns. The probation department did not submit a statutorily required case plan before the disposition hearing, although it later provided one after the court’s order.The Superior Court of Contra Costa County held several hearings, ultimately ordering A.H.’s placement in an STRTP without first reviewing a case plan as required by Welfare and Institutions Code sections 706.5 and 706.6, and relevant California Rules of Court. A.H.’s counsel objected to the lack of a case plan, but the court proceeded with the placement order and deferred consideration of certain recommendations pending receipt of the case plan. The case plan was provided at a subsequent hearing, but the court did not indicate it had reviewed it before proceeding.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case. While the appeal became moot when the juvenile court vacated the placement order, the appellate court exercised its discretion to address the issue due to its public importance and likelihood of recurrence. The court held that the statutory scheme requires probation to submit, and the juvenile court to consider, a case plan before ordering foster care placement. The failure to do so constituted an abuse of discretion. After deciding the merits, the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal as moot. View "In re A.H." on Justia Law

A 13-year-old juvenile pleaded guilty to fourth degree assault and was placed under community supervision with several conditions, including abstaining from alcohol. Over several months, she repeatedly violated these conditions, including using alcohol, failing to report to her probation officer, and leaving her home. The State sought multiple bench warrants, ultimately arguing that her actions, including a suicide attempt while intoxicated, posed a serious threat to public safety. The juvenile court issued a bench warrant, finding that her conduct met the “serious threat to public safety” standard required by a court rule, JuCR 7.16.On appeal, the Washington Court of Appeals determined that the facts did not meet JuCR 7.16’s “serious threat to public safety” requirement, as the connection between her actions and a threat to public safety was too attenuated. However, the appellate court also held that JuCR 7.16 irreconcilably conflicted with RCW 13.40.040, a statute with less restrictive prerequisites for issuing juvenile arrest warrants. The majority concluded that JuCR 7.16 was substantive, not procedural, and therefore invalid because it conflicted with the legislature’s authority over substantive law. A dissenting judge disagreed, viewing the rule as procedural.The Supreme Court of the State of Washington reversed the Court of Appeals. It held that JuCR 7.16 is a procedural rule governing the issuance of warrants and falls within the court’s inherent, constitutional, and statutory authority. The court further held that JuCR 7.16 and RCW 13.40.040 can be harmonized, requiring courts to satisfy both sets of prerequisites before issuing a warrant. The court also clarified that “serious threat to public safety” under JuCR 7.16 does not include threats solely to the juvenile’s own safety. The Supreme Court declined to recuse itself from the case. View "State v. A.M.W." on Justia Law

A child was born in Connecticut in July 2024 to parents who both resided in Connecticut at the time of the birth. The mother, who had previously lived in Massachusetts and had a long history with the Massachusetts Department of Children and Families (DCF), moved to Connecticut several months before the birth, enrolling in a Connecticut healthcare program and living in a domestic violence shelter there. The father had also been living in Connecticut. The Massachusetts DCF, concerned about the child’s welfare due to the mother’s history and a recent domestic violence incident involving the father, arranged to take emergency custody of the child at the Connecticut hospital immediately after birth.Two days after the child’s birth, the Massachusetts DCF filed a care and protection petition in the Hampden County Division of the Juvenile Court Department, seeking temporary custody. The Juvenile Court granted temporary custody to the department without determining the basis for jurisdiction. Later, after hearings, a Juvenile Court judge found that Massachusetts had default jurisdiction under the Massachusetts Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (MCCJA), and subsequently, after joint conferences with a Connecticut judge, concluded that Massachusetts was the appropriate forum because Connecticut had declined jurisdiction. The parents and the child sought interlocutory appeal, and the Appeals Court allowed it. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts then transferred the case on its own initiative.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that the Juvenile Court lacked jurisdiction under the MCCJA because Connecticut was the child’s “home state,” as the child lived there from birth with the parents. The Court found that Massachusetts did not have default, emergency, or appropriate forum jurisdiction, as Connecticut had not declined jurisdiction before the Massachusetts court issued custody orders. The Supreme Judicial Court remanded the case for dismissal due to lack of jurisdiction. View "Care and Protection of Faraj" on Justia Law

A mother appealed the dismissal of a neglect case brought against her by the State of Wyoming. The case involved her two children, AB and JC. The mother was arrested for drug-related charges, and the children were placed in protective custody. JC was released to his father, who had primary custody, while AB was released to his paternal grandfather and later to his father, who lived in Texas. The State filed a neglect petition, and the juvenile court held hearings, during which the mother denied the allegations. The court initially placed AB with his paternal grandfather and later with his father.The juvenile court found the children had been neglected and ordered continued placement with their fathers while the mother completed a case plan. The State moved to dismiss the neglect petition after the mother made progress on her case plan and AB's father sought custody. The juvenile court initially dismissed the petition but vacated the dismissal after the mother objected. The court later set a permanency review hearing and maintained the status quo, allowing the mother to continue working on her case plan.The State again moved to dismiss the case, noting the mother’s progress and the existence of custody agreements for both children. The juvenile court dismissed the neglect petition, and the mother appealed. The Wyoming Supreme Court found the appeal moot because the State had dismissed the neglect action, and the mother had physical custody of AB. The court concluded that any judgment would have no practical effect on the existing controversy and dismissed the appeal. The court also determined that none of the exceptions to the mootness doctrine applied in this case. View "In the Interest Of: AB and JC" on Justia Law

C.C. is the mother of B.F. and I.F. In November 2021, she left the children with their paternal uncle, who provided a stable home. In November 2022, the children came under the protective custody of the Cass County Human Service Zone (CHSZ) due to concerns of parental abandonment. The whereabouts of A.F., the father, were unknown. In March 2023, the juvenile court adjudicated the children as needing protection and placed them in CHSZ custody for nine months, finding aggravating factors and adopting a reunification plan. In December 2023, CHSZ filed a petition to terminate C.C.'s parental rights but later amended it to extend CHSZ custody for nine months due to C.C.'s progress. In February 2024, the court granted CHSZ custody for an additional nine months with concurrent plans of reunification and termination.In October 2024, CHSZ petitioned to terminate C.C. and A.F.'s parental rights, citing C.C.'s failure to maintain progress on the reunification plan. C.C. attended the initial hearing and a status conference in December 2024 but failed to attend the February 2025 status conference. The court found C.C. and A.F. in default and terminated their parental rights, noting C.C.'s continued drug use, failure to secure stable housing and employment, and lack of consistent participation in visitations and services.The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the juvenile court's order. The court held that the juvenile court did not err in finding C.C. in default and that the evidence supported the termination of parental rights. The court also found no abuse of discretion in denying C.C.'s motion to vacate the default judgment and concluded that the termination did not violate C.C.'s constitutional due process rights. View "Interest of B.F." on Justia Law

In this dependency and neglect proceeding, the juvenile court found that K.L.W. ("Father") waived his statutory right to a jury trial by failing to appear for the trial in 2021. The court then incorrectly adjudicated Father's five children as dependent or neglected by default. In 2023, the juvenile court vacated the default judgment and scheduled a new adjudicatory trial, again finding that Father had waived his right to a jury trial by failing to appear in 2021. Father did not demand a jury trial during the twenty days before the bench trial and acknowledged the bench trial in a pretrial pleading. On the morning of the 2023 trial, Father objected to the waiver finding, but the court proceeded with the bench trial and adjudicated the children dependent or neglected.The Colorado Court of Appeals reversed the juvenile court's adjudicatory judgment, concluding that Father's 2021 waiver of a jury trial did not extend to the 2023 proceeding. The appellate court held that the 2023 trial was a new trial, and since Father appeared, he did not waive his right to a jury trial for the 2023 proceeding.The Supreme Court of Colorado reversed the appellate court's decision. The court held that even if the 2021 waiver was not binding for the 2023 trial, Father failed to demand a jury trial as required by statute and rule. The court found that Father's objection on the morning of the 2023 trial was not a valid or timely demand for a jury trial. The court emphasized that granting Father's objection would have delayed the proceedings, contrary to the children's best interests and the orderly administration of justice. Therefore, the juvenile court correctly conducted a bench trial, and the appellate court erred in reversing the adjudicatory judgment. View "People ex rel. Kay. W. v. K.L.W." on Justia Law

In January 2024, seventeen-year-old B.H. was held at Logansport Juvenile Correctional Facility. After being informed of a minor sanction, B.H. allegedly threatened and struck an officer, causing a lacerated nose. B.H. later explained he was upset due to news about his parents. Three months later, after B.H. turned eighteen, the State sought approval to file a juvenile delinquency petition for battery on a public safety officer. The trial court denied the request, citing "LACK OF JURISDICTION." The State filed a motion to correct error, arguing the court had jurisdiction since B.H. was under twenty-one and the act occurred before he turned eighteen. The court denied the motion, stating the case was filed after B.H. turned eighteen.The State then petitioned for an interlocutory appeal, which the trial court granted. The Indiana Court of Appeals accepted jurisdiction and reversed the trial court's decision, treating the order as a final judgment. The State missed the thirty-day deadline for filing its notice of appeal, but the Court of Appeals did not dismiss the appeal. B.H. petitioned for transfer to the Indiana Supreme Court, which was granted, vacating the Court of Appeals' opinion.The Indiana Supreme Court reviewed the case de novo. The court found that the trial court had subject-matter jurisdiction but focused on whether the State had the authority to appeal the order and whether the appeal was timely. The court concluded that the State forfeited its right to appeal by filing an untimely notice of appeal and failed to present extraordinarily compelling reasons to reinstate that right. Consequently, the Indiana Supreme Court dismissed the appeal. View "State of Indiana v. BH" on Justia Law